俱舍論記 13

English (machine translation) 13

Language: English

Regarding "Karma-nirdeśa": action is called karma; because this chapter explains it in detail, it is called "nirdeśa" (exposition). As for why karma is explained next: the preceding chapter explained the result, and this chapter explains the cause. Results do not arise in isolation but necessarily depend on causes to arise; because it is proximate to the result, karma is explained next.

13.4

"As previously explained... produced by what?" Within this chapter: first, explaining the essential nature of karma; second, interpreting the various karmas of the sūtras; third, miscellaneous explanations of various karmas. Within explaining the essential nature of karma: first, directly explaining the essential nature of karma; second, distinguishing karma through various aspects; third, explaining in detail manifestation (vijñapti) and non-manifestation (avijñapti). Within directly explaining the substance of karma: first, explaining the karma that is produced; second, explaining the primary elements that produce it. Within explaining the karma that is produced: first, explaining the two and three karmas; second, explaining the five kinds of karma. From here down is the first: explaining the two and three karmas. It takes up the preceding text to introduce the question.

13.5

"The verse says... what is done is called bodily and vocal": the first line directly answers; the second line presents the substance of the two karmas; the lower two lines present the substance of the three karmas. Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra says: "The word 'world-diversity' (lokavaicitrya) is based on the sixth case (genitive), meaning the diversity of the world; or the seventh case (locative), meaning the diversity in the world." The explanation is: 'world' has the meaning of being destructible, which is the general [whole]; 'diversity' refers to various differences. If it is the diversity of the world, it shows that the diversity belongs to the general; if it is the diversity in the world, it shows that the diversity relies on the general. Whether belonging to or relying on, both indicate diversity, which is the meaning of diversity of the world.

13.6

"The treatise says... arises from diversity of karma" explains the first line. "A single Lord" refers to a single heavenly Lord, either the Great Brahmā King, or Maheśvara, and so forth. Various non-Buddhists hypothesize that this heavenly Lord is able to create all things; when he is about to create, he first gives rise to this awareness, desiring to enjoy the objects, and then generates all the worlds. Alternatively, Sāṃkhya non-Buddhists hypothesize a single Self as Lord, with volition as its essence; when it desires to enjoy objects, it must first give rise to the awareness, 'I now wish to enjoy objects,' and then primal nature (prakṛti) gradually transforms to produce all worlds. Alternatively, certain Vaiśeṣika non-Buddhists hypothesize the Self as the agent that gives rise to all dharmas, also preceded by awareness, after which it generates the world. Hence it is said: 'generated through the prior awareness of a single Lord.' The treatise master refutes this, saying: These worlds are not generated through the prior awareness of a single Lord; it is solely due to the diversity of sentient beings' karma that these two kinds of worldly results arise. Another explanation: Diverse results arise solely due to the karma of sentient beings. Another explanation: Diversity applies both to the karmic cause and to the resulting arising.

13.7

"If so, why... is contrary to that?" is the question. Since both are born of karma, external saffron and the like are extremely pleasant, so why are internal physical forms and the like unpleasant?

13.8

"Because sentient beings... both things are excellent" is the reply. Because the types of collective and non-collective karma of sentient beings differ, the results they produce are distinct. Either they perform collective pure karma to produce saffron and the like, or they perform collective impure karma to produce poison thorns and the like; or they perform non-collective pure karma to produce an internal pure body, or they perform non-collective impure karma to produce an internal defiled body; or they perform mixed karma to produce an internally defiled and externally pure result, or they perform mixed karma to produce an internally pure and externally defiled result; or they perform purely impure karma to produce results that are both internally and externally defiled, or they perform purely pure karma to produce results that are both internally and externally pure. All this is due to differences in karma, which is why the experienced results are diverse. By this principle, if one creates mixed karma, the experienced result is internally defiled and externally pure. To serve as an antidote to that internal bodily impurity, external forms and the like are produced that are extremely pleasant; therefore, they cannot be equated uniformly with saffron and the like. If the devas and the like create purely pure karma, the experienced results are both internally and externally excellent. The terms 'mixed karma' and 'pure karma' mean: producing pure and defiled results is called mixed, while producing solely pure results is called pure. Alternatively, a mixture of wholesome and unwholesome karma is called mixed, while solely wholesome karma is called pure. Alternatively, the wholesome karma performed by humans and the like is weak and inferior, and afflictions are strong and increasing, frequently mixed and overpowered by afflictions, hence called mixed; while in performing the wholesome karma of devas, although afflictions still arise, the wholesome is superior and the unwholesome is inferior, so it obtains the designation 'pure'.

13.9

"What is the substance of this karma from which it arises?" explains the second line. This is the question.

13.10

"It refers to mental volition... refers to what is done by volition" is the reply. Volitional karma (cetanā-karma) refers to the mind's volition; volition itself is karma, hence it is called volitional karma. Karma after having willed (cetayitvā-karma) refers to what is done by volition; the two karmas of body and speech are done by volition; because they are done after having willed, they are called karma after having willed.

13.11

"These two karmas... bodily, vocal, and mental karma" explains the lower two lines, opening the two into three.

13.12

"How are they established?... or in terms of origination?" is the question. Are these three karmas established with reference to the supporting body? Or on the basis of their intrinsic nature? Or in terms of that which originates them (samutthāna)?

13.13

"Even if so, what contradiction is there?" reproaches the opponent's doubt.

13.14

"If in terms of support... originated by mind" is the opponent stating the intent of their doubt.

13.15

"The Vibhāṣā masters... due to the above three causes" is the reply. Bodily karma is established by reason of the supporting body: the accumulation of physical forms is collectively called the body, and because this karma relies on the body, it is called bodily karma. Vocal karma is established by reason of intrinsic nature: the nature of the karma is speech itself, so it is called vocal karma. Mental karma is established by reason of origination: 'mind' refers to mental consciousness, and 'karma' refers to volition. 'Origination' (samutthāna) means: that which originates resides in the mind, not in volition; or that which is originated resides in volition, not in the mind; or it encompasses both that which originates and that which is originated in both mind and volition; or it is originated by mind, etc.—'by' residing in the mind, and 'originated' residing in volition; because it is originated by the mind, it is called mental karma. Therefore, Nyāyānusāra 33 states: "Because karma relies on the body, it is called bodily karma. The nature of the karma is speech itself, so it is called vocal karma. This karma relies on the mind, and together with the mind originates bodily and vocal [actions], so it is called mental karma."

13.16

"However, mental volition... because it is what is originated" explains the lower two lines. Because the treatise master relates the three karmas of the Sarvāstivāda, he inserts the word 'however'. Volition is mental karma; volition is that which acts, that which originates. Body and speech are what is done, what is originated.

13.17

"What is the intrinsic nature of the two karmas of body and speech?" From here down is the second: explaining the five karmas. Within this: first, explaining manifestation (vijñapti) and non-manifestation (avijñapti) in general; second, explaining bodily and vocal manifestation in particular; third, separately demonstrating the existence of non-manifestation. From here down is the first: explaining manifestation and non-manifestation in general. Mental karma is volition, as has already been distinguished above. The intrinsic nature of body and speech has not yet been stated, so it is now questioned.

13.18

[On the passage] "The verse says: […] Both are of the nature of vijñapti and avijñapti": One should know that among the three kinds of karma explained as such, the two karmas of body and speech are both of the nature of vijñapti and avijñapti, and are alike physical karma (rūpa-karma). One is named vijñapti (manifestation) because it can manifest one's own mind's wholesomeness and so forth, making it known to others; the other is named avijñapti (unmanifest) precisely because it cannot manifest one's own mind. In virtue of this distinction, two designations are established. Mental karma is not physical (rūpa) and cannot manifest [anything], hence it is not named vijñapti; and because there is no vijñapti, avijñapti is also absent [in it], for the name avijñapti [functions to] exclude the bodily and vocal manifestations that belong to the category of form (rūpa).

13.19

[On the question] "Now what are the characteristics of bodily and vocal vijñapti?": Below, this is the second [section], explaining bodily and vocal vijñapti in particular. It poses a question preparatory to explaining them.

13.20

[On the passage] "The verse says: […] Vocal vijñapti is accepted as the sound of speech": Among the ten lines of the verse, the first nine lines explain bodily vijñapti, and the last line explains vocal vijñapti. Within the first nine lines: in the first line the author of the treatise states the Sarvāstivāda view that shape (saṃsthāna) is bodily vijñapti; in the next five lines the author of the treatise refutes the Saṃmatīya view that motion is bodily vijñapti—since this moving form is accepted neither by the Sautrāntika nor by the Sarvāstivāda, it is refuted first; in the next three lines the author of the treatise refutes the Sarvāstivāda view that shape is bodily vijñapti. If one relies on the Sautrāntika school, the two vijñaptis of body and speech are designated as vijñapti as continuum-phases (saṃtati-avasthā) formed by the aggregation of multiple entities of form and sound. A single [atom] lacks the capacity to manifest, for a single entity cannot manifest alone. Because it is said that wholesome and unwholesome in a single moment have no capacity to benefit or harm, they must arise through a continuum and be brought about by aggregation, being nominal (prajñapti) and not real. If one relies on the Saṃmatīya school, among conditioned phenomena they admit that there is vijñapti that endures for a long time and is not momentary (kṣaṇika); therefore bodily and vocal vijñaptis both consist in the continuous locomotion of subtle atoms capable of manifestation, so that precisely through motion they can manifest benefit or harm. If one relies on the Sarvāstivāda, the two vijñaptis of body and speech have distinct subtle atoms and are real entities (dravyasat). Here the author of the treatise intends to side with the Sautrāntika, and therefore refutes those two schools. The karma of vocal vijñapti is to be explained by analogy with bodily vijñapti, and so is not discussed again.

13.21

[On the passage] "The treatise says: […] is called bodily vijñapti-karma": This explains the first line. In stating the Sarvāstivāda view to show the doctrine of his own teacher, the preceding verse says that bodily vijñapti is accepted as a distinct shape. The collection of hair, pores, and so forth is collectively called the body; the shapes of the body are not one, hence it says "such and such". In this body, due to the power of intention (cetanā), such and such distinct bodily shapes arise, which can manifest the mind; this is called bodily vijñapti-karma.

13.22

[On the passage] "Other masters say […] it is said not to be motion": This explains the second line. Other masters, the Saṃmatīyas, say: There is a distinct form of motion that goes from here to there, which is called bodily vijñapti-karma. For when the aggregate physical body moves, it is because this karma-form is capable of moving it. The Saṃmatīya school posits: Among conditioned phenomena, mind, mental factors, sound, light, and so forth perish moment by moment, and therefore definitely have no motion. Conditioned factors unassociated with mind (cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra), bodily vijñapti-karma form, the body, mountains, firewood, and so forth do not perish moment by moment, but endure for a long time; as appropriate, in their initial period they arise, in their final period they perish, and in between there is persistence and alteration; not undergoing [instantaneous] arising and perishing, it is admissible that they move from here to another place, so that there is the meaning of motion. To refute this attachment, the verse says "it is not motion".

13.23

[On the phrase] "Because all conditioned phenomena have moments (kṣaṇika)": Below, this explains the third line and the words "because they have moments" in the fourth line, establishing the reasoning to correctly refute [it] and prove that there is no motion. The inference (anumāna) is: The form of bodily vijñapti-karma definitely has no motion, because it has moments, just like sound, light, and so forth.

13.24

[On the question] "What is meant by a moment (kṣaṇa)?": The Saṃmatīya asks.

13.25

[On the passage] "Acquiring its substance, it immediately perishes […] motion is called bodily vijñapti": The author of the treatise answers. Having previously been non-existent and now being existent, when a phenomenon first arises, it is called "acquiring its substance"; this substance must immediately perish and return to non-existence. Possessing this moment, conditioned phenomena are said to "have moments". An analogy is brought in by way of comparison: just as a person who has a staff is called a person "having a staff", so conditioned phenomena, reaching the present time, only just acquire their own substance, and from this present immediately must perish and return to non-existence. If it only just arises in this place, it immediately passes away and perishes in this very place; there is no possibility of its arising from here and moving to another place to perish. Therefore the Saṃmatīya cannot state that motion is called bodily vijñapti.

13.26

[On the passage] "If conditioned phenomena […] the meaning could be established": The Saṃmatīya attempts a rescue. If all conditioned phenomena had moments, then because they do not go to another place, your thesis could be established. But of conditioned phenomena themselves, there are some that do not have moments, such as bodily vijñapti and the like; therefore this reason of "having moments" commits the fallacy of being unestablished (asiddha).

13.27

[On the passage] "All conditioned phenomena […] having only just arisen, they immediately perish": The author of the treatise rescues the fallacy of being unestablished, explaining the two characters "because of cessation" in the fourth line. Form and unassociated [factors] definitely have moments, because in the end there must be cessation, just like the flame of a lamp and so forth. The author of the treatise further demonstrates that perishing does not depend on a cause; that is, conditioned phenomena are definitively momentary in perishing, and their perishing does not depend on a cause. Why is this? Rationally speaking, what depends on a cause is an effect. Perishing is a non-existent entity, and a non-existent entity is not an effect; therefore it does not depend on a cause. The inference is: Perishing does not depend on a cause, because it is non-existent, just like the horn of a hare. Alternatively, an inference is established: Perishing does not depend on a cause, because it is not an effect, just like the hair of a tortoise. Alternatively, an inference is established: Perishing does not depend on a cause, because it is non-existent and not an effect, just like a flower in the sky. Since perishing does not depend on a cause, having only just arisen, it immediately perishes. The word "perishing" here means that conditioned phenomena cease after having arisen; that this perishing is without substance is universally acknowledged by all schools. Next, he explains broadly that the arising and perishing of conditioned phenomena have two kinds of causes: first is the primary cause (mukhya-hetu), meaning the characteristics of arising and perishing that are constantly concomitant with the phenomenon, called the primary cause because its causal function is powerful; second is the incidental cause (āgantuka-hetu), meaning the other causes and conditions which may be present or absent, called the incidental cause because its causal function is not powerful. If one relies on the Saṃmatīya: the arising of phenomena is difficult, depending on both primary and incidental causes; when phenomena perish, it encompasses both the difficult and the easy: mind, mental factors, sound, light, and so forth depend only on the primary cause and not on incidental causes, whereas unassociated factors, other forms, firewood, and so forth depend on both primary and incidental causes. If one relies on the Sarvāstivāda: the arising of phenomena is difficult, depending on both primary and incidental causes; the perishing of phenomena is easy, depending only on the primary cause and not on incidental causes. If one relies on the Sautrāntika: when phenomena arise, they arise due to incidental causes; when phenomena perish, they do not perish due to incidental causes, and since the primary cause has no substance, it cannot be called a cause. Another explanation: according to the Sautrāntika, although arising and perishing have no real substance, they are nominally said to exist; when phenomena arise, they arise due to primary and incidental causes, and when phenomena perish, they do not perish due to a cause—just as when an object is thrown into the air, its going [up] is due to human effort, but its falling is not. Yet another explanation: the Sautrāntika agrees with the Sarvāstivāda: when phenomena arise, they arise due to primary and incidental causes, and when phenomena perish, they perish due to the primary cause, not due to incidental causes; although the primary cause has no distinct substance, it can nominally be called a cause. Furthermore, there are non-Buddhists who posit: when phenomena arise, they arise without a cause; when phenomena perish, they perish without a cause. This briefly outlines the different doctrines of the various schools.

13.28

[On the passage] "If it did not perish at the beginning […] this is logically impossible": He cites their position, questions, and refutes it. If phenomena such as form did not perish at their initial phase, then at their subsequent phase they should also not perish, because the subsequent and the initial possess identity of substantial nature. An inference is established: At the subsequent phase it should not perish, because it has identity of nature [with the initial], just like the initial phase. Since there is cessation in the end, we know there is perishing before. An inference is established: At the initial phase there should also be perishing, because it has identity of nature [with the subsequent], just like the subsequent phase. If you attempt to rescue it by saying: The subsequent phase of form and so forth has a substance different from before, and only then can it perish—now, as for the word "different", when comparing two phenomena at the subsequent phase, it should not be the very substantial entity of this prior phase that is called different; that the substantial characteristics of this very prior phenomenon should become different is logically impossible.

13.29

[On the passage] "Is it not observed in the world […] do not depend on a cause?": The Saṃmatīya attempts a rescue, showing that the perishing of phenomena depends on incidental causes. Is it not observed directly in the world that firewood and the like, through the power of the incidental cause of union with fire, are thereby brought to perishing and non-existence? Among the three means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), in verifying phenomena, definitely neither of the other two—inference and scriptural authority—can surpass direct perception (pratyakṣa); therefore it is not the case that the perishing of phenomena never depends on incidental causes.

13.30

[On the question] "How is it known that firewood and the like perish due to union with fire?": The author of the treatise questions him.

13.31

[On the reply] "Because after firewood and the like unite with fire, they are no longer seen": The Saṃmatīya answers.

13.32

[On the passage] "One should deliberate together […] must be through inference": The author of the treatise urges the Saṃmatīya to reflect: Is it as your school holds, that this prior firewood and so forth are not seen because they perish and become non-existent through the power of the incidental cause of union with fire; or is it as my school holds, that this prior firewood and so forth, having arisen, perish of themselves, and it is not that they are destroyed by fire, but rather that subsequent firewood does not arise, and because of this non-existence they are not seen? One should know that whether firewood and so forth unite or do not unite with fire, moment by moment they perish of themselves through the primary cause. When fire has not yet united with it, firewood and so forth have the power to induce the arising of subsequent effects; when fire later unites with it, this fire merely causes the firewood and so forth to lack the power to induce the arising of subsequent effects, and furthermore can obstruct subsequent firewood from arising, but does not destroy the firewood and so forth. Just as in your school, when wind unites with a lamp flame, or a hand unites with the sound of a bell, you also admit that the flame and the sound are not destroyed by the incidental causes of the wind and the hand. Whether united or not united, moment by moment they perish of themselves through the primary cause. When not yet united, the flame and the sound have the power to draw forth subsequent effects; later, when hand and wind unite [with them], the hand and wind merely cause the flame and the sound to lack the power to draw forth subsequent effects, and furthermore can obstruct subsequent flame and sound from arising, but do not destroy the flame and the sound. Therefore, that this meaning of the momentary perishing of phenomena is established must be through inference. Another explanation: Therefore, that this meaning of the perishing of phenomena not depending on a cause is established [must be through inference].

13.33

[On the question] "What is the inference?": The Saṃmatīya asks.

13.34

[On the passage] "Namely, as previously stated […] therefore it does not depend on a cause": The author of the treatise cites the previous text to reply. The inference established is as before.

13.35

[On the passage] "Furthermore, if it depended on a cause […] also does not depend on a cause": This explains the fifth line: "there would be none without cause". If you stubbornly insist that firewood and so forth perish only by depending on an incidental cause, then of conditioned phenomena, the perishing of all phenomena would without exception depend on incidental causes. The inference is: The perishing of consciousness, flames, and so forth should depend on incidental causes, because they are subsumed under conditioned phenomena, just like firewood and so forth. Analogizing perishing to arising: just as the arising of conditioned phenomena all depends on incidental causes and there are none without cause, the perishing of conditioned phenomena should logically also be the same, all depending on incidental causes and none being without cause. But if the perishing of phenomena must depend on incidental causes, this would contradict direct perception. Yet it is seen directly in the world that consciousness, flames, and sound perish of themselves moment by moment without depending on incidental causes. Mind and mental factors are collectively named "consciousness" (buddhi) because they are capable of perceiving. Thus he concludes himself by saying: Therefore the perishing of firewood and so forth also does not depend on incidental causes. The inference is: When firewood and so forth perish, they do not depend on incidental causes, because they have moments, just like consciousness, flames, and so forth.

13.36

[On the passage] "Some hold that prior consciousness and sound perish caused by the subsequent": Below, this recounts a different doctrine and refutes it. This refers to different teachers of the Vaiśeṣika. The perishing of prior consciousness and sound is caused by the arising of the subsequent moment, because the subsequent and the prior are contrary in nature, just like subsequent water pressing upon the flow of prior water. Those teachers do not posit the four characteristics (lakṣaṇa); it is simply that the subsequent arising causes the prior moment to perish.

13.37

[On the text,] "That is also unreasonable … by what would it then be destroyed?": The author of the treatise refutes that [view] as also unreasonable. If two [moments] arose together, one could say that this destroys that. But a preceding and a succeeding awareness, or a preceding and a succeeding sound, do not arise simultaneously. If the preceding reaches the present, the succeeding moment has not yet arisen and has no real substance; it cannot be capable of destroying the preceding phenomenon. If the succeeding reaches the present, the preceding moment has already perished; how could a succeeding phenomenon destroy the preceding? Like doubt and knowledge, pain and pleasure, or greed and hatred, their self-characteristics are mutually contradictory, and logically they cannot exist simultaneously; how could one say that the succeeding destroys the preceding? Even granted that a succeeding moment could destroy the preceding, how could an indistinct awareness or sound in a succeeding stage destroy a distinct awareness or sound in a preceding stage? Even granted that an inferior succeeding [moment] could destroy a superior preceding [moment], and that in a continuous series a succeeding [moment] could destroy the preceding, by what would the final awareness or sound then be destroyed?

13.38

[On the text,] "Some hold that the destruction of a lamp flame has the nonexistence of duration as its cause": This is the doctrine of the Sthavira and Sammatīya schools. "Duration" refers to the characteristic of duration. If the characteristic of duration is present, phenomena cannot be destroyed; only when duration is nonexistent can phenomena be destroyed. Thus, for them, the destruction of a lamp flame takes the nonexistence of duration as its cause.

13.39

[On the text,] "Some hold that when a flame is destroyed, it is by the power of dharma and adharma": This is a divergent doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas. Dharma and adharma are subsumed under the category of quality (guṇa-padārtha). That which is beneficial to people is called dharma; that which is not beneficial to people is called adharma. By the power of these two, they can produce all phenomena and can destroy all phenomena. For example, in a dark room there is a bright lamp: from the perspective of the user, the presence of the lamp is beneficial, which is the arising of dharma; the extinguishment of the lamp is not beneficial, which is the destruction by adharma. From the perspective of a thief, the presence of the lamp is not beneficial, which is the arising of adharma; the extinguishment of the lamp is beneficial, which is the destruction by dharma.

13.40

[On the text,] "Both of these are unreasonable … because they are concordant and contradictory, being mutually opposed": The author of the treatise rejects both attachments together. Refuting the former attachment, he says: Generally speaking, the "nonexistence of duration" means there is no real substance. Because a phenomenon lacking real substance cannot constitute a cause, he says "a nonexistence is not a cause." Thus he formulates a syllogism: "The nonexistence of duration is not a cause, because it lacks real substance, just like a rabbit's horn." Refuting the latter attachment, he says: In a single moment, the Vaiśeṣika cannot have dharma and adharma both serve as the cause of arising, nor can dharma and adharma both serve as the cause of destruction, because from moment to moment, dharma is concordant and adharma is contradictory, the two being mutually opposed. How could two such phenomena both be causes of arising and destruction? Furthermore, the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Dharma and adharma are also not causes of destruction, because a flame is observed to continue in an empty cave (explaining this: a flame in an empty cave brings neither benefit nor harm; since there is no object, there is no dharma [or adharma], so what would serve as the cause of destruction?)."

13.41

[On the text,] "Or, in all … because all possess momentariness": This re-refutes the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, continuing from that discussion. You, the Vaiśeṣika master, could also imagine that in all conditioned phenomena, from moment to moment, there is this dharma and adharma acting as the cause of arising and destruction. Although you posit that dharma and adharma are distinct causes for arising and destruction, you thereby concede that conditioned phenomena arise and perish moment by moment. Since they continually arise and perish, your fundamental dispute with the Sammatīya over the absence of momentary destruction ought to cease, because by conceding that [destruction] does not depend on extraneous causes of destruction such as fire, all possess momentariness. Another explanation: This re-refutes both attachments. Or, in all conditioned phenomena, one could imagine from moment to moment that there is this cause of destruction consisting in the nonexistence of duration, or this cause of destruction consisting in dharma and adharma. If so, the fundamental dispute over the absence of momentary destruction ought to cease, because both agree that, not depending on extraneous causes of destruction such as fire, all possess momentariness. Another explanation: This re-refutes the Sammatīya. You, the Sammatīya, could also imagine that in all conditioned phenomena, from moment to moment, there is this primary cause of destruction. If so, your dispute with the Sammatīya over the absence of momentary destruction ought to cease, because by not depending on extraneous causes of destruction such as fire, all possess momentariness.

13.42

[On the text,] "Furthermore, if for the destruction of firewood and the like, contact with fire is the cause": Below, this explains the sixth line, that the cause of arising would then be capable of destruction. This takes up the attached view to refute it.

13.43

[On the text,] "In the arising of cooked transformations … the destruction of the lower and intermediate stages of cooking": This is the direct refutation. If you stubbornly maintain that fire is the cause when firewood and the like are destroyed, then the substance of the cause of arising would itself become the cause of destruction. For instance, when fire burns firewood, in the arising of cooked transformations there are three different grades—lower, intermediate, and upper: when it first turns yellow, it is called lower; next when black, intermediate; and finally when fully black, upper. The substance of the cause of arising would then become the cause of destruction. Why is that? Because contact between the firewood and the cause that is fire can cause the firewood to undergo three different grades of arising cooked transformations: when the intermediate stage of cooking arises, the lower stage of cooking is destroyed; when the upper stage of cooking arises, the intermediate stage of cooking is destroyed. The cause of the arising of the intermediate stage of cooking would then be the cause of the destruction of the lower stage of cooking, because at the very time the intermediate stage of cooking arises, the lower stage of cooking is destroyed; the cause of the arising of the upper stage of cooking would then be the cause of the destruction of the intermediate stage of cooking, because at the very time the upper stage of cooking arises, the intermediate stage of cooking is destroyed. Therefore it is said that the substance of the cause of arising would itself become the cause of destruction.

13.44

[On the text,] "Either identical or similar … destroys the lower and intermediate stages of cooking": This recounts their position to rescue their doctrine. Either the cause that produces the lower stage of cooking is itself capable of acting as the cause that destroys the lower stage of cooking, and it is not the cause producing the intermediate stage that destroys the lower stage; or the cause that produces the intermediate stage of cooking is itself capable of acting as the cause that destroys the intermediate stage of cooking, and it is not the cause producing the upper stage that destroys the intermediate stage. Hence it says "either identical." This is the "either identical" thesis. Or they shift their position: the cause producing the lower stage of cooking is similar to the cause destroying the lower stage of cooking, and the cause producing the intermediate stage of cooking is similar to the cause destroying the intermediate stage of cooking; although the two causes of arising and destruction in the flame are different, because they are mingled at the same time they appear similar—one is the cause of arising and one is the cause of destruction, so it is not a single entity that is the cause of both arising and destruction. Or their position is: the continuum of the flame is ceaseless and earlier and later [moments] are similar: the earlier is the cause of arising and the later is the cause of destruction, so it is not a single entity that is the cause of both arising and destruction. Or, [a cause] similar to the cause producing the lower stage of cooking is capable of acting as the cause that destroys the lower grade of cooking, but it is not the very cause producing the lower stage that destroys the lower stage; though appearing similar, their substances are distinct. Or, [a cause] similar to the cause producing the intermediate stage of cooking is capable of acting as the cause that destroys the intermediate grade of cooking, but it is not the very cause producing the intermediate stage that destroys the intermediate stage; though appearing similar, their substances are distinct. Hence it says "or similar." This is the "or similar" thesis.

13.45

[On the text,] "Then the substance of the cause of arising … or similar to this, it would not exist": This refutes the preceding two theses. Then the substance of the cause producing the lower or intermediate stage of cooking would itself be the cause of the destruction of the lower or intermediate stage of cooking. How could a cause of arising itself be a cause of destruction? This refutes the "either identical" thesis. Or, the cause of destruction and the cause of arising for the lower grade of cooking, or the cause of destruction and the cause of arising for the intermediate grade of cooking, would have similar substances and their characteristics would be undifferentiated. Since their substances are similar, how could one say that one is the cause of arising and one is the cause of destruction? This refutes the "or similar" thesis. From "it should not be" onwards, he refutes both schools together. "Identical" refers to the "either identical" thesis; "similar" refers to the "or similar" thesis. "Being" means arising; "non-being" means destruction. It should not be that by this very flame the lower and intermediate stages of cooking exist, and by this very same flame the lower and intermediate stages of cooking cease to exist. This refutes the "either identical" thesis. It should not be that by a flame similar to this the lower and intermediate stages of cooking exist, and by a flame similar to this the lower and intermediate stages of cooking cease to exist. This refutes the "or similar" thesis. This passage intertwines the refutation of both schools; the author's composition is ingenious and should be carefully reflected upon.

13.46

[On the text,] "Even granted that in a flame … the causes of arising and destruction are distinct": This grants [their point] hypothetically and then questions and refutes it. Even granted that in the flame, in its diverse arising—suddenly surging and suddenly subsiding, coming together or scattering, suddenly long and suddenly short, small or great—one might imagine that the cause capable of producing is distinct from the cause capable of destroying, yet with ash and the other six, which have no characteristics of surging and subsiding and are undifferentiated, when in contact with firewood and the like they cause the firewood to undergo the arising of cooked transformations, how could one imagine that the causes of arising and destruction are distinct?

13.47

[On the text,] "If so, then it is observed … what function does it perform?": The Sammatīya asks: If so, then boiling water is observed to diminish until exhausted; through this we clearly know that fire is the cause of destruction. If that were not so, what function would contact with fire perform therein?

13.48

[On the text,] "Through contact with the contingent fire … the principle is established": The author of the treatise answers. Through contact with the contingent external fire, the power of the internal fire-element increases. Because the internal fire-element increases, it can cause the aggregation of water to become progressively subtler without continuing; this is what is called the function performed by contact with fire. Fire only renders the preceding water powerless so that it does not induce subsequent water, and furthermore counteracts subsequent water so that it cannot arise; it does not destroy the preceding water. Therefore, there is no extraneous cause that destroys conditioned forces. All conditioned phenomena perish of their own nature from moment to moment without stopping; because their nature is destructible, because they perish naturally, they are destroyed as soon as they arise, and the meaning of momentariness is established. Because there is momentariness, there is definitely no motion; the uninterrupted [arising in] a different location is nominally designated as "motion." To falsely think there is motion is an overweening pride. Having completed his refutation, the author of the treatise tentatively concedes their transmission: since, by this principle, the motion maintained by the Sammatīya definitely does not exist, the Sarvāstivāda thesis that bodily informative matter is shape is established in principle. For the moment he recounts this provisional concession, but will immediately refute it in the next section.

13.49

[On the text,] "However, the Sautrāntika says … distinct category of corporeal substance": Below, the author of the treatise sets forth the Sautrāntika doctrine, refuting the Sarvāstivāda [claim] that shape-matter is substantially existent. This explains the seventh line of the verse, "shape is also not substantially real," clarifying that there is no real shape, but that it is nominally designated on the basis of color. That is, based on the different arrangements of color-matter, the shapes of long, short, square, and round are nominally established, as can be understood from the text.

13.50

[On the text,] "The remaining shapes should be understood accordingly": When the central surface is convex, "high shape" is nominally established; when concave, "low shape" is nominally established; when level, "regular shape" is nominally established; when uneven, "irregular shape" is nominally established. In reality, one sees color-matter, and the mind conceives of it as long and so on. A metaphor is introduced to illustrate this: like seeing a firebrand, when it is moved swiftly, one thinks it is long; when whirled around, one thinks it is round. This long and round are nominally established on the basis of the firebrand; in reality one sees the firebrand, and the mind conceives of it as long and so on. Shape being based on color is logically also like this; therefore shape has no real, distinct category of corporeal substance.

13.51

[On the text,] "If you maintain that it is substantially real … capable of apprehending shape": This explains the eighth line of the verse, "because it would be apprehended by two sense-faculties." The Sautrāntika master says: If you, the Sarvāstivāda school that maintains permanent existence, claim that real shape is distinct, then a single shape-matter would be apprehended by two physical sense-faculties. That is, with respect to the distinctions of long and so forth in a material aggregation, the visual faculty can see them, and the tactile faculty can touch them, both apprehending long and so on; consequently, the fault of being apprehended by two faculties would follow. Logically speaking, among the twelve sense bases, there is never a single rūpa-āyatana that is apprehended by two physical sense-faculties. Having refuted them logically, he indicates the correct view, saying: But just as mental consciousness, relying on tangible objects, apprehends nominal length and so on therein, so mental consciousness, relying on color, can apprehend nominal shape therein. Because shape is nominally established based on tangible objects and color, it is said to be apprehended by the mind.

13.52

[On the text,] "Is it not that touch and shape … capable of recollecting the color of the flower?": The Sarvāstivāda rescues its doctrine. "Being" means existing together; is it not that touch and shape are both present in a single aggregation? Relying on apprehending the tangible, the mind is able to recollect the shape previously seen; the body does not directly apprehend shape within touch. Therefore, there is no fault of a single rūpa-āyatana being apprehended by two faculties. A metaphor is introduced to illustrate this: like the eye seeing the red color of fire, the mind immediately recollects the heat of fire previously touched; the eye does not directly apprehend touch within color. Again, like the nose smelling the fragrance of a flower, the mind is able to recollect the color of the flower previously seen; the nose does not directly apprehend color within fragrance.

13.53

On "In this case, the two phenomena ... could remember the shape": The Sautrāntika objects: Here, the red color of fire and the hot touch of fire, or the fragrance of a flower and the visible color of that flower, are two phenomena that are invariably unseparated; therefore, due to apprehending one, one can remember the other. There is no such touch and no such shape that are invariably correlated and unseparated, because there is length and the like with a smooth touch, or at other times there is also length and the like with a rough touch. How could apprehending touch cause one to remember shape? Furthermore, pressing the objection hypothetically: If touch and shape are not invariably in the same conglomeration, yet apprehending touch causes one to remember shape, then since touch and visible color are also not invariably in the same conglomeration, visible color should also be invariably remembered due to touch. Moreover, just as visible color is not invariably tied to touch, when touching, one cannot cognize visible color because it is not invariably tied [to it]. Or shape-color, like visible color, being not invariably tied to touch, then at the time of apprehending touch one should be unable to cognize shape. But in actual truth it is not so: when closing one's eyes and touching, one is only able to cognize shape, not visible color; from this we know that shape is nominal and visible color is real. Therefore, you should not say that due to apprehending touch one is able to remember a previously seen real shape. If one remembers a real shape, why does one not remember visible color? Since one does not remember visible color, it is clear that shape is nominal. Another explanation: In actual truth, shape-color is not like that. Why is this? If there were a real shape, the body would directly apprehend it as well; therefore, one should not say that due to apprehending touch one is able to remember a previously seen real shape.

13.54

On "Or in brocade and the like ... has no real substantial entity": The Sautrāntika refutes further: Or in brocade and the like, looking from the left one sees a horse, looking from the right one sees an ox, looking straight on one sees a person, and looking upside down one sees a ghost—many different shapes of distinct kinds [appear]. Thus in a single place there would be many real shapes, which is logically impossible. Like various visible colors, which have many real entities without changing, shape-color therefore has no real substantial entity.

13.55

On "Furthermore, all existing ... nominally designate length and the like": The Sautrāntika raises another objection: Furthermore, all existing real forms with resistance among the five sense faculties and five sense fields must have distinct kinds of real atoms. Investigating thoroughly through reason, however, there are no atoms called 'long' and the like; therefore, it is precisely within the differentiated configuration of many atoms of visible color that 'long' and the like are nominally designated. Formulating an inference: Shape is not real, because it lacks distinct atoms, like a flower in the sky.

13.56

On "If it is said that precisely by means of ... agglomeration and configuration": The Sautrāntika cites and refutes the Sarvāstivādin's rescue: If you say that precisely the configuration of shape atoms is called 'long' and the like, thereby showing that the previously stated reason 'lacking distinct atoms' incurs the fault of being unproven (asiddhi), this is merely partisan bias, for I do not accept it, as it is unestablished for both parties (aprasiddha). Another explanation: This is merely partisan bias toward the Vaiśeṣika doctrine. In their school, visible color and shape have distinct individual essences, which is unestablished for both. If the substantial entity of shape atoms were established for both, they could be configured to form 'long' and the like; but the substantial entity of shape atoms is not established for both like visible color—how could they be configured? *Nyāyānusāra* recounts the Sarvāstivādin's rescue, stating: "Has it not already been said that it is precisely shape atoms, configured in such a way, that are obtained by eye-consciousness as an accumulated differentiation, nominally designated as length and the like?" In accord with the intent of the *Nyāyānusāra*'s rescue, establishing nominal 'long' and the like is known by mental consciousness, not cognized by the five consciousnesses. If refuting from the position of the *Kośa* master: The original intent of your school was to establish 'long' and the like as real; pressed by objections, you now claim that 'long' and the like are nominal.

13.57

On "Is it not seen ... yet their shape-characteristics differ": The Sarvāstivādin rescues: Is it not directly seen in various earthenware vessels and the like that they share the same visible color, whether blue or yellow, yet the shapes of pots, basins, and the like are distinct from one another? Therefore, we know that apart from visible color there is a real, separate shape.

13.58

On "Has it not already been explained ... the principle should likewise be so": The Sautrāntika refutes again: Has this point not already been explained above? It is precisely the differentiation in the configuration of multiple items of visible color that is nominally designated as 'long' and the like, or the difference between pots and basins. Drawing an analogy to illustrate: Just as a multitude of ants and the like have the same black appearance without difference, yet sometimes their configurations differ as a long line or a circular wheel; apart from the appearance of the ants and the like, there is no separate line or wheel. For shape being based on visible color and the like, the principle should likewise be so: apart from visible color and the like, there is no separate shape. 'Visible color and the like' includes touch by 'and the like'.

13.59

On "Is it not that in the dark ... configured as shape": The Sarvāstivādin rescues: Is it not that in the dark or from a distance, when looking with the eyes at a post or the like, one only cognizes shapes such as 'long' and does not cognize visible colors such as 'blue'? This clearly shows that apart from visible color there is a separate real shape. Why would it be that visible color and the like are configured as shape?

13.60

On "Because in the dark or at a distance ... only knows the gross accumulation": The Sautrāntika resolves and explains: Because in the dark or from a distance, when observing many visible colors, they are not very clear, yet they are not entirely unapprehended; therefore mental consciousness merely gives rise to conceptual discriminations of long, short, square, round, and the like, not seeing a real shape. Drawing an analogy to illustrate: Just as from afar or in the dark, when looking at a grove of trees or a crowd of people, mental consciousness only cognizes the nominal line of trees or the nominal army of people, without knowing the distinct characteristics of the trees or people. Another explanation: Mental consciousness only cognizes the line of trees or the army of people, while eye-consciousness does not know the distinct characteristics of the trees or people. The line and army illustrate shape; the distinct characteristics illustrate visible color. The principle must certainly be so. What is this principle? Because sometimes mental consciousness does not cognize the distinction between visible color and shape; mental consciousness only knows the gross accumulation of nominal marks. Another explanation: Eye-consciousness does not cognize either visible color or shape; mental consciousness only knows the gross accumulation of nominal marks. Because it is not distinct, it is called 'not cognizing visible color'; because it does not apprehend shape, it is called 'not cognizing shape'. Another explanation: Eye-consciousness does not cognize it clearly, so visible color is not distinct, which is called 'not cognizing visible color', not that it fails to cognize it entirely. Mental consciousness does not cognize shape, because it does not discriminate shape, which is called 'not cognizing shape'. Mental consciousness only knows the gross accumulation of nominal marks.

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese