俱舍論記 17

English (machine translation) 17

Language: English

17.2

Chapter Four: Exposition of Karma, Part Five.

Regarding "Having thus explained [...] because the seven are karma and also paths": this is the second major section, explaining the designation 'path of karma'. The first line clarifies the three of the mind, and the second line clarifies the seven of body and speech.

17.4

Regarding "The commentary says [...] because it acts accordingly": this explains the first line. Among the ten unwholesome paths of karma, the latter three—covetousness, ill will, and wrong view—are exclusively paths. Because they are the paths of the karma of volition, the designation 'path of karma' is established. The volition associated with that covetousness and so forth is called karma. Because that covetousness and so forth proceed, volition proceeds; because that covetousness and so forth operate, volition operates; because volition acts according to the power of that covetousness and so forth, and because covetousness and so forth are that upon which volition relies, they are named the paths of karma.

17.5

Regarding "The former seven are karma [...] the designation 'path of karma' is established": this explains the second line. Among the ten unwholesome paths of karma, the entities of the former seven are karma, because their nature is bodily and verbal karma; they are also paths of karma, because they are traversed by that karma of volition. Because the volition that serves as the causal originator of bodily and verbal karma proceeds taking bodily and verbal karma as its object, they are named the paths of karma. The first 'karma' is bodily and verbal karma; the second 'karma' is the karma of volition. Karma and the paths of karma are collectively given the designation 'path of karma'.

17.6

Regarding "Therefore herein [...] because both are well established": this shows that the name is identical while subsuming different categories. Therefore, herein, in explaining the designation 'path of karma', the phrase 'path of karma' fully reveals the meaning of 'path of karma' for the latter three, and 'karma and path of karma' for the former seven. If one says 'path of karma', karma is volition associated with covetousness, and the path is covetousness and so forth associated with volition. If one says 'karma and path of karma', the former karma is bodily and verbal, the latter karma is volition as the causal originator, and the path is bodily and verbal. What is meant here is: one 'karma' reveals multiple karmas; one 'path' reveals multiple paths. Although the natures and categories of karma and path are different, because the name 'karma' is identical, one name 'karma' stands for the remaining karmas; because the name 'path' is identical, one name 'path' stands for the remaining paths. Things of this kind are well established both in the world and in standard treatises. 'Well established in the world' is like saying 'cart and ox': although multiple carts and oxen differ in nature and category, because the name 'cart and ox' is identical, one 'cart and ox' stands for the remaining carts and oxen. 'Well established in treatises' is like saying 'station of consciousness': although the four stations of consciousness differ in nature and category, because the name 'station of consciousness' is identical, one 'station of consciousness' stands for the remaining stations of consciousness.

17.7

Regarding "The seven of abstaining from killing, and so forth [...] the rest should be explained analogously to this": this explains the wholesome paths of karma by analogy.

17.8

Regarding "For what reason are its preliminary preparations and concluding acts not paths of karma?": this is a question. Preliminary preparations and concluding acts should be named paths of karma, because volition also proceeds taking them as objects. For what reason is it said that they are not paths of karma?

17.9

Regarding the passage "For this, relying on this ... otherwise it is not so": Within the answer there are three points: First, because the preparatory stage [of an action] proceeds only for the sake of this fundamental [course of action], and its subsequent stage proceeds only relying upon this fundamental [course of action], therefore the preparatory and subsequent stages are not the fundamental. Second, also, it was previously said that these fundamental courses of action subsume the coarse grades; because preparatory and subsequent stages are not coarse grades, they are not subsumed under courses of action. Third, also, if by the decrease of this unwholesome course of action, internal and external bad things are made to decrease, and by the increase of the unwholesome course of action, internal and external bad things are made to increase; and if by the decrease of this wholesome course of action, internal and external good things are made to decrease, and by the increase of the wholesome course of action, internal and external good things are made to increase—those which have this function are established as courses of action. Different from this fundamental, the preceding and subsequent stages are not so; hence they are not courses of action. Another explanation: If by the decrease of this unwholesome course of action, internal and external good things are made to increase, and by the increase of the unwholesome course of action, internal and external good things are made to decrease; and if by the decrease of this wholesome course of action, internal and external bad things are made to increase, and by the increase of the wholesome course of action, internal and external bad things are made to decrease—[then] they are designated courses of action. Otherwise it is not so. Another explanation: If by the decrease of this unwholesome course of action, internal and external bad things decrease and good things increase; and by the increase of the unwholesome course of action, internal and external bad things increase and good things decrease; and if by the decrease of this wholesome course of action, internal and external good things decrease and bad things increase; and by the increase of the wholesome course of action, internal and external good things increase and bad things decrease—[then] they are designated courses of action. Otherwise it is not so. As for the words "internal and external things," the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 113, states: "Dwelling places are called external; life-span and the like are called internal."

17.10

Regarding "The Dārṣṭāntikas ... designate them courses of action": A question. For the Vaibhāṣikas, covetousness and the rest are not volition (cetanā), but each has a distinct entity, and they explain the course of action separately. The Dārṣṭāntikas maintain that covetousness, ill-will, and the rest are precisely mental volition and have no distinct entity; based on what meaning do they explain those—covetousness, ill-will, and the rest—as courses of action?

17.11

Regarding "One should ask that master ... are all called courses of action": The author of the treatise answers. One should ask that master; it is no business of mine. If one were to explain it for them, however, one could also say that covetousness, ill-will, and the rest are precisely mental karma because they lack any distinct entity. Furthermore, as for calling them "courses" (path): because one falls into the bad destinies through this covetousness and the rest, they serve as paths to the bad destinies, and hence are designated "courses of karma" (karmapatha). Alternatively, because ill-will and the rest arise subsequent to covetousness, or covetousness and the rest arise subsequent to ill-will—the preceding being able to produce the subsequent, and the subsequent arising by mounting upon the preceding—it is said that they serve as a path for what follows. Or because they mutually mount upon one another, they are all called courses of action.

17.12

Regarding "As for what has been explained ... what are the differences?": Below this is the third major section, which as a convenience of exposition clarifies the severing of the wholesome [roots]. First, it asks: Since unwholesome karma is entirely contrary to the present wholesome, through which course of action do those who sever the wholesome roots [do so]? Second, it asks: What are the differences in characteristics between the severing of the wholesome and the reconnecting of the wholesome?

17.13

Regarding "The verse states: ... eliminated immediately, in reverse": The first line answers the first question, and the remaining seven lines answer the second question.

17.14

Regarding "The commentary states: ... is able to sever the wholesome roots": Explaining the first line. Among the ten unwholesome courses of action, only wrong view of the highest grade and complete is able to sever the wholesome roots.

17.15

Regarding "If so, for what reason ... that which is first eliminated?": A question. If one says that wrong view can sever the wholesome roots, why does the root treatise say that unwholesome roots can sever the wholesome roots? Moreover, that which is first eliminated at the stage of detachment from desire is also the highest grade of unwholesome roots.

17.16

Regarding "Due to the unwholesome roots ... the burning of a village by bandits": An answer. Because the unwholesome cause leads to the fruit of wrong view, the action done by the fruit is attributed to that cause. The analogy is obvious.

17.17

Regarding "Which wholesome roots are severed by this?": Below this explains the second line. This is the question.

17.18

Regarding "Namely, only the innate ... not having been previously possessed": An answer. It means that only the innate wholesome roots of the desire realm are severed by it. Because the wholesome of the form and formless realms was not previously possessed prior to the severing of the wholesome, it is not severed.

17.19

Regarding "The Prajñaptipāda ... wholesome roots of the three realms": An objection. If only the wholesome of the desire realm is severed, why does the treatise say that the wholesome of the three realms is severed?

17.20

Regarding "Relying on the higher wholesome roots ... not being a vessel for them": Resolution. When the treatise says it can sever the wholesome of the three realms, it speaks remotely based on the acquisition (prāpti) of the wholesome of the higher realms, in that it gradually causes the body of the desire realm to no longer be a vessel for the acquisition of that wholesome; therefore it is said to sever the higher realms. In actual reality, it severs only the desire realm.

17.21

Regarding "For what reason are only the innate wholesome roots severed?": An inquiry. Within the desire realm, for what reason are only the innate wholesome roots severed, and not the wholesome [acquired through] preparation?

17.22

Regarding "Because the prepared wholesome roots have already been fallen away from beforehand": Explanation. Because the prepared wholesome roots, namely the two wisdoms of hearing and reflection, have already been fallen away from and abandoned beforehand in the preparatory stage by the time the wholesome is severed. When it comes to the actual severing of the wholesome, it severs only the innate, not the prepared. Question: Can a prepared wholesome mind give rise to restraint (saṃvara)? Master Kong has three explanations: The first says that a prepared wholesome mind cannot give rise to restraint; restraint is abandoned upon the severing of the wholesome, and wrong view only severs innate wholesome [roots]. The second says that a prepared wholesome mind can also give rise to restraint, but it cannot be severed because it is powerful and superior; when the various treatises say that prepared wholesome roots are not previously possessed, they speak in terms of the weak and inferior ones; if they are powerful and superior, they are firm and not abandoned. The third says that if restraint is generated by preparation, one must, when about to sever the wholesome, first perform the formal act of abandoning that restraint, and only then sever the wholesome. All three explanations contradict the Nyāyānusāra. Therefore Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 42, states: "The fruits of restraint are produced from either a prepared or an innate wholesome mind. If produced from a prepared wholesome mind, the restraint is abandoned first, and subsequently the wholesome roots are severed. However, both the preparatory and the fundamental stages of severing the wholesome roots are called severing the wholesome; relying on this, it is said that restraint is abandoned at the time of severing the wholesome roots. If produced from an innate wholesome mind, then in accordance with whichever grade of root capable of generating it is severed, the restraint produced is abandoned at that time, because when that which is capable of equal origination is abandoned, it is abandoned along with it." (Thus far the text of the treatise).

17.23

Regarding "Relying on what kind of wrong view can it sever the wholesome roots?": Below this explains the third line. This is the question.

17.24

Regarding "Namely, definitely repudiating ... the maturation of their fruits": An answer. Namely, definitely repudiating the cause and effect of the four truths.

17.25

Regarding "Other masters say ... the difference between paths of liberation": Relaying a different view. Between these two kinds of wrong view that repudiate cause and effect, the wrong view that repudiates the cause is like the uninterrupted path (ānantarya-mārga); the wrong view that repudiates the fruit is like the path of liberation (vimukti-mārga). They are not truly those paths; hence the word "like" is used.

17.26

Regarding "Other masters say ... because its power is weak": Above, repudiating cause and fruit was explained; below, all [objects] are explained. First, a different view is relayed; second, the correct doctrine is presented. This is the different view. Other masters say: The wrong view that severs the wholesome takes only the defiled (sāsrava) of suffering and accumulation as its object, not the undefiled (anāsrava) of cessation and the path; it takes only its own realm as an object, not other realms. Because those taking the undefiled as object and taking other realms as object only produce the growth of latent defilements through concord (saṃprayukta), but do not grow through the object (ālambana), their power is weak.

17.27

Regarding "The correct doctrine says ... because it has great power": This is the correct doctrine. The correct doctrine says that it generally takes all as its object. Whether taking the defiled or undefiled as object, or taking its own realm or other realms as object, wrong view is able to sever the wholesome. Although wrong view taking the undefiled or other realms as object does not increase through the object, it also increases through homologous causes (sabhāga-hetu) and omnipresent causes (sarvatraga-hetu); because wrong view has great power, it is also able to sever the wholesome. Another explanation: Although it does not increase through the object, it also increases through concordant causes (saṃprayuktaka-hetu) and co-existent causes (sahabhū-hetu); because wrong view has great power, it is therefore also able to sever the wholesome.

17.28

Regarding "Other masters say ... defilements abandoned through vision": Below this explains gradual severing. First, a different view is relayed; second, the correct doctrine is presented. This is the different view. The nine grades of wholesome roots are severed immediately by wrong view in a single instant, just as defilements abandoned through vision are abandoned in the path of vision—the nine grades are severed immediately by a single uninterrupted path. Question: Wrong view has nine grades; which grade can sever them? An explanation says: Only when reaching the highest-of-the-highest grade of wrong view, the ninth grade, are they severed immediately. Another explanation says: Since the text does not specify, whichever grade of wrong view arises, it can sever them immediately.

17.29

Regarding "The correct doctrine says ... is called severing the wholesome roots": This is the correct doctrine: the wholesome roots are severed gradually. The nine grades of wholesome roots to be severed, moving from coarse to subtle, are called the "reverse"; the nine grades of wrong view capable of severing, moving from subtle to coarse, are called the "direct." Corresponding in reverse and direct, they are severed sequentially, just as the defilements abandoned through cultivation are abandoned in the path of cultivation—the nine grades are severed gradually. If one gives this explanation, it accords with the root treatise. Since that treatise says, "The subtle concurrent wholesome is abandoned last," we clearly know that the wholesome roots are severed gradually in nine grades.

17.30

Regarding "If so, how does that text ... can sever the wholesome roots?": An objection citing the root treatise. Since the root treatise says that the highest grade of unwholesome roots can sever the wholesome roots, we clearly know that they are severed immediately. Why then say they are severed gradually in nine grades?

17.31

Regarding "That relies upon the ultimate ... is called able to sever the wholesome roots": Resolution. The root treatise speaks of severing in reverse and direct order, as understood previously. Although severing the first eight grades is also called severing, the severing is not yet exhausted; only upon severing the ninth is it ultimately exhausted. Relying on the ultimate, it made this statement implicitly: the highest grade of unwholesome roots can sever the wholesome roots, but this does not mean the first eight grades cannot sever the wholesome.

17.32

Regarding "Other masters say ... it applies both to emerging and not emerging": In severing the nine grades of wholesome roots, for the former master there is never emerging halfway, just as in the path of vision when abandoning the defilements concerning the eight truths. This is not the correct doctrine. The correct doctrine says: it applies both to emerging and not emerging, just as when abandoning defilements through cultivation. This is the correct doctrine.

17.33

Regarding "Other masters say ... because it is not easy to abandon": This explains the abandonment of both. First, a different view is relayed; second, the correct doctrine is presented. This relays the different view. Restraint is generated based on those wholesome roots; therefore the wholesome root is the root and restraint is the branch. Because the branch is easily abandoned, it is abandoned first; because the root is difficult to abandon, it is severed later.

17.34

Regarding "The correct doctrine says ... because the grades of the category are identical": This presents the correct doctrine. The nine grades of wholesome roots can generate nine grades of restraint. In accordance with what is appropriate among the nine grades, if that restraint is the fruit equally originated by this grade of wholesome mind, when this grade of wholesome mind is severed, the restraint is immediately abandoned, because the restraint as fruit and the wholesome mind as cause are of an identical category of grade. If restraint was generated by prepared wholesome [roots], it is abandoned at the preparatory stage when about to sever the wholesome, because when about to sever the wholesome, one abandons that wholesome. Because it is abandoned at the preparatory stage of severing the wholesome, it is also called abandonment upon severing the wholesome. Thus the Nyāyānusāra states: "The fruits of restraint are produced from either a prepared or an innate wholesome mind. If produced from a prepared wholesome mind, the restraint is abandoned first, and subsequently the wholesome roots are severed. However, both the preparatory and the fundamental stages of severing the wholesome roots are called severing the wholesome; relying on this, it is said that restraint is abandoned at the time of severing the wholesome roots. If produced from an innate wholesome mind, then in accordance with whichever grade of root capable of generating it is severed, the restraint produced is abandoned at that time, because when that which is capable of equal origination is abandoned, it is abandoned along with it."

17.35

Regarding "In which place can one sever the wholesome roots?": Explaining the three continents of humans. This is the question.

17.36

Regarding "The three continents of the human destiny ... because of [their] āśaya": An answer. Only in the three continents of humans: in the bad destinies, because defiled wisdom is not firm, they cannot sever the wholesome roots, and because undefiled wisdom is not firm, they cannot enter into noble status. In mentioning undefiled wisdom, it is additionally raised in the course of the exposition that in the divine destiny there is wisdom acquired by birth, and because they visibly see the fruits of various wholesome and unwholesome karmas, they do not repudiate cause and effect and likewise do not sever the wholesome. It does not occur in the northern continent, because they do not have an extremely evil mental disposition (āśaya) and therefore cannot sever the wholesome.

17.37

Regarding "Other masters say Jambudvīpa": Relaying a different view. The intention of this master is: in the eastern and western continents there is also no extremely evil mental disposition (āśaya), so they cannot sever the wholesome, but because their wholesome minds are firm, it does not prevent them from entering into noble status.

17.38

"If so, then it contradicts [the basic treatise's statement: 'and the other two continents are likewise']": This refutes the heterodox opinion. In the root treatise it states: A human being of Jambudvīpa possesses at the very least eight faculties—namely, when a person who has severed the roots of good possesses at the very least eight, which are the faculties of the physical body, life, mind, and the five feelings, as explained in the "Indriya-nirdeśa". Since it says that the eastern and western continents are also like this, one clearly knows that [beings of] those continents can also sever the roots of good.

17.39

"On the basis of what kind of physical body does one sever the roots of good?": This explains [the physical bodies of] men and women. This is a question.

17.40

"Only in the bodies of men and women, because their mental resolve is stable": This is the answer.

17.41

"Other masters say [that it is only a male body, because in women] desire, effort, and discernment are all dull": This recounts an alternative opinion, [which holds that] it is not a female body either, because when desire, effort, discernment, and so forth arise in women, they are all dull, whereas wrong view is clear and sharp.

17.42

"If so, then it contradicts [the statement that if one possesses the female faculty, one possesses at the very least eight faculties;] the male faculty is likewise": This refutes the heterodox opinion. In the root treatise it states: If one possesses the female faculty, one definitely possesses at the very least eight faculties, namely the female faculty, body, life, mind, and four feelings—excluding sorrow. The male faculty is also like this, exchanging the female [faculty] for the male. Since it says that one possessing the female faculty is not said to definitely possess the five faculties of faith and so forth, one clearly knows that the female body also allows the severance of the roots of good. If a woman were unable to sever the roots of good, how could she possess only eight faculties?

17.43

"What kind of practitioner is able to sever the roots of good?": This explains that one who operates through views severs them. This is a question.

17.44

"Only one who operates through views, [not one who operates through passion,] because [the passion-practitioner is unstable] like the bad destinies": This is the answer. Being restless and unfixed, unable to hold firmly and unable to penetrate deeply, is called one who operates through passion. Being firm, deep, and immovable, capable of holding firmly and capable of penetrating deeply, is called one who operates through views. By this reasoning, ṣaṇḍhas and the like cannot sever the roots of good, because they belong to the class of passion-practitioners, just like [beings of] the bad destinies. Therefore the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Only one who operates through views, not one who operates through passion. The evil intention (*āśaya*) of practitioners of views is extremely firm and deep: their evil intent investigates continuously, hence it is called 'extremely firm'; their view penetrates far and wide, hence it is called 'extremely deep'. Because it is extremely firm and deep, they can sever the roots of good. The evil intention of practitioners of passion is extremely restless."

17.45

"What is the intrinsic nature of this severance of the roots of good?": This explains non-possession (*aprāpti*). Or, the word "severance" in the verse belongs solely to what follows, so one should know that it explains severance as non-possession; or it applies to both above and below. This is a question.

17.46

"The severance of good should be known [to have non-possession as its intrinsic nature]": This is the answer. This severance of the roots of good takes non-possession among the non-concomitant [formations] as its intrinsic nature. The rest of the text can be understood.

17.47

"Once the roots of good are severed, by what are they resumed?": This explains the resumption of good by doubt and right view. This is a question.

17.48

"Through doubt or view [affirming existence]... they are said to be resumed": This is the answer. "Through doubt or view affirming existence" means that doubt is twofold: first, doubt affirming existence, and second, doubt asserting non-existence. Doubt affirming existence can resume the roots of good; doubt asserting non-existence cannot resume good. Here it is stated based on doubt affirming existence. It means that regarding cause and effect, sometimes a doubt arises: 'Perhaps this might exist,' and thereupon one resumes the roots of good. Or right view arises: '[Cause and effect] definitely exist and are not non-existent.' This is right view being able to resume the roots of good. When the possession of good first arises, it is called resuming the roots of good. As for the verse mentioning 'doubt or view affirming existence', the 'affirming existence' applies either solely to doubt, solely to view, or to both above and below. Furthermore, the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "'Through doubt or view affirming existence': this means that at the stage of resuming good, either through the power of causes or relying on good friends, one suddenly generates doubt regarding cause and effect: 'Is the future life to be incurred non-existent, or does it exist?' Or one suddenly gives rise to right view regarding cause and effect: 'A future life definitely exists; what I held previously was wrong.' At that time, the possession (*prāpti*) of the roots of good arises again, and the non-possession (*aprāpti*) perishes; this is called resuming the roots of good."

17.49

"Other masters say: they are gradually resumed in nine grades": This explains the verse. First is setting forth the alternative opinion; second is presenting the correct tenet. This sets forth the alternative opinion.

17.50

"Those who explain it thus [say: they are resumed all at once, but their strength gradually increases]": This presents the correct tenet. One resumes the roots of good all at once, and afterwards they gradually become manifest. The analogies can be understood.

17.51

"Can they be resumed in the present lifetime or not?": This explains the present [life], excluding those who committed [deeds with] immediate retribution. This is a question.

17.52

"There are also those who can resume [them in the present life, except for those who committed immediate retribution, because they resume them in another state]": This is the answer. There are also those who can resume the roots of good in the present life, except for those who committed the acts of immediate retribution (*ānantarya*); they do not resume them in the present [life]. A sūtra is cited to prove that those who commit acts of immediate retribution and sever the roots of good do not resume them in the present life.

17.53

"The statement 'at the point of being about to be born' [means at the transition of existence; at the point of death is likewise]": This explains the sūtra's difference between the two stages of resuming good. If one severed the roots of good through the power of internal causal wrong views habitually practiced in the past, one resumes them when about to die, because the causes are strong. If one severed the roots of good through the power of external conditions such as various false teachings in the present, one resumes them when about to take birth, because the conditions are weak. If it is through the power of one's own deliberation and investigation, or through the power of being taught by evil friends, it should be understood in the same way.

17.54

"Furthermore, corrupted intent... should also be understood likewise": This explains why those who have not committed acts of immediate retribution may resume them in the present life or not. "Corrupted intent" and "corrupted view" mean giving rise to wrong view, but not corrupted in preliminary application (*prayoga*); morality is not broken, and deportment is maintained. "Corrupted in application" means that morality is also broken, and deportment is also not maintained. Therefore the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "When worldly people deny the future life, this is called corrupted intent. Yet if they do not act in accordance with that intent, they are not corrupted in application; their view is corrupted, but their morality is not broken. Those who sever the roots of good with view corrupted and morality also broken should be understood in the same way. The roots of good are not severed when an eon is about to be destroyed or when an eon is first formed, because of the predominant power of the destruction of the receptacle world, and because the mental continuum is moistened. Those who practice good conduct do not sever the roots of good, because their minds are firm and have aspirations."

17.55

"There are those who sever the roots of good [and those who fall into the false fixed destiny... the fourth category excludes the previous characteristics]": Here, taking occasion of the topic, a fourfold analysis is made comparing the severance of the roots of good with falling into the false fixed destiny (*mithyātva-niyata-rāśi*). A person who produces wrong view is called one who severs the roots of good; a person who commits an act of immediate retribution is called one who falls into the false fixed destiny. The first category refers to Pūraṇa. 'Pūraṇa' is translated here as 'Mǎn' (Full); this is Pūraṇa-Kāśyapa. In the old translations, it was rendered *Fúlóunà*, which is an error. Because he gave rise to wrong views, he is called one who severed the roots of good; because he did not commit an act of immediate retribution, he has not fallen into the false fixed destiny. The second category refers to Ajātaśatru and others. 'Unborn Enemy' (*Ajātaśatru*) is King Ajātaśatru. Because he committed an act of immediate retribution, he fell into the false fixed destiny; because he had faith in the Three Jewels, he did not sever the roots of good. The third category refers to Devadatta and others. In Sanskrit he is called Devadatta, which translates here as 'Tiānshòu' (God-given). Because he produced wrong views, he severed the roots of good; because he committed acts of immediate retribution, he fell into the false fixed destiny. The fourth category excludes the previous characteristics. Furthermore, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 35, says: "If one who has severed the roots of good commits acts of immediate retribution and the further act of causing schism in the Saṃgha, he is definitely destined to experience suffering in the Avīci hell. For one who has not severed the roots of good, the other four acts of immediate retribution will yield maturation either in the Avīci hell or in other hells." The explanation says: Since producing wrong view definitely results in falling into Avīci, producing wrong view and committing acts of immediate retribution definitely result in falling into Avīci. Therefore the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Wrong view that severs the roots of good and false speech that causes schism in the Saṃgha should be known to definitely incur maturation in Avīci. The other acts of immediate retribution incur maturation either in Avīci or in other hells."

17.56

"Having taken occasion of the topic [to explain the severance of good, we must now explain how many paths of action] occur together with volition (*cetanā*)": Below this is the fourth major section, explaining the concurrent operation of paths of action (*karma-patha*) with volition. This concludes the preceding and introduces what follows, raising the question.

17.57

"The verse says: [...specifically barring one, eight, and five]": The upper two lines clarify unwholesome paths of action operating together with volition; the lower two lines clarify wholesome paths of action operating together with volition. Here, paths of action operating together with volition is stated based on their concurrent operation at the very same instant (*kṣaṇa*), not based on the cause-originating volition (*hetu-samutthāna-cetanā*) being spoken of as occurring before or after. Because in receiving the fourfold or sevenfold branch precepts, obtaining precepts during an unconscious state (*acittaka*) is not mentioned, we know it is definitely stated in terms of an instant. Question: As the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 113, states: "When abiding in a defiled mind, an indeterminate mind, or without mind, the completion occurs through the volition arisen together with the seven wholesome paths of action." The *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* (*Záxīn*) also speaks of being without mind. Since those treatises speak of being without mind, we clearly know that concurrent operation is also stated in terms of the cause-originating [volition]; why then say that it is definitely in terms of an instant? Answer: When the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* mention being without mind, they are incidentally explaining the attainment of precepts while without mind; it is not the primary explanation of operating together with volition. In truth, concurrent operation is definitely in terms of an instant, which is why in this treatise's discussion of seven operating together, being without mind is not mentioned. Another explanation: 'Together' (*jù*) is of two kinds: first, 'simultaneous togetherness', meaning arising side by side at the same instant; second, 'sequential togetherness', meaning occurring before and after: because that prior dharma exists, this subsequent dharma is able to exist. The *Abhidharmakośa* relies on simultaneous togetherness, hence does not mention being without mind. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* and *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* encompass sequential togetherness, hence they also mention being without mind. Each relies on one meaning, so there is no contradiction.

17.58

"The treatise says: [...only up to eight]": This explains the upper two lines. First is a general statement, and second is a specific explanation; this is the general statement.

17.59

"Operating together with one means: [...any one is completed]": Below this is the specific explanation, clarifying one path of action operating together with volition. 'Operating together with one' means: apart from the other seven bodily and vocal unwholesome paths of action, when any one among the three—greed and the rest—arises manifestly, it operates together with its corresponding volition. If through prior preparation (*prayoga*) one had an emissary perform killing and so forth, committing six unwholesome physical actions, and at the time of an undefiled mind any one of them reaches completion, that is also one path of action operating together with volition. This is stated in terms of operating together with volition at the same time. The *Nyāyānusāra* refutes this, saying: "If an unwholesome action committed through prior preparation reaches completion when other defiled states like greed and so forth or an undefiled mind is present, the author of the commentary only mentioned an undefiled mind; this is an under-inclusion. For when defiled minds such as pride and doubt arise, there are also paths of action arisen through prior preparation that reach completion. Moreover, stating that preparation commits unwholesome physical (*rūpa*) action is an over-inclusion of the word 'physical'. In the non-physical (*arūpa*), it is impossible for actions to be performed through prior preparation and for the path of action to only then be completed when an undefiled mind arises. A qualification was required. Other similar cases should likewise be critiqued (Explanation: 'other defilements' refers to pride, doubt, etc.; 'non-physical' refers to greed, anger, and wrong view)." The Kośa master defends: There is no over-inclusion with 'physical', because it refers to physical karma. If he had not mentioned 'physical', it would not definitely show that karma is physical. If you say that preparation is definitely physical, then there would be no need to say 'physical'; but you could equally say that preparation is definitely karma, and thus there would be no need to say 'karma', making 'karma' also an over-inclusion. Rather, one should say: with unwholesome deeds committed through prior preparation, the author's intention in specifying an undefiled mind was that an undefiled mind definitely operates together with one [path of action]. Defiled minds are not definite: although when pride, doubt, and the like are manifest they operate together with one, if greed, hatred, and the like are manifest they operate together with two. Because defiled minds are variable, they were omitted for brevity. Furthermore, this concurrent operation was merely cited as proof, without needing to be stated exhaustively. If understood in this way, there is no need for critique.

17.60

Regarding "Two functioning simultaneously up to or frivolous talk": this clarifies two courses of action functioning simultaneously with volition. 'Two functioning simultaneously' means that when one personally gives rise to a mind of hatred, one culminates the karma of killing. 'Culminating' means that bringing this act of killing to completion through a mind of hatred is called culmination. If at the stage of personally giving rise to greed, one accomplishes [the karma of] taking what is not given, or accomplishes sexual misconduct, or accomplishes frivolous talk, in all these cases two function simultaneously. Question: Why are false speech and the other two [verbal actions] not mentioned? The explanation is: there is frivolous talk apart from false speech and the other three; but where false speech and the other three [occur], being untimely, they necessarily involve frivolous talk as well. Here, since it clarifies two functioning simultaneously, it only mentions frivolous talk and does not speak of the three such as false speech. The *Nyāyānusāra* refutes this, saying: "'Two functioning simultaneously' refers to engaging in misconduct: if one personally performs killing, stealing, or frivolous talk, or dispatches another to do so, at the stage where any one of these is accomplished, any one among greed, hatred, or wrong view is present. Or, when any two of evil karmas performed through prior preparation culminate while greed and other remaining defiled [minds] or undefiled minds are present. In this regard the author of the treatise states that at the time of a mind of hatred, one culminates the karma of killing; if at the stage of giving rise to greed, one accomplishes taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, or frivolous talk. This too is unreasonable. If one personally culminates it, then for killing there is no need to specify hatred, because there is no room for any other [defilement] to culminate it; the same applies to specifying greed for stealing and sexual misconduct. To state that when giving rise to greed one accomplishes frivolous talk is deficient, because it can be accomplished through three. If [accomplished] through prior preparation, at the time of culmination one should state each one as 'any one among greed and the others.'" The Kośa master defends it, saying: When personally culminating killing, in principle there must be hatred. In explaining two functioning simultaneously, if hatred were not stated, it would not be evident in the phrasing. Because the *Nyāyānusāra* does not state it, the phrasing is obscure and difficult to understand. For stealing and sexual misconduct, one should interpret it by analogy with this. In reality, frivolous talk can be culminated through three; the one-sided mention of greed is made in passing while discussing greed. In the subsequent 'three functioning simultaneously', the statement 'any one among greed and the others' casts a shadow to indicate that in the preceding 'two functioning simultaneously' there is also 'any one among greed and the others'. Since the undefiled mind was already mentioned in the preceding 'one functioning simultaneously', it casts a shadow to indicate that in the subsequent 'two functioning simultaneously' there is also an undefiled mind. The author of the treatise is skillful in phrasing, using mutual implication across earlier and later passages, and did not wish to use redundant words; hence he did not explain them separately.

17.61

Regarding "Three functioning simultaneously up to killing and stealing at the same time": this clarifies three courses of action functioning simultaneously with volition. 'Three functioning simultaneously' means that with a mind of hatred, toward living beings such as chickens and ducks belonging to another, when one directly cuts off their life and also moves them from their original place, at that very time the three of hatred, stealing, and killing function simultaneously with volition.

17.62

Regarding "If so, what was said... in principle should not hold": this is a question. If it is said that a mind of hatred also culminates stealing, then what was stated in the earlier text—that the course of action of theft is culminated by greed—in principle should not hold.

17.63

Regarding "It is based on being performed with the same mind up to should be known as a definitive judgment": this is an answer. When it was stated in the earlier text that the course of action of theft is culminated by greed, this was based on culmination performed with an undifferentiated mind. That is to say, in this theft there are two kinds of greed: first, causal origination, and second, momentary origination. When the subsequent greed of momentary origination culminates it, because it is the same greed as the prior greed of causal origination, it is called culmination performed based on an undifferentiated mind. When the later text states that hatred also culminates theft, this is based on culmination performed with a different mind. That is to say, in this theft, hatred culminates it; because hatred and greed are distinct from the greed of causal origination of that theft, it is called culmination performed based on a different mind. The earlier and later [passages] each rely on one meaning; therefore, you should know that this definitive judgment was made in this way. Another explanation: The statement in the later text that hatred can culminate both killing and stealing is based on culmination performed with an undifferentiated mind—meaning that both killing and stealing are culminated by the same single mind of hatred; hence it says 'culmination performed based on an undifferentiated mind'. The statement in the earlier text that theft is culminated by greed is based on culmination performed with a different mind—meaning that theft is culminated by greed, whereas killing is culminated by hatred; each relying on a single mind, greed and hatred being distinct, it is called culmination performed based on a different mind. Therefore, you should know that this definitive judgment was made in this way.

17.64

Regarding "If through prior preparation up to any two culminate": if through prior preparation one dispatches an emissary to commit killing, stealing, and so forth, performing evil material karma, when one of greed, hatred, or wrong view is directly arising, any two culminate; thus three courses of action also function simultaneously with volition. Among the three functioning simultaneously, two categories are provisionally cited; the rest that are not stated should be considered in accordance with principle. Therefore the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "'Three functioning simultaneously' means: when greed and the like arise for evil karma performed through prior preparation, any two culminate. If one dispatches a single emissary to perform one [action] such as killing, and personally engages in sexual misconduct, etc., they culminate simultaneously. If one personally performs two, this should be considered in accordance with principle. When any three of evil karmas performed through prior preparation culminate while greed and other remaining defiled [minds] or undefiled minds are present; or when giving rise to greed and other remaining defiled minds, one personally accomplishes divisive speech, false speech, and the like, while having dispatched an emissary to perform one, etc.—these should be considered in accordance with principle."

17.65

Regarding "Four functioning simultaneously up to any three culminate": this clarifies four courses of action functioning simultaneously with volition. 'Four functioning simultaneously' means: the wish to divide others is divisive speech; fearing that they will not be divided, one utters false speech, which adds to the previous one to make two; because it is untimely, it necessarily involves frivolous talk, which adds to the previous ones to make three, called three verbal courses of action; with one mental course of action, it is called four functioning simultaneously. That is, wishing to divide others is divisive speech; fearing that they will not be divided, one utters harsh speech, which adds to the previous one to make two; because it is untimely, it necessarily involves frivolous talk, which adds to the previous ones to make three, called three verbal courses of action; with one mental course of action, it is called four functioning simultaneously. Because divisive, false, and harsh speech are untimely, they necessarily involve frivolous talk without waiting to be accomplished by separate speech; therefore, they are not explained separately. Question: When the prior three kinds of speech arise, they necessarily involve frivolous talk; are the four karmas of vijñapti and avijñapti distinct for each? Dharma Master Nian and others explain: "There are two kinds of frivolous talk: namely, solitary frivolous talk, where the prior three kinds of speech are metaphorically given the name of frivolous talk; and when frivolous talk is apart from the prior three kinds of speech, separately giving rise to flattery, songs, and the like, it is called solitary frivolous talk." The present explanation is not so. The meaning of 'identical and solitary' belongs to the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra*, not to this school. According to this school, when the prior three kinds of speech arise, there is simultaneously a separate substance of frivolous talk, which is called 'co-arising frivolous talk'. If it is apart from the prior three kinds of speech, separately giving rise to flattery, songs, and the like, it is called 'non-shared frivolous talk'. In summary, if three kinds of speech arise together, there are three vijñaptis and three avijñaptis. If four kinds of speech arise together, there are four vijñaptis and four avijñaptis. Therefore, when the distinct items of action are clear, a person receiving the five precepts obtains five vijñaptis and five avijñaptis at once. Since those wholesome courses of action can arise simultaneously, in principle unwholesome courses of action should also be like this. If through prior preparation one dispatches an emissary to kill and so forth, performing evil material karma, and any one of greed, hatred, or wrong view is directly present, any three culminate; thus four also function simultaneously. Among the four functioning simultaneously, three categories are provisionally cited; the rest that are not stated should be considered in accordance with principle.

17.66

Regarding "Likewise, five, six, and seven should all be known in accordance with principle": these three are not stated, encouraging students to consider them. For example, when greed and the like arise for evil material karma performed through prior preparation, if any four culminate it is called five functioning simultaneously; if any five culminate it is called six functioning simultaneously; if any six culminate it is called seven functioning simultaneously. As for the rest that are not stated, they can be thought through by discernment.

17.67

Regarding "Eight functioning simultaneously up to therefore there are no nine or ten": this clarifies eight courses of action functioning simultaneously with volition. 'Eight functioning simultaneously' means that through prior preparation one dispatches emissaries to perform the remaining six evil material karmas, and personally engages in illicit desire, which adds to the previous ones to make seven. When engaging in illicit desire there is necessarily greed, so the treatise does not mention it, which adds to the previous ones to make eight culminating simultaneously. Because the latter three cannot possibly operate together by their own power, there are no nine or ten courses of action that function simultaneously with volition.

17.68

Regarding "Thus it has been stated up to excluding one, eight, and five": this explains the lower two lines, clarifying wholesome courses of action functioning simultaneously with volition. It concludes what came before and states the thesis.

First 68 of 163 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese