俱舍論記 20

English (machine translation) 20

Language: English

20.2

Chapter on the Investigation of Latent Defilements, Part Two of Five

On the passage from "Sentient beings" to "which entities can they bind?": below this is the sixth section, clarifying how defilements bind. Within this: first, clarifying binding in terms of time; second, clarifying binding in terms of abandonment. Within clarifying binding in terms of time: first, properly clarifying binding in terms of time; second, clarifying the existence or non-existence of the three times. Below this is the first, properly clarifying binding in terms of time. It sets forth the thesis and introduces the question. That sentient beings have latent defilements that increase in accordance with an entity is called binding this entity—this sets forth the thesis. One should explain which latent defilements of the three times can bind the entities of which times—this introduces the question.

20.4

On the passage from "The verse says" to "that which is currently cognizing can bind": an answer. The first line clarifies the bound entity; the latter seven lines clarify that which binds. In the second line, "not abandoned," and in the eighth line, "can bind," apply to the intermediate lines as appropriate. There are two kinds of universal: first, universally binding the three times; second, universally binding their own objects. The three defilements of greed, anger, and conceit of the mental consciousness in the future, whether arising or not arising; greed and anger of the five consciousnesses in the future that do not arise; and the remaining views, doubt, and ignorance of the past and future—all possess both universalities as appropriate, and receive the name of "universal." The three of greed, anger, and conceit of the mental consciousness in the past, although they also universally bind the three times, do not universally bind their own objects; hence they are not called universal here, but are stated together with the five. As for defilements with a common characteristic currently cognizing, although some possess both kinds of universality and some do not, because they are indefinite they are not called universal.

20.5

On the passage from "The treatise says" to "flows to the subsequent headings": this is a brief indication and explanation. That which arises by taking a distinct phenomenon as object is called a specific characteristic; that which arises by taking multiple phenomena as object is called a common characteristic. Concomitant ignorance among defilements of specific characteristics, because it is necessarily present, is omitted and not discussed. Although entities are manifold, there are five brief kinds: first, entity as intrinsic nature; second, entity as intentional object; third, entity as that which is bound; fourth, entity as cause; fifth, entity as subsumption. Here, it speaks of the third: entity as that which is bound. "Not abandoned" in the second line flows through to the subsequent headings as appropriate.

20.6

On the passage from "If toward this entity" to "because they definitely arise universally": explaining the first three lines. If toward this entity there is greed, anger, or conceit that has already arisen in the past and is not abandoned, or has already arisen in the present, it can bind this entity. Because greed, anger, and conceit are defilements of specific characteristics, arising by taking distinct entities as objects, sentient beings do not definitely give rise to them universally across all entities of the three times. Since being manifest in the present necessarily precludes the meaning of abandonment, "not abandoned" is not stated for the present, while the words "not abandoned" are designated for the past.

20.7

On the passage from "If in the future" to "can also bind the three times": explaining the next three lines. If greed, anger, and conceit associated with mental consciousness in the future universally bind the three times, whether the defilement arises or does not arise regarding this entity, as long as it is not abandoned, it can bind. Greed and anger associated with the five consciousnesses in the future, if not abandoned and capable of arising, because their objects are necessarily simultaneous, only bind the future. Thus the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "By this it is already revealed that latent defilements capable of arising associated with the five consciousnesses, if they reach the past, only bind the past; if they reach the present, it is likewise—the meaning can be understood by analogy. If they are latent defilements capable of arising associated with mental consciousness, if they reach the past or present and are not abandoned, they can bind dharmas that do not belong to their own time (end of treatise quotation)." Greed and anger associated with the five consciousnesses in the future, if not abandoned and not arising, because their types are manifold, can also bind the three times; since their cognitive objects may be in the future, or flow to the present, or enter the past, although that which cognizes does not arise due to lacking conditions, because they are not abandoned, their nature binds the three times.

20.8

Regarding "The rest of all [defilements] ... can bind this matter": this explains the last two lines. Except for the previous three kinds, all the remaining views, doubt, and ignorance, when unabandoned in the past and future, universally bind all matters across the three periods of time. Because these three kinds—views, doubt, and ignorance—are afflictions with universal characteristics (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa), they together universally bind those matters of the three periods of time for all sentient beings. If views, doubt, and ignorance of the present period are currently taking objects of the three periods of time as cognitive conditions, they bind this matter according to the case.

20.9

Regarding "One should distinguish whether the matters ... and release from bondage": from here below is the second [section], explaining the existence or non-existence of the three periods of time. Within this, first is the presentation of the tenet, and second is the direct refutation. Within the presentation of the tenet, first are scriptural and rational proofs of existence, and second is recounting the explanations to establish the tenet. Below is scriptural and rational proof of existence. The Sautrāntika master asks: One should distinguish whether all matters in the past and future are substantially existent or substantially non-existent; only then can bondage be spoken of. If the past and future periods are substantially existent, then because all conditioned factors (saṃskāra) would exist at all times, they should be spoken of as permanent. If the past and future periods are substantially non-existent, how could there be spoken of a binder, what is bound, and release from bondage?

20.10

Regarding "The Vaibhāṣikas ... admit the statement that all exists": this is the reply. The Vaibhāṣikas definitively establish that the two periods of past and future are substantially existent, yet conditioned factors are not permanent, because they combine with the four characteristics [of conditioned existence]. In order to make this establishment that past and future are substantially existent decisively clear, one should briefly state the tenet to reveal its rationale: The three periods of time are substantially existent because the Buddha said so, because [cognition] arises from two conditions, because consciousness has an object, and because karma has a result. The next two lines conclude.

20.11

Regarding "The treatise says ... the three periods of time are substantially existent": this explains the existence of the three periods of time.

20.12

Regarding "Why is that?": below explains "because it was spoken [by the Buddha]". This is the query.

20.13

Regarding "Because in the sūtras ... diligently sever desire and craving": this is the reply. Since the sūtras state that because past form exists one diligently cultivates aversion and renunciation, and because future form exists one diligently severs desire and craving, one clearly knows that past and future are substantially existent. Contemplating the impermanence of form, one can diligently cultivate aversion and renunciation toward past form. Another explanation: contemplating impermanence is called "diligently cultivating aversion"; not yearning back is called "diligently cultivating renunciation". Contemplating the impermanence of form, one can sever desire and craving toward future form; desire and craving are greed directed toward future form. Another explanation: contemplating impermanence is called "diligently severing desire"; not hoping for or longing after is called "diligently severing craving".

20.14

Regarding "Furthermore, possessing two conditions ... consciousness arises from two conditions": this explains "because of two". The sūtra states that two conditions can produce consciousness; one clearly knows that the two periods of past and future are substantially existent.

20.15

Regarding "What are the two?": this is the question.

20.16

Regarding "Namely, eye and forms ... would lack the two conditions": this is the reply. The six sense-faculties and the six sense-objects each produce their own consciousness, which is called the "two conditions". If past and future periods were not substantially existent, the mental consciousness taking the past and future as objects would lack two conditions. Because the past would not exist, it would lack support and condition. Because past and future would not exist, it would lack the objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya).

20.17

Regarding "Having relied on the holy teaching ... consciousness would also not exist": this explains "because consciousness has an object". In terms of reason, only when there is necessarily an object can consciousness arise; if there is none, it does not arise—this principle is definitive. If past and future do not exist, there would be a consciousness without an object; because there would be no object, consciousness would also not exist.

20.18

Regarding "Furthermore, ceased karma ... there is a present cause existing": this explains "because karma has a result". Furthermore, karma that has already ceased in the past period has a future result, which demonstrates that the two periods exist. That is, if past entities were substantially non-existent, the entities of wholesome and unwholesome karma would be non-existent. Because karma would not exist, the future result would also not exist. It is not the case that when a present result arises there is a present cause existing, because a fruition result (vipāka-phala) is not simultaneous with its cause. Another explanation: it is not the case that when a future result arises there is a present cause existing, because a fruition result is not immediate to its cause. Another explanation: it is not the case that when present and future results arise there is a present cause existing, because a fruition result is neither simultaneous with nor immediately contiguous to its cause.

20.19

Regarding "Due to this scriptural authority and reasoning ... the two periods are substantially existent": this is the conclusion. Based on the previous two scriptural authorities and the latter two reasonings, the Vaibhāṣikas establish that past and future exist.

20.20

Regarding "If one considers oneself to be ... the Sarvāstivāda school": this explains the next two lines. If one considers oneself to belong to the Sarvāstivāda school, one must definitively admit that past and future periods are substantially existent; because one states that all three periods are definitively and substantially existent, one is admitted to belong to the Sarvāstivāda school.

20.21

Regarding "That is, if there is a person ... not included in this school": this contrasts and distinguishes the schools. Expounding without exhausting the full principle, half right and half wrong, requiring further distinction, hence they are called the Vibhajyavāda school. In Sanskrit, *Vibhajyavādin*: *vibhajya* means distinction, and *vādin* means speaker. The old translation *pipo zhepotil* was erroneous. In the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*, the Kāśyapīya school holds: if the karmic fruit has matured, it does not exist; if the fruit has not matured, it exists. Their doctrine is the same as this.

20.22

Regarding "Now within this school ... the establishment of the periods of time is the best": this is the second [part], recounting the explanations to establish the tenet. The upper two lines answer the first question, and the lower two lines answer the second question.

20.23

Regarding "The treatise says ... not abandoning and obtaining substance": there are four explanations in total; this is the first master. Because he can rescue the true Dharma, or the true Dharma rescues him, or he rescues people by means of the true Dharma, he is named Dharmatrāta. Or when "the Venerable" (Bhadanta) is spoken of, it is this person. Dharmatrāta states: Because of difference in three modalities (bhāva), there is distinction among the three periods of time. He maintains that when dharmas traverse the three periods of time, there is difference in the three modalities, but not a difference in substance. Just as when breaking a gold vessel to make other articles, though shapes such as square and round differ, the color-form (rūpa) is not different; and again just as when milk transforms into curd, it abandons the sweet taste of milk and the cool potency of milk, and obtains the sour taste of curd and the hot potency of curd, yet does not abandon its visible color; so it is as dharmas traverse the periods of time: from the future coming to the present, and from the present entering the past, they only abandon a modality and obtain a modality, not abandoning substance and obtaining substance.

20.24

Regarding "Venerable Ghoṣaka ... is not called free from passion": this is the second master. Because his voice was wondrous, he is called Ghoṣaka. In Sanskrit *Ghoṣa*; the old translation *qusha* was erroneous. He says: Due to a distinct class of temporal characteristics (lakṣaṇa) among the non-concomitant factors, there is distinction among the three periods of time. Each conditioned dharma has three [characteristics]. In whichever period it resides, one is manifested and two are latent. The one that is currently manifested is called 'directly joined with', while the other two, though latent, are not non-existent in substance, and therefore are also said to be 'not apart from that characteristic'. Another explanation: when the characteristic has an operation, it is called 'joined with'; although the characteristics have no operation [when latent], they accompany the dharma and their substance is not non-existent, hence he says 'and is not called apart from'. Just as when a man is currently impassioned with one wife, that single greed has an operation, while toward the other concubines, although greed exists, it has no operation, yet he is not called free from greed, because it constantly accompanies him.

20.25

Regarding "Venerable Vasumitra ... placed in the thousands position is called a thousand": this is the explanation of the third master. *Vasu* is the name of a deity; being a companion to the deity, he is called Vasumitra. His parents loved their child, and fearing harm inflicted by evil spirits, they said the deity was his companion so that they would not dare to harm him, hence he was named thus. In Sanskrit *Vasumitra*: *Vasu* means the deity, and *mitra* means friend. The old translation *hosumi* was erroneous. He says: Due to difference in state (avasthā), there is distinction among the three periods of time. He maintains that when dharmas traverse the periods of time, when they reach the states of the three periods, distinct designations of the three periods are made in each state. Due to the distinction among the three states, it is not that the three substances are distinct. Just as moving a single counting token, placing it in the units position it is called one, placing it in the hundreds position it is called a hundred, placing it in the thousands position it is called a thousand; although passing through different positions it is distinct, the substance of the counting token is not different.

20.26

Regarding "Venerable Buddhadeva ... is called mother and called daughter": because he can awaken the gods, he is called Buddhadeva. In Sanskrit *Buddhadeva*: *Buddha* means awakened, and *deva* means god. The old translation *fotuotipo* was erroneous. He says: Due to difference in relative designation (apekṣā), there is distinction among the three periods of time. He maintains that when dharmas traverse the periods of time, establishing designations based on relative relation between before and after is different: relative to what comes after, it is called past; relative to what comes before, it is called future; relative to both, it is called present. Just as a single woman is called mother relative to her daughter, and called daughter relative to her mother; although the substance is not distinct, due to differences in relation, she obtains the names of mother and daughter.

20.27

Regarding "Among these four explanations ... should be placed among the ranks of non-Buddhist outsiders": below explains the latter two lines. About to endorse Vasumitra, he first refutes the other three; this is the refutation of the first master. Among these four types of Sarvāstivāda doctrines, the first posits the transformation (pariṇāma) of dharmas, and therefore should be placed among the ranks of the Sāṃkhya non-Buddhist outsiders, because it agrees with their doctrine. Furthermore, *Mahāvibhāṣā* fascicle 77 states: "Regarding the statement of difference in modality (bhāva): apart from the intrinsic nature of the dharma, what can be spoken of as modality? Therefore it is also illogical. When conditioned dharmas come from the future period to the present, the previous modality should cease. When going from the present period to the past, the subsequent modality should arise. That the past would have arising and the future would have cessation—how could that be correct reason?"

20.28

Regarding "What is established by the second ... in what sense is it similar?": this refutes the second master. What that master establishes causes temporal characteristics to be confounded, because all three periods would possess the characteristics of the three periods. Furthermore, refuting the analogy, it says: When a man's greed toward his wife is actively manifest, toward the other concubines greed only exists as possession (prāpti) and no greed arises at present—in what sense is it similar? Because the dharmas of the three periods of time would simultaneously all possess the characteristics of the three periods. The analogy does not match the dharma.

20.29

Regarding "What is established by the fourth ... should also be analogous": this refutes the fourth master. Under what this master establishes through mutual relation of before and after, within the dharmas of a single period there should be all three periods. That is, in the past period, the preceding moment should be called past, the succeeding moment should be called future, and the middle moment should be called present. The three periods in the future should also be analogous. Although the dharma of the present period is a single moment, relative to what comes after it should be called past, relative to what comes before it should be called future, and relative to both it should be called present.

