俱舍論記 28

English (machine translation) 28

Language: English

Regarding "Chapter on the Analysis of Samādhi": single-minded focus on a single object of observation is called samādhi; because this chapter explains it extensively, it is called "analysis." As for why the Chapter on Samādhi is explained next: the Pudgala-nirdeśa explains the fruit, the Jñāna-nirdeśa explains the cause, and the Samādhi-nirdeśa explains the condition. Conditions are more remote in relation to the fruit; hence samādhi is explained next. Another explanation states: Because wisdom is aroused in dependence on samādhi, samādhi is explained next.

28.4

"Having already explained the various knowledges… now they should be analyzed next": within this chapter, first, the virtues of the various samādhis are explained; second, the abiding of the True Dharma in the world is explained; third, the main intent in composing the treatise is explained. Within the first, the explanation of the virtues of the various samādhis, there are two parts: first, the explanatory analysis of the various samādhis that serve as the basis; second, the virtues that depend on them. Within the first, the explanatory analysis of the various samādhis that serve as the basis, there are four parts: first, the explanation of the four dhyānas; second, the explanation of the four formless [attainments]; third, the explanation of the eight meditative attainments; fourth, the explanation of the various samādhis. Below this is the first part, the explanation of the four dhyānas. It is about to explain their arising. Within this arising, there are three parts: first, summarizing the arising in general; second, separately introducing samādhi; third, raising a question to introduce the verse text. This is the first, summarizing the arising in general. Among the common virtues analyzed previously, virtues accomplished by the various knowledges such as non-strife have already been explained; the remaining virtues, such as the dhyānas, should now be analyzed next.

28.5

"Among them, we first analyze the samādhis that serve as the basis": this is the second part, separately introducing samādhi.

28.6

"Now, among the various samādhis, what is dhyāna?": this is the third part, raising a question to introduce the verse text.

28.7

"The verse states: '…later one gradually abandons the former factors'": in answering with verses, the first verse presents the essential nature, and the latter half-verse displays the distinctions. In this passage, where it speaks of 'joy,' joy is of two kinds: in the case of the joy of the first and second dhyānas, pliancy is called joy; in the case of the joy of the third dhyāna, pleasant feeling is called joy. Because the name 'joy' is identical, the verse speaks of joy in general. Were it not so, how could it apply across the first three dhyānas? The rest is as explained in the prose commentary.

28.8

"The commentary states: '…distinctions among the dhyānas'": this explains the intention of the earlier statement.

28.9

"These are four in total… having the five skandhas as their nature": this explains the first verse. These four dhyānas each have two kinds, namely meditative absorption and rebirth. Rebirth has already been explained above in the Loka-nirdeśa. The entity of the dhyāna of meditative absorption, broadly speaking, is subsumed under wholesome nature. It is capable of causing the primary mind to dwell in one-pointedness of the object; strictly defining the entity, it has wholesome samādhi as its intrinsic nature. If taken together with its attendants, both conjoined and co-arising, it has the five skandhas as its nature.

28.10

"What is called one-pointedness of the object?" is a question.

28.11

"It means single-minded focus on an object of observation" is the answer. Single-minded focus on an object of observation is called samādhi.

28.12

"If so, it is simply the mind… another mental factor": this is an objection by the Sautrāntika. If it is single-minded focus on an object, then this state of the primary mind being focused on a single object is what the name samādhi is established upon; there should not be a separate other mental factor called samādhi. This is because the Sautrāntika designates samādhi nominally on the basis of mind.

28.13

"A distinct dharma causes the mind… its entity is not simply the mind": this is the explanation of the Sarvāstivāda. A separate mental factor causes that primary mind to operate upon a single object; this is called samādhi, and its entity is not simply the mind.

28.14

"Do not all minds… all operate upon a single object?": this is a further objection by the Sautrāntika. Do not all minds, because they perish moment by moment in succession, all operate upon a single object? Apart from the primary mind, what need is there for samādhi? If you say that samādhi is needed because it causes that primary mind not to be distracted in the second moment, then samādhi is useless with respect to the primary mind conjoined in that very moment. The Sautrāntika further objects: You establish other minds and mental factors as operating upon a single object through samādhi. Through what, then, does this samādhi operate upon a single object? If you explain that it is precisely through these other minds and mental factors that samādhi is caused to operate upon a single object, we then counter by stating: furthermore, it is because of these other minds and mental factors that samādhi is accomplished; why then would it not be precisely through these other minds and mental factors that the mind operates upon a single object? What need is there for samādhi to make the mind one-pointed? This text is somewhat subtle; one should reflect on it carefully. Furthermore, samādhi is a mahābhūmika dharma, universally conjoined with all three moral natures. Hence all minds would operate upon a single object, and all should be called samādhi.

28.15

"Not so, because samādhi in the other categories is weak": the Sarvāstivāda rescues [its position], saying: Not so; although the nature of the mind in other, distracted categories has samādhi, because its intrinsic nature is weak, it is not called meditative absorption.

28.16

"Other masters say: '…namely, the four dhyānas'": other Sautrāntika masters say that when the mind operates in continuous succession upon a single object, that is called samādhi; apart from the mind, it has no separate entity. Because the sūtra speaks of this samādhi as the training in higher mind (adhicitta-śikṣā), it shows that samādhi is simply the mind; and because purity of mind is supreme, namely the four dhyānas, it shows that the mind is simply samādhi. Therefore we know that apart from the mind, there is no separate entity of samādhi.

28.17

"On the basis of what meaning is the name 'dhyāna' established?" asks about the name.

28.18

"Because of this tranquility… having wisdom as its entity": this is the answer of the Sarvāstivāda. Through the tranquility of meditative absorption, wisdom is able to investigate; investigation is the meaning of knowing truly. Since it is named after its function and its fruit, it is called dhyāna. As the sūtra says: 'If the mind is in samādhi, it can know truly.' In the grammatical treatises on linguistics in India, there are verbal roots and affixes. 'Investigation' in Sanskrit is cintā, which is an affix. Because the root dhyai is placed within the meaning of cintā—dhyai being the Sanskrit sound—and this root dhyai with cintā is further modified by other grammatical rules, it becomes dhyāna. Dhyāna is translated here as 'quiet reflection' (jinglü); the old translations as chan, channa, or chiana are all corruptions. Other schools hold that investigation is cetanā (volition); to exclude their view, it is stated that in this school investigation has prajñā as its entity. Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 83, states: 'Tranquil means balanced composure (samāhita); reflection means universal contemplation (vipaśyanā); hence it is called quiet reflection (dhyāna).'

28.19

"If so, all samādhis should be called dhyānas": an objection. If tranquil investigation is called dhyāna, then all samādhis of the eight stages should be called dhyānas.

28.20

"Not so; only the superior… also obtains the name of sun": the answer. Not so; only the superior receives this name. Just as in worldly usage, that which emits light is called the sun, but fireflies, candles, and the like, emitting inferior light, do not also obtain the name of sun.

28.21

"How is dhyāna uniquely called superior?" is a question.

28.22

As for "Among all samādhis... are uniquely called dhyāna": this is the answer. Among the eight samādhis, only these four [are so called, because]: first, they possess the factors of dhyāna (dhyānāṅga); second, śamatha and vipaśyanā proceed equally in them so that they are most capable of deliberate investigation; third, they attain pleasant abiding in the present life (dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihāra); fourth, they obtain the name 'path of easy progress' (sukhā pratipad). Therefore, these four samādhis alone are called dhyāna, while the remaining concentrations are not.

28.23

As for "If so, how can defiled [dhyānas] obtain this name?": this is a question.

28.24

As for "Because they also are capable of corrupt investigation": this is the answer. Because that defiled concentration gives rise to corrupt discernment (ku-prajñā) that is capable of corrupt investigation, it is also called dhyāna.

28.25

As for "In that case, there would be the fault of being overly broad": this is an objection. If it is called dhyāna because it causes discernment to engage in corrupt investigation, then there would be the fault of being overly broad: discernment associated with all afflictions in the three realms is capable of corrupt investigation, so the concentration associated with those [afflictions] would also have to be called dhyāna.

28.26

As for "There is no fault of being overly broad... there are bad dhyānas": this is the answer. There is no fault of being overly broad: it is only when there is similarity in meaning to wholesome dhyāna that it is called defiled dhyāna, whereas anything else that lacks similarity is not called dhyāna. A seed that sprouts is called a seed, and a ruined seed is also called a seed; because it resembles a viable seed, it is given the name 'seed'. 'And so forth' includes dried ponds, dead men, and the like; this adduces an analogy. The World-Honoured One also spoke of 'bad dhyānas', which refers to relish-associated dhyāna (āsvādanā-dhyāna). This adduces proof.

28.27

As for "If one-pointedness of mind... the first, second, third, and fourth": this explains the fifth and sixth lines [of the verse]. Question: If one-pointedness of mind is the intrinsic nature of dhyāna, on what characteristics are the distinct differences of the first, second, third, and fourth established?

28.28

As for "Possessing investigation (vicāra), joy (prīti), and bliss (sukha)... it is divided into four kinds": this is the answer. Possessing investigation, joy, and bliss is established as the first. By this it has already been clarified that it also possesses applied thought (vitarka), because these three dharmas are necessarily conjoined with vitarka, just as smoke necessarily accompanies fire. It is not that vicāra can have joy and bliss without being conjoined with vitarka. This is understood by contextual implication, so the verse does not state it separately. Concentration (samādhi) is common to all four concentrations, so it is not clarified with respect to it. The second, third, and fourth are established by gradually leaving behind the preceding factors: leaving behind vicāra, possessing only joy and bliss, the second concentration is established; leaving behind both vicāra and joy, possessing only bliss, the third concentration is established; completely leaving behind the three of vicāra, joy, and bliss, the fourth concentration is established. They are matched and explained in this order. Stating merely 'leaving behind vicāra' also necessarily means leaving behind vitarka, so it is not separately mentioned. Therefore, one-pointedness of mind is divided into four kinds.

28.29

As for "Having distinguished the dhyānas, what about the formless [attainments]?": below this is the second part, clarifying the four formless attainments. This summarizes the preceding and introduces the question.

28.30

As for "The verse says: ... are named because they are dull and inferior": in the answer given in the verse, the first line and the [reference to the] four skandhas clarify intrinsic nature, and they are divided into four according to rebirth through detachment from lower stages; the next two lines show the elimination of notions of form; the next line explains the general name; the next line resolves an objection; and the last four lines explain the individual names.

28.31

As for "The commentary says: ... because there is no form that conforms [with the mind]": this explains the first line and the four skandhas. These four formless attainments and the four dhyānas are identical in number and identical in intrinsic nature. That is, in number there are four, and in intrinsic nature there are two kinds each. As for rebirth, as stated earlier—namely, as stated in the 'Loka-nirdeśa'—there are four kinds according to rebirth. As for the intrinsic nature of the formless concentrations, stated generally, it is also one-pointedness of mind subsumed under the wholesome. Because they are identical in this number and nature, the verse states 'is also like that'. However, among their accompanying factors, these [formless attainments] exclude the form skandha (rūpa-skandha) and have the remaining four skandhas, because in the formless realm there is no form that conforms with the mind (cittānuvartin-rūpa).

28.32

As for "Although it is one-pointedness of mind... the stage of neither-perception-nor-non-perception": this explains the division into four according to rebirth through detachment from lower stages. Although one-pointedness of mind has no difference in intrinsic characteristic across the four formless concentrations, when one is detached from the defilements of a lower stage and reborn in a higher stage, they are divided into four according to differences in rebirth. That is, when one has detached from the defilements of the fourth dhyāna and is reborn in the stage above, the stage of boundless space (ākāśānantyāyatana) is established; and so forth, up to when one has detached from the defilements of the stage of nothingness (ākiṃcanyāyatana) and is reborn in the stage above, the stage of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana) is established.

28.33

As for "What is the meaning of 'detachment'?": this is a question.

28.34

As for "It means that by whichever path... this is the meaning of detaching from lower defilements": this is the answer. It means that being liberated from the afflictions of a lower stage through whatever path is the meaning of detaching from lower defilements.

28.35

As for "These four fundamental ones... because of giving rise to notions of form": this explains the third and fourth lines. In the course of explaining the formless, it clarifies the elimination of notions of form that take the form of the lower stage as object—namely, the form of the fourth dhyāna. The rest of the text is clear. Although the formless attainments also take as objects the morality-form arisen together with the path of the category of subsequent cognition (anvaya-jñāna) belonging to the lower six stages, here the elimination of notions of form is stated with reference to the sāsrava.

28.36

As for "They are called 'formless' because they all lack form": this explains the fifth line. Because the four stages, such as [boundless] space, all lack form, they are given the name 'formless' (ārūpya).

28.37

As for "This reason is unestablished, because it is admitted that form exists": the Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahīśāsakas, and others point out a flaw. As for 'they are given the name formless because they all lack form', this reason is unestablished, because we admit that form also exists in that realm.

28.38

As for "If so, why is it given the name 'formless'?": this is a question.

28.39

As for "Because that form is subtle... it is also called 'non-yellow'": the Mahāsāṃghikas and others reply. It is called 'formless' because that form is subtle; the adduced analogy is clear.

28.40

As for "What characteristic does the form admitted in that realm possess?... its existence is also precluded": the Sarvāstivādins reprove and refute the Mahāsāṃghikas and others. What characteristic does the form you admit in that realm possess? This is a general interrogation. Below, their assertion is cited and refuted: If you say that although there is no other form in that realm, there is only physical and vocal discipline (śīla/saṃvara), the refutation says: Since bodily and vocal [actions] do not exist, how could discipline exist? Discipline exists where body and speech can possibly arise in that stage. Since bodily and vocal [actions] do not exist in the formless realm, how could discipline exist? Furthermore, without the great elements (mahābhūta), how could there be derived form (upādāya-rūpa)? Derived form is produced by the great elements; since there are no great elements in that formless realm, how could there be the derived form of physical and vocal discipline? If you say that just as there is anāsrava discipline, and although there are no anāsrava great elements of body and speech, there is anāsrava discipline derived from the sāsrava great elements of the support-body; and likewise, although there are no great elements of body and speech in that realm, what prevents there being physical and vocal discipline derived from the body's great elements? The refutation says: This is not so. Anāsrava discipline is unattached [to any realm]. Although there are no anāsrava bodily and vocal great elements, anāsrava discipline is derived from the sāsrava great elements of the supporting body. The intrinsic nature of formless discipline would be sāsrava, because it is bound to that realm; therefore, one cannot say that although there are no bodily and vocal great elements in that realm, discipline exists derived from the body's great elements. Furthermore, in that concentration not only is that anāsrava discipline precluded, but that sāsrava discipline is also precluded from existing. Another interpretation: In that concentration not only are bodily and vocal great elements precluded, but bodily and vocal discipline are also precluded from existing. Since it is said to be formless, how could discipline exist?

28.41

As for "If one admits that in that realm... what reason is there for this?": this is further citing their thesis under a concession and refuting it. If you admit that there is a physical sense-organ body in that formless realm, the refutation says: How could one say that its form is subtle and scarce? If you say it is called formless because the body's size is small, the refutation says: Minute insects in water and subtle atoms should also be called formless, because they are small and cannot be seen. If you say it is called formless because the body is extremely fine and pure, the refutation says: The intermediate existence (antarābhava) and the form realm should be called formless, because they are also fine and pure. If you say that that body is called formless because it is the utmost in being fine and pure, whereas the intermediate existence and the form realm are not called formless because their fine purity is not the utmost, the refutation says: Then only the summit of existence (bhavāgra) should obtain the name formless because its fine purity is the utmost; just as concentrations have distinctions of superior and inferior, higher and lower, the bodies of rebirth also have inequalities of superior and inferior, higher and lower, so the summit of existence is the most superior. If you say that it is called formless because that form cannot be seen by the eyes of lower stages, the refutation says: Furthermore, since the physical bodies of all those born in the four dhyānas cannot be grasped by the eyes of lower stages, how are they different from that formless realm such that they are not called formless? This equates the lower with the upper. If you say that the desire realm and the form realm are named according to their actual meaning—real desire and real form exist, so they are called the desire realm and the form realm—whereas the formless realm is not so, not being named according to its actual meaning, so that although form really exists it is called formless: what reason is there for this?

28.42

As for "If you say that the sūtra states... it is established that form exists by principle": this cites four sūtras adduced by the Mahāsāṃghikas and others to prove that form exists in the formless realm. First, if you say that a sūtra states that life-span (āyus) and heat (uṣman) are conjoined; since life-span exists there, it is clearly known that heat exists, and heat is form. Second, another sūtra states that name-and-form (nāmarūpa) and consciousness (vijñāna) depend on each other, standing supported by each other like two bundles of reeds; since it is admitted that consciousness itself is not absent in that realm, then it should also be admitted that name-and-form exists. Third, another sūtra states that name-and-form has consciousness as its condition; since consciousness exists in that realm, it is clearly known that name-and-form exists. Fourth, another sūtra states that it is denied that apart from the four of form, feeling, perception, and formations, consciousness has coming or going; therefore, since consciousness exists in that realm, it is clearly known that it also fully possesses form, feeling, perception, and formations. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā says: 'Furthermore, it is said that apart from form, feeling, perception, and formations, one should not say that consciousness has going, coming, staying, dying, or being born. Since consciousness can exist in the formless realm, it must also fully possess the four stations of consciousness (vijñānasthiti)' (this ends the śāstra text). Therefore, they conclude generally: 'Because of this, it is established by principle that form exists in the formless realm.'

28.43

As for "This proof is unestablished... or is it to preclude leaving all of them?": the Sarvāstivādins reject this overall and urge reflection, resolving the scriptural citations above. First, regarding the first sūtra stating that life-span and heat are conjoined: Is this spoken with reference to the three realms, as your heterodox tenet holds; or is it spoken with reference to the desire realm, as our school maintains? In principle, it should be spoken with reference to the desire realm; if it applied to the two higher realms, it should not speak of heat. Based on the apparent manifestation of heat, it is stated with reference to the desire realm, without mentioning the form realm. If implicit and explicit are considered together, heat also applies to the form realm. Resolving the second sūtra, which says that name-and-form and consciousness abide depending on each other: Is this spoken with reference to the three realms, as your heterodox tenet holds; or is it spoken with reference to the desire and form realms, as our school maintains? In principle, it should only be spoken with reference to the desire and form realms; if it applied to the formless realm, it should not speak of form. Resolving the third sūtra, which says that name-and-form has consciousness as its condition: Does it mean that all consciousness serves as a condition for name-and-form, as your heterodox tenet holds; or does it mean that the arising of name-and-form never fails to have consciousness as a condition, as our school maintains? In truth, there is also consciousness that produces only name and cannot produce form. Resolving the fourth sūtra, which denies that apart from form and so forth up to formations consciousness has coming or going: Among the four skandhas, is it to preclude consciousness having coming or going apart from any single one, as your heterodox tenet holds; or is it to preclude consciousness having coming or going apart from all of them, as our school maintains? In truth, in the formless realm there is also consciousness having coming and going apart from form while having the remaining three skandhas. Saying 'there is no going or coming' precludes leaving all of them.

28.44

As for "If one says that the sūtras... there should be solid food": the Sarvāstivādins cite their defense and refute it. If you say that the discourse of the sūtra is without distinction, and one should not direct further critical reflection upon this, this assertion is incorrect, because it incurs the fault of being overly broad. Refuting the first [sūtra]: If because the sūtra makes no distinction, the formless realm has life-span and also has heat, then since the sūtra makes no distinction, external heat should also be conjoined with life-span. Refuting the second [sūtra]: If because the sūtra makes no distinction, the formless realm has consciousness and also has name-and-form abiding mutually dependent, then since the sūtra makes no distinction, external name-and-form should also depend on consciousness. Refuting the third [sūtra]: If because the sūtra makes no distinction, consciousness in the formless realm serves as a condition for name-and-form, then since the sūtra makes no distinction, external name-and-form should also take consciousness as a condition. This text jointly refutes the second and third. Refuting the fourth [sūtra]: If because the sūtra makes no distinction, stating that the four stations of consciousness can support consciousness, the formless realm has consciousness and therefore also has the form station of consciousness; then since the sūtra makes no distinction in stating that the four foods (āhāra) can support sentient beings, since sentient beings exist in the form and formless realms, they should have solid food (kavaḍīkārāhāra); thus the four foods are spoken of just as the four stations of consciousness are. The mention of the 'four stations of consciousness' refers to the fourth sūtra text they cited, the sūtra on the four stations of consciousness that denies [consciousness having coming or going] apart from form up to formations.

28.45

Regarding 'If it is claimed that the sūtras state... transcending ideations of form, and so on': this takes up their defense, interrogates, and refutes it. If you claim that because the sūtras say a certain class of devas transcends material food, and also say that these devas take joy as food, it is said that material food does not exist in the higher realms without incurring this error, then the formless realm should not have form. You cite two sūtras to prove that the higher two realms lack material food; I cite three sūtras to prove that the formless realm lacks form: [1] The sūtras say that in that formless realm there is emancipation from form. If there were still form in that realm, how could it be called 'emancipation'? [2] Furthermore, a sūtra says that the four formless liberations are the most tranquil because they transcend forms. Since it says they 'transcend forms', it is clearly known that they lack form. [3] Furthermore, a sūtra says that sentient beings of the formless realm transcend all ideations of form. Severing attachment that takes form as its object is called 'transcending ideations of form'. Or, based on the fact that the four fundamental states and the upper three access states transcend ideations of form, it is clear that form does not exist. If the formless realm truly had form as you maintain, its form would certainly have an observable intrinsic characteristic; how then could it be said to 'transcend ideations of form'? 'And so on' includes the previous two sūtras.

28.46

Regarding 'If it is claimed that with respect to lower... that realm has no form': this again takes up their defense and refutes it. If you claim that it is with respect to the coarse forms of the lower desire and form realms that the text speaks of 'transcending ideations of form' and so forth, then the same should be granted for material food: having transcended lower coarse material food, there should be subtle material food. Furthermore, the four dhyānas transcend lower coarse form, so the words 'emancipation from form' should also apply to them; if so, the four dhyānas should also be called 'formless'. Furthermore, one should also speak of 'emancipation from feeling' and the like in the formless realm, because they also transcend lower coarse feeling and the like. Since the sūtra does not speak of transcending feeling and the like in the formless realm, we know that in the formless realm there is a comprehensive transcendence of the class of form, not a transcendence of feeling and the like. From this, it is definitively known that that realm has no form.

28.47

Regarding 'However, in the sūtras... not being permanent emergence': the Sarvāstivāda resolves an implicit objection raised by the Mahāsāṃghika and others. The implicit objection means: 'Since the sūtras say that existence cannot emerge from existence, it is clear that formless existence cannot emerge from form existence. If it could emerge, one should say existence emerges from existence.' To resolve this implicit objection, the text explains this sūtra: however, when the sūtras say that the three existences cannot emerge from the three existences, it is because one is bound by the defilements of one's own stage; hence it says 'because one cannot emerge from existence of one's own stage.' It is only separation from eight stages, not separation from the peak of existence; hence it says 'because it is not an all-pervading emergence.' Because ordinary persons backslide after severing defilements, it says 'because it is not a permanent emergence.' Therefore the sūtra says 'existence does not emerge from existence'; it does not say that formless existence cannot emerge from form existence.

28.48

Regarding 'Moreover, the Bhagavān... no fallacy of an unestablished [reason]': it again cites sūtras to prove that the formless realm has no form, as is clear from the text. Having finished the refutation, it concludes: 'Therefore, because all the established reasons lack form, the name formless is established. There is no fallacy of being unestablished.'

28.49

Regarding 'There for many eons... from what does form arise?': this explains the sixth line. Question: In that formless realm, after passing through many eons, the continuum of form has been interrupted; later, when one dies and is reborn below in the desire or form realms, from what does form arise?

28.50

Regarding 'This arises from the mind... arises from that mind': the author of the treatise answers using the Sautrāntika position, directly explaining the verse line 'subsequent form arises from the mind'. This form arises from the mind, not from form. That is, the causes that act to produce the result of form, which were produced in the past, have perfumed the mind, and their potency has now ripened; therefore, the present form in the desire or form realms arises from the seeds of form within that mind of the formless realm.

28.51

Regarding 'In that formless realm, on what does mind depend to operate?': the Mahāsāṃghika and others ask.

28.52

Regarding 'Separated from a body, why would it not operate?': the Sarvāstivāda retorts with an interrogation.

28.53

Regarding 'Because below it is never seen': the Mahāsāṃghika and others answer. In the lower desire and form realms, it has never been seen that mind can operate separated from a physical body.

28.54

Regarding 'In the form realm there is no material food... the basis on which mind operates': the Sarvāstivāda retorts with an interrogation. In the form realm there is no material food; on what, then, does the body depend to operate? For in the lower desire realm, a physical body is never seen operating separated from material food. Furthermore, previously in the 'Loka-nirdeśa', it explained the basis on which the mind in that formless realm operates: namely, operating dependent on the life-faculty and nikāya-sabhāga.

28.55

Regarding 'Having explained the general name... do they obtain distinct names?': this explains the last four lines. It concludes the preceding and introduces the question.

28.56

'Not so' is the answer.

28.57

'How so?' is the interrogation.

28.58

Regarding 'The lower three formless states... three names are established': this explains that the first three formless states are named from their preparatory practice. Thus the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle seventy-seven, says: 'If it is accomplished by the preparatory practice of mentally contemplating boundless space through resolve, it is called the base of infinite space. That is, if there is a dharma that, although coexisting with form, has an essence that is not dependent on form—those seeking emancipation from form must initially contemplate that dharma; that is, although the essence of space coexists with form, it becomes apparent only depending on the absence of form. As something subsumed under external dharmas, its characteristic is boundless, and when mentally contemplating it, one can easily become detached from form. Therefore, at the stage of preparatory practice one contemplates space, and when it is accomplished, one may also take other dharmas as objects according to the case; the name is established merely from the preparatory practice. If it is accomplished by the preparatory practice of mentally contemplating boundless consciousness through resolve, it is called the base of infinite consciousness. That is, having properly grasped the characteristics within the capability of discernment of the purely clean six consciousness bodies, one abides in resolve. By the power of conceptual ideation, one mentally contemplates and observes the boundless characteristic of consciousness; accomplished through this preparatory practice as the prerequisite, according to the case it also takes other dharmas as objects; the name is established merely from the preparatory practice. If it is accomplished by the preparatory practice of relinquishing everything through resolve, it is called the base of nothingness. That is, seeing boundless mental aspects as coarse and agitating, in order to cultivate aversion and relinquishment one initiates this preparatory practice; therefore, this base is called supreme relinquishment. Because herein one no longer takes delight in producing boundless mental aspects, and the mind abides in tranquility, relinquishing all things with respect to the object (the text of the treatise ends here).'

28.59

Regarding 'Establishing the fourth name... is the direct cause of establishing the name': this explains that establishing the fourth name for the last formless state is due to its ideation being obscure and weak. Because it lacks the clear and superior ideations of the lower seven stages, it obtains the name 'neither ideation'; because it has obscure and weak ideation, differing from the two mind-less states, it is called 'nor non-ideation'. Although at the time of preparatory practice one also thinks: 'The ideations of the preceding seven absorptions are like a disease, like an arrow, like a boil.' Or, 'The ideation of joy in the first and second absorptions is like a disease, the ideation of pleasure in the third absorption is like an arrow, and the ideation of equanimity in the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh stages is like a boil. If there were entirely no ideation, as in the two mind-less states, one would resemble the darkness of ignorance, devoid of awareness. Only in neither ideation nor non-ideation is it contrary to the above, tranquil and exquisite.' In the preparatory practice, cultivating aversion toward ideation and aversion toward non-ideation should yield the name 'neither ideation nor non-ideation', yet the name is not established based on this preparatory practice. For if one were asked, 'For what reason does the preparatory practice produce such a thought?', one must answer: 'Because in the fundamental state of the peak of existence ideation is obscure and weak, the preparatory practice produces such a thought in conformity with that fundamental state.' Because ideation in this fundamental state is obscure and weak, this is the direct cause of establishing the name 'neither ideation nor non-ideation'; thus the name is established from the fundamental state, not from the preparatory practice. Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra says: 'The reason these four formless states are all called "bases" (āyatana) is that they are the places of growth and arising of existences.'

28.60

Regarding 'Having distinguished the formless... the uncontaminated is called supramundane': below, this is the third section, explaining the eight attainments. Within this, there are: first, generally explaining the eight attainments; second, specifically explaining the eight attainments. This is the general explanation of the eight attainments. It concludes the question and answers with a verse.

28.61

Regarding 'The treatise says... because there is no uncontaminated': this explains the first verse. It is clear.

28.62

Regarding 'The initial attainment of tasting... this obtains the name of tasting': this explains the fifth line. The initial attainment of tasting refers to being associated with attachment; attachment can savor and cling to pure absorption, hence it is called 'tasting'. Because the attainment is associated with that, this attainment obtains the name of 'tasting'. Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā says: 'Question: Why is it said to be associated only with attachment, and not with other afflictions? Some say: Here it speaks of similarity; that is, attachment is similar to absorption, whereas other afflictions are not. Why is this? Absorption flows continuously toward its object, and attachment is likewise.' As detailed therein.

28.63

Regarding 'The name pure attainment... is said to be entering': this explains the sixth and seventh lines. The name 'pure attainment' designates all worldly, contaminated wholesome absorptions, because they arise associated with intrinsically wholesome white pure dharmas such as non-greed. This attainment obtains the name 'pure', and it is precisely the object savored by the first, tasting-associated state. Immediately after this pure absorption ceases, that tasting absorption arises. Taking past pure absorption as its object, it generates deep craving and attachment; it does not take the present as its object, because it definitely does not contemplate intrinsic nature and the like; it does not take the future as its object, because it has not yet experienced it; having experienced the past, it specifically speaks of the past. At that time, although one is said to emerge from the savored absorption, one is said to enter the savoring absorption.

28.64

Regarding 'Uncontaminated absorption... is not something savored': this explains the last line. It is clear from the text. It should be known that the entering and emerging of the three types—tasting, pure, and uncontaminated—are entering and emerging of different classes of minds among the five types of entering and emerging. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred and sixty-one, says: 'Herein, regarding entering and emerging, there are five kinds of entering and emerging: first, stage; second, mental aspect; third, object; fourth, different class of mind; fifth, moment. Stage entering and emerging means: when the second dhyāna manifests immediately after the first dhyāna, it is called entering the second dhyāna and emerging from the first dhyāna. Up to, when the base of neither ideation nor non-ideation manifests immediately after the base of nothingness, it is called entering the base of neither ideation nor non-ideation and emerging from the base of nothingness. As with progressive entering and emerging, so it is with retrogressive entering and emerging, as well as skipping forward and backward. Mental aspect entering and emerging means: when the aspect of suffering manifests immediately after the aspect of impermanence, it is called entering the aspect of suffering and emerging from the aspect of impermanence. The other mental aspects are likewise. Object entering and emerging means: when absorption taking feeling as object manifests immediately after absorption taking form as object, it is called entering absorption taking feeling as object and emerging from absorption taking form as object. Absorptions taking other objects are likewise. Different class of mind entering and emerging means: when a mind of the form realm or an unattached mind manifests immediately after a mind of the desire realm, it is called entering a form realm or unattached mind and emerging from a desire realm mind. The explanation for form realm minds and so on is likewise, as with desire realm minds. Trainee minds and the like are also like this; other wholesome minds and so on are likewise according to the case. Moment entering and emerging means: when a second moment manifests immediately after a first moment, it is called entering the second moment and emerging from the first moment. The other moments are likewise.'

28.65

Regarding 'Among these as explained... not the formless states': below, this is the second section, specifically explaining the eight attainments. Within this, there are: first, specifically explaining the dhyāna; second, explaining the three attainments. Within the first, specifically explaining the dhyāna: first, explaining the dhyāna factors; second, explaining the intrinsic nature of the dhyāna factors; third, explaining defiled states lacking factors; fourth, explaining the name immovable; fifth, explaining differences in feeling upon rebirth; sixth, explaining the arising of lower minds. This is the first, explaining the dhyāna factors, hence the thesis is presented first. Among the eight attainments explained in this manner, the dhyānas subsume factors because calming and insight are balanced; this is not so for the formless states, where calming is predominant and insight is deficient. For this reason, the threshold and intermediate absorptions do not establish factors either, because insight is predominant and calming is deficient.

28.66

Regarding 'In the four dhyānas, how many factors are there in each?': this is a question.

28.67

"The verse states: […] equanimity, mindfulness, neutral sensation, and absorption" is the verse answering the question. Within this verse, two analytical gates are briefly established: first, explaining the universal and restricted [distribution across] the stages; second, explaining the unequal number of factors. Regarding the universal and restricted [distribution across] the stages: the factors of the four dhyānas are eighteen in total, which fall broadly into three categories: First, absorption as the support. This is of four kinds, namely, the substantive natures of the four absorptions. Because this serves as the support for the various factors, it is common to all stages; there is no need for questions and answers [about it]. Second, [factors that] necessarily exist according to the dharma of that stage. These are of six kinds, namely: investigation, analysis, and joy in the first dhyāna; joy in the second dhyāna; bliss in the third dhyāna; and neutral sensation in the fourth dhyāna. Because these six kinds necessarily exist according to the dharma of that stage, they may be present or absent across the stages; there is no need for questions and answers [about them]. Third, [factors] established based on specific conditions. These are of eight kinds, namely: bliss in the first dhyāna; internal clarity and bliss in the second dhyāna; equanimity, mindfulness, and discernment in the third dhyāna; and equanimity and mindfulness in the fourth dhyāna. The questions and answers are briefly distinguished based on this third category. The meaning in Vibhāṣā 80 explains: "Question: Prahsrabdhi and upekṣā exist in all stages. Why are prahsrabdhi and not upekṣā established in the first and second, while upekṣā and not prahsrabdhi is established in the third and fourth? Answer: Furthermore, in the first and second, the activity of prahsrabdhi is superior, as its nature is elevated, counteracting torpor; in the third and fourth, the activity of upekṣā is superior, as its nature is calm and quiet, counteracting agitation. Furthermore, to counteract the five consciousnesses and the heaviness of the body induced by them, prahsrabdhi is established in the first dhyāna; to counteract the three consciousnesses of the first dhyāna and the heaviness of the body induced by them, prahsrabdhi is established in the second dhyāna. In the second and third dhyānas, there is no coarse collection of consciousnesses or heaviness of the body induced by them to be counteracted; thus, prahsrabdhi is not established as a factor in the third and fourth. Since prahsrabdhi is absent, upekṣā is established. Furthermore, the third dhyāna abandons extreme joy, and the fourth dhyāna abandons extreme bliss; therefore, upekṣā is established. In the first and second dhyānas, upekṣā is not established; therefore, prahsrabdhi is established." Question: Faith is common to all stages. Why is it established as a factor only in the second dhyāna? The Vibhāṣā's meaning states: "Furthermore, in the first dhyāna, investigation and analysis are like fire, and the bodily consciousness is like mud, causing the mental continuum to be tormented, turbid, and disturbed, so that faith is not bright and clear, just as a facial reflection does not appear in hot mud. In the second dhyāna, there are no such things; the characteristics of faith are bright and clear, just as a facial reflection can appear in clear, cool water. The third dhyāna has an extremely pleasant sensation, and the fourth dhyāna has a superior neutral sensation, which obscure the mental continuum so that the characteristics of faith do not appear. Furthermore, when yogins attain the second dhyāna, superior faith first arises; having become detached from both the realm and the stage, they will inevitably become detached later on, up to the peak of existence. In the first dhyāna, stable faith has not yet arisen; in the latter two, it is not a first arising. Furthermore, the arising of sovereign faith necessarily relies on great joy; for one whose faith is caused by joy, faith is necessarily firm. The second dhyāna has supreme joy; therefore, the factor of internal clarity is established only in this [stage]." Question: Discernment is common to all stages. Why is it established only in the third dhyāna? The Vibhāṣā's meaning states: "Because it conforms to the third dhyāna. Furthermore, the third dhyāna has an extremely pleasant sensation; craving this bliss and failing to aspire to the superior dharmas of the higher stages can become an impediment within its own stage. To counteract this, the factor of right discernment is established. Therefore, the World-Honoured One said: 'One should perceive this bliss with right discernment.' Among the higher and lower stages, there is no impediment of extreme bliss of its own stage like that of this stage. Furthermore, the first dhyāna has coarse investigation and analysis, the second dhyāna has extreme exhilaration, and the fourth dhyāna has a superior neutral sensation. Because superior neutral sensation is ignorance, and right discernment is knowledge, and the categories of knowledge and ignorance mutually conflict, right discernment is obstructed and occluded by investigation, analysis, and so forth; thus, it is not established in those. In the third dhyāna, there is no dharma that obstructs right discernment like those." Question: Mindfulness is common to all stages. Why is it established as a factor only in the third and fourth? The Vibhāṣā's meaning states: "Mindfulness conforms to the latter two. Furthermore, the third dhyāna is swept away and submerged by the supreme joy of the second dhyāna, and the fourth dhyāna is obstructed by the supreme bliss of the third dhyāna; being impeded by the lower stages, one cannot transcend the defilement of one's own stage. Therefore, the World-Honoured One exhorted one to abide in right mindfulness. Furthermore, the first dhyāna has coarse investigation and analysis, which are like a violent storm; the second dhyāna has extreme exhilaration, which is like crashing waves of water, obscuring right mindfulness. The latter two are free of these faults." Regarding the second point, the unequal number of factors: Question: Why do the first and third equally have five, while the second and fourth both have four? The Vibhāṣā explains: "Furthermore, because the evils of the desire realm are difficult to sever, difficult to break, and difficult to cross over, the first dhyāna establishes five factors as a powerful antidote. In the deep stage of the second dhyāna, extreme joy is difficult to sever, difficult to break, and difficult to cross over; [therefore,] the third dhyāna establishes five factors as a powerful antidote. Since neither the first nor the third [as objects] has such conditions [with respect to the second and fourth], the second and fourth have only four. Furthermore, to counteract attachment to the five sense objects of the desire realm, the first establishes five. As an antidote to the joy sensation of the five categories of the deep stage of the second dhyāna, the third dhyāna has five. Since neither the first nor the third has such conditions, the second and fourth each have four. Furthermore, it is to conform to the method of skipping absorptions: that is, from a five-factored absorption one leaps into a five-factored absorption, and again from a four-factored absorption one leaps into a four-factored absorption, because when factors are equal, it is easy to leap. Question: If one leaps from the third dhyāna into the sphere of boundless space, and again leaps from the fourth dhyāna into the sphere of boundless consciousness, and neither of those has factors, how does this conform? Answer: All external and internal activities are difficult when first undertaken, but when accomplished later, they do not rely on conformity. As for external activities: for example, Cāṇakya and his minister Candragupta studied the method of making gold for twelve years; when they first produced a single grain the size of a barley grain, they made a lion's roar: 'We can now create a mountain of gold!' As for internal activities: for example, when a yogin cultivates the supernormal power of psychic transformation, upon first training he leaves the ground by half a sesame seed, later by one sesame seed, and gradually half a barley grain, one barley grain, and up to one fathom. When he later accomplishes it, he can go to Akaniṣṭha Heaven at will, with complete mastery. Skipping absorptions is also like this: because it is difficult at first, it relies on an equal number of factors; because it is easy later on, even without established factors, one can leap into them (the above is the text of the treatise)."

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese