俱舍論記 19

English (machine translation) 19

Language: English

19.60 — 4 parts

19.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Śākyaputro Puguang

As for the "Anuśaya-nirdeśa" (Exposition of the Latent Defilements): adhering to (anubadh-) sentient beings is called suí (latent/following); its mode of activity (ākāra) being subtle is called mián (dormant/sleep), just as a person sleeping has a mode of activity difficult to discern. This chapter explains them extensively; hence it is called nirdeśa (exposition/distinction). Although this chapter also explains the entanglements (paryavasthāna), stains (mala), and so forth, the latent defilements are predominant, and thus it takes its title from them. Alternatively explained: this chapter initially explains the latent defilements; taking its title from the beginning, it is named accordingly. As for why the latent defilements are explained immediately following karma: the cause of karma in producing a fruition cannot arise in isolation but must rely on the condition of afflictions (kleśa); because afflictions are more remote in relation to the fruition, the latent defilements are explained after [karma].

19.4

Regarding "It was previously stated that the variety of the world [...] lacks the capacity to actualize existence": within this chapter, there is first the explanation of the essential nature of afflictions, and second the explanation of the cessation of afflictions. Within the first, explaining the essential nature of afflictions, there is first the primary explanation of root afflictions, and second the explanation of miscellaneous afflictions. Within the primary explanation of root afflictions, there is first the analysis of the root afflictions, and second the analysis according to various categories. Within the analysis of root afflictions, there is first explaining them by increasing enumeration; second, explaining their abandonment through vision (darśana-heya) and cultivation (bhāvanā-heya); third, separately explaining the five views; fourth, incidentally explaining the four inversions (viparyāsa); fifth, explaining the seven and nine conceits (māna). Within the first, explaining by increasing enumeration, there is first explaining the six latent defilements; second, explaining the seven latent defilements; third, explaining the ten latent defilements; fourth, explaining the ninety-eight [latent defilements]. Below this is the first, explaining the six latent defilements. The beginning of the previous chapter stated that the variety of the world is entirely born from karma; this karma in turn only attains generation and growth through the latent defilements; karma separated from the latent defilements has no capacity to actualize the fruition of existence. This repeats the preceding to introduce what follows.

19.5

"Why is this, and how many latent defilements are there?": the first asks why this is, and the second asks how many latent defilements there are.

19.6

Regarding "The verse says: [...] ignorance, views, and doubt": the first line answers the first question; the lower three lines answer the second question.

19.7

Regarding "The commentary says: [...] lacks the capacity to actualize existence": this explains the first line. The three existences (bhavas) are not one, hence they are called "existences." Because the latent defilements can instigate karma, and further, through karma, the fruition of existence can be actualized, therefore the latent defilements are the root of all three existences; karma separated from these latent defilements lacks the capacity to actualize the fruition of existence. Hence, at the beginning of the twelve links (dvādaśāṅga), the latent defilements are spoken of.

19.8

"Why can latent defilements serve as the root of existence?": this is a question.

19.9

Regarding "When the afflictions become manifest [...] [karma] has the capacity to actualize existence": this is the answer. When the afflictions become manifest, they can accomplish ten tasks. First, strengthening the root. Nyāyānusāra fascicle 45 says: "First, making the root firm and solid, causing it to become secure, because the antidote is distant. The root of affliction refers to the acquisition (prāpti) of affliction." The explanation states: Because afflictions arise, the path of antidotes does not arise, and the acquisition of afflictions becomes stronger; this is called "strengthening." Only through possessing affliction does affliction become manifest; hence the acquisition of affliction is the root of affliction. Second, establishing the continuum. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Establishing the continuum, because they can repeatedly cause other [afflictions] to arise continuously." The explanation states: They can repeatedly cause other subsequent moments of afflictions to arise continuously, or induce other subsequent rebirths to arise continuously. Third, cultivating their own field. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Cultivating their own field, causing the basis (āśraya) to conform and abide with them." The explanation states: "Own field" refers to the physical basis upon which the active manifestations of affliction rely. Causing this physical basis to be predisposed to producing afflictions means that because afflictions repeatedly become active, they cause one's own body and mind to produce wholesome states with difficulty and stiffness, whereas when producing afflictions, they do so spontaneously and smoothly; thus it is called cultivating their own field. Fourth, leading to outflow (niṣyanda). The Nyāyānusāra says: "Leading to toxic outflows, because they can lead to secondary afflictions (upakleśa) similar to themselves." The explanation states: Because they can lead to the outflow-fruition of secondary afflictions similar to themselves. Fifth, initiating karmic existence. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Initiating karmic existence, because they instigate karma that can bring about future existence." The explanation states: Karma is itself existence; alternatively, [it refers to] karma and existence, because both karma and its fruition are called existence. Sixth, gathering their own requisites. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Gathering their own requisites (sambhāra), because they can repeatedly gather and produce improper attention (ayoniso-manaskāra)." The explanation states: "Own requisites" and sambhāra have different names but the same meaning. Another explanation states: The "own requisites" in this treatise refers to the mind and mental factors simultaneous with the affliction. Seventh, delusion regarding the intentional object (ālambana). The Nyāyānusāra says: "Delusion regarding the intentional object, because they can destroy one's own discernment of correct awakening." The explanation states: Because they fail to comprehend the object, and damage correct discernment. Eighth, guiding the stream of consciousness. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Guiding the stream of consciousness, because regarding the intentional object of future existence, they can induce and produce consciousness." The explanation states: When afflictions arise, they guide defiled consciousness; in future existence they can induce the link of consciousness, and regarding an intentional object they can produce defiled consciousness; hence it is called guiding the stream of consciousness. Ninth, contravening wholesome factors. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Contravening wholesome factors, because they cause all wholesome phenomena to deteriorate (evident from the context)." Tenth, the meaning of extensive binding, extending to one's own realm and stage. The Nyāyānusāra says: "The meaning of extensive binding: causing one to be unable to transcend one's own realm and one's own stage, because they can nourish the defiled realm." The explanation states: "Defiled realm" means the afflictions are subsumed under the realm. When the defiled realm increases, the bondage becomes all the greater; hence they can extensively bind sentient beings so that they do not transcend their realm or stage. Because the latent defilements can thus serve as the root of existence, karma has the capacity to actualize existence on this basis. "Existence" means future existence; hence the Nyāyānusāra says: "Although one who has separated from passion also creates wholesome karma, it lacks the power to bring about future existence."

19.10

Regarding "Briefly, these should be known [...] their entities are each distinct": this explains the lower three lines. That there are six latent defilements is evident from the text. The verse says "also"—not only does hatred increase according to the object through the power of greed, but the intention is to show that conceit and so forth also increase according to the object through the power of greed. Increasing according to greed is explained later, pointing to the subsequent text. Craving is the basis of all afflictions, and therefore leads to the arising of the others. The others arise from this; in full, one should say greed and hatred, greed and conceit, greed and ignorance, and so forth; this is incidentally clarified via the power of greed. The word "and" shows that the six entities are each distinct, which is a coordinate compound (dvandva) interpretation among the six compound interpretations.

19.11

Regarding "If latent defilements [...] there are seven latent defilements": below this is the second part, explaining the seven latent defilements. This is the question.

19.12

Regarding "The verse says: [...] to counter the notion of liberation": the first line directly answers; the lower three lines state the reason for establishing attachment to existence (bhava-rāga). Within the lower three lines, the first line states that attachment to existence belongs to the upper two realms, in order to differentiate from the Sautrāntika and others; the Sautrāntika and others say that attachment to existence also extends to the desire realm. Another explanation: it specifically shows that attachment to existence has a different name and is specifically designated. In the desire realm it is called sensual attachment (kāma-rāga); since this can be understood by analogy, it is not separately stated; or because its own name makes it clear, it is not separately stated. The second line states that because it operates internally, it is not called sensual attachment. The third line states that in order to counter the notion of liberation, it is called attachment to existence.

19.13

Regarding "The commentary says: [...] therefore the sūtra speaks of seven": this explains the first line.

19.14

"Which seven are they?": this is a question.

19.15

"First, the latent defilement of sensual attachment [...] seventh, the latent defilement of doubt": this is the answer.

19.16

Regarding "The latent defilement of sensual attachment [...] the interrogation is also the same": this is an interrogation through two alternatives to settle [the definition]. Is the entity of sensual attachment itself the latent defilement, based on a karmadhāraya compound? Or is it the latent defilement of sensual attachment, based on a tatpuruṣa compound? Concerning the meaning of the remaining six afflictions, the interrogation is also the same.

19.17

"If so, what is the fault?": this objects to the intent of the doubt.

19.18

Regarding "Both have faults [...] associated with the three faculties": this re-elucidates the intent of the doubt. Both karmadhāraya and tatpuruṣa have faults. If the entity of sensual attachment is itself the latent defilement, based on a karmadhāraya interpretation, it would contradict the sūtra. As the sūtra says: If there is a category of sentient beings who not for a long time [...] up to and including: abandoned along with the latent defilements; banishing the entanglement of sensual attachment indicates abandoning active manifestation; abandoning along with the latent defilements indicates abandoning the seeds. Since the sūtra speaks of properly banishing the entanglement of sensual attachment and separately speaks of abandoning along with the latent defilements, we clearly know that the entity of sensual attachment is not itself the latent defilement. The citation of the sūtra primarily takes the clause "abandoned along with the latent defilements" to formulate the objection; the rest appears because it is the same text. If it means the latent defilement of sensual attachment, based on a tatpuruṣa interpretation, then the latent defilement would be citta-viprayukta (unassociated with mind), agreeing with the Mahāsāṃghika and others. They posit that the latent defilement is unassociated with mind, stating that when afflictions are actively arising, they induce within their own continuum a distinct dharma subsumed under the saṃskāra-skandha that is unassociated with mind, called a latent defilement. According to the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, the Mahāsāṃghika and others state that the latent defilement is unassociated with mind. Stating that it is unassociated not only agrees with the Mahāsāṃghika and others, but also contradicts the Abhidharma. As the fundamental treatise says: the latent defilement of sensual attachment is associated with three faculties: joy (saumanasya), pleasure (sukha), and equanimity (upekṣā). Since the treatise says the latent defilement of sensual attachment is associated with three faculties, we clearly know that sensual attachment is itself the latent defilement, actively manifest and associated, and there is no latent defilement apart from sensual attachment called unassociated.

19.19

Regarding "The Vaibhāṣikas [...] is itself the latent defilement": the Vaibhāṣikas speak thus: The entity of sensual attachment and so forth is itself the latent defilement, based on a karmadhāraya interpretation. It is associated with mind, not unassociated.

19.20

"Does this not contradict the sūtra?": this is an objection raised by the Mahāsāṃghika and others.

19.21

On [the phrase] “There is no fault of contradicting the sūtras [...] [anuśayas] are associated dharmas”: The Vaibhāṣikas resolve the sūtra. When the sūtra says, “abandoned together with the anuśayas,” it means that not only is the substantial entity of sensual attachment (kāmarāga) abandoned, but the [dharmas] associated with attachment as well as the adherence to [its] cognitive objects (ālambana-paryavasthāna) are also abandoned. Nyāyānusāra, fascicle forty-five, states: “Furthermore, when that sūtra says ‘abandoned together with the anuśayas,’ it indicates that the envelopment (paryavasthāna) of sensual attachment is abandoned without remainder. That is, when abandoning the eight grades abandoned by cultivation (bhāvanāheya), one grade of anuśaya is still able to adhere; in order to indicate the abandonment of the entity, it speaks of fully expelling it. The statement ‘abandoned together with the anuśayas’ indicates that adherence is completely ended.” (End of śāstra passage.) Alternatively, the sūtra metaphorically designates the acquisition (prāpti) as an anuśaya: not only is attachment abandoned, but the acquisition of attachment is also abandoned; the acquisition is not [itself] an anuśaya, but because it generates the anuśaya, it is metaphorically designated an anuśaya, just as fire and the like generate suffering and the like, and so the name “suffering” and so forth is applied to fire and the like. As for the word “conception” (saṃjñā), it is because conception can give rise to names, or because names give rise to conceptions, that it is called “conception.” The Abhidharma speaks according to real characteristics: the defilements themselves are termed anuśayas, which is based on an appositional compound (karmadhāraya). Therefore, an anuśaya, when currently arisen and associated [with mind], is an associated dharma, not a dissociated [dharma].

19.22

On “By what reason is it proven to be definitely associated?”: The Mahāsāṃghikas and others challenge.

19.23

On “Because all anuśayas [...] are associated dharmas”: Master Dharmatrāta among the Vaibhāṣikas explains. Hence the Nyāyānusāra states: “Here, the author of the śāstra first recounts what was stated by Dharmatrāta: ‘Because all anuśayas...’ The reason one knows anuśayas to be associated dharmas is, first, because anuśayas defile and afflict the mind; second, because they conceal and obstruct the mind; and third, because they can oppose wholesome [dharmas]. That is, through the power of an anuśaya to defile and afflict the mind, it can defile and afflict the mind. Because it conceals and obstructs the mind, unarisen wholesome [dharmas] do not arise. Because it can oppose wholesome [dharmas], already-arisen wholesome [dharmas] fall back and are lost. [This applies] respectively.” Another explanation: The passage beginning with “That is” explains all three preceding points together. Yet another explanation: The passage beginning with “That is” explains only the first point, while the latter two are omitted and not discussed. Because anuśayas can perform these three functions, the entity of an anuśaya is not dissociated [from mind]. A counter-objection is posed to the Mahāsāṃghikas and others: “If a dissociated [factor] could perform these three functions, then wholesome dharmas would never have an occasion to arise, because according to your thesis, dissociated [factors] are constantly present at every moment.” This indirectly establishes one’s own position. It means: since wholesome dharmas indeed have occasions to arise, we know that anuśayas are associated dharmas, not dissociated dharmas.

19.24

On “None of this provides proof [...] are the doing of anuśayas”: The Mahāsāṃghikas and others reject [it]: None of this provides proof. Why is that? If our school holds that the entity of that anuśaya is not associated [with mind], we do not accept that the above three functions are the doing of anuśayas; they are all the doing of currently arisen defilements (paryavasthāna). According to the Mahāsāṃghikas and others, currently arisen defilements are called envelopments (paryavasthāna), while their perfuming to form seeds is called anuśayas, which are dissociated [from mind].

19.25

On “However, what the Sautrāntikas state is the best”: The author of the śāstra evaluates and adopts the Sautrāntika view.

19.26

On “What do the Sautrāntikas state on this?”: A question.

19.27

On “They state that sensual attachment [...] is named an envelopment”: This expounds the Sautrāntika school. They state that the meaning of “the anuśaya of sensual attachment” is based on a determinative compound (tatpuruṣa). However, the entity of an anuśaya is not associated with mind; thus it is not the same as the Sarvāstivāda. Nor is it dissociated [from mind]; thus it is not the same as the Mahāsāṃghikas and others. Because this anuśaya does not exist as a separate entity apart from matter (rūpa) and mind (citta) called “associated with mind” or “dissociated,” it is therefore neither of the two kinds. When defilements are in a dormant state, their perfuming to form seeds is termed an anuśaya; when in an awake state, their current arising to perceive objects is named an envelopment (paryavasthāna).

19.28

On “What is called dormant?”: A question.

19.29

On “It refers to non-active seeds following along”: The Sautrāntikas answer. When the defilement is not active, it is similar to sleep; hence it is called “dormant.”

19.30

On “What is called awake?”: A question.

19.31

On “It refers to the defilements actively arising and enveloping the mind”: The Sautrāntikas answer. When the defilement is active, it perceives the cognitive object before it; hence it is called “awake.”

19.32

On “What are called defilement seeds?”: A question.

19.33

On “It refers to, upon the entity [...] cannot be found”: The Sautrāntikas answer. It refers to a distinctive capacity upon the entity of matter and mind, because defilement seeds are distinct from other seeds; it is called a “distinctive capacity” (sāmarthya-viśeṣa). This very capacity is generated from a preceding active defilement and can generate a subsequent active defilement. The phrase “direct knowledge” (saṃvedana-jñāna) refers to the knowledge associated with mental consciousness following immediately upon the five [sense] consciousnesses. Another explanation: It also includes knowledge associated with a mind in meditative concentration. Yet another explanation: It also includes knowledge associated with the five [sense] consciousnesses, since all are direct perceptual verification (pratyakṣa). For example, the seed of mindfulness is generated by the mindfulness that co-arises with the preceding direct knowledge, and its distinctive capacity to produce the future fruit of mindfulness is called a seed. This text should have said: “Just as the seed of mindfulness is generated by mindfulness”; yet it says that it is generated by direct knowledge because in the earlier state knowledge is predominant, so the name “knowledge” is marked, whereas in the later state mindfulness is superior, so the title “mindfulness” is designated. Another explanation: In the preceding mental assemblage, knowledge is predominant, so it is collectively termed direct knowledge; in the subsequent mental assemblage, mindfulness is predominant, so it is collectively termed mindfulness. If interpreted this way, the name is established based on the predominant factor, but in reality, each perfumes and forms a seed. Yet another explanation: Mind and mental factors that can remember a prior object are generally termed mindfulness, while those that can directly verify a prior object are generally termed knowledge. Hence it is said: “Just as the seed of mindfulness is generated by direct knowledge, a distinctive capacity capable of generating future mindfulness.” Furthermore, just as in a sprout and the like, generated from a preceding barley fruit or the like, there is a distinctive capacity capable of generating subsequent fruits such as stalks and the like, which is called a seed. If you Mahāsāṃghikas and others hold that apart from active defilements there are distinct anuśayas, which are mind-dissociated [factors] called defilement seeds, then you ought to admit that the seed of mindfulness is not merely a capacity to generate active mindfulness, but that there should also be a distinct dissociated entity called the seed of mindfulness capable of inducing subsequent mindfulness. If this is not so for mindfulness, why should it be so for defilement? Mindfulness and defilement belong to the same category, because a differentiated causal condition cannot be found. A formal inference (prayogavākya) is established: “The seed of mindfulness should be a dissociated [factor], because it is produced from another and can produce another, like an anuśaya.” Another inference is established: “An anuśaya should have no substantial entity, because it is produced from another and can produce another, like the seed of mindfulness.” Because according to the Mahāsāṃghikas and others, the power of defilements is strong, through long practice from beginningless time perfuming into seeds, they possess a distinct substantial entity that is mind-dissociated. As for the seed of mindfulness, its power is weak and not from beginningless practice; although perfumed into a seed, it is only a capacity and has no distinct substantial entity. For the Sautrāntikas, both defilement seeds and mindfulness seeds possess capacity and both lack a distinct substantial entity. Due to this difference, they challenge the Mahāsāṃghikas and others.

19.34

On “If so, [how do you explain] the Six Sextets [...] ‘there is the anuśaya of attachment’?”: The Sarvāstivādins object. Since the sūtra states that “in regard to pleasant feeling, there is the anuśaya of attachment,” it is evident that the anuśaya is actively arisen; how can you say that the anuśaya is called a seed?

19.35

On “The sūtra merely says ‘there is’ [...] what contradiction is there?”: The Sautrāntikas resolve the sūtra. The sūtra merely says that there is an anuśaya of attachment; it does not say that when pleasant feeling is active, the anuśaya is currently present. What contradiction is there?

19.36

On “At what time does it exist?”: The Sarvāstivādins ask.

19.37

On “At the time when it is dormant [...] established the conception of anuśaya”: The Sautrāntikas answer. At the time when pleasant feeling perfumes the seeds and is dormant, it is said that “there is the anuśaya of attachment.” Alternatively, it is a metaphorical designation on the cause (attachment) with the name of the effect (anuśaya), which is called a conception. This has already been explained above.

19.38

On “Let us set aside peripheral discussions and determine the main treatise”: Below, this explains the last three lines. It puts an end to the debate and introduces what follows.

19.39

On “Attachment is divided into two [...] what is its entity?”: This cites the text to be explained and raises the question.

19.40

On “Namely, attachment within the two realms of form and formlessness”: This cites the second line in answer.

19.41

On “For what reason is this name established only for those [realms]?”: A question. For what reason is this name “attachment to existence” (bhavarāga) established only for those higher realms?

19.42

On “Attachment there mostly relies on [...] is not separately displayed”: This cites the bottom two lines in answer. Although attachment in those higher realms also takes external objects as its cognitive object, it mostly operates by relying on an inward direction. That is, in those two realms, attachment to meditative concentration mostly arises, and all attachment to concentration operates inwardly; hence the name “attachment to existence” is established only for them. Furthermore, because some people conceive the idea of liberation with regard to the basis-body (āśraya-kāya) in the upper two realms, in order to refute them, the name “attachment to existence” is established for the upper realms, revealing that the cognitive object of their attachment is not true liberation. Broadly speaking, “existence” (bhava) pervades the three realms, and pervades the internal and external. Here, however, “existence” is designated only on the contaminated internal personal entity of the upper realms; hence it is called “existence.” Because sentient beings in those realms mostly develop deep attachment to the two entities—the meditative attainment of absorption (samāpatti) and the basis-body—it is said that they only relish the internal personal entity, not external objects, because they are free from sensual-realm attachment. Because the body in meditative concentration is superior, they relish it exclusively; thus the name “attachment to existence” is established only for those realms. Since it is stated that attachment to existence belongs to the upper two realms, it implicitly follows that attachment in the desire realm is named attachment to the five sensual objects; therefore it is not separately displayed in the verse. Although attachment in the desire realm also takes the internal body as its cognitive object, it mostly takes external objects as its cognitive object; speaking from the majority, it is named “sensual attachment” (kāmarāga).

19.43

On “Just as stated above [...] five doubts”: This is the third section, explaining the ten anuśayas. It can be understood from the text.

19.44

On “Furthermore, as just stated [...] the rest are as explained for desire”: This is the fourth section, explaining the ninety-eight [anuśayas]. It presents the question and the versified answer.

19.45

On “The treatise says [...] the three realms: formlessness”: This explains the first two lines. “Category” (nikāya/varga) means “multitude” (saṃgha). Hence the Vibhāṣā states: “Question: What meaning is the word ‘category’ here intended to reveal? Answer: It is intended to reveal the meaning of a multitude.” The rest of the text is clear.

19.46

On “First, in the desire realm [...] and those abandoned by cultivation”: This explains the next four lines. Multiplying by the ten anuśayas yields thirty-six. That is, those abandoned by seeing suffering (duḥkha-darśana-heya) are ten—this is one group possessing all ten. Those abandoned by seeing origination and cessation (samudaya- and nirodha-darśana-heya) are seven each—these two groups lack three views. Those abandoned by seeing the path (mārga-darśana-heya) are eight—this is one group lacking two views. Those abandoned by cultivation (bhāvanāheya) are four—this is one group lacking views and doubt. This shows the pervasiveness or restriction of the ten anuśayas across the five categories, as is clear from the text. “Cultivation” (abhyāsa) means bhāvanā, because they are abandoned only through repeated cultivation of the path. The two views—view of the self-aggregate (satkāyadṛṣṭi) and extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi)—arise with respect to coarse results and belong to only one category [abandoned by seeing suffering]; attachment to rules and rituals (śīlavrataparāmarśa) that arises with respect to results is abandoned by seeing suffering, whereas that which does not arise with respect to results but grasps a general characteristic without investigating cause and effect is abandoned by seeing the path, so it belongs to two categories. Wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi), adherence to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), and doubt: the first and last take the four truths as their cognitive object, while the middle one is adherence to views. If it arises with respect to result and cause, it is abandoned by seeing suffering and origination; if it grasps a general characteristic without investigating cause and effect, it is abandoned by seeing cessation and the path. None of these three arise from delusion regarding concrete things (vastu), so they are not abandoned by cultivation. Attachment, aversion, and conceit: if they arise taking what is abandoned by the four truths as their cognitive object, they are abandoned by the four truths; if they arise from delusion regarding concrete things, they are abandoned by cultivation. This is because the activity of attachment and so forth is coarse, not subtle, and because it does not investigate principle, it is not directly deluded about principle. Ignorance (avidyā): if associated with the five views and doubt, or associated with attachment and so forth that take what is abandoned by the four truths as their cognitive object, as well as unshared (āveṇikī) ignorance, it is abandoned by the four truths; if associated with attachment and so forth deluded regarding concrete things, it is abandoned by cultivation. Therefore, the four beginning with attachment each pervade the five categories.

19.47

On “Here, what are the characteristics [...] are abandoned by cultivation?”: A general question on the characteristics of the five kinds of abandonment.

19.48

"If taking as an objective condition what is seen in this... is termed abandoned by cultivation" provides the answer. As with the five views and doubt under [the truths of] suffering and arising, along with ignorance associated with them or unshared [ignorance], and the afflictions that take the uncontaminated as objective condition under [the truths of] cessation and the path, as appropriate: if they take what is seen in this truth as their objective condition, they are called abandoned by seeing this truth. As with attachment, hostility, and conceit under suffering and arising, along with ignorance associated with them, and afflictions taking the contaminated as objective condition under cessation and the path, as appropriate: if they take as an objective condition what is abandoned by seeing this truth, they are called abandoned by seeing this truth. The remaining attachment, hostility, conceit, and ignorance associated with them do not take what is seen in this truth as their objective condition, nor do they take as an objective condition what is abandoned by seeing this truth, but merely arise confused regarding actual things; they are called abandoned by cultivation. Question: In the case of afflictions that take another realm as an objective condition, how can it be said that taking as an objective condition what is seen in this truth is called abandoned by seeing this truth? The explanation says: this text is stated for the time being with respect to afflictions that take one's own realm as their objective condition, because taking another realm as an objective condition is not taking as an objective condition what is seen in this truth, nor is it taking as an objective condition what is abandoned by seeing this truth, since it takes phenomena of another realm as its objective condition. Another explanation says: because it takes this class as its objective condition, it is abandoned by seeing this. Another explanation says: this text is also stated with respect to afflictions regarding other realms, because when taking another realm as an objective condition, it also takes suffering and arising as its objective condition. Here in this text, it is stated generally, encompassing all three realms and the five classes of abandonment. The Nyāyānusāra (fascicle 46) refutes this, saying: "The author of the Śāstra here questions and answers himself: 'Here, with what characteristic is an affliction abandoned by seeing suffering, down to with what characteristic is it abandoned by cultivation? If it takes as an objective condition what is abandoned by seeing this, it is called abandoned by seeing this; the remainder are called abandoned by cultivation.' This is illogical. Why is that? Because omnipresent anuśayas take all five classes as their objective condition; thus anuśayas abandoned by seeing suffering and arising would also have to be abandoned across seeing arising, suffering, and so forth. Furthermore, for anuśayas abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, which take phenomena that are not to be abandoned as their objective condition, by what should they be said to be abandoned? Therefore, he does not properly establish the characteristics of what is to be abandoned. One should say: if seeing takes suffering as its objective condition, it is termed 'seeing suffering', which refers to the receptivities to the cognition of dharma and the subsequent cognition of suffering. What is abandoned by these two is collectively called abandoned by seeing suffering. Down to what is abandoned by seeing the path, it is likewise. Repeated practice is called cultivation; that is, one who sees the traces, in order to attain a higher purpose, repeatedly cultivates the cognitions of suffering and so forth, which is termed cultivation; what is eliminated by this path is called abandoned by cultivation. This is properly establishing the characteristics of what is to be abandoned." The masters of the Kośa defend this, saying: "The author of the Nyāyānusāra misunderstood our text, thinking that only taking as an objective condition what is abandoned by this truth is termed abandoned by seeing this truth, and therefore raised objections using afflictions taking another class as objective condition and those taking the uncontaminated as objective condition. One should say: if taking as an objective condition what is seen in this truth, or if taking as an objective condition what is abandoned by seeing this truth, it is called abandoned by seeing this truth. Afflictions taking another class as objective condition and those taking the uncontaminated as objective condition should be understood as subsumed under taking as an objective condition what is seen in this truth, because they take the truths as their objective condition. Furthermore, his own explanation does not differ from what we have stated."

19.49

"Thus among the six... there are thirty-six" individually enumerates the six afflictions, opening them up to thirty-six.

19.50

"The form and formless realms... each thirty-one" explains the seventh and eighth lines. It is understandable. Question: For what reason does the higher realm have no anuśaya of hostility? Answer: The Xianzong lun says: "In that realm, the anuśaya of hostility has no basis for existence. That is, the anuśaya of hostility exists with respect to painful feeling; painful feeling does not exist there, and therefore hostility does not exist. Furthermore, their continuum is moistened by concentration; and furthermore, that realm is not a maturation-cause of hostility. Some say: because they have no harmful circumstances, because it is the dwelling place of wholesome roots such as loving-kindness, and because they are entirely free from any possessiveness."

19.51

"Hence the basic treatise... speaks of ninety-eight" cites the text of the basic treatise to conclude and state the summary. Because full knowledge is established through detachment from attachment to realms, ninety-eight anuśayas are established according to realms, not stages. Therefore the Xianzong lun says: "Anuśayas are established according to realms, not stages, because full knowledge is established through detachment from attachment to realms. That is, the afflictive phenomena of the four dhyānas are slightly similar in nature; though there are four stages, they are stated together as one, and the same applies to the four formless [stages] being stated together, because the sūtras only speak of attachment to the form realm, attachment to the formless realm, and so forth."

19.52

"Among those distinguished here... because they are destroyed by cognition" is the second part below, clarifying abandonment by seeing and abandonment by cultivation. This is the general statement.

19.53

"Is what is thus stated... definitely so?" is the question.

19.54

"It is not so" is the answer.

19.55

"How so?" is the inquiry.

19.56

"The verse states: ... What is destroyed by cognition is only [abandoned by] cultivation" is the verse reply.

19.57

"The commentary says: ... only then can it be abandoned" explains the first two lines. The term 'receptivity' broadly refers to the receptivity to the cognition of dharma and the receptivity to subsequent cognition. Here, when clarifying receptivity, it is called 'cognition' by naming it after its fruit. Among the anuśayas destroyed by receptivity, those subsumed in the stage of the peak of existence are abandoned solely by seeing, because only the receptivity to subsequent cognition is able to abandon them.

19.58

"Those subsumed under the remaining eight stages... because they are abandoned by cognition" explains the third line. What is abandoned by receptivity subsumed under the remaining eight stages—the desire realm, the four dhyānas, and the three formless stages—is common to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation. That is, the abandonment by noble ones is solely by seeing, not cultivation: if in the desire realm, it is abandoned by the receptivity to the cognition of dharma; if in the higher seven stages, it is abandoned by the receptivity to subsequent cognition. If abandoned by worldlings, it is solely by cultivation, not seeing, because it is abandoned through repeated practice of conventional cognition.

19.59

"What is destroyed by cognition... because they are abandoned by cognition" explains the fourth line. The anuśayas destroyed by cognition, subsumed under all nine stages, are solely abandoned by cultivation. This is because for both noble ones and worldlings, as appropriate, for noble ones they are abandoned through repeated practice of uncontaminated and conventional cognition, and for worldlings they are abandoned through repeated practice of conventional cognition.

19.60.1

"Some other masters say [...] because the views are not yet abandoned" recounts a divergent theory. Non-Buddhist ṛṣis are incapable of subduing the defilements abandoned through seeing; they can only temporarily subdue the defilements abandoned through cultivation and thereby attain rebirth in higher realms. Therefore, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle fifty-one, states: "Namely, the Dārṣṭāntikas speak thus: 'Ordinary persons cannot abandon the defilements.'" Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle ninety, states: "Or again, some maintain: 'Ordinary persons cannot abandon the anuśayas abandoned through seeing.' Still others maintain: 'Ordinary persons cannot abandon any anuśayas; they can only suppress and subdue them.'" The explanation states: the defilements abandoned through seeing can neither be subdued nor abandoned, whereas the defilements abandoned through cultivation are subdued but not abandoned. As the Mahāvibhaṅga-karma-sūtra states: "Even though they are free from desire [for the realm of desire] with respect to craving abandoned through cultivation, non-Buddhists still have active wrong views that take the desire realm as their object"; hence one knows that they can neither subdue nor abandon the defilements of view. The remaining defilements abandoned through seeing, by analogy with this wrong view, all cannot be abandoned. And the Brahmajāla-sūtra also states: "Non-Buddhists who are free from desire have active views that take the desire realm as their object," referring to those who theorize based on discrimination concerning the past: some maintain four kinds of universal permanence, some maintain four kinds of partial permanence, some maintain two kinds of causeless arising of dharmas, and so forth. That sūtra comprehensively speaks of sixty-two views. Based on this, it is known that they cannot subdue or abandon the defilements abandoned through seeing; for defilements of the form realm do not arise taking the desire realm as object, and since they are already free from craving toward the objects of the desire realm, it is definite that these views belonging to the desire realm have not yet been abandoned. Question: What are the names and essential natures of the sixty-two views? Explanation: As extensively clarified in fascicles 199 and 200 of the Mahāvibhāṣā, now we briefly take the general sense to clearly designate the sixty-two views of that treatise. Furthermore, the Brahmajāla-sūtra states: "The sixty-two destinations of evil views all have satkāyadṛṣṭi as their root." The sixty-two destinations of views are: eighteen views discriminating the past, and forty-four views discriminating the future. The eighteen views discriminating the past are: four doctrines of universal permanence, four doctrines of partial permanence, two doctrines of causeless arising, four doctrines of the finite and so forth, and four doctrines of eel-wriggling evasiveness. The forty-four views discriminating the future are: sixteen doctrines of conscious survival, eight doctrines of unconscious survival, eight doctrines of neither-conscious-nor-unconscious survival, seven doctrines of annihilation, and five doctrines of nirvāṇa in the present life. Here, discriminatory views arising based on the past are called views discriminating the past; discriminatory views arising based on the future are called views discriminating the future. If they arise based on the present, this is indeterminate: they are either called views discriminating the past or called views discriminating the future, because the present time is prior to the future and subsequent to the past, or because it is the cause of the future and the fruit of the past. Among the views discriminating the past, the four doctrines of universal permanence are: First, by recollecting aeons: that is, because one can recollect one aeon of evolution and dissolution, or two, or three, up to eight or ten, one then grasps that both the self and the world are permanent. Second, by recollecting births: that is, because one can recollect one birth, or two, or three, up to a hundred or a thousand births' events, one then grasps that both the self and the world are permanent. Although previously one recollected many [aeons], one had not yet attained mastery regarding the continuity between the recollected births; now, although one recollects few, one has already attained mastery regarding the continuity between the recollected births. Third, by death and rebirth: that is, through the divine eye, seeing the continuity of the skandhas of sentient beings at the time of death and at the time of rebirth, one consequently grasps that both the self and the world are permanent. Fourth, by reasoning and investigation: that is, through such false reasoning and investigation, one grasps that both the self and the world are permanent. Because these four kinds grasp universal permanence, they are called universal permanence, having the view of permanence as their nature. The four doctrines of partial permanence are: First, due to the Great Brahmā: that is, having died in the Brahmā world and come to be born here, because one has attained the supernormal power of recollection of past lives, one grasps thus: "We were all created by the Great Brahmā King; the Brahmā King, being able to create, resides there permanently, whereas we, being created, are therefore impermanent." Second, due to the primary elements or the mind: that is, hearing the Brahmā King say that either the primary elements or the mind—whichever one—is permanent, one then grasps: "I take the Great Brahmā King as the authoritative standard; therefore, one part of the world is permanent and one part is impermanent." Third, due to the gods corrupted by play: that is, there are those who previously died from the gods corrupted by play and came to be born here; because they have attained the supernormal power of recollection of past lives, they then grasp: "Those among the gods there who do not excessively play and lose mindfulness reside there permanently; we, having previously fallen from that realm because of excessive play and loss of mindfulness, are therefore impermanent." Fourth, due to the gods corrupted by malice: that is, there are those who previously died from the gods of malice and came to be born here; because they have attained the supernormal power of recollection of past lives, they immediately grasp: "Those among the gods there whose minds are not excessively angry, looking askance at one another, reside there permanently; we, having previously fallen from that realm because of our minds being excessively angry at one another and looking askance, are therefore impermanent." Some say: they dwell on the terraces of Mount Sumeru. Some say: they are the Trāyastriṃśa gods. Because these four kinds grasp partial permanence, they are called partial [permanence], having the view of permanence as their nature. The two doctrines of causeless arising are: First, due to the non-conceptual gods: that is, having died from the non-conceptual sentient beings and come to be born here, because one has attained the supernormal power of recollection of past lives, although one can recollect the mind emerging from non-conceptuality and the subsequent stages, one cannot recollect all the stages prior to the emerging mind; one then thinks: "At that time I arose from non-existence, and dharmas, like myself, must all likewise arise from non-existence." Consequently, one grasps that both the self and the world are without cause, arising spontaneously. Second, false reasoning and investigation: that is, through reasoning and investigation falsely inquiring, [one thinks:] "Since what is experienced in this present body can all be recollected, if there had been experiences in a previous body, one should also be able to recollect them in this present body; since one cannot recollect them, one knows they did not exist." Consequently, one grasps that both the self and the world arise without cause, existing spontaneously. Because these two kinds grasp causeless arising, they are called doctrines of causeless arising, having wrong view as their nature. The four doctrines of the finite and so forth are: First, the finite: that is, through the divine eye, seeing below only as far as the Avīci Hell and seeing above only as far as the First Dhyāna heaven, one grasps that the self fully pervades therein. One thinks: "If there were a self and a world beyond this, I should also see them; since I cannot see them, I know they do not exist." Consequently, one grasps that both the self and the world are finite, which is the meaning of the two kinds having limits. Second, the infinite: that is, depending on the superior dhyāna and developing the pure divine eye, seeing horizontally without limit, one grasps that the self fully pervades therein. Consequently, one grasps that both the self and the world are infinite, which is the meaning of the two kinds being limitless. Third, both finite and infinite: that is, through the divine eye and the supernormal power of psychic transformation; through the power of the divine eye, seeing below only as far as the Avīci Hell and seeing above only as far as the First Dhyāna heaven;

19.60.2

By supernormal power to move the physical body laterally, one fails to find an edge, and thus conceives a notion of having an edge with respect to above and below, and a notion of being boundless with respect to the lateral world, grasping the self as entirely pervading therein. Due to this, one grasps the self and the world as both having an edge and being boundless—that is, the sense that both have delimitations and are without delimitations. Fourth: [the doctrine that] it is neither with edge nor boundless, which negates the third to form this fourth. They formulate this thought: 'The self and the world are both ineffable as definitely having an edge or definitely being boundless, yet both are real entities.' Or, as some say: because they see that the world is laterally boundless, they grasp that the self and the world are both not with an edge; because they see that the world is vertically bounded, they grasp that the self and the world are both not boundless. Although there is no determinacy, the self really exists. Still others say: they grasp that the substance of the self either expands or contracts and cannot be definitively stated; because it is boundless when expanding, they say it is not with an edge, and because it has an edge when contracting, they say it is not boundless. Question: Since these four kinds take the present as their object, why are they called speculations regarding the prior limit? Answer: In relation to the future, they are also called the prior limit. [This is] elaborated in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. It also says: 'Some say: one who grasps that it has an edge holds the view of annihilation; one who grasps that it is boundless holds the view of permanence; one who grasps that it both has an edge and is boundless holds a partly annihilationist and partly eternalist view; one who grasps that it is neither with an edge nor boundless only generates the view of personal identity (satkāyadṛṣṭi).' The explanation says: the former account takes the view of self as its nature, since it mentions 'grasping a self'; the latter masters take annihilationist, eternalist, and the view of self as its nature. The four evasive wrigglers (amarāvikkhepa): they consider heaven to be permanent, which is called 'immortal' (amara); if one can answer without confusion, one will be reborn in that heaven, whereas if one cannot answer truthfully, one fears not being reborn in heaven. Because one's speech is evasive and confusing, it is called wriggling (evasiveness). First: out of fear of false speech. 'I do not know all phenomena as they really are; if another asks and I answer, it would be false speech; fearing false speech, I fear not being reborn in heaven,' so one speaks evasively: 'Secret meanings and the like should not all be spoken.' Second: out of fear of wrong view. 'I do not know all phenomena as they really are; if another asks and I repudiate it, it would be wrong view; fearing wrong view, I fear not being reborn in heaven,' so one speaks evasively: 'Secret meanings and the like should not all be spoken.' Third: out of fear of ignorance. 'I do not know all phenomena as they really are; if another asks and I confirm it, I fear being interrogated and found not knowing; fearing ignorance, I fear not being reborn in heaven,' so one speaks evasively: 'Secret meanings and the like should not all be spoken.' Fourth: out of fear of dull-wittedness. 'If I oppose the other's mind, I will not be reborn in heaven; whoever asks me, I should ask back in turn, and according to what they desire, I then confirm it. Moreover, my nature is foolish; if I reject the other, they will examine me; fearing foolishness, I fear not being reborn in heaven,' thus speaking evasively. Although these four operate on present matters, in relation to the future they are given the name of the prior limit. Such four kinds conceive of the immortality of heaven; their substance is entirely eternalist view. Conceiving answering another's questions to be the cause of rebirth in heaven is attachment to vows and ascetic rules (śīlavrataparāmarśa). Among the speculations regarding the posterior limit, the sixteen doctrines of [the self being] percipient: namely, four regarding having form and the like; four regarding having an edge and the like; four regarding having a single perception and the like; four regarding having pleasure and the like. As for the four regarding having form and the like: First: 'My self has form and is percipient after death.' That is, the grasped self has form as its nature, so it is called 'having form'; because this self that has form possesses that perception, it is called 'percipient'. They formulate this thought: 'This self having form is percipient after death.' Second: 'My self is formless and is percipient after death.' That is, the grasped self has formlessness as its nature, so it is called 'formless'; this formless self either has perception as its nature, or is said to be percipient because it has the function of perception, or is said to be percipient because it possesses that perception. They formulate this thought: 'This formless self is percipient after death.' Third: 'My self both has form and is formless, and is percipient after death.' That is, the grasped self has both form and formlessness as its nature, so it is called 'both having form and formless'. The self either has perception as its nature, or is said to be percipient because it has the function of perception, or is said to be percipient because it possesses that perception. Thus they formulate this thought: 'This self that both has form and is formless is percipient after death.' Fourth: 'My self is neither with form nor formless, and is percipient after death.' This negates the third without a separate basis. They formulate this thought: 'Although the self really exists, it cannot be definitively stated as both having form and being formless.' Because they see that a real self being definitively both with form and formless both incur fault, they state: 'This self is neither with form nor formless, and is percipient after death.' As for the four regarding having an edge and the like: First: 'My self has an edge and is percipient after death.' The substance of their grasped self has delimitations, so it is called 'my self has an edge'; this self having an edge is percipient after death. Second: grasping 'My self is boundless and is percipient after death.' Their grasped self pervades all places, so it is called 'my self is boundless'; this boundless self is percipient after death. Third: grasping 'My self both has an edge and is boundless, and is percipient after death.' Their grasped self is at times with an edge and at times boundless; they conceive that this self is percipient after death. Fourth: grasping 'My self is neither with an edge nor boundless, and is percipient after death,' which negates the third to form this fourth. As for the four regarding having a single perception and the like: First: 'My self has a single perception and is percipient after death.' Operating with reference to a single object is called a single perception; the conjunction of the self with that is called having a single perception. Hereafter, 'percipient after death' is to be explained according to the preceding. Second: 'My self has various perceptions and is percipient after death.' Arising with reference to different objects is called various perceptions; the conjunction of the self with that is called having various perceptions. Third: 'My self has limited perception and is percipient after death.' Because of relying on a small body or taking a limited object, it is said to be a limited perception; the conjunction of the self with that is called having a limited perception. If one grasps the skandha of limited perception as the self, because it has the function of perception it is called having a limited perception. The rest below are explained accordingly. Fourth: 'My self has immeasurable perception and is percipient after death.' Because of relying on an immeasurable body or taking an immeasurable object, it is called immeasurable perception; the conjunction of the self with that is called having immeasurable perception. As for the four regarding having pleasure and the like: First: 'My self has solely pleasure and is percipient after death.' Pleasure means pleasant feeling or requisites of pleasure; the conjunction of the self with that is called having solely pleasure. Second: 'My self has solely suffering and is percipient after death.' Suffering means unpleasant feeling or requisites of suffering; the conjunction of the self with that is called having solely suffering. Third: 'My self has pleasure and has suffering, and is percipient after death.' Either suffering and pleasure are experienced mixed, or both suffering and pleasure are combined, so one formulates this thought: 'My self has suffering and pleasure.' Fourth: 'My self has neither suffering nor pleasure and is percipient after death.' Not experiencing suffering or pleasure is called having neither suffering nor pleasure; or experiencing it temporarily as if it did not exist, one formulates this thought: 'My self has neither suffering nor pleasure.' It should be known that although the sixteen doctrines of being percipient are all percipient, the first four are distinguished by form and formlessness, the next four by edge and boundlessness, the next four in terms of perception, and the latter four in terms of feeling; these sixteen all take eternalist view as their substance. The eight doctrines of being non-percipient: namely, four regarding having form and the like, and four regarding having an edge and the like.

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese

俱舍論記 19

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