俱舍論記 9.182

9.182

「起若現在至即亦至緣」者，經部破，或說一切有部破。言經部破者，夫起是未滿足，用在於未來，現在是已生之名而非是起。若已生復起便致無窮，由是故知起非現在。起若未來，依汝所宗未來無體何成作者？作者尚無，何有起用？故不可說起在未來。破訖述正義云：故於起位即亦至緣。此顯起與至緣同時。言說一切有部破者，起若現在，起非已生，以起在未來非現在，如何成現？餘破及與述正義，並如前說。

Regarding "if origination is present ... it also approaches the conditions": the Sautrāntika refutes it, or the Sarvāstivāda refutes it. To explain it as the Sautrāntika refutation: origination is not yet fulfilled and its function is in the future; the present is the name for what has already arisen, not origination. If what has already arisen were to originate again, it would lead to infinite regress; therefore, one knows that origination is not present. If origination were future, according to your school the future lacks substance, so how could it constitute an agent? When an agent does not even exist, how could there be the action of originating? Therefore, one cannot say that origination is in the future. Having refuted this, they state the correct doctrine: "Therefore, at the stage of origination, it also approaches conditions." This shows that origination and approaching conditions are simultaneous. To explain it as the Sarvāstivāda refutation: if origination were present, origination would not be what has already arisen; since origination is in the future and not in the present, how could it become present? The rest of the refutation and the statement of the correct doctrine are both as explained above.