20.30

Regarding "Therefore among these four ... not that the substances are distinct": this evaluates and adopts the third master, Vasumitra, as can be known from the text.

20.31

Regarding "This is already fully known ... what is meant by past and future?": the Sautrāntika objects: If past and future are substantially existent, they should be called present; what is meant by past and future?

20.32

Regarding "Was it not previously stated that they are established based on activity (kāritra)?": the Sarvāstivādin replies, pointing to the same as previously stated.

20.33

Regarding "If so, present ... what activity does it have?": the Sautrāntika objects again: If so, a present sense-faculty such as the eye that does not see visible form, being subsumed under the non-functional counterpart (sabhāga), what activity does it have that it is called present?

20.34

Regarding "How could it not be able to grasp a fruit and give a fruit?": the Sarvāstivādin replies: Although that non-functional counterpart eye lacks the activity of seeing visible form and generating consciousness, how could it not be able to perform the activity of grasping a fruit and giving a fruit to be called present?

20.35

Regarding "Then the past ... temporal characteristics would be confounded": the Sautrāntika objects again: Since a past cause and the like can give a fruit, it should possess activity. Since it possesses activity, it should also be called present. If it has half an activity, there would be the fault of confounding the temporal characteristics.

20.36

Regarding "Having briefly investigated ... this nature of dharmas is exceedingly profound": this is the second [part], the direct refutation. The word "activity" (kāritra) in the upper line applies to both places, meaning: what obstructs activity, and how does activity [exist]? If activity and substance are not distinct, the meaning of the periods of time is ruined. If it is said that the substances of past and future dharmas are substantially existent, what has not yet arisen would be called future, and what has already ceased would be called past? The Vaibhāṣikas make this statement: "This nature of dharmas is exceedingly profound."

20.37

Regarding "The treatise says ... because it is admitted to exist constantly": this explains "what obstructs activity". The Sautrāntika objects, saying: One must say that all conditioned dharmas constantly exist in their intrinsic substance across the three periods of time; they should be able to initiate activity at all times—what obstructs this dharma's activity from existing and then becoming non-existent? If you say that the various conditions are not assembled, this rescue is illogical, because you admit that causes and conditions also exist constantly.

20.38

Regarding "Further, how could this activity [...] dharmas are called past and future": This explains "what of activity?" Moreover, how can this activity be spoken of as past, future, or present? The intent of this refutation is: You say that the distinct entity of a dharma is designated as differentiated into the three times by virtue of activity—prior to the arising of activity it is called future, having arisen it is called present, and having ceased it is called past. If the entity is differentiated into the three times on the basis of activity, on the basis of what then is activity differentiated into the three times of past, future, and present? Could one posit yet another activity within an activity, speaking of this activity as past, future, or present? If there were another activity over and above the activity, and activity again possessed an activity, this would lead to an infinite regress. If this activity has no further activity and is not subsumed within the three times of past, future, and present, yet you say that the activity exists, then it would be unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) and therefore must be eternally non-absent. Therefore, one should not say that when activity has ceased a dharma is called past, and when it does not yet exist it is called future.

20.39

Regarding "If it is accepted that activity [...] has this fault": This is the Sarvāstivādin defense, explaining that there is no difference [between activity and entity]. If it were accepted that activity is distinct from the entity of the dharma, the faults of an infinite regress of activities and the permanence of activity could indeed follow. However, I say that activity is not distinct from the entity; it is spoken of in accordance with the entity. Because the entity is free from an infinite regress, the activity is also free from an infinite regress; because the entity is not permanent, the activity is also not permanent. Therefore, you Sautrāntika master should not say that there is this fault.

20.40

Regarding "If so, then that which is established [...] the meaning of the times is not established": This is the Sautrāntika refutation, explaining that "the times are thereby ruined." If activity is identical to the entity, then since the entity exists constantly throughout the three times, the activity should also exist throughout the three times just as the entity does. If it constantly has activity, it should universally be called present; how could it at times be called past or future? Therefore, the meaning of the times as established by them is not established.

20.41

Regarding "Why is it not established [...] called past": This is the Sarvāstivādin defense. Why is it not established? Because conditioned dharmas that have not yet been produced are called future; those that have been produced and have not yet ceased are called present; those that have already ceased are called past.

20.42

Regarding "They should further state [...] none are established": This is the Sautrāntika refutation, explaining the third line [of the verse]. They should further state: If, just as the entity of a dharma is real in the present, it is likewise so in the past and future, then who is not yet produced and called future? And who has already ceased and is called past? That is to say, if the entity of a conditioned dharma truly exists constantly throughout the three times, how could it be made out to be not yet produced and called future, or already ceased and called past? What is it lacking earlier in the future such that, being absent then, it is called not yet produced? And what dharma is it lacking later in the past such that, being already gone then, it is called already ceased? Therefore, if you do not accept that the entity of a dharma is originally non-existent and now exists, and having existed returns to non-existence, then the meaning of the three times is entirely unestablished. And if the meaning of the three times is unestablished, then conditioned dharmas of all kinds must be entirely unestablished.

20.43

Regarding "Yet what they state [...] this is truly the work of Īśvara": Below this is the extensive refutation. The Sautrāntika cites the previous thesis set up by the Vaibhāṣikas and interrogates it to refute it. As for what was stated earlier by them—that because it is constantly conjoined with the conditioned characteristics, the conditioned formation is impermanent—this is merely empty words; since the entities in the three times really exist, the principle of arising and cessation is impossible. That you allow the entity to exist really and constantly across the three times, yet say that its nature is impermanent—such a doctrinal statement is unprecedented. Based on this meaning, there is a verse: "They allow that the dharmas of the three times have entities that constantly exist, / yet say that in the three times their nature is impermanent. / Nature and entity are different names for the same referent and have no distinction; / this is truly the work of that Lord Īśvara." The non-Buddhists maintain that whatever Lord Īśvara wishes to make, he makes; the author of the śāstra teases them: wanting to make whatever you wish to make is identical to that Īśvara, hence he says "this is truly the work of Īśvara."

20.44

Regarding "Further, as to what they said [...] truly existing like the present": The Sautrāntika cites the earlier first sūtra to provide a general explanation. We too say that the past and future times exist: that is, the past time existed previously and is therefore called existent, and the future will exist later and is therefore called existent; the past has a present effect and is spoken of as a previously existing cause, and the future has a present cause and is spoken of as an effect that will exist. Another explanation: The future will have an effect; the past previously had a cause. Based on "previously existed" and "will exist," we speak of the past and future as existing. It does not mean that the past and future truly exist like the present, as in that eternalist doctrine.

20.45

Regarding "Who says they exist like the present time?": This is the Sarvāstivādin defense: Not like the present time.

20.46

Regarding "How do they exist?": The Sautrāntika questions.

20.47

Regarding "They have the intrinsic nature of the two times, past and future": This is the Sarvāstivādin reply: that is, the past has the intrinsic nature of the past, and the future has the intrinsic nature of the future.

20.48

Regarding "This should be questioned again [...] the nature of past and future is not established": The Sautrāntika questions again. If the entities of the past and future times both exist, how can one speak of a difference between the two times as the nature of past and future? Therefore, when their existence is spoken of, it is based on the previously existing cause and based on the effect that will exist, not on real existence of the entity. To prevent the view that slanders cause and effect, the World-Honoured One spoke of the existence of the past and future based on the sense of "previously existed" and "will exist," because the word "existence" applies generally to express both existent and non-existent phenomena. When "existence" expresses an existent phenomenon, its characteristics are manifest and can be known without pointing to an instance; when "existence" expresses a non-existent phenomenon, its characteristics are concealed and difficult to know, so an instance is pointed to, as the worldly say: "there is a lamp that previously did not exist," meaning the lamp had not yet been produced; "there is a lamp that later does not exist," meaning the lamp has already ceased. Or as it is said: "There is a lamp that has already ceased, it is not I who extinguished it now." Although these speak of "existence," they all express non-existent phenomena. Speaking of the existence of past and future should also be understood in this way: "existence" expresses a non-existent phenomenon. If it were not so, the entities would all be real, and the nature of past and future would not be established.

20.49

Regarding "If so, for what reason [...] repeatedly spoke of it as existent?": This is the Sarvāstivādin objection. If so, for what reason did the World-Honoured One say to the Śikhandin ascetic that karma is past, spent, ceased, and transformed, yet is still existent? Since he used the word "existent," it is clear that the past is real. Could it be that that non-Buddhist did not accept that past karma previously had existence, such that the Buddha had to restate that it is existent? It is precisely because the non-Buddhist believed in its previously having existed, but did not believe in its real existence, that the Buddha spoke of it as existent. He walked holding a staff in hand with a topknot on his head, hence he was called "Staff-Topknot." Spent, ceased, and transformed are alternative names for the past; it means karma is past, karma is spent, karma is ceased, karma is transformed.

20.50

Regarding "Based on what was induced by it [...] the meaning is already established": The Sautrāntika master explains the sūtra speaking of karma as existent: Based on the existence of the seed, which is the capacity to grant results within the present continuity of the body induced by that karma, the past perfuming karma is implicitly spoken of as existent. The perfumed karmic cause, being able to grant future results, is called the capacity to grant results. If it were not so, that past karma would exist really now in the present and should be present; how could it be established as past? By principle it must be so. For the sūtra says: At the moment the visual faculty is produced, it comes from nowhere—showing that there is no future. When the visual faculty ceases, it accumulates nowhere—showing that there is no past. "Originally non-existent, now it exists"—since it says "originally non-existent," it is clear there is no future. "Having existed, it returns to non-existence"—since it says "returns to non-existence," it is clear there is no past. If past and future visual faculties were real, the sūtra would not have said words such as "originally non-existent." Citing the defense to refute it: If you say that when the sūtra says the visual faculty is originally non-existent and now exists, and having existed returns to non-existence, this is spoken with reference to the present time; this defense is unreasonable. If the nature of the present time were different from the entity of that visual faculty, it could be said that it is spoken with reference to the present time: "originally non-existent, now it exists; having existed, it returns to non-existence." Since this nature of the present time is not distinct from the entity of that visual faculty, how can you say it is spoken with reference to the present time: "originally non-existent, now it exists; having existed, it returns to non-existence"? For apart from the conditioned there is no distinct time. If you accept that the present time is originally non-existent and now exists, and having existed returns to non-existence, then the meaning that the past and future of the visual faculty lack an entity is already established, because time and the visual faculty are not distinct in entity, and when speaking of time one should also speak of the visual faculty. Another explanation: If you say that when the sūtra says the visual faculty is originally non-existent and now exists, and having existed returns to non-existence, this is spoken with reference to the visual faculty of the present time; this defense is unreasonable. If the intrinsic nature of the present visual faculty were different from the entity of the visual faculty in the two times of past and future, it could be said that it is spoken with reference to the entity of the present visual faculty: "originally non-existent, now it exists; having existed, it returns to non-existence." Since this intrinsic nature of the present visual faculty is not distinct from the entity of the visual faculty in the two times of past and future, how can you say it is spoken with reference to the entity of the present visual faculty: "originally non-existent, now it exists; having existed, it returns to non-existence"? If you accept that the present visual faculty is originally non-existent and now exists, and having existed returns to non-existence, then the meaning that the past and future visual faculty lack an entity is already established.

20.51

Regarding "Further, as to what they said [...] is also an intentional object (ālambana)": Recounting the second proof to refute it. We should investigate together: When the mental faculty (manas) and the dharma-object serve as conditions to generate consciousness, does the dharma act as a productive condition (janaka-pratyaya) just like the mental faculty? Or can the dharma only act as an intentional object (ālambana)? If the dharma acts as a productive condition just like the mental faculty, how could that dharma which will exist hundreds of thousands of kalpas later in the future be about to arise in the present? Or perhaps it will not exist at all, being unproduced due to a lack of conditions—how could it act as a productive condition to produce consciousness at the present moment? A productive condition has distinct characteristics, whereas those characteristics are obscure; how could it produce? Furthermore, the nature of nirvāṇa is contrary to all production; establishing it as a producer of the sixth mental consciousness is inconsistent with correct reasoning. If a dharma only can be an intentional object to generate mental consciousness, I say that the past and future are also intentional objects. The Sautrāntika accepts that a mind can arise apprehending what is non-existent.

20.52

Regarding "If it is non-existent, how does it become an intentional object?": This is the Sarvāstivādin objection.

20.53

Regarding "I say that they exist in such a way as to become intentional objects": This is the Sautrāntika reply: I say they exist in resemblance to becoming an intentional object, projecting toward and apprehending them.

20.54

Regarding "How do they become intentional objects?": The Sarvāstivādin interrogates: If past and future have no entity, how do they become intentional objects?

20.55

Regarding "Namely, previously existed [...] the principle is established by itself": This is the Sautrāntika reply. The past previously existed, and the future will exist; when remembering past form, feeling, and so forth, one does not clearly observe them as existent like the present, but merely recollects the characteristics of their previously present existence; looking forward to the future that will exist is likewise so. From "namely, like..." downward, the restated explanation is understandable. It is based on "previously existed" and "will exist" that one projects toward and apprehends them, hence the statement "in such a way as to become intentional objects." Because they previously existed or will exist, they are not like a turtle's hair; because they lack a real entity, they are not like the present. If past and future objects existed like the present, they should become the present time; why speak of past and future? If their entities are non-existent in the present, then one must accept that there is a consciousness apprehending a non-existent object. The principle is established by itself, in agreement with our Sautrāntika.

20.56

Regarding "If it is said that the past and future [...] the principle is also established by itself": The Sautrāntika grants the defense hypothetically and cites it to refute it. You Sarvāstivādin, if you say that subtle atoms (paramāṇu) in the past and future being scattered is what is called existent, and because they are not aggregated they are not present: the principle is also not so. When apprehending the characteristics of those past and future subtle atoms, because they are not scattered, they should not be past or future. Furthermore, if you defend: "Those past and future forms have entities identical to the present, differing only in the scattering of subtle atoms," then since subtle atomic form is unaltered across the three times, its entity should be permanent. Moreover, form should only be called present when subtle atoms are aggregated, and called past or future when subtle atoms are scattered, with not the slightest bit of anything that could be called arising and cessation. If you cling to the permanence of atoms, you are following the treatises of the Ājīvikas—that is, the Vaiśeṣikas—and turning your back on the sūtras spoken by the Sugata. Citing the sūtra is understandable. Furthermore, the aggregation and scattering of subtle atoms of form can be called past or future, but feeling, conception, and so on are not aggregated from subtle atoms; how could they be said to be scattered in the past and future? Yet in recollecting the past regarding feeling and so on, it is like the characteristics of when they had not yet ceased in the present; looking forward to the future, it is also like the characteristics of when they have already arisen in the present. If the two times of past and future exist like the present, their entities should be permanent. If their entities are non-existent in the present, you must once again accept that there is a consciousness apprehending a non-existent object. The principle is also established by itself, in agreement with our Sautrāntika.

20.57

"If non-existence [itself] were an objective condition, then a thirteenth āyatana should be an objective condition": this is an objection raised by the Sarvāstivāda. "If, as you Sautrāntikas hold, that which is completely non-existent can be an objective condition, then a thirteenth āyatana ought to be an objective condition."

20.58

"Regarding all those who realize the non-existence [of a thirteenth āyatana] ... that name is non-existent": here the Sautrāntika turns the question back against the Sarvāstivāda. For all those who realize the non-existence of a thirteenth āyatana, what is the objective condition of this cognizing consciousness? If you maintain that it cognizes precisely the thirteenth āyatana as its object, then at that time, having understood that there is no thirteenth āyatana, yet since the name stands in place of the base (āyatana), one would then have to negate that name as non-existent. If one negates the name as non-existent, this would be identical to wrong view and not right view. For their intention is: if one negates the thirteenth āyatana, that is right view; if one establishes a thirteenth āyatana, that is wrong view. When one negates it, since that cognizing consciousness has no thirteenth āyatana to cognize, it takes the name "thirteenth āyatana" as its object. Having negated the name as non-existent, it ought to be wrong view and not right view, because there is indeed a name and yet one negates it as non-existent. But according to your position, negating the thirteenth āyatana as non-existent is right view. Therefore, [the text] says: it would then follow that one must negate that name as non-existent, which would be wrong view and not right view.

20.59

"Moreover, if one cognizes sound ... has both existent and non-existent objects": here the Sautrāntika further questions on the basis of actual facts. Before a sound arises, it is called the prior non-existence of sound, looking at it prior to the present. Moreover, if one cognizes the prior non-existence of a sound, what is the objective condition of this cognizing consciousness? Since it cognizes non-existence, one clearly knows that a mental state arises taking non-existence as its object. If you say that cognizing the prior non-existence of sound means taking that very sound as its object, then one who seeks the absence of sound should instead emit a sound! If even cognizing the non-existence of sound takes sound as its object, then logically, one who seeks the absence of sound should emit a sound. If you say that when sound is priorly non-existent it abides in the state of the future, then according to your school's tenet the future is substantially existent—how can you call it non-existent? If you say that sounds of the past and future periods are called non-existent because they lack the present period, this also is illogical. If the nature of the present period and the substance of past and future sounds were distinct and different, one could say that they lack the present period. But because this present period and the past and future sounds are identical in substance, how can one say they lack the present period? Another explanation: if you say that the past and future sounds lack the present sound and therefore are called non-existent, this also is illogical. If the sounds of the three times were each distinct in substance, one could say that they lack the present sound. But although this present sound and the past and future sounds pass through the three different times, their substance is one; how could one say they lack the present sound? If a future sound and its present sound had even a slight difference in substance, then [the principle of] "originally non-existent, now existing" would naturally be established, agreeing with our Sautrāntika view. Having concluded the refutation, [the text] concludes: "Therefore, consciousness universally takes both existent and non-existent objects." One could also raise the question regarding the posterior non-existence of sound, but it is omitted for brevity.

20.60

"Yet what the Bodhisattva said ... is unsurpassed": here the Sautrāntika reconciles the sūtra and cites it as proof. As for what the Bodhisattva said—that regarding phenomena non-existent in the world, to say that I know and see them is impossible—this was intended to address others who harbor exaggerated pride and falsely manifest appearances, claiming existence regarding what does not exist and has not been realized. "I perceive existence as existence only when there is existence; I do not manifest appearances claiming existence regarding non-existence." This was not meant to show that consciousness does not arise with non-existence as its object. If it were contrary to our explanation and one did not allow that [consciousness] universally cognizes both the existent and the non-existent, then since every cognition would possess a real, substantial entity as its object, why would hesitation ever arise regarding an object: "Does it exist? Does it not exist?" or "Is there a difference, or is there no difference between existence and non-existence?" Since there is hesitation and there is distinction, one clearly knows that there is also consciousness arising taking non-existence as an object. "Every cognition" refers to mind and mental factors being able to cognize objects, so the principle must certainly be so. He further cites the sūtra as proof. Since the sūtra speaks of knowing the non-existent, one clearly knows that taking non-existence as an object also gives rise to mind. "Existent" refers to existent dharmas. "Non-existent" refers to non-existent dharmas. "Surpassed" means there are dharmas superior to it; these dharmas are still inferior, namely the conditioned (saṃskṛta), as well as space (ākāśa) and non-analytical cessation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha). "Unsurpassed" means there are no dharmas superior to it; this dharma is supreme, namely nirvāṇa.

20.61

"Therefore, their statement ... also fails to serve as a proof": this refutes the third proof by analogy. By means of the scriptural and logical proofs presented above, that school's statement that "past and future exist because consciousness has an object" also fails to serve as a valid reason.

20.62

"Moreover, as for what they say ... will be extensively shown": this refutes the fourth proof, citing it as incorrect. The Sautrāntika does not claim that past karma itself can directly produce a future fruit. Rather, past karma acts as the prior perfuming agent, inducing a karmic seed within the present body whose continuity (saṃtatāna), transformation (pariṇāma), and distinction (viśeṣa) cause the future fruit to arise. The three factors of continuity and so forth will be extensively shown in the "Pudgala-pratiṣedha". Furthermore, Nyāyānusāra fascicle 51 quotes the Sautrāntika: "Rather, with karma as the prerequisite, the induced continuity, transformation, and distinction are able to produce the future fruit. 'Continuity of karma' means that with karma as the prerequisite, subsequent moments of mental continuity arise; that very continuity arising differently moment by moment is called 'transformation'; and at the final moment possessing the superior capacity to produce the fruit without interval, being distinguished from the other transformations, is called 'distinction.'"

20.63

"If one adheres to real existence ... the capacity to produce": here [the text] again cites their position to refute it. If one adheres to the real existence of the past and future, then the fruit is permanently existent; what function could karma have with respect to that fruit? If you say that karma can produce the fruit and the substance of the fruit is newly born, then for the produced fruit to be originally non-existent and now existing naturally follows. If all dharmas exist at all times across the three times, what cause could possess the capacity to produce what fruit?

20.64

"Moreover, it would clearly establish ... the existent must never perish": this shows the fault of being identical with the non-Buddhists. Because [the founder] was born during rain, he was given the name of Rain (Varṣā). His followers are therefore called the Rain-Host (Vārṣagaṇya), which refers to the Sāṃkhyas. Your insistence on fixed existence and non-existence would moreover clearly establish the false doctrine espoused by the Vārṣagaṇya non-Buddhists. They say that among the twenty-five principles (tattva), what exists must always exist, and what is not included among the principles is non-existent and must always be non-existent. The non-existent must never arise, because it lacks substantiality; the existent must never perish, because it possesses substantiality.

20.65

"If you say that it can cause ... its principle is naturally established": here again a rejoinder is conceded and refuted. If you say that past karma can cause the future fruit to become present, then since the substance of the fruit originally exists, how could it cause the fruit to become present? If you say that past karma draws that future fruit from another location to this location, then the drawn fruit moving from here to there ought to be permanent in its substance. Form (rūpa) has shape and parts, so it could be drawn from this place to another place; but as for formless (arūpa) dharmas, since they lack shape and parts, how could they be drawn? Moreover, the drawn fruit ought to be originally non-existent in substance and only now newly acquired. If you say that past karma merely causes the substance of the future fruit to have a distinction unlike its prior state, then [the principle of] "originally non-existent, now existing" naturally follows.

20.66

"Therefore, this statement ... spoken according to what was taught": the author of the śāstra concludes the refutation and praises the Sautrāntika view.

20.67

"How does the sūtra speak?": this is a question by the Sarvāstivāda.

20.68

"As the sūtra says ... speaks the word 'exists'": this is the Sautrāntika's reply. As the sūtra says: "O Brahmin, you should know that 'all that exists' refers only to the twelve āyatanas, or only to the three times; according to the manner in which they exist, the word 'exists' is spoken." The Sautrāntika's intention is: whether nominal or real, whether past or future, according to how they exist the word "exists" is spoken; it does not mean that all are substantially existent like the present. The past once existed, the future will exist, and the present is substantially existent. Among the present twelve āyatanas, eight āyatanas are substantially existent, and four āyatanas are partly substantially existent and partly substantially non-existent. For example, in the visible āyatana (rūpāyatana), color is substantially existent, while shape is substantially non-existent. In the sound āyatana (śabdāyatana), neutral momentary sound is substantially existent, whereas continuous vocal action consisting of wholesome or unwholesome sound is substantially non-existent. In the tangible āyatana (spraṣṭavyāyatana), the four great elements are substantially existent, while other tangibles are substantially non-existent. In the mental āyatana (dharmāyatana), meditative visible form, feeling, perception, and volition are substantially existent, whereas the remaining mental factors nominally imputed upon volition are substantially non-existent, and the conditioned dharmas not associated with mind as well as the three unconditioned dharmas are also substantially non-existent. Therefore, the Nyāyānusāra quotes the Sautrāntika as saying: "Moreover, you assert that among the present twelve āyatanas, some parts are substantially existent and some parts are substantially non-existent, as in the Sthavira school regarding rūpa, śabda, spraṣṭavya, and dharma."

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese