俱舍論記 30

English (machine translation) 30

Language: English

30.2

Chapter Nine: Refutation of the Attachment to a Self, Part Two.

"If it were merely the five appropriation-aggregates... bearing the heavy burden": the Vātsīputrīya master again cites a sūtra to raise an objection. If the author of the treatise says that the self is merely a nominal designation for the five appropriation-aggregates, why did the Buddha say: "I shall now explain to you the heavy burden of the five appropriation-aggregates, the taking up of the subsequent burden, the laying down of the prior burden, and the one who currently bears the heavy burden"? If there were no self, the World-Honoured One should not have spoken in this sūtra of bearing the heavy burden and so forth.

30.4

"On what account should the Buddha not have spoken thus?": the author of the treatise counters with an inquiry. On what account should the Buddha not have spoken thus?

30.5

"Bearing the heavy burden... for it has never been seen": the Vātsīputrīyas reply. The substance of the heavy burden—the five appropriation-aggregates—should not itself be called the bearer. Why is this? Because it has never been seen that this heavy burden is itself called the bearer; therefore we know there is a self termed the bearer. The skandhas are what are taken up and laid down—these two are omitted here for brevity.

30.6

"The ineffable entity... pudgala": the author of the treatise explains this. Within the explanation, he first challenges, then explains. The challenge: The entity of the fifth, ineffable repository of dharmas posited by your school should also not be spoken of. Why is this? Because it too has never been seen. He further challenges with an analogical explanation: The one who takes up the heavy burden should not be subsumed under the skandhas, because the heavy burden taking up itself has never been seen. The meaning of the challenge here is: If the self is the bearer and thus not subsumed under the skandhas, the taking up is the agent of taking and should also not be subsumed under the skandhas. The analogical explanation: However, the sūtra speaks of craving, the cause, as taking up the fruit, the heavy burden; craving is the agent of taking. Since it is already subsumed under the skandhas, the bearer of the skandhas should likewise be subsumed under the skandhas, and a pudgala is merely nominally established upon the skandhas. However, the Buddha feared that the Vātsīputrīya sūtras would hold this substance of the self to be permanent and truly existent as the fifth, ineffable repository of dharmas; therefore, following this sūtra, the Buddha himself explained: "It is only according to worldly convention that one says this venerable one has such a name..." and so on at length, down to many names, just as the sentences of the Sūtra on the Person cited above. In order to make them understand that this nominal self of the five skandhas can be spoken of as impermanent and not of a real nature, the five appropriation-aggregates themselves mutually oppress and harm each other, thus receiving the name 'burden'; because preceding moments induce succeeding moments, they are termed 'bearing.' This means the preceding cause can bear the succeeding fruit, so there is no substantially real pudgala.

30.7

"A pudgala... because it is subsumed under wrong view": the Vātsīputrīyas again cite a sūtra to raise an objection, showing that the self is real, that the self is definitely real. The sūtra says that denying the existence of spontaneously born sentient beings is subsumed under wrong view. A spontaneously born sentient being is precisely the real self; since denying it is wrong view, it is clear that a real self exists.

30.8

"Who says there are none... because it is abandoned through cultivation": the author of the treatise resolves the objection. Who says there are no spontaneously born sentient beings? As the Buddha said: "I declare that spontaneously born intermediate beings exist." That is, the continuity of the skandhas capable of going to the next world without relying on a womb, an egg, or moisture is called a spontaneously born sentient being. Denying the existence of this intermediate state is subsumed under wrong view. Because the spontaneously born five skandhas are real in principle, he conveniently interrogates them further: Furthermore, if you hold that this wrong view slanders the pudgala, by what is it abandoned? Is it abandoned through seeing or through cultivation? Neither is logically admissible: since the real self you grasp is not subsumed under the four noble truths, it cannot be abandoned through seeing the truths. Furthermore, it should not be said that this wrong view is abandoned through cultivation.

30.9

"If you say the sūtra states that there is... born in the world": the author of the treatise again cites their thesis to refute it. If you say the sūtra states that there is a single pudgala born in the world, where the self is one while the skandhas are many: this is also unreasonable. The sūtra speaks of one self because it nominally speaks of one self with respect to the aggregate of skandhas as a whole. Just as in the world, many minute atoms are called one sesame seed or one grain of rice, many grains and barley are called one heap, and sounds of many moments are called one word. Alternatively, the self you posit should be conceded as subsumed under the conditioned, because the sūtra says it is born in the world; yet your school does not accept that it is subsumed under the conditioned.

30.10

"This mention of being born is not like the skandhas being newly produced": the Vātsīputrīyas defend. This arising of the self is not like the skandhas arising anew.

30.11

"In what sense is it said to be born in the world?": the author of the treatise queries.

30.12

"In reliance upon this present time... acquiring distinct states": the Vātsīputrīyas reply. Saying that the self is born relies on the self at this present time relinquishing previous distinct skandhas and gathering subsequent distinct skandhas; it is not that a new self is born. Just as in the world it is said that one who studies sacrifices and attains mastery is called 'a sacrificer born.' The Vyākaraṇa-śāstra is called the treatise of grammatical analysis, which is the science of grammar (śabda-vidyā); one who studies grammatical analysis and attains mastery is called 'a grammarian born.' In these two cases, because they acquire treatises of learning, it is called 'born'; the treatises they study are called treatises of learning. Again, just as worldly people say that upon first going forth, one is called 'a monk born,' or upon first entering an external path, one is called 'an outsider born'—in these two cases, because they adopt their own deportment and their own rules, it is called 'born.' Or just as worldly people say that when hair is white and the face wrinkled, one is called 'an aged one born,' or when the four great elements are in disharmony, one is called 'a sick one born'—in these two cases, because they acquire distinct states, it is called 'born.' The birth spoken of above is in terms of distinct acquisitions of attributes, not an initial birth. The birth of the self is likewise: it is in terms of taking up distinct skandhas, not that the self is newly born anew.

30.13

"Because the Buddha has already excluded it... therefore the Buddha has already excluded it": below, the author of the treatise refutes it. Here he cites a sūtra to refute it. The sūtra states that there is action and there is maturation, but a real agent cannot be found; that is, one who can relinquish these prior skandhas and continue other subsequent skandhas, except for the continuous dharmas of the five skandhas which are nominally designated as a self. Therefore, the Buddha has already excluded a real self outside the skandhas.

30.14

"Phalguna... taking up and relinquishing the skandhas": the author of the treatise again cites a sūtra to refute it. It does not speak of a real grasper; therefore there is no real self capable of taking up and relinquishing the skandhas.

30.15

"Furthermore, regarding what you have cited... is also like the mind and so on": the author of the treatise also refutes by analyzing the examples. Furthermore, regarding the 'sacrificer born' and so on cited by you, what is their substance such that they can serve as an example for the self? If you hold that the sacrificer is the self, the example is unestablished, because I do not accept that there is a real substance of self. If you hold that the sacrificer is mind and mental factors, they perish moment by moment and arise anew moment by moment, so taking up and relinquishing cannot be established. If you accept that the sacrificer is the physical body, it is also like the mind and so on: perishing moment by moment and arising anew moment by moment, taking up and relinquishing cannot be established.

30.16

Regarding '[Moreover, just as the Vedas, etc. ...] the example is not established': the author of the treatise refutes [them] again with reference to the example. Moreover, just as the Vedas and so forth are distinct from the bodies of the sacrificer and the like, the aggregates should also be distinct from the self. How can you say they are not distinct? The aged body and the diseased body are each distinct from the body at the previous stage; thus the aggregates should also be distinct from the person (pudgala). If you say that the youthful body or the handsome body transforms into [that other] body, then you agree with the Sāṃkhya doctrine of transformation. The Sāṃkhya [view of] transformation has already been refuted above. Therefore, their citation of the sacrificer being born and so forth as an example is not established.

30.17

Regarding 'Moreover, if it is accepted that the aggregates arise [anew ... there is difference from the aggregates]': the author of the treatise refutes [them] again. If you accept that the aggregates are newly arisen and are not the transmigrating entity (pudgala), then you necessarily accept that the self is different from the aggregates and is permanent. How can your school say that it is not different from the aggregates and not impermanent? Furthermore, the self is only one, while the entities of the aggregates are five; why do you not say that the self is different from the aggregates?

30.18

Regarding 'There are four primary elements [while derived matter is only one ...] not different from the primary elements': the Vātsīputrīya counters with an objection. [According to] the author of the treatise, the self is one and the aggregates are five, so the vital principle (jīva) and self are different from the aggregates. [Yet] the primary elements are four, and derived matter is only one; why do you say that derived matter is not different from the primary elements?

30.19

Regarding 'That is the fault of their school': the author of the treatise replies. That is the fault of that school; it does not concern me.

30.20

Regarding 'What is that school?': the Vātsīputrīya poses a new question.

30.21

Regarding 'Those who assert that derived matter [is simply the primary elements ...] a person': the author of the treatise replies. Those such as Dharmatrāta assert the thesis that derived matter is simply the primary elements. If one accepts their view, one should formulate the following challenge: Just as derived matter is simply the four primary elements, one should likewise establish the person (pudgala) as being simply the five aggregates. Why do you say that the self is not identical with the aggregates?

30.22

Regarding 'If the person [is not identical with the aggregates ... the vital principle is the body]': the Vātsīputrīya raises an objection.

30.23

Regarding 'Observing the inquirer's [intention ...] identical with or different from the body': the author of the treatise replies. It is because he observed the inquirer's intention (āśaya). The inquirer grasped at a real entity of an internal self termed the 'vital principle' (jīva), and on this basis asked the Buddha whether it was identical with or different from the body. Since the self is completely non-existent, identity or difference cannot be established; how could [the Buddha] declare it to be identical with or different from the body? It is like saying that turtle's hair cannot be declared either hard or soft. Since turtle's hair is fundamentally non-existent, how could one discuss hardness or softness? Ancient masters have already explained this intricate and difficult point. From 'Formerly there was' onward, it refers to an incident that is clear to understand. The mango tree grew outside the city in the Western regions, not in the royal palace.

30.24

Regarding 'Why did the Buddha not say that the vital principle is completely non-existent?': the Vātsīputrīya asks.

30.25

Regarding 'Also observing the inquirer's [intention ...] the Buddha did not answer whether it exists or not': the author of the treatise replies. It is also because he observed the inquirer's intention (āśaya). The inquirer perhaps designated a nominal 'vital principle' based on the continuum of the aggregates and raised the question on that basis. If the Buddha had answered that it does not exist, that person would have fallen into wrong views; hence the Buddha did not say [so]. Why did he not explain to him that the vital principle is nominally existent? Because he had not yet understood the profound principle of all phenomena being dependently originated and was not a vessel capable of receiving the correct Dharma, the Buddha did not explain to him that the vital principle is nominally existent. The principle must necessarily be so, because the World-Honoured One spoke [as follows]. Vatsa means 'calf' in Chinese. The wanderer Vatsagotra asked the World-Honoured One: 'Does my self exist in the world, or does it not exist?' The Buddha did not declare [an answer] to him. If he had declared it to exist, it would contradict the true reality of dharmas; if he had stated it not to exist, it would increase that person's delusion and confusion. He would then think, 'My self existed previously and is now annihilated,' and would generate the view of annihilationism. This view of annihilationism is contrasted with the delusion of grasping at existence: this delusion [of annihilationism] is even more severe, because its delusion is grave. That is to say, grasping that a self exists falls into the extreme of eternalism, while grasping that there is no self falls into the extreme of annihilationism. The fault of grasping at existence is lighter; the fault of grasping at non-existence is heavier. As the sūtra explains in detail: It is better to give rise to the view of self as large as Mount Sumeru than to give rise to the view of annihilationism as small as a mustard seed. Because generating the view of self still allows one to cultivate various good deeds, its fault is lighter. Because generating the view of annihilationism causes one to commit many evils, its fault is heavier. Therefore the Buddha did not state for him that there is no self. Relying on such an inexpressible principle, Kumāralāta of the Sautrāntika school uttered this verse. The first verse speaks generally, and the second verse explains specifically: Observing that one would be harmed by [false] views, he did not teach existence; and observing that good karma would be destroyed, he did not teach non-existence. Thus the Buddha taught the correct Dharma neither too tightly nor too loosely. It is just like a tigress holding her cub in her mouth: tightness and looseness are properly adjusted. If too tight, it is harmed; if too loose, it drops. If the Buddha had said that the self exists, that person would grasp that a real self exists and would thus be harmed by views, because views are sharp like teeth and capable of harming people. This explains the first line. If the Buddha had said that there is no self, that person would reject the conventional self as non-existent and would thereby destroy the child of karma. Wholesome karma is like a child, hence called 'the child of wholesome karma'. This explains the second line. Relying on such a principle, the author of the present treatise now speaks verses again to recapitulate the earlier meaning. Among the four verses: the first two lines versify the earlier [point that] the vital principle is neither identical with nor different from the body; the next six lines versify the earlier [point of] why the Buddha did not say that the vital principle is completely non-existent, down to the fact that because that person would fall into wrong views, the Buddha did not speak. Among these six lines, the first two lines versify generally, and the following four lines explain specifically. For fear that the inquirer would reject the conventional self as non-existent, the Buddha also did not state that the vital principle is completely non-existent. That is to say, within the path of the continuum of the five aggregates, there is karma and there is fruition, nominally designated as the 'vital principle'. If the Buddha had explained to him that there is no vital principle, fearing that the inquirer would also reject the conventional vital principle as non-existent, he did not say it is completely non-existent. The third stanza versifies the earlier [point that] because he had not yet understood the principle of dependent origination and was not a vessel for receiving the true Dharma, [the Buddha] did not speak of conventional existence. That the World-Honoured One did not state that there is a conventional vital principle within the aggregates was because, observing that the inquirer lacked the capacity to comprehend the principle of the true emptiness of dependent origination, he therefore did not speak of it. The fourth stanza versifies the earlier Vatsagotra-sūtra, where the Buddha observed the particular disposition of Vatsagotra. When he asked the World-Honoured One whether there is a self or no self, the Buddha did not answer him that there is a self or no self.

30.26

Regarding 'For what reason did he not declare whether the world is eternal, and so forth?': the Vātsīputrīya asks. For what reason did the World-Honoured One not declare the four propositions concerning whether the world is eternal and so forth?

30.27

Regarding 'Also observing the inquirer's [intention ...] he did not give a definitive declaration': the author of the treatise replies. It is also because he observed the inquirer's intention (āśaya). If the inquirer grasped at the self as the world and asked the World-Honoured One: 'Is the world eternal? Is it impermanent? Is it both eternal and impermanent? Is it neither eternal nor impermanent?'—since to that inquirer the world was a real self, and the entity of the self is completely non-existent, all four answers would be unreasonable, and therefore the Buddha did not answer. If he alternatively grasped that the five aggregates of saṃsāra are all termed 'the world', the Buddha giving an answer according to the four alternatives would likewise be unreasonable, and therefore he also did not answer. That is to say: if the world were eternal, it could not be severed, and there would be no attaining of nirvāṇa. If it were impermanent, it would naturally perish of itself, and one would not, through the diligent labor of cultivating the path, realize nirvāṇa. If he had answered that it is both eternal and impermanent, within saṃsāra one portion of sentient beings would definitely not attain nirvāṇa, while one portion of sentient beings would spontaneously realize perfect quiescence. If he had answered that it is neither eternal nor impermanent, this world would also neither attain nirvāṇa nor not attain nirvāṇa. Another explanation: because it is not impermanent, it should not attain nirvāṇa; because it is not eternal, it should not fail to attain nirvāṇa. Being neither impermanent nor eternal is mutually contradictory and becomes mere sophistry; how could it constitute an answer to the question? However, based on the noble path, one can attain parinirvāṇa; therefore, none of the four definitive declarations would be reasonable. It is like the Nirgrantha non-Buddhist who held a sparrow in his hand and asked the Buddha whether it was dead or alive. The Buddha knew his mind and would not make a definitive statement: if he answered that it was dead, he would let it go alive; if he answered that it was alive, he would wring its neck and kill it. Therefore the Buddha did not answer. This case is also like that.

30.28

Regarding 'The four propositions concerning being finite and so forth [are also not declared] because all incur faults': the author of the treatise explains by analogy. If asked about the four propositions concerning whether the world is finite and so forth, the Buddha also did not declare [an answer], because, identical to [the questions on] eternal, etc., all incur faults.

30.29

Regarding 'How is it known that these four have the same meaning as eternal and so forth?': the Vātsīputrīya asks.

30.30

Regarding 'Because there was a non-Buddhist [named Uttika ...] the meaning is the same as the previous': the author of the treatise replies. Because there was a non-Buddhist named Uttika (translated here as 'one who can speak'). He first asked about the four propositions concerning whether the world is finite and so forth, and the World-Honoured One did not answer. Later, he devised an expedient to question the World-Honoured One deceitfully: 'Can all the worlds, being eternal and so forth, attain liberation by means of the noble path? Or does only a portion attain liberation while another portion does not attain liberation?' The Venerable Ānanda, who was at the Buddha's side, then said to him: 'You have already asked the World-Honoured One concerning this matter with the four propositions of whether the world is finite, infinite, and so forth. For what reason do you now alter the four terms "finite", "infinite", and so forth into the four of "eternal", "impermanent", and so forth, and ask the World-Honoured One again?' Finite is impermanent; infinite is eternal; both finite and infinite is both eternal and impermanent; neither finite nor infinite is neither eternal nor impermanent. Therefore we know that the meaning of the latter four is the same as the former.

30.31

Regarding 'For what reason again [did he not declare the four propositions concerning whether] the Tathāgata exists after death and so forth?': the Vātsīputrīya asks. For what reason again did the World-Honoured One not declare the four propositions concerning whether the Tathāgata after death exists, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist?

30.32

Regarding 'Also because he observed the inquirer's [intention ...] and raised the question': the author of the treatise replies. It is also because he observed the inquirer's intention (āśaya). The inquirer falsely conceived of a liberated self termed the 'Tathāgata' and raised the question on that basis. Because there is no real self, the Buddha did not answer.

30.33

Regarding 'Now one should cross-examine [the Vātsīputrīya masters ...] also exists after death': the author of the treatise cross-examines. Now one should cross-examine the Vātsīputrīya masters who assert the existence of a self: For what reason did the Buddha declare that a present self exists, but did not declare that a self also exists after the Tathāgata's death?

30.34

Regarding 'They say: for fear of incurