俱舍論記 9.186

9.186

「故說頌言至若後眠應閉」者，經部說二頌，或說一切有部說二頌。言經部說二頌者，論主為經部師說二頌言重攝前義。初兩句述經部宗，頌前故於起位亦即至緣等。次兩句結破聲論，後頌引事證俱言己。或答前難若俱便壞己，如未來法體雖非有，無間必有，向現在故，而假名起。至緣應亦然，例同於起，故言亦然。如未來法體雖非有，無間必有，向現在故，假名至緣。若言非有不得至緣，亦應非有不得正起，以起必非已生位故。非有尚得名起，亦應得說至緣，故雖無體，假說無過失。生已起無窮者，頌前起在現在失。已生復起，便致無窮。或先有非有者，頌前起在未來失。若言起在未來，有二過失：一謂未來體應先有，以未來有起故；二謂起用體應非有，以未來無體故。又解：未來先有起用，非有作者，違自宗過，以彼作用必依作者。由此道理，起非已生故不在現，未來無體故不在未來。故於將有假說起言、假說至緣，假故無過。與聲論師作不定過。俱時之法亦有言己，如至闇現在燈滅落謝，此即別世同時名俱。雖復俱時，而得說言闇至已燈滅。又解：以闇至與燈滅俱時，而言闇至已燈滅。此言滅者是滅無也，故說與闇俱時。又如開口與眠雖復同時，而言開口已眠。故至緣與起雖復同時，說己無過。聲論不救闇至已燈滅，即難開口已眠，云：如有一人先開口已然後方眠，是即先後不俱時也。為通伏難，故言：若後眠時，此口應閉而不俱時。若謂眠時口亦有閉，雖亦有人眠時閉口，今據眠時開口者說。言說一切有部說二頌者，論主為說一切有部說二頌言重攝前義。初兩句述說一切有部宗，頌前故於起位即亦至緣等。如未來非有真實作者而得名起，未來雖無真實作者亦名至緣。例同於起，故言亦然。釋後六句，隨其所應準前可知。

Regarding "Therefore, it is said in verse: … if he sleeps afterward, the mouth should be closed": the Sautrāntika states two verses, or the Sarvāstivādin states two verses. As for the statement that the Sautrāntika states two verses: the author of the treatise states the two verses for the Sautrāntika master to recapitulate the preceding points. The first two lines express the Sautrāntika tenet, versifying the preceding point that "therefore, in the state of arising, it also reaches the conditions," and so forth. The next two lines conclude the refutation of the grammarian. The latter verse adduces real instances to prove [the use of] "having [done something]" in the case of simultaneity, or it answers the preceding objection that "if simultaneous, it would contradict 'having [done something]' ". Just as a future dharma, though its substance does not exist, will definitely exist without interval because it is oriented toward the present, and is thus conventionally designated as "arising," so too should "reaching the conditions" be: it is an analogy parallel to "arising," hence it says "should also be so." Just as a future dharma, though its substance does not exist, will definitely exist without interval because it is oriented toward the present, and is conventionally designated as "reaching the conditions." If one says that non-existence cannot reach the conditions, then it should also be that non-existence cannot be in the process of arising, because arising is definitely not in the state of already having been born. Since non-existence can still be termed "arising," it should also be permissible to speak of "reaching the conditions." Therefore, though devoid of substance, metaphorical designation entails no fault. "If arising has already occurred, there would be an infinite regress": this versifies the preceding fault of arising being located in the present. If that which is already born were to arise again, it would lead to an infinite regress. "Or if existing previously, it would be non-existent": this versifies the preceding fault of arising being located in the future. If one says that arising is located in the future, there are two faults: first, the substance would have to exist previously in the future because arising exists in the future; second, the substance of the activity of arising would have to be non-existent because the future has no substance. Another explanation: if in the future the activity of arising previously exists, but the agent does not exist, this incurs the fault of contradicting one's own tenet, because that activity must depend on an agent. By this reasoning, arising is not already born, so it is not in the present; and the future has no substance, so it is not in the future. Therefore, with respect to the state about to exist, one metaphorically speaks of "arising" and metaphorically speaks of "reaching the conditions." Because it is metaphorical, there is no fault. This establishes the fault of inconclusiveness against the grammarian. Simultaneous dharmas can also be spoken of as "having [done something]": just as when darkness arrives in the present, the lamp extinguishes and falls away, which is simultaneous across different time periods. Although they are simultaneous, one can still say, "Darkness having arrived, the lamp is extinguished." Another explanation: because the arrival of darkness and the extinction of the lamp are simultaneous, one says, "Darkness having arrived, the lamp is extinguished." Here "extinction" means extinction into non-existence, hence it is said to be simultaneous with darkness. Furthermore, just as opening the mouth and sleeping, though simultaneous, are spoken of as "having opened the mouth, one sleeps." Therefore, though reaching the conditions and arising are simultaneous, to say "having [reached]" entails no fault. The grammarian, unable to rescue [his position against] "darkness having arrived, the lamp is extinguished," then objects to "having opened the mouth, one sleeps," saying: "Just as a person first opens the mouth and only afterward sleeps, this is sequential and not simultaneous." To resolve the hidden objection, [the text] therefore says: "If he sleeps afterward, this mouth should be closed and not simultaneous." If it is said that when sleeping the mouth can also be closed: although some people do close their mouths when sleeping, this is spoken with reference to those who have their mouths open when sleeping. As for the statement that the Sarvāstivādin states two verses: the author of the treatise states the two verses for the Sarvāstivādin to recapitulate the preceding points. The first two lines express the Sarvāstivādin tenet, versifying the preceding point that "therefore, in the state of arising, it also reaches the conditions," and so forth. Just as the future lacks a real agent yet can be termed "arising," so too the future, though devoid of a real agent, is termed "reaching the conditions." It is an analogy parallel to "arising," hence it says "should also be so." The explanation of the remaining six lines can be understood by analogy with the preceding, as appropriate.