俱舍論記 1

English (machine translation) 1

Language: English

Approaching the explanation of the text of the treatise, there are three sections: first, clarifying the origins of the treatise; second, explaining the title of the treatise; third, separately commenting in accordance with the text. The Abhidharmakośa-śāstra was composed by Vasubandhu (Vasu means "world" [世], Bandhu means "kin" [親]. In India there was a deity colloquially called "Vasubandhu"; worldly people were close to and made offerings to him, so he was named after him. The Bodhisattva's parents named him after the place where they prayed. The old translation rendered it as "Tian" [Heaven/Deva], which was an erroneous translation; if it meant Deva, it should have been called Dipo [Deva]). The Bodhisattva thoroughly mastered both inner and outer teachings and was broadly versed in ancient and modern lore. His fame shook the five regions of India, and his renown flowed to the four sovereigns. Thus he could conceal his name for several years to probe the source of the vast teachings, and in a single period compose this treatise, spreading a fragrant renown for myriad ages. As he secretly expounded the transmissions, the Sarvāstivādins harboured doubts; when they requested an explanation of the root verses, their longstanding blockages were finally dispelled. As for this treatise, its phrasing is like linked chains, connecting myriad threads; its meaning is like interlocking rings, endless from beginning to end. It gathers the essentials of the Ṣaḍdharmaskandha completely and without omission, and reveals the wondrous gateway of the Aṣṭaskandha as though looking into the palm of one's hand. Although it recounts the tenets of the Sarvāstivāda, it occasionally rectifies them using the Sautrāntika. The master of the treatise took truth as his standard, without partisan attachment; he thereby led the ninety-six paths together to admire these writings, and the eighteen diverse schools all to rejoice in this esoteric text. Since interpretations diverged and schools divided, each claimed their own text to be worth consecutive cities or to outshine a chariot. Only this single treatise stands towering and pre-eminent—like Mount Meru presiding over the vast ocean, like the blazing sun outshining the multitude of stars. Therefore, students in India called it the "Treatise of Intelligence". Formerly, the Tripiṭaka Dharma Master Paramārtha had already translated this treatise in Lingnan, but because the local dialect was not fully adapted, errors occasionally occurred. Matters such as the non-attainment in the present life caused shared doubts among earlier sages; and that the permanent is neither cause nor fruit was something earlier worthies could not discern. Such instances are difficult to detail fully; two or three are briefly cited to highlight the present translation. Our Upādhyāya, the Tripiṭaka Dharma Master, had the resolve to propagate it widely and vowed to journey to the Western Regions. He searched out and uncovered esoteric canons, exhausting the bequeathed words of Gṛdhrakūṭa; he cut through the undergrowth of doctrinal gates, delving fully into the surviving explanations of superior sages. Having comprehensively viewed those sacred traces and made a thorough inquiry into the Way, he turned his carriage back to the capital and, in obedience to the imperial decree, translated it.

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This treatise was translated in the Yonghui era at Da Cien Monastery. The words and meaning are complete and thorough, without defect in its subtle principles. In transmitting those Sanskrit words, great care was taken to preserve the original, hoping that those who harboured doubts might have them dissolved like melting ice, and those awaiting resolution might truly forget food and sleep. This concludes the first part, clarifying the origins of the treatise.

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As for explaining the title: "Abhidharma" sets its name in contrast with the other two pitakas. "Kośa" designates the specific title of this particular work. "Abhi" means "facing" (counter-facing), because of the confronting [faculty] and the confronted [object]. "Dharma" means teaching, because it preserves [its own nature] and generates understanding. "Kośa" means repository, because it encompasses and serves as the locus for that. "Śāstra" means treatise, instructing and admonishing students. This fascicle is at the beginning, hence it is called the first.

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"Dhātu-nirdeśa, Chapter 1": below this is the third section, commenting separately according to the text. Within this there are three points: first, clarifying the composition of the treatise based on the sūtras; second, separately explaining the chapter title; third, providing the direct interpretation based on the text.

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First, clarifying the composition of the treatise based on the sūtras: treatises composed in the Western Regions all comment on the Buddha's sūtras. Although the sūtra teachings are numerous, they are broadly of three kinds, namely the three dharmamudrās: first, anityaḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ; second, anātmānaḥ sarvadharmāḥ; third, śāntaṃ nirvāṇam. These imprint all phenomena, hence they are called dharmamudrās. If it conforms to these seals, it is a Buddhist sūtra; if it contradicts these seals, it was not spoken by the Buddha. Therefore, later treatise authors all explain the dharmamudrās. Among them, inclinations toward brevity or detail differ: some explain one dharmamudrā exclusively, while others cite one to elucidate all three. For instance, the Pañcaskandhaka-śāstra and others only explain anityaḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ, while the Nirvāṇa-śāstra and others only explain śāntaṃ nirvāṇam; these exclusively explain a single dharmamudrā. Works such as the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra explain anātmānaḥ sarvadharmāḥ; this is citing one to elucidate all three. The reason it explains according to this is that anityaḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ explains only the conditioned, śāntaṃ nirvāṇam explains only the unconditioned, while anātmānaḥ sarvadharmāḥ explains both conditioned and unconditioned alike. Wishing to demonstrate that this treatise leaves nothing unencompassed, it therefore elucidates according to the broadest.

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Second, separately explaining the chapter title: within this there are two points: first, directly explaining the chapter title; second, clarifying the sequence of the chapters. As for directly explaining the chapter title: "dhātu" means lineage/clan, preserving, and nature. "Pin" (nirdeśa/chapter) means category, so the dhātus are called a chapter; hence it is called "Dhātu-nirdeśa". Because this chapter explains them extensively, it is called "nirdeśa" (analysis/differentiation). Throughout this treatise there are nine chapters in total; this chapter is at the beginning, hence it is called "Chapter 1". Alternatively, "Chapter 1" is an explanation that incorporates a numeral. Question: This chapter also explains the skandhas and āyatanas; why is it titled after dhātu? Answer: Dhātu means nature, and nature means essence (svabhāva). This chapter explains the essence of phenomena, so it is titled after dhātu; skandhas and āyatanas are not the essence, so they are not separately mentioned. Another explanation: among the three—skandha, āyatana, and dhātu—the meaning of the name dhātu is broad, so it is mentioned alone. Although āyatana has a broad meaning, its name is narrow, so it is not used; both the name and meaning of skandha are narrow, so it is not used. Another explanation: the faculties of sentient beings are superior, middling, and inferior. Those of superior faculties take joy in brevity, and understand upon the mention of skandhas; those of middling faculties are somewhat slower, understanding only when the āyatanas are distinguished; those of inferior faculties prefer broad explanations, understanding only when the dhātus are discussed. The superior can encompass the inferior, so dhātu benefits all three faculties. The inferior cannot reach the superior: āyatana benefits two, and skandha benefits one. Benefiting broadly is superior, so it is titled after dhātu. Another explanation: this chapter extensively analyzes the meaning of the eighteen dhātus through various approaches, so it is titled after dhātu; this is not the case for skandhas and āyatanas. Second, clarifying the sequence of chapters: this single treatise has nine chapters in total, explaining "anātmānaḥ sarvadharmāḥ" from the Buddha's sūtras. The first eight chapters explain the empirical phenomena (vastu), and though they also explain the principle (tattva), they do so mostly in predominant terms, or not as their primary focus. The last chapter explains the principle of non-self, and though it also explains empirical phenomena, it does so mostly in predominant terms, or not as its primary focus. Empirical phenomena are coarse and are explained first; principle is subtle and is explained later. Another explanation: empirical phenomena are that which is relied upon, hence explained first; principle is that which relies, hence explained later. Among the first eight chapters, the first two broadly explain the sāsrava and anāsrava, and the latter six separately explain the sāsrava and anāsrava. The broad is the root, hence explained first; explaining the specific relies on the broad, hence stated later. This is just as in various treatises, where the general chapter is raised first, and only afterward is the specific explanation given. Within the general explanation, the Dhātu-nirdeśa explains the essence of phenomena, and though it also explains their function, it does so mostly in predominant terms, or not as its primary focus. The Indriya-nirdeśa explains the function of phenomena, and though it also explains their essence, it does so mostly in predominant terms, or not as its primary focus. The essence is the root, so dhātu is explained first; function arises relying on essence, so indriya is explained next. Among the six chapters of specific explanation, the first three explain sāsrava phenomena, though within them they also explain anāsrava phenomena mostly in predominant terms, or not as their primary focus. The latter three chapters explain anāsrava phenomena, though within them they also explain sāsrava phenomena mostly in predominant terms, or not as their primary focus. Sāsrava phenomena are coarse, hence explained first; anāsrava phenomena are subtle, hence explained later. Just as among the four truths, duḥkha and samudaya are explained first, and nirodha and mārga are explained later. Another explanation: the sāsrava is to be reviled, hence explained first; once reviled, it causes one to rejoice [in liberation], hence the anāsrava is explained later. Another explanation: the sāsrava has arisen from beginningless time, hence explained first; the anāsrava is newly arisen, hence explained later. Within the specific explanation of the sāsrava there are three chapters, namely Loka, Karma, and Anuśaya, whose sequence is clarified in terms of fruit, cause, and condition. The Loka-nirdeśa explains the fruit of the sāsrava; its aspects are coarse and easily reviled, so it is explained first. Although it also explains cause and condition, it does so mostly in predominant terms, or not as its primary focus. The Karma-nirdeśa explains the cause that induces the fruit; the fruit necessarily arises due to the cause and its power is necessarily superior, so it is explained next. Although it also explains fruit and condition, it does so mostly in predominant terms, or not as its primary focus. The Anuśaya-nirdeśa explains the conditions for karma; karma cannot induce fruit on its own and must rely on conditions. Because anuśaya is slightly inferior in producing fruit, it is distinguished later. Although it also explains fruit and cause, it does so mostly in predominant terms, or not as its primary focus. Within the specific explanation of anāsrava phenomena, there are three chapters, namely Pudgala, Jñāna, and Samādhi, whose sequence is also distinguished in terms of fruit, cause, and condition. The Pudgala-nirdeśa explains the anāsrava fruit; because its aspects are manifest and easily rejoiced in, it is explained first. Although it also explains cause and condition, it does so mostly in predominant terms, or not as its primary focus. The Jñāna-nirdeśa explains the cause of realizing the fruit; the fruit necessarily relies on the cause, and [knowledge] is also powerful in realizing the fruit, so it is explained next. Although it also explains fruit and condition, it does so mostly in predominant terms, or not as its primary focus. The Samādhi-nirdeśa explains the condition for knowledge; knowledge alone cannot realize the fruit, but must rely on the condition of samādhi; relative to that fruit its power is slightly inferior, so it is explained later. Although it also explains fruit and cause, it does so mostly in predominant terms, or not as its primary focus.

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"To the one who [destroyed all darkness] in every mode... I shall explain": below this is the third section, providing the direct interpretation based on the text. In this single treatise, the overall text consists of three parts: first, the preface; second, the main doctrinal body; third, the transmission and circulation. When holy persons compose a treatise, there is always a cause; hence the preface is clarified first. Once the preface is revealed, there must be something expounded; hence the main doctrinal body is clarified next. Once the main body is completed, study and circulation are encouraged; hence the transmission is clarified last. Concerning the explanation of these three parts, three interpretations differ. The first interpretation states: the first three lines of verses are called the preface. From "Which dharmas are called..." onward down to the Pudgala-pratiṣedha is called the main doctrinal body. From the end of the Pudgala-pratiṣedha, "Having well expounded this..." onward, is called the transmission section. This single treatise overall explains "anātmānaḥ sarvadharmāḥ" from the sūtras; therefore the Pudgala-pratiṣedha is also subsumed under the main doctrinal body. Although the end of the Samādhi-nirdeśa laments and encourages study, because it precedes the main doctrinal body [of non-self], it is also termed the main doctrinal body. The second interpretation states: the preface is the same as above. From "Which dharmas are called..." onward down to the Samādhi-nirdeśa is the main doctrinal body. From the end of the Samādhi-nirdeśa, "Having previously differentiated..." onward, is collectively termed the transmission. The reason why the Pudgala-pratiṣedha is also termed transmission is that taking advantage of the transmission section, an inquiry was raised, and the extra explanation of the Pudgala-pratiṣedha, because it occurs after the transmission, is also termed transmission. The third interpretation states: this treatise explains the sūtras' "anātmānaḥ sarvadharmāḥ"; the first eight chapters clarify that phenomena have substantial existence to eliminate the clinging to depreciation, and thus have three parts: the preface and main body are the same as the second master's, and from "Having previously differentiated..." onward down to the end of the Samādhi-nirdeśa is the transmission section. The last chapter clarifies non-self to eliminate the clinging to reification, and it also has three parts. The first two lines, "Aside from this, based on another, could there be no explanation?" are called the preface. From "In truth there is definitely none..." onward is the main body, and from "Having well expounded this..." onward is the transmission. Because they explain two meanings from the sūtras, each separately has a different three parts. In any case, clarifying various treatises shows that the main doctrinal body is definitely present, while the presence or absence of the preface and transmission is unfixed. Some have a preface but no transmission, such as the Mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra; some have a transmission but no preface, such as the Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā; some have both parts, as explained in this treatise; some lack both parts, such as the Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra. This is because the intentions of treatise authors each differ.

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Regarding the introductory section: first, directly explaining the introductory section; second, separately resolving difficulties as they arise. This initial single verse directly clarifies the introductory section. Within it, the first three lines explain the introductory refuge and veneration, while the fourth line explains the introductory inception. 'Refuge and veneration' refers to taking refuge in and venerating the World-Honoured One; 'inception' refers to initiating the primary exposition. Therefore, one first takes refuge and venerates, and only thereafter clarifies the inception. Question: Why praise [the Buddha's] virtues and pay homage at the beginning of the treatise? Answer: For fear that demonic obstacles might arise and leave the composition of the treatise incomplete, virtues are praised and homage is paid to request protective support. Hence the Prakaraṇaśāsana (Xianzong) states: 'By words of praise and salutation, all evil impediments are destroyed and auspicious omens are marked.' Another explanation: It enables one to know that the World-Honoured One possesses supreme virtues, thereby giving rise to faith and reverence toward the Dharma spoken by the Buddha. Another explanation: Just as a filial child informs their father and mother before undertaking anything, the treatise master does likewise; now, desiring to compose the treatise, he first informs the World-Honoured One. Speaking generally of treatises, the presence or absence of homage and inception is variable: some have homage but lack inception, such as the Abhidharma-hṛdaya; some have inception but lack homage, such as the Saṃyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya; some have both introductions, such as the Abhidharmakośa; some have neither introduction, such as the Jñānaprasthāna. This likewise depends on the differing intentions of the various authors.

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Regarding the introductory refuge and veneration: the first two lines explain the Buddha's three virtues, while the third line designates the virtues and pays homage. Within the first two lines, the initial word 'whoever' (zhū) clarifies the person constituted by virtue; from 'all kinds' onward, it clarifies the virtues constituted by the person. Because virtues are determined on the basis of the person, the person comes first and the virtues follow. Stating the word 'whoever' at the outset demonstrates an absence of partisanship, summoning the person by means of virtue: 'Whoever possesses these three virtues, in them I take refuge and pay homage.' Because the various non-Buddhists each claim their own teacher is omniscient, if one were exclusively to take refuge in and pay homage to Śākyamuni, one fears they might generate slander; therefore, the word 'whoever' is placed there to quiet their discordant views. Or perhaps, fearing that the Buddha converts sentient beings of shallow capacity by provisionally assuming the role of their teachers to lead them into the true Dharma, the word 'whoever' is placed there. This word 'whoever' originated in the West from the treatise master Mātrceta; whenever he wished to take refuge and pay homage, he always placed the word 'whoever'. The treatise master considered this to be reasonable, and therefore also said 'whoever'. Within the virtues constituted by the person, the upper six characters explain the virtue of self-benefit, while the lower single line explains the virtue of benefiting others. Why is self-benefit explained first, and benefiting others explained later? If one does not benefit oneself, how could one benefit others? When the sūtras say that bodhisattvas act for the sake of benefiting others, this is stated with respect to their aspiration.

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'Has destroyed darkness in all its kinds': this explains the virtue of self-benefit. Of darkness, there are two kinds: first, defiled ignorance (kliṣṭājñāna); second, undefiled ignorance (akliṣṭājñāna). Destruction also has two kinds: first, analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha); second, non-analytical cessation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha). The destruction of darkness in all kinds cuts off undefiled ignorance and attains non-analytical cessation; this demonstrates the virtue of wisdom. The destruction of all darkness cuts off defiled ignorance and attains analytical cessation; this demonstrates the virtue of abandonment. The two characters 'darkness-destruction' apply to both places. Because undefiled ignorance comprises numerous kinds, it is called 'all' (yíqiè). Because defiled ignorance does not comprise many kinds, it is merely called 'all' (zhū). Alternatively, 'all' (yíqiè) and 'various' (zhū) are synonymous expressions. Or, although 'all' and 'various' are synonyms, here 'all' is taken as broader and 'various' as narrower. Why is 'kinds' not mentioned for defiled [ignorance]? 'Kinds' refers to variety of types; because undefiled ignorance has boundless varieties, it is therefore called 'kinds', whereas defiled ignorance does not have many varieties, so 'kinds' is not mentioned. Alternatively, 'kinds' ought to be mentioned, but is omitted for brevity. Or it may be understood by implication, or this word 'kinds' applies to both places. Within the virtue of self-benefit, why is the virtue of wisdom explained first and the virtue of abandonment explained later? Because the virtue of wisdom belongs exclusively to the Buddha, it is therefore stated first; because the virtue of abandonment is also shared with the two vehicles, it is therefore explained later. Another explanation: The virtue of wisdom is conditioned (saṃskṛta), so it is stated first; the virtue of abandonment is unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), so it is explained later. Another explanation: Wisdom, as the cause, is stated first; abandonment, as the fruit, is explained later.

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'Pulling sentient beings out from the mire of saṃsāra': this explains the virtue of benefiting others. It means pulling sentient beings out of the mire of birth and death; this demonstrates the virtue of grace. They are called 'sentient beings' (zhòngshēng, lit. 'multitude of births') because they undergo many births and deaths. Now, birth is inevitably followed by death; speaking of birth can encompass death, so they are called 'multitude of births'; death is not inevitably followed by birth, as when entering nirvāṇa, and for this reason they are not called 'multitude of deaths'. Alternatively, mention of the beginning indicates what follows; if there are other passages that speak of 'multitude of deaths', mentioning what follows indicates the beginning. Birth and death are boundless, deep, and broad, difficult to escape; hence the metaphor of 'mire'. 'I pay homage to such a teacher who accords with reality': this designates the virtues and pays homage. The phrase 'to such' refers to the three virtues above. Question: Why does the prose commentary state: 'The expression "teacher who accords with reality" demonstrates the virtue of benefiting others'? Answer: Merely stating the benefit of others already demonstrates self-benefit, for one who benefits others must necessarily have benefited oneself. Another explanation: 'I pay homage to such three virtues; I pay homage to the teacher who accords with reality.' 'Such' refers generally to the three virtues. The expression 'teacher who accords with reality' specifically demonstrates the virtue of benefiting others. Question: Why does this treatise only pay homage to the three virtues without mentioning the Three Jewels? Answer: The three virtues and the Three Jewels differ in meaning; they are stated according to the intention and inclination of the treatise master. Speaking generally of treatises, the presence or absence of the three virtues and the Three Jewels is variable: some state the three virtues without mentioning the Three Jewels, as in this treatise; some state the Three Jewels without mentioning the three virtues, as in the Abhidharma-hṛdaya; some state both, which must also exist in texts, though not yet located; some state neither, as in the Jñānaprasthāna. Another explanation: This treatise also pays homage to the Buddha Jewel, since the Buddha is concurrently demonstrated within the virtue of wisdom. Another explanation: This treatise also pays homage to the Dharma Jewel, because the fruitional dharma of nirvāṇa is precisely the virtue of abandonment. As for not mentioning the Saṃgha, it is omitted for brevity; alternatively, the four practitioners of the path and four fruit-attainers are called the Saṃgha. Bodhisattva Vasubandhu had completed the approach of one asaṃkhyeya [eon], and his wisdom surpassed theirs, so he did not pay homage to them. Question: Why did the treatise master also pay homage to the Saṃgha when composing the Mahāyānasaṃgraha? Answer: 'Saṃgha' means a community; in the Mahāyāna, it is possible for multiple bodhisattvas to enter the noble state simultaneously, which is called a Saṃgha and is paid homage. In this school (Sarvāstivāda), only a single bodhisattva attains entry in thirty-four thought-moments, which does not constitute a Saṃgha, and therefore he does not pay homage to them. Another explanation: This treatise also pays homage to the Saṃgha Jewel, because the Saṃgha is concurrently demonstrated within the virtue of grace. Hence the treatise below states: 'With the hand of the true Dharma's teaching, pulling them out to rescue them from the mire, pulling sentient beings to bring them out of the three realms'—this precisely demonstrates the Saṃgha Jewel. Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha also gave this interpretation.

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'I shall explain the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra': this explains the introductory inception. The Abhidharmakośa-śāstra will be explained by the text below itself. As for 'I shall explain': the provisional person consisting of the five skandhas is designated as 'I'. The word 'shall explain' distinguishes [this exposition] from what has already been spoken or is currently being spoken. Having completed refuge in the World-Honoured One, he promises to initiate the treatise, saying 'I shall explain'. Desiring next to compose the treatise, he therefore first provides this inception.

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'The commentary states: [...] only thereafter extending homage': in the prose commentary, first, the overall intent of the verse is generally marked; second, the verse text is separately explained. This is the general marking. Desiring now to compose the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra, although the treatise master summons the person by means of virtue, his underlying intent is to demonstrate that his own teacher, Śākyamuni, possesses a nature of virtue that is exalted and supreme, transcending all the noble assemblies of the two vehicles and bodhisattvas; therefore, he first praises virtues and only thereafter extends homage. Alternatively, as for 'noble assemblies', the various non-Buddhists and others consider themselves to be noble assemblies. As for 'what is indicated by the word "whoever" refers to the Buddha, the World-Honoured One': from here downward is the separate explanation. Because one summons the person by means of virtue, and other persons lack this virtue, although the word 'whoever' is general, it ultimately refers to the World-Honoured One.

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'Because he is able to shatter darkness, he is said to have destroyed darkness': this resolves an implicit objection. The intent of the implicit objection is: The word 'whoever' is general; how can it designate the Buddha? Therefore, it is resolved here by saying: This Buddha, the World-Honoured One, through wisdom is able to shatter the two kinds of darkness, and is therefore called the World-Honoured One. Both types of darkness are destroyed; because the two kinds of darkness are destroyed by the Buddha, the World-Honoured One, the word 'whoever', though general, ultimately denotes the World-Honoured One. Another explanation: This passage separately demonstrates the person capable of shattering darkness: this Buddha has the power to destroy all darkness forever, and therefore the World-Honoured One is said to have 'destroyed darkness'.

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'The phrase "all kinds" [...] darkness of all varieties': this means destroying the darkness regarding all objective spheres, cutting off defiled ignorance. 'All objective spheres' refers to the four noble truths and the path of cultivation (bhāvanā-mārga); delusion regarding these spheres is called darkness. This explains the 'destruction of all darkness'. Hence the Nyāyānusāra states: 'Because darkness regarding all objective spheres is also eternally destroyed, the virtue of abandonment is complete.' Destroying the darkness of all varieties means cutting off undefiled ignorance. 'All varieties' refers to the categories of all dharmas; delusion regarding these categories is called darkness. This explains the 'destruction of darkness in all its kinds'. Hence the Nyāyānusāra states: 'Because darkness of all kinds is entirely and eternally destroyed, the virtue of wisdom is complete.' Question: Why does the verse text state 'all kinds' first, while the prose commentary explains it later? Answer: The verse follows the sequence of meaning, whereas the prose follows convenience of phrasing. Alternatively, Abhidharma investigates nature and characteristics; phrasing is stated as convenient, so what fixed order must there be? Question: What constitutes the essence of the virtue of wisdom and the virtue of abandonment? Answer: The virtue of wisdom takes as its essence the wisdom within the Buddha's body; if combined with attendant factors, it takes the five skandhas as its essence. The virtue of abandonment takes analytical cessation as its essence. Question: If one says that the virtue of abandonment takes analytical cessation as its essence, why does the Abhidharmakośa, fascicle 27, state: 'The complete virtue of abandonment has four kinds: 1. the abandonment of all afflictions; 2. the abandonment of all meditative hindrances; 3. ultimate abandonment; 4. abandonment together with residual impressions (vāsanā)'? According to that treatise text, if all affliction-hindrances are abandoned, one attains analytical cessation; if the meditative hindrances of undefiled ignorance are abandoned, one attains non-analytical cessation. Having abandoned those two hindrances without regression is called ultimate abandonment, which universally attains analytical cessation and non-analytical cessation. This distinguishes him from those of dull faculties. The Tathāgata not only abandons those afflictions, but also abandons the residual impressions of those afflictions, attaining non-analytical cessation; this distinguishes him from the two vehicles of sharp faculties. Another explanation: 'Abandonment together with residual impressions' means not only abandoning the affliction-hindrance and meditative hindrance, but also abandoning the residual impressions of both hindrances. According to that, since the virtue of abandonment universally applies to non-analytical cessation, why is it solely stated to take analytical cessation as its essence? Answer: The virtue of abandonment takes its essence from what is predominant, namely analytical cessation; if considered in terms of what is concomitant, it also includes non-analytical cessation, so there is no contradiction. Another explanation: The virtue of abandonment takes solely analytical cessation as its essence. However, when meditative hindrances and so forth exist, analytical cessation is not apparent; when meditative hindrances and so forth are absent, analytical cessation becomes apparent. Because it can reveal abandonment, it is called the complete virtue of abandonment. Another explanation: All four abandonments in that text are analytical cessation. If it is abandonment of afflictions, it is abandonment of intrinsic nature and abandonment of bondage to conditions; if it is abandonment of meditative hindrances and abandonment together with residual impressions, it is abandonment of bondage to conditions; if it is ultimate abandonment, it universally applies to abandonment of intrinsic nature and abandonment of bondage to conditions.

1.18

Regarding "Because [these] various [forms of] ignorance [veil true reality and obstruct true vision,] therefore it is called darkness": this explains the meaning of darkness. Defiled and undefiled, ignorance is not single; hence they are termed "various [forms of] ignorance." Defiled ignorance can veil the two kinds of real meaning—principle and fact. Undefiled ignorance can obstruct the two kinds of true vision—of principle and fact. Another explanation states: That which can veil real meaning is undefiled ignorance; that which can obstruct true vision is defiled ignorance. Yet another explanation states: "Veiling real meaning" refers to veiling external objects; "obstructing true vision" refers to obstructing the internal mind. Both "capable of veiling" and "capable of obstructing" are the meaning of darkness, which applies to both kinds of ignorance. Question: What is the intrinsic nature of defiled ignorance? Explanation: It takes ignorance (avidyā) as its intrinsic nature. The reason other afflictions are not mentioned is that ignorance is common to and associated with all defilements; by mentioning ignorance, the remaining defilements are also indicated. Question: What is the meaning of undefiled ignorance? Explanation: To explain this meaning, it is analyzed briefly through three headings: first, identifying its intrinsic nature; second, explaining its name; third, distinctions through various headings. Under identifying its intrinsic nature: first, recounting divergent theories; second, pointing out their faults and errors; third, stating the correct doctrine. Regarding recounting divergent theories, counting persons and treatises, there are eleven teachers in all. The first teacher says: Undefiled ignorance takes as its intrinsic nature the dull vipāka-indeterminate mind and mental factors prior to becoming a Buddha. The second teacher says: Undefiled ignorance takes as its intrinsic nature the dull fourfold indeterminate mind and mental factors prior to becoming a Buddha. The third, the Western Master Guṇaprabha, says: Undefiled ignorance takes as its intrinsic nature the dull naturally indeterminate mind and mental factors prior to becoming a Buddha, which are not subsumed under the four indeterminates, pervading the three realms and constantly accomplished across past and future. The fourth teacher says: Undefiled ignorance takes as its intrinsic nature the dull generic similarity (sabhāgatā) prior to becoming a Buddha; based on this generic similarity, wisdom and the like that arise cannot clearly observe their objects. The fifth teacher says: Undefiled ignorance takes non-mastery as its intrinsic nature. Thus the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle seventy, in identifying the intrinsic nature of the obstacle to liberation, states: "Other teachers say: This obstacle to liberation precisely takes non-mastery regarding the absorptions as its intrinsic nature." The sixth teacher says: Undefiled ignorance takes non-acquisition (aprāpti) as its intrinsic nature. Thus the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle seventy, states: "Other teachers say: This obstacle to liberation precisely takes the non-acquisition of the absorptions as its intrinsic nature." The seventh teacher says: Undefiled ignorance takes lack of diligent seeking and the like as its intrinsic nature. Thus the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle seventy, states: "Other teachers say: Because one does not diligently seek, does not hear, and does not repeatedly practice regarding their preliminary preparation, liberation does not arise; precisely this is called the intrinsic nature of the obstacle to liberation." The eighth teacher says: Undefiled ignorance takes the absence of wisdom as its intrinsic nature. Thus the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle twenty-eight, in explaining the distinction between the two kinds of ignorance, states: "There are some who say: That which can obstruct wisdom is defiled ignorance; undefiled ignorance is merely the nonexistence of wisdom." Explanation: The entity of this ignorance can obstruct the clarity of wisdom; the obstructing entity is defiled ignorance. The place where wisdom is absent is termed undefiled. Another explanation states: This is the Sautrāntika master's doctrine. The ninth teacher says: Undefiled ignorance takes the collective impressions (vāsanā) of mind and mental factors as its intrinsic nature. Thus the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle twenty-eight, states: "Mind and mental factors together are collectively called impressions." Explanation: Although the Nyāyānusāra does not cite a distinct proponent, judging from the ancient masters' refutations, one knows this doctrine exists. This asserts that all impressions of mind and mental factors are collectively called ignorance; ignorance and impressions have neither greater nor lesser scope. The tenth teacher says: Undefiled ignorance is precisely named impression, which has a distinct real entity among the mental factors. Thus the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle twenty-eight, states: "An ancient master described the mark of impression, saying: 'There is a distinct undefiled mental factor, induced by the repeated cultivation of defiled and undefiled phenomena, manifesting in continuum prior to all-knowledge, causing the mind and mental factors to function without mastery; this is called impression.'" Explanation: The ancient master is an ancient master of the Sarvāstivāda. This ancient master says: Among the mental factors there is a distinct entity called impression, which is undefiled ignorance. Impression and ignorance have no difference in scope. Just as defiled ignorance has avidyā as a distinct entity, [this impression] is induced generally by the repeated cultivation of all defiled and undefiled phenomena, continually arising in continuum throughout all classes of mind prior to becoming a Buddha, causing the conjoined mind to function without mastery. Although it is universally associated with the three natures, its entity is unobscured-indeterminate. The eleventh teacher says: Undefiled ignorance takes impressions as its intrinsic nature. Thus the Nyāyānusāra states: "The Venerable *Kṣema says as follows: 'There is an undefiled phenomenon called impression, just as unwholesome causes incur vipāka. When the World-Honoured One was formerly at the bodhisattva stage, cultivating various preparations for three incalculable eons, though he had afflictions, he was able gradually to eliminate the undefiled impressions induced by afflictions, and caused the impressions of pure phenomena gradually to increase. At the time he acquired the eternal eradication of all outflows, among the preceding impressions some were destroyed and some were not destroyed; because he cultivated preparations for a long time, he realized the unsurpassed eternal exhaustion of all outflows. Yet the Buddha still possessed impressions of pure phenomena, because it is said that impressions have those destroyed and those not destroyed.'" Explanation: This master maintains that there is a distinct phenomenon that is undefiled yet capable of obstructing wisdom, just as an unwholesome cause incurs a vipāka result, having a distinct entity. However, this ignorance is precisely the impressions of all afflictions. The rest of the text can be understood. *Kṣema (*Kṣīma) is translated here as 'Joy and Pleasure'.

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Second, pointing out faults and errors: Refuting the first teacher: If undefiled ignorance took the vipāka-indeterminate mind and mental factors as its intrinsic nature, then when an arhat of the two vehicles has no vipāka-born mind currently manifesting and does not possess it, they ought to be named a Buddha. If you say they are not named a Buddha because it will definitely arise, then when it arises later and is possessed, they might not be named a Buddha, but when it has not arisen and is not possessed, they ought to be named a Buddha. If you say they are not named a Buddha because they have impressions, then it is precisely on account of those [impressions] that they are not named a Buddha; what does this have to do with the vipāka mind and mental factors? Therefore, this statement is illogical. Refuting the second teacher: If undefiled ignorance took the four indeterminate minds and the like as its intrinsic nature, then when unobscured-indeterminate minds of the desire and form realms are not currently manifesting, they could still be accomplished across past and future. But when a formless realm aśaikṣa has no vipāka-born mind currently manifesting, and does not accomplish it in the past or future, they ought to be named a Buddha. Therefore this is also illogical. If you say they are not named a Buddha because it will definitely arise or because they have impressions, the refutation applies as above; hence this too is illogical. Refuting the third teacher: If undefiled ignorance took the naturally indeterminate mind and the like as its intrinsic nature, pervading the three realms and constantly accomplished across past and future, although it would be free of the fault of non-accomplishment, it contradicts the Vijñānakāya, fascicle fourteen. That treatise, in explaining the twelve minds, states that when one is born in the formless realm and the vipāka-born mind is not currently manifesting, one does not possess the unobscured-indeterminate mind. Since it contradicts this statement, it is also illogical. Refuting the fourth teacher: If undefiled ignorance took generic similarity as its intrinsic nature, treating it as an alternative avenue might perhaps allow such an assertion, but upon searching through the treatises there is no such text at all; therefore this too is illogical. Refuting the fifth teacher: If non-mastery were taken as the intrinsic nature of the obstacle, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle seventy, refutes this, saying: "There must be some subtle phenomenon that acts with force as an obstructor, causing them to function without mastery regarding the absorptions. If it were not so, by what condition would they fail to attain mastery in the absorptions?" Explanation: There must be some subtle phenomenon of undefiled ignorance. Refuting the sixth teacher: If non-acquisition were taken as the intrinsic nature of the obstacle, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle seventy, refutes this, saying: "Those who do not acquire the absorptions must have a cause. It cannot be said that non-acquisition is itself the cause, for an entity cannot be its own cause. Or else, the obstacle of affliction should also be said to take the non-acquisition of the fruit of arhatship as its nature. Since that is not so, why should this be so?" Refuting the seventh teacher: If lack of diligent seeking and the like were taken as the intrinsic nature of the obstacle, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle seventy, refutes this, saying: "The fruit of arhatship also fails to arise in its entity due to lack of diligent seeking in preparation and the like; could there then be no distinct entity of the obstacle of affliction?" Refuting the eighth teacher: If undefiled ignorance took the nonexistence of wisdom as its intrinsic nature, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle twenty-eight, states: "An ancient master refuted it, saying: 'It is not merely the nonexistence of wisdom, for a nonexistent phenomenon cannot possibly act as a cause.'" Refuting the ninth teacher: If undefiled ignorance took the mind and mental factors collectively named impressions as its intrinsic nature, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle twenty-eight, records an ancient master's refutation, saying: "Nor should it be said that mind and mental factors of such a class are collectively named impressions, because undefiled ignorance was already explained previously. That is, does this ignorance take the naturally abiding mind and the like as its intrinsic nature, or does it have a differentiating factor? If it takes the naturally abiding mind and the like as its intrinsic nature, the Buddha should also possess undefiled ignorance. If there is a differentiating factor, that which differentiates could be ignorance, not that which is differentiated. We observe that among mind and mental factors differentiated into wholesome and other classes, there must be a distinct phenomenon that serves as the differentiator, not all of them together. For example, in the wholesome class there must be faith and the like, in the unwholesome class there are shamelessness and the like, and in the defiled class there is heedlessness and the like. Among such classes of mind and mental factors, there must be a distinct phenomenon that serves as the differentiator. Therefore we know that here too there is a distinct phenomenon capable of differentiating, which is undefiled ignorance." (Explanation: Based on this text of refutation, we know there was a proponent of this collective view.) Refuting the tenth, ancient master: If undefiled ignorance had a distinct entity among the mental factors, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle twenty-eight, states: "The orthodox master refutes it, saying: 'Examining their assertion now, it has excessive faults. The mind and mental factors of ordinary worldlings and the like do not perceive the characteristics of taste, potency, maturation, and so forth as they truly are, yet no other mental factors are seen to arise. Furthermore, in each single moment, those minds and mental factors arise distinctly; thus in moment after moment, distinct phenomena of ignorance ought to arise individually. If it is said that there are different characteristics that cause the ignorance to be differentiated, then these [characteristics] are themselves what can differentiate the classes of mind; why positing a distinct undefiled ignorance?'" Explanation: If in an unawakened state this phenomenon functions constantly, then because all ordinary worldlings, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas fail to understand, they should all equally possess this ignorance, yet in reality no other class of mind is seen to arise—only wholesome and other mental factors arise. If it is said that this phenomenon does not conflict with anything and is constantly associated in moment after moment, then because the associated classes have differences, it ought to have differences. Due to those differences, the associated classes would arise differently. If it is said that different characteristics constitute the differentiation, then those very characteristics can cause the classes of mind to have distinct ignorances; why labor to posit a separate phenomenon? Refuting the eleventh, *Kṣema, who claims undefiled ignorance takes impressions as its intrinsic nature: the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle twenty-eight, refutes this, saying: "What is stated in this way could indeed be reasonable, yet he is unable to demonstrate its intrinsic nature. What is the intrinsic nature of this undefiled impression? Mere empty words cannot produce true understanding." (Explanation: Speaking generally of impressions does not contradict reason, but being unable to demonstrate its entity ultimately renders it a flawed doctrine.)

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Third, set forth the correct view: non-defiled ignorance takes as its essential nature all sāsrava, non-defiled, inferior prajñā prior to the attainment of buddhahood. Therefore Nyāyānusāra 28 says: "Consequently, because one does not diligently seek to understand flavor, potency, maturation, and so on, prajñā along with dharmas of distinct characteristics together act as a cause to generate prajñā of that same class. This prajñā in turn does not diligently seek to understand, and again acts as a cause to generate prajñā that does not diligently seek to understand. In this way, alternating repeatedly from beginningless time, cause and effect follow upon one another and through habituation become one's nature. Therefore, with respect to those objects such as flavor, one repeatedly habituates oneself to cognition devoid of capability; the inferior cognition induced thereby is called non-defiled ignorance. The mind and mental factors arising concurrently with this are collectively called habitual residue (vāsanā); this must certainly be the case logically. Or, during states wherein sentient beings possess defilements, all non-defiled minds and their mental continuities are perfumed by the mingling of various defilements, so that they have portions [of their nature] that accord with the generation of defilements; thus, all non-defiled minds and their retinues arise resembling those distinct mental modes. Because they arise continuously through the power of repeated habituation, in a body that is [otherwise] free from faults they are still called 'having habitual residue.' The Omniscient One abandons them forever so that they never arise; however, at the stage where what is to be abandoned by seeing has been abandoned, throughout the mental continuities that are both defiled and non-defiled, there remain habitual dispositions that accord with the generation of defilements; these are portions of defilements to be abandoned by seeing. Among them, those that are defiled are termed 'homogeneous nature' (sabhāgatā); when abandoned by the vajropamasamādhi path, none of them will arise in active operation. Those that are non-defiled are called 'habitual residues of defilements to be abandoned by seeing,' and are also abandoned by that path; depending on the differences in faculties, they may or may not arise in active operation. If at the stage where what is to be abandoned by cultivation has been abandoned, then only in non-defiled mental continuities are there remaining habitual dispositions that accord with the generation of defilements; these are portions of defilements to be abandoned by cultivation, and are called 'habitual residues of defilements to be abandoned by cultivation.' Because they are sāsrava, the aśaikṣa has already abandoned them; depending on whether one's faculties are sharp or dull, they may or may not arise in active operation. Because the World-Honoured One has attained mastery over dharmas, such defilements never arise in active operation at all; thus the Buddha alone is acclaimed as having an excellently purified continuity. It is precisely due to this that his actions are without mistake or fault, and he attains the unshared dharmas, the three applications of mindfulness, and so on. Furthermore, it is due to this that it is said with intentional meaning that the Buddha alone is named as having attained the fruit of an aśaikṣa." Explanation: the intent of Nyāyānusāra is to say that non-defiled ignorance takes inferior prajñā as its essential nature; ignorance is narrower, while habitual residue is broader. However, in explaining habitual residue, there are two distinct interpretations. One interpretation: the mind and mental factors arising concurrently with inferior prajñā are collectively termed habitual residue. Another interpretation: habitual residue extends not only through mind and mental factors, but also throughout the continuity of the body. Furthermore, Mahāvibhāṣā 153, in presenting the essential nature of the obstacle to liberation, says: "As for the obstacle to liberation, some say: it takes inferior ignorance as its essential nature. Some say: it takes non-mastery over meditative absorptions as its essential nature. Some say: it takes the non-attainment of the various meditative absorptions as its essential nature." Although the Mahāvibhāṣā gives no master evaluation, based on the Nyāyānusāra, the first master's view is correct. Thus Nyāyānusāra 70 records four masters in total regarding the essential nature of the obstacle to liberation: the first master says: there is an inferior ignorance of the non-obscured neutral nature that can obstruct liberation; this is the essential nature of the obstacle to liberation; the second master takes non-mastery as its nature; the third master takes non-attainment as its nature; the fourth master takes the lack of diligent pursuit and so on as its nature. It further says: the first statement accords with reason. The positions of those three masters are fully as stated before. By the testimony of these passages, we know that non-defiled ignorance takes inferior prajñā as its essential nature. Furthermore, Dharma Master Yuanyu, in explaining the passage of Nyāyānusāra from "Or, during states wherein sentient beings..." onward, says: "Because in all non-defiled minds and in the bodily continuity there are portions perfumed by defilements, in those who have much ignorance, even when a wholesome mind arises in active operation, it is also largely dark and obscured, according with ignorance. The other [cases] follow the same pattern. By virtue of this habitual residue, it is called this ignorance. What is this essential nature? It is that prior to the attainment of buddhahood, all sāsrava wholesome and neutral dharmas, because they accord with ignorance and contravene omniscient cognition, are all named ignorance. Such portions of the defiled category are also sāsrava, but because they are subsumed under defilement, they are not discussed here. Therefore, at the stage where what is to be abandoned by seeing has been abandoned—that is, from srotāpanna up to aśaikṣa—both defiled and non-defiled categories have habitual dispositions of defilements to be abandoned by seeing, excluding only the anāsrava; the defiled are called 'homogeneous nature' because they are of the same kind as defilements; the non-defiled are called 'habitual residue' because they are formed through the habituation of defilements." The general meaning here is that all non-defiled sāsrava [phenomena], whether mind or body, that accord with defilements, are called habitual residue because they resemble defilements. Non-defiled ignorance and the ignorance that is habitual residue have no difference in being broader or narrower. The Buddha's body definitively does not accord with defilements; because he has abandoned habitual residues, he is called a purified continuity. Only when one no longer needs to train in prajñā is one called an aśaikṣa. The rest of the text is understandable from this.

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese