俱舍論記 14

English (machine translation) 14

Language: English

"The digression having ended... the characteristics of informative and uninformative action": from here on is the third part, extensively explaining informative and uninformative action. Within this, there are two parts: first, explaining the three kinds of uninformative action; second, individually explaining according to the three. This explains the three kinds of uninformative action, concluding the previous and introducing the inquiry.

14.4

As for '[The stanza says: ...] therefore it is called restraint (saṃvara)': this is the answer. 'Able to ward off' means able to ward off the continuity of bad morality; 'able to eliminate' means able to eliminate the continuity of bad morality; hence it is called restraint. Another explanation: it can ward off the continuity of bad morality that would be induced in the future, and eliminate the continuity of bad morality capable of being induced from the past. Yet another explanation: prātimokṣa morality is able to ward off the continuity of bad morality, while absorption and path morality are able to eliminate the continuity of bad morality; hence it is called restraint. Restraint (lǜ, sam-) means law/regulation; comportment (yí, -vara) means decorum. Because vijñapti does not extend everywhere, it is not spoken of here. The rest of the text is clear.

14.5

As for 'How many distinctions are there of such restraints?': below this, the text explains the three separately. Within this, there are five parts: first, explaining the restraints separately; second, explaining their possession in general; third, explaining the causes and conditions for acquiring them; fourth, explaining the distinctions in abandoning them; fifth, examining their possession in terms of realm. In the first part, explaining the restraints separately: first, explaining the three wholesome restraints; second, explaining the first restraint in detail. Here, this is the first, explaining the three wholesome restraints. It introduces the stanza with a question.

14.6

As for '[The stanza says: ...] means undefiled morality': this is the reply text, which is easy to understand.

14.7

As for 'What are the distinctions in the characteristics of the first restraint?': below this is the second part, explaining the first restraint in detail. Within this, there are three parts: first, explaining the characteristics of the first restraint; second, establishing the four restraints; third, explaining the different designations for separate liberation (prātimokṣa). Here, this is the first, explaining the characteristics of the first restraint, introducing the verse with a question.

14.8

As for '[The stanza says: ...] each distinct and not mutually contradictory': this is the answer. The first line distinguishes the names, and the lower three lines distinguish the substance.

14.9

As for 'The treatise says: [...] prātimokṣa restraint': this explains the first line. 'Bhikṣu' is rendered in Tang Chinese as 'beggar-scholar' (qǐshì); the older rendering 'bǐqiū' was corrupt. 'Bhikṣuṇī': bhikṣu is explained as before, and 'nī' is the feminine ending. In Sanskrit, 'śikṣamāṇā', rendered in Tang Chinese as 'correctly training', where 'correctly' means correctly training in the six dharmas. The six dharmas are: not engaging in sexual misconduct, not stealing, not killing, not uttering false speech, not drinking intoxicants, and not eating at improper times. In Sanskrit, 'śrāmaṇeraka', rendered in Tang Chinese as 'diligent striver', meaning one who exerts diligence on behalf of the bhikṣus; 'ka' is the masculine ending. The older rendering 'shāmí' was corrupt. In Sanskrit, 'śrāmaṇerikā', rendered in Tang Chinese as 'female diligent striver'; the explanation of the name is as before; 'kā' is the feminine ending. The older rendering 'shāmíní' was corrupt. In Sanskrit, 'upāsaka', rendered in Tang Chinese as 'serving attendant'; 'ka' is the masculine ending. The older rendering 'yōupósè' was corrupt. As for 'serving attendant', the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 123, says: 'Question: Why is he called an upāsaka? Answer: Because he approaches and attends to all wholesome dharmas; that is, because his body and mind habituate themselves to wholesome dharmas, he is called an upāsaka. Other teachers say: because he approaches and serves good persons. Still others say: because he approaches and serves all Buddhadharmas.' It is explained at length as in that text. In Sanskrit, 'upāsikā', rendered in Tang Chinese as 'female serving attendant'; the explanation of the name is as before; 'kā' is the feminine ending. The older rendering 'yōupóyí' was corrupt. In Sanskrit, 'upoṣadha', rendered in Tang Chinese as 'dwelling close'. As for 'dwelling close', the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 124, says: 'Dwelling close to the arhats, because by receiving this restraint, one trains after them. Some say: this dwells close to the lifelong precepts, hence it is called dwelling close. Some say: this precept dwells for a brief time, hence it is called dwelling close.' Among these eight, the first five are monastic precepts and the latter three are lay precepts. The first seven are lifelong precepts, while the last one is a precept for a day and a night. Although these eight are distinct, they are collectively termed the first, the prātimokṣa restraint. Question: Why are these eight established based on the prātimokṣa restraint, and not based on the dhyāna or anāsrava restraints? The explanation says: because the prātimokṣa restraint is obtained gradually, it is established gradually, so the eightfold distinction can be established based on it. The seven limbs of dhyāna and anāsrava [restraints] are obtained all at once, so the eightfold distinction cannot be established based on them. Another explanation: prātimokṣa precepts pertain only to the eight assemblies of the human destiny of the desire realm, and also solely to the human destiny of the desire realm; therefore it is established based on them. Dhyāna and anāsrava [restraints] both apply to higher realms and also arise in the heavenly destiny; therefore the eightfold distinction is not established based on them.

14.10

As for 'Although there are eight names [...] there is no separate upāsikā restraint': this explains the second line. Although there are eight names according to different persons, in terms of their actual substance there are only four kinds: apart from the bhikṣu restraint there is no separate bhikṣuṇī restraint; apart from the śrāmaṇeraka restraint there is no separate six-dharma restraint of the śikṣamāṇā. Regarding the ten-precept restraint of the śrāmaṇerikā: the śrāmaṇerikā first receives the ten precepts and later receives the six dharmas; although she further acquires the six dharmas, they are identical to six precepts among the ten precepts, and so the ten precepts of the śrāmaṇerikā and the six dharmas of the śikṣamāṇā are not different from the ten dharmas of the śrāmaṇeraka. Another explanation: when becoming a śikṣamāṇā, one does not acquire six dharmas separately; it is only receiving the instructional practice again, enjoining her to maintain what was previously received, so these six dharmas are just six among the ten precepts. Therefore, it is said that the ten precepts of the śikṣamāṇā and the śrāmaṇerikā are not different from the ten precepts of the śrāmaṇeraka. The eight precepts of dwelling close (upoṣadha) are for only one day and night; because the time is short, men and women are not divided, and so it stands alone as one.

14.11

As for 'How is this known to be so?': below this explains the third line. This is a question.

14.12

As for 'Due to the transformation of bodily form [...] they are not separate from the three substances': this cites the stanza in direct answer. For example, when the faculty transforms, there is no abandoning or acquiring of the precepts; only the name differs. That is, at the time of faculty transformation: if a bhikṣu transforms faculties to become a woman, it causes his original bhikṣu restraint to be called the bhikṣuṇī restraint; if a bhikṣuṇī transforms faculties to become a man, it causes her original bhikṣuṇī restraint to be called the bhikṣu restraint. Question: The precepts of a bhikṣu and a bhikṣuṇī differ in number; how can it be that upon faculty transformation the names differ while the substance is the same? The explanation says: men and women differ, and permissions and prohibitions vary; because of varying conditions, they are said to be two hundred and fifty, or five hundred, but in terms of their seven limbs, the precept-substances are entirely equal. Another explanation: based on the root seven limbs, the precepts of the two assemblies are equal; but in terms of the prohibitive precepts, they differ in number. Although the prohibitive precepts differ, when the precepts were first received, the two assemblies mutually acquired them. Why is that? Both bhikṣus and bhikṣuṇīs make the vow to sever all evils; by the power of this vow, they mutually acquire the prohibitive precepts. Although both mutually acquire them, due to distinct conditions, their observance and violation differ, and the prescribed offenses are distinct. Another explanation: regarding the substance of the prohibitive precepts, they differ in number. Before the faculty transforms, if one receives this category of precepts, one acquires this category of precepts. At the time of faculty transformation, upon entering that category, one does not separately acquire the prohibitive precepts; although there are no prohibitive precepts, because of transgressing the teaching, one also incurs that offense. If a śrāmaṇeraka transforms faculties to become a woman, it causes his original śrāmaṇeraka restraint to be called the śrāmaṇerikā restraint; because she has not acquired the six dharmas or has not repeatedly received instruction and restriction regarding the six dharmas, she is not called a śikṣamāṇā. If a śrāmaṇerikā or a śikṣamāṇā transforms faculties to become a man, it causes her original śrāmaṇerikā restraint and śikṣamāṇā restraint to be called the śrāmaṇeraka restraint, because those ten precepts and the six dharmas are both identical to the ten kinds of precepts of the śrāmaṇeraka. If an upāsaka transforms faculties to become a woman, it causes his original upāsaka restraint to be called the upāsikā restraint; if an upāsikā transforms faculties to become a man, it causes her original upāsikā restraint to be called the upāsaka restraint. As for the day-and-night upoṣadha, although there is faculty transformation, because separate names for male and female are not established, it is not spoken of separately. At the time of faculty transformation, there are no causes or conditions for abandoning previously acquired restraints, because the four kinds of abandoning conditions are absent. At the time of faculty transformation, there are no causes or conditions for acquiring previously unacquired restraints, because the causes and conditions for receiving precepts are absent. The four restraints of bhikṣuṇī, śrāmaṇerikā, śikṣamāṇā, and upāsikā are not separate from the three substances of bhikṣu, śrāmaṇeraka, and upāsaka.

14.13

As for 'If from an upāsaka [...] do they arise complete all at once?': below this explains the fourth line. The question is: if from an upāsaka one receives the śrāmaṇeraka precepts, and further from a śrāmaṇeraka one receives the bhikṣu precepts, are these three restraints due to augmenting and completing the abstinences, or augmenting and completing the preparations? 'Abstinence' is another name for precept, because one stays far from evil. 'Preparation' means the preparatory effort of seeking the precepts, because one seeks the subsequent precepts. Due to further augmenting and completing, there are differences from the prior ones, establishing distinct names: adding five onto the five precepts makes ten precepts called śrāmaṇeraka; adding two hundred and forty onto the ten precepts makes two hundred and fifty called bhikṣu. Just as adding one to a single coin makes a pair of gold coins, adding five onto five makes ten, and adding ten onto ten makes twenty? Or do the three precept-substances arise complete and all at once, each separately?

14.14

As for 'The three restraints [...] according to what is appropriate': this answers and explains the verse's 'each distinct'. The three kinds of restraints, according to their numbers, arise each separately all at once. If one reflects on it, it can be understood. The eight precepts should also be questioned and answered here, but because of the brevity of time, they are omitted and not discussed.

14.15

As for 'If so, when compared, how do those of the same kind differ?': this is a question. How do the three kinds of non-killing, etc., of the same class differ from one another?

14.16

As for 'Due to the difference of causes and conditions, they differ when compared': this is the answer. Due to the differences in internal causes and external conditions, they differ when compared.

14.17

As for 'How is that?': this is a query.

14.18

As for 'Just as one seeks and receives [...] therefore the three are each distinct': this is the explanation. Those who receive precepts are not one, which is called 'just as'. The precept-substances are not one, which is called 'in such and such a way'. Just as one seeks and receives, according to what is appropriate, the multiple kinds of training rules—training rules meaning precepts—in such and such a way, according to what is appropriate, when one is able to abandon the multiple grounds of negligence such as high and broad beds, drinking intoxicants, and so forth, one thereby abandons the numerous conditions for killing, stealing, and so forth, and is able to give rise to these precepts. Because all abstinences arise dependent on internal causes and external conditions, when the causes and conditions differ, the abstinences are distinct. 'Causes differ' means the mind seeking the precepts differs: either seeking the five precepts, or seeking the ten precepts, or seeking the full ordination precepts; hence it is called 'causes differ'. 'Conditions differ' means the conditions for receiving the precepts differ, namely the upādhyāya, ācārya, and so forth. If receiving the five precepts, it is before one person; if receiving the ten precepts, it is before two persons; if receiving the full ordination precepts, it is before ten persons, and so forth; hence it is called 'conditions differ'. Because of these differences in causes and conditions, the abstinences differ. To challenge by reductio ad absurdum: if this were not so, and the three kinds of non-killing and so forth were gradually augmented and completed, then when abandoning the bhikṣu restraint, at that time the three restraints of upāsaka, śrāmaṇeraka, and bhikṣu should all be abandoned, because the previous two—upāsaka and śrāmaṇeraka—would be subsumed within the latter one, bhikṣu. Since that is not accepted, the three are therefore each distinct. Because the three are distinct, when one abandons the bhikṣu precepts one is still called a śrāmaṇeraka, and when one further abandons the śrāmaṇeraka precepts one is still called an upāsaka.

14.19

"However, these three kinds [...] does not thereby fail to be an upāsaka, and so forth" explains that they do not conflict. The three [disciplines of] non-killing and so forth do not conflict with one another in a single mental continuum; they operate simultaneously at the exact same moment. It is not because one receives the later śrāmaṇera or bhikṣu discipline that one abandons the earlier upāsaka or śrāmaṇera discipline, for that is not a condition for abandoning them. It is not the case that in abandoning the bhikṣu precepts one ceases to be a śrāmaṇera, nor that in abandoning the śrāmaṇera precepts one ceases to be an upāsaka. Since even when abandoning the later one can still be designated by the earlier, one knows that one possesses all three disciplines within one's person. Although two or three disciplines may be present in a single person, because the later discipline is superior, one receives one's designation from the superior one. Question: If one has not received the earlier precepts, does one obtain the later precepts? Answer: As the Vibhāṣā, fascicle 124, states: "Question: If one receives the śrāmaṇera discipline without having previously received the upāsaka discipline, does one obtain the śrāmaṇera discipline? Some say one does not, because the upāsaka discipline serves as the doorway, the basis, and the preparatory application for this [śrāmaṇera] discipline. Some say it is indefinite: if, out of ignorance that one must first receive the upāsaka discipline and only then can one obtain the śrāmaṇera discipline, one receives this discipline trusting the precept-master, he obtains the discipline, while the precept-master incurs an offence. If he understands that receiving the upāsaka discipline first and then the śrāmaṇera discipline is the proper ritual procedure, but out of arrogance does not wish to receive and train in the upāsaka discipline, saying: 'What use is receiving these inferior upāsaka precepts?,' his mind being bound by arrogance, he does not obtain them even though he undergoes the ritual. Just as it is said of receiving the śrāmaṇera discipline without receiving the upāsaka discipline, so too it is extensively explained for receiving the bhikṣu discipline without receiving the śrāmaṇera discipline." Question: If one has taken a later precept and turns back to receive an earlier precept, does one obtain the precept? Answer: As the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 36, states: "If a śrāmaṇera receives the upāsaka discipline, or a bhikṣu receives the previous two kinds of precepts, do they obtain them upon receiving them? Some say: This should not be questioned. If one already possessed them previously, there is no principle by which one would obtain them anew, since they were already obtained before. If one did not possess them previously, then one would be neither a śrāmaṇera nor a bhikṣu, because if one has not previously received the upāsaka discipline, there is certainly no principle by which one could obtain the śrāmaṇera discipline; and if one has not previously received the śrāmaṇera discipline, there is likewise no principle by which one could obtain the bhikṣu discipline—thus neither designation could be established. Inferring in this way, one should not obtain them upon reception. Other masters say: Even without receiving the previous discipline, there is also the principle that one can immediately obtain the later discipline. Therefore, the vinaya-holders recite: 'Although he previously did not receive the śrāmaṇera precepts, now merely receiving the complete discipline, he is also called one who has well received the complete discipline.' Hence, it is possible for a śrāmaṇera to receive and obtain the upāsaka discipline, and there is the principle that a bhikṣu may receive and obtain the śrāmaṇera and upāsaka disciplines. [Objection:] Would not a śrāmaṇera be inappropriate to declare of himself: 'May you bear witness that I am an upāsaka'? A bhikṣu likewise would be inappropriate to declare of himself: 'May you bear witness that I am the preceding two.' For apart from such an self-declaration, there is no principle by which one obtains the upāsaka or śrāmaṇera discipline. [Response:] This objection is unreasonable, because both can be declared; that is, he can declare: 'I am a śrāmaṇera and also an upāsaka; may you bear witness.' The bhikṣu should likewise speak appropriately. However, it is also no fault to designate him with those two names with respect to the superior discipline. If so, a śrāmaṇera or a bhikṣu should also be able to receive and obtain the upavāsa discipline. If they obtain it as they would the upāsaka [discipline], what fault would there be in accepting this? Yet because it is inferior, no one aspires to receive it."

14.20

"Upāsaka, upavāsa [...] up to bhikṣu discipline" is the second section, establishing the four disciplines. Anointing with perfumes and wearing garlands make one precept, and watching dances and listening to songs make another. Another explanation: one must not dance, sing, watch, or listen; hence, when arriving at the ten [precepts], they are opened into two kinds. Question: Why are they combined into eight and opened into ten? The explanation says: for householders the fault is slight, so the two are combined into one; for the renunciant community criticism and suspicion are grave, so one is opened into two. Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā says: "Because abstaining from anointing with perfumes and garlands and abstaining from songs, dances, and entertainments both function with respect to bodily ornament, they are combined and established as a single branch." Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 36, says: "In order to attract householder sentient beings who are timid and fearful of numerous rules of training, and to show that it is easy to accept and maintain, two are combined into one among the eight precepts." Question: Why is receiving and keeping gold and so forth not established among the upavāsa precepts, but included among the ten precepts? The explanation says: householders are indulgently attached to gold, silver, and other treasures and are not yet able to stay away from them, so the upavāsa discipline does not institute this precept. Śrāmaṇeras and renunciants should not be indulgently attached to gold, silver, and other treasures to the hindrance and ruin of their cultivation of the path; therefore, it is separately established as one among the ten precepts. If one undertakes to abstain from all bodily and vocal misdeeds that should be avoided, that constitutes the fourth precept. The remainder of the text is understandable.

14.21

"Prātimokṣa discipline [...] is therefore called śīla" is the third section, explaining the synonyms of prātimokṣa. Being able to level and calm dangerous and evil unwholesome actions, it is therefore called śīla; this is the first name. Keeping the precepts causes body and mind to be cool and refreshed, because of peace and happiness. Breaking the precepts causes body and mind to be feverish and tormented, because of regret. The quoted verse can be understood.

14.22

"Praised by the wise, it is therefore called good conduct (sucarita)" is the second. Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra says: "Or because practicing this yields agreeable fruits."

14.23

"Being the intrinsic nature of what is done, it is therefore called karma" is the third. That is, the intrinsic nature of the precept itself is what is performed, so it is called karma.

14.24

"Is it not that non-information [...] the intrinsic nature of what is done?" raises a question. That information (vijñapti) is called karma is indeed correct. But is it not that non-information (avijñapti) is also called 'non-action' in the sūtras? How can it now be called 'the intrinsic nature of what is done'?"

14.25

"One with a sense of shame [...] obtains the designation of 'action'" answers. The sūtra speaks of 'non-action' because one with a sense of shame and modesty, through the power of receiving non-information, does not perform manifold evils, and so it is called 'non-action'. The treatise speaks of 'what is done' because, being enacted by bodily and vocal information as well as volition, it obtains the name of 'what is done'.

14.26

"Another master explains [...] it is called action without fault" relates a different explanation. Non-information is later, being the cause of the resultant action, and is therefore named after the fruit; or, being the fruit of the previous informational volition, which is the cause of the action, it is therefore named after the cause. Calling it 'action' is without fault.

14.27

"Being able to guard body and speech, it is therefore called discipline (saṃvara)" is the fourth. Because it is able to guard body and speech, preventing them from committing faults, it is called discipline.

14.28

"Thus it should be known [...] is called subsequent arising" explains the fifth and sixth names, commenting on the lower two lines. Thus it should be known that the prātimokṣa precept has no differentiated name throughout its initial moment and all subsequent moments. Only the information and non-information of the very first moment obtain the fifth name, 'prātimokṣa', and the sixth name, 'path of karma' (karmapatha). Why is this? Because at the time of receiving the precepts, the information and non-information of the initial moment, such as the precept of non-killing, individually and distinctly renounce manifold evils like killing living beings, it is established with the name 'prātimokṣa' (individual liberation) in the sense of this initial distinct renunciation. That is, in the initial moment, the wholesome deeds performed are all brought to completion; based on the sense that the generating volition is fully discharged, the name 'path of karma' is established. The generating volition, in its enacting, is called karma. The initial information and non-information are the pathway trodden by volition, called the path of karma; hence they are named 'path of karma'. Therefore, the initial distinct renunciation of evil in the very first moment is called prātimokṣa. Its initial distinct prevention is also called the prātimokṣa discipline. In terms of fulfilling the volition, it can also be called a fundamental path of karma. From the second moment onward, as long as it has not been abandoned, it is not an initial distinct renunciation of evil, and so is not called prātimokṣa; but because it can guard and prevent, it obtains the name 'discipline'. Being the discipline of individual liberation, it is called the 'prātimokṣa discipline'. Because it does not fulfill the volition, it is not called a path of karma. Being subsequent to the fundamental [path], it is called 'subsequent arising'.

14.29

"Who possesses which discipline?" introduces below the second general explanation of possession. Within this, there are: first, a general explanation of the possession of the three disciplines; and second, an explanation of possession with respect to the [three] time periods. In the general explanation of the possession of the three disciplines, there are: first, the direct explanation of general possession; second, the incidental explanation of the severance of discipline; and third, the harmonization of the two disciplines mentioned in the sūtras. This is the first, directly explaining general possession. It is the question raised before the verse.

14.30

"The verse says [...] the latter two operate in conformity with the mind" is the answer. The first line explains the possession of prātimokṣa, the next two lines explain the possession of the meditative and path precepts, and the bottom line shows their difference.

14.31

"The commentary says [...] up to upavāsa" explains the first line, clarifying that the eight classes of persons possess prātimokṣa.

14.32

"Do non-Buddhists have no precepts that they receive?" asks the question.

14.33

"Although they have them, they are not named [...] because they rely on and are attached to existence" answers. Although non-Buddhists may receive precepts such as non-killing, these are only called intermediate precepts and are not called prātimokṣa precepts, because what they receive lacks the capacity to perpetually and individually liberate them from manifold evil dharmas, and because they rely upon and cling to the ripening fruit of the three realms of existence; therefore, they are not called prātimokṣa precepts.

14.34

"Born of dhyāna [...] this too should be likewise" explains the second and third lines of the verse, where one who attains dhyāna possesses [the discipline] of dhyāna, clarifying the dhyāna discipline. The phrase 'born of dhyāna' in the verse means that this discipline arises from dhyāna, explained in terms of the generative cause (janaka-hetu); or that it relies upon dhyāna, explained in terms of the supportive cause (āśraya-hetu). Hence it is called the discipline born of dhyāna. One who attains dhyāna definitely possesses this dhyāna discipline. The preparatory thresholds (sāmantaka) of the dhyānas are also called dhyāna, just as rice fields in the vicinity of a village obtain the name of the village. For these preparatory stages, the principle should also be likewise.

14.35

"The discipline born of the path [...] refers to those in training and those beyond training" explains the second and third lines of the verse, where one who attains the noble state possesses [the discipline] born of the path, clarifying the uncontaminated discipline. 'Path' refers to the uncontaminated noble path; because it can generate the discipline, it is called the discipline born of the path.

14.36

"Among those analyzed previously [...] what are the two?" explains the fourth line. It cites the preceding text to raise the question.

14.37

"Those born of dhyāna [...] because it also operates constantly" answers. The two born of concentration and the path operate in conformity with the mind, whereas prātimokṣa does not. Why is this? Because this prātimokṣa also operates constantly during states of different minds that are unwholesome or indeterminate, and even in mindless states; therefore, it is not called a precept that operates in conformity with the mind. If this prātimokṣa precept were called one that operates in conformity with the mind, it could only be said to follow along when a wholesome mind arises, and would necessarily be severed when an unwholesome or indeterminate mind arises or in mindless states.

14.38

Regarding "[Disciplines arising from] dhyāna and anāsrava... are called the discipline of abandonment": this is the second [section], which directly explains the discipline of abandonment (prahāṇa-saṃvara). Because it is explained in the text on possession (prāpti), it is also classified under the heading of possession. The rest of the text is self-evident. "Abandonment" refers to the antidote of abandonment (prahāṇa-pratipakṣa). Thus, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 119, states: "Question: Why is only this called the discipline of abandonment? Answer: Because it acts as the antidote of abandonment against the breach of moral discipline and the afflictions that give rise to the breach of moral discipline. That is, the two concomitant disciplines within the first eight uninterrupted paths act as the antidote of abandonment only against the afflictions that give rise to the breach of moral discipline. The two concomitant disciplines within the ninth uninterrupted path act as the antidote of abandonment against both the breach of moral discipline and the afflictions that give rise to the breach of moral discipline" (end of treatise passage). According to these passages, only the concomitant discipline of the nine uninterrupted paths of the threshold concentration (anāgamya) serves as the antidote of abandonment with respect to the bad discipline of the desire realm and the afflictions that give rise to it. Although the five levels beginning with the first dhyāna have no antidote of abandonment with respect to the breach of moral discipline and so forth, they do possess the antidote of revulsion (vidūṣaṇā-pratipakṣa), and therefore possess the concomitant discipline. The formless realm, with respect to the breach of moral discipline and so forth, lacks both abandonment and revulsion, and therefore lacks the concomitant discipline. Although the path belonging to the subsequent knowledge of the form realm lacks both the antidotes of abandonment and revulsion with respect to the breach of moral discipline and so forth, it possesses the two antidotes of maintenance (ādhāra-pratipakṣa) and distance (dūrībhāva-pratipakṣa), and therefore possesses the concomitant discipline. Question: Since the formless realm, with respect to the breach of moral discipline and so forth in the desire realm, also possesses the two antidotes of maintenance and distance, it should possess the concomitant discipline. The explanation is: although it possesses maintenance and distance, because it turns away from form it is called the formless realm, and therefore it lacks the concomitant discipline. In summary, there are five antidotes: first, relinquishment; second, abandonment; third, maintenance; fourth, distance; and fifth, revulsion. With respect to the breach of moral discipline and so forth, the threshold concentration is complete with all five. The five levels beginning with the first dhyāna lack relinquishment and abandonment, but possess maintenance, distance, and revulsion. The formless realm lacks relinquishment, abandonment, and revulsion, but possesses maintenance and distance. These five antidotes are stated in this way according to the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 17. The detailed explanation is as found there.

14.39

Regarding "From this, there may be... anāsrava discipline": the four alternatives comparing the dhyāna discipline to the discipline of abandonment are self-evident.

14.40

Regarding "Likewise, there may be... as appropriate, it should be known": the four alternatives comparing the anāsrava discipline to the discipline of abandonment are to be understood according to the preceding. The first alternative is: the remaining anāsrava disciplines, excluding the anāsrava discipline of the nine uninterrupted paths of the threshold concentration. The second alternative is: the sāsrava discipline based on the nine uninterrupted paths of the threshold concentration. The third alternative is: the anāsrava discipline based on the nine uninterrupted paths of the threshold concentration. The fourth alternative is: all other sāsrava disciplines, excluding the sāsrava discipline of the nine uninterrupted paths of the threshold concentration.

14.41

Regarding "If so, why did the World-Honoured One... what is their intrinsic nature?": from here down is the third [section], reconciling the two disciplines mentioned in the sūtras, posing a question based on scripture. If only bodily and vocal [actions] are called discipline, why did the World-Honoured One, in stating the summary discipline, designate all three—body, speech, and mind—as discipline and praise them as excellent? In speaking of all-encompassing discipline, all three kinds are spoken of collectively. Furthermore, why does the sūtra also speak of the discipline of the eye faculty? The former sūtra spoke of the mental discipline, and the latter sūtra spoke of the eye faculty's discipline; what is their intrinsic nature?

14.42

"The intrinsic nature of these two is not unmanifest form": this is the answer.

14.43

"If so, what are they?": this is the enquiry.

14.44

Regarding "The verse states... showing they are not to be matched respectively": this is the explanation. "Mind" refers to the mental discipline; "faculty" refers to the discipline of the eye faculty. In order to show that both take correct knowledge (saṃprajanya) and correct mindfulness (smṛti) as their substance, the verse first lists the names of correct knowledge and correct mindfulness, and then states the word "combined". That is, the earlier summary discipline stated that mental discipline takes wisdom and mindfulness as its substance, and this combination of wisdom and mindfulness constitutes the eye faculty's discipline in the later sūtra; thus they are first separate and then combined. The words "showing they are not to be matched respectively" assign them to the two disciplines. As for why wisdom and mindfulness are called discipline: wisdom is able to discern, and mindfulness is able to remember; the power of these two is strong, guarding and restraining the mind and the eye faculty, preventing faults and transgressions from arising regarding objects; therefore they are called discipline, and are not unmanifest form. One should also speak fully of the six faculties including the eye and so on; not mentioning the ear and the rest is merely an omission for brevity. Thus, Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 36, says: "Therefore the sūtra states: 'Having seen form with the eye, one is neither pleased nor distressed, but constantly abides in equanimity with correct knowledge and correct mindfulness. So it is up to: having cognized dharmas with the mind.'"

14.45

Regarding "Now it should be examined... up to what point in time?": from here down is the second [major section], clarifying possession in terms of the time periods (adhvan). Within this, first is the question, and second is the answer. This is the question: Now it should be examined: regarding manifest and unmanifest, which person possesses which manifest and unmanifest [karma]? Within the three time periods, up to what point in time?

14.46

Regarding "First, the possession of unmanifest discipline and non-discipline will be differentiated": from here down is the answer. Within the answer: first, clarifying the possession of the unmanifest; second, clarifying the possession of the manifest; third, clarifying the alternative designations of non-discipline; fourth, possessing both manifest and unmanifest. Within the first, clarifying the possession of the unmanifest: first, possessing the good and the bad in terms of the time periods; second, possessing the intermediate in terms of the time periods; third, abiding in good or bad while possessing the intermediate. This is the first, possessing the good and bad in terms of the time periods. Within this: first, stating the thesis; second, the direct explanation. This is stating the thesis.

14.47

Regarding "The verse states... abiding in concentration or path, one possesses the intermediate": this is the direct explanation. In the verse, the first three lines clarify the prātimokṣa discipline; the fourth line clarifies non-discipline; the fifth and sixth lines clarify the dhyāna discipline; the seventh line clarifies the anāsrava discipline; and the eighth line clarifies both concentration and the path.

14.48

Regarding "The commentary states... because their power is slight and inferior": this explains the first three lines. One who abides in prātimokṣa, so long as they have not yet relinquished the precepts, constantly possesses the present. From the second moment onward after the initial moment, one also possesses the past. The words "not yet relinquished" in the second line extend universally through to the subsequent non-discipline and so forth. There is no unmanifest form of the scattered plane of the desire realm that is possessed in the future, because it is a form that does not conform to the mind, is not the single fruit of the mind, and its power is slight and inferior. Precisely for this reason, one also cannot possess the precepts from a past life.

14.49

Regarding "As it is said, one who abides... also possesses the past": this explains the fourth line. One who abides in non-discipline, up to the time they have not yet relinquished that bad discipline, constantly possesses the present. From the second moment onward after the initial moment, one also possesses the past.

14.50

Regarding "All those who have acquired... will inevitably reacquire it": this explains the fifth and sixth lines. All those who have acquired the dhyāna discipline, up to the time they have not yet relinquished those precepts, constantly possess the past and future. Because the past discipline of concentration lost in a previous life is inevitably reacquired in this initial moment. Question: As the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 17, states: "The discipline concomitant with the heat [stage] has the antidote of relinquishment against the breach of moral discipline." Furthermore, Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 61, states: "All those who previously have not yet separated from desire and passion, relying on the wisdom arisen from reflection, induce the wholesome root of heat to arise." Moreover, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 7, also states that for one who has not separated from desire and passion, the wisdom of reflection is immediately able to induce heat. According to these three passages, there are those who initially enter the heat stage from the wisdom of reflection. Furthermore, the wholesome root of heat cultivates only the homogeneous and does not cultivate the heterogeneous; since this person who initially enters the heat stage from the wisdom of reflection does not cultivate the heterogeneous, they should also not acquire the concentration lost from beginningless time, which means that the past would not be definite. How then can one, upon initially acquiring concentration, definitely possess the past and future? The explanation is: in the very first moment of entering heat from the wisdom of reflection, one also cultivates the heterogeneous, and therefore also acquires that concentration lost from beginningless time, possessing it; from the second moment onward, one cultivates only the homogeneous, and it is said from the general perspective that one does not cultivate the heterogeneous. Another explanation is: this is stated according to the factor of merit, meaning that upon initially acquiring concentration, one definitely possesses the past and future. If stated according to the aids to penetration (nirvedha-bhāgīya), upon initially acquiring concentration one does not possess the past. Thus Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 36, states: "All those who have acquired the dhyāna discipline, up to the point of not relinquishing it, constantly possess the past and future. Because the past concentration discipline lost in a previous life is inevitably reacquired in this initial moment. Here, a qualification should be stated: because the concentration discipline subsumed under the aids to penetration does not possess the past in the initial moment. What was acquired in other lives is relinquished at the time of death, and in this life there is no possibility of reacquiring it" (end of treatise passage).

14.51

Regarding "All noble ones... because it has never arisen before": this explains the seventh line. It is self-evident.

14.52

Regarding "If one currently abides... there is possession of the present": this explains the eighth line. Regarding the disciplines of concentration and path: if one currently abides in dhyāna, one possesses the present dhyāna discipline; if one currently abides in the anāsrava path, one possesses the present discipline of the path. When emerging from meditative absorption, one does not possess the present discipline of concentration or path, because they are concomitant with the mind, and when a scattered mind is present, they are definitely absent. Question: Why is dhyāna called concentration, and anāsrava called path? The explanation is: although concentration and path both apply to both, in order to distinguish them, each is assigned one name. Another explanation is: the anāsrava dharma is the path traversed by the noble ones to emerge from saṃsāra, completely transcending suffering, and although it also applies to concentration, it is specifically designated by the name "path"; the sāsrava is not like this, and although it also applies to the path, it is designated by the name "concentration".

14.53

Regarding "Having differentiated those who abide... unmanifest of two time periods": this is the second [sub-section], clarifying the possession of the intermediate in terms of the time periods. To say "abiding in the intermediate" means being neither the supremely good discipline nor the supremely evil non-discipline; hence it is called "intermediate". The karma generated by them does not necessarily always possess the unmanifest; for instance, performing good that is not pure, or doing evil that is not intensely harmful, has no unmanifest. If one performs good that is pure, or does evil that is intensely harmful, there is unmanifest. The unmanifest of intermediate good is subsumed under the category of good precepts; the unmanifest of intermediate evil is subsumed under the category of evil precepts. Because the meaning of unmanifest is identical and their types are similar, it is said to be "subsumed under the category". The intermediate unmanifest is possessed in the present in the initial moment; from the second moment onward, as long as it is not relinquished, one constantly possesses the unmanifest of the two time periods, past and present.

14.54

Regarding "If someone abides... for how long?": from here down is the third [sub-section], abiding in good or bad while possessing the intermediate. Question: Does a person abiding in discipline possess the intermediate evil unmanifest? Does a person abiding in non-discipline possess the intermediate good unmanifest? If they possess it, for how long?

14.55

Regarding "The verse states... until the force of defilement or purity ends": the first two lines answer the first question, and the last two lines answer the second question.

14.56

Regarding "The commentary states... possesses both past and present": a person abiding in discipline, such as a bhikṣu, who commits acts such as killing through powerful afflictions, possesses the unwholesome intermediate unmanifest. A person of non-discipline, such as a butcher of sheep, who performs acts such as veneration through pure faith, possesses the wholesome intermediate unmanifest. As long as these two minds are not interrupted, the unmanifest constantly continues in succession, possessed in the present in the first moment, and later possessed in both the past and present.

14.57

Regarding "Having differentiated the unmanifest... only possesses the present": from here down is the second [section], clarifying the possession of the manifest. The first two lines clarify good and bad manifest karma; the lower two lines clarify indeterminate manifest karma.

14.58

Regarding "The commentary states... explained like the unmanifest": this explains the first two lines. A person abiding in discipline, non-discipline, or the intermediate, when directly performing manifest karma, constantly possesses the present manifest karma; when not performing it, they do not possess it. After the initial moment, up to the time it is not relinquished, they constantly possess the past. If relinquished, they do not possess it. There is definitely no possession of future manifest karma, as explained for the unmanifest of the scattered realm, because it is a form that does not conform to the mind and its power is slight and inferior.

14.59

Regarding "Obstructed and unobstructed... retroactively possessing": this explains the lower two lines. The two indeterminate manifest karmas are not possessed in the past or future; since the power of the dharma is inferior, the power of acquisition (prāpti) is also weak, and therefore they cannot anticipate the future nor retroactively possess the past.

14.60

"This dharma's power is inferior: caused by what?": this is the question.

14.61

"It is caused by the mind": this is the answer.

14.62

Regarding "If so, then obstructed... should not possess the past or future": this is the objection. Since this indeterminate manifest karma cannot possess the past or future, the two indeterminate minds that are able to express that manifest karma should likewise not possess that past or future. "And so on" means including strong indeterminate minds, which are the minds of habitual practice, deportment, artisanship, and the fruits of supernormal powers.

14.63

"[If you say,] 'This reprimand is unreasonable … that they differ in possession'" is the explanation. This is because matter of vijñapti is dull and obscure, and arises dependent on another, namely the mind. The mind and so forth are sharp and clear, and do not arise dependent on another. "And so forth" means including the mental factors (caittas). The two indeterminate minds are inferior compared to wholesome and unwholesome minds. Indeterminate vijñapti-karma arises from an inferior mind; its power is doubly inferior to that of the mind which can generate it, and that is why it does not possess [it in] the past or the future. Therefore, vijñapti and mind differ in possession, and cannot be cited as parallel examples. Furthermore, the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "This reprimand is unreasonable, because what is produced is inferior to the mind that produces it. Why is that? As an indeterminate mind can produce vijñapti-karma, yet the produced vijñapti-karma does not produce avijñapti, hence we know that what is produced is inferior to the producing mind."

14.64

"As previously explained … to establish the remaining four designations" is the third part, which clarifies the different designations for non-restraint (asaṃvara). Because it distinguishes possession, the text conveniently explains this alongside it. It can be easily understood.

14.65

"One may possess vijñapti-karma … one should make four permutations" is the fourth part below: possessing vijñapti and avijñapti. This states the main proposition.

14.66

"How is this so?" is the question.

14.67

"The stanza says: … / One possesses avijñapti but not vijñapti" is the verse answer.

14.68

"The treatise says: … / and the completion of paths of karma" explains the first two lines. That is, the first line, "possesses vijñapti but not avijñapti", refers to an intermediate person who produces good or evil with weak and inferior intention (cetanā); they only produce vijñapti-karma and do not yet have avijñapti, how much less could the vijñapti-karma produced by indeterminate intention produce avijñapti? Mentioning the superior serves to show the inferior by comparison. Excepting the seven [types of] merit resting on material bases and the completion of wholesome or unwholesome paths of karma, even when an intermediate person generates a weak and inferior intention, avijñapti is still produced; hence they are specifically distinguished.

14.69

"One possesses only avijñapti … / or having arisen, is discarded" explains the lower two lines. That is, the second line, "possesses avijñapti but not vijñapti", refers to noble ones in the three realms who are subject to transition: if in the desire or form realms, they definitely possess the avijñapti of the path and absorption; if born in the formless realm, they possess the avijñapti of the path; and their vijñapti is not possessed, such as when dwelling in the womb and the like where vijñapti-karma has not yet arisen, or after vijñapti has arisen, it is abandoned upon encountering conditions.

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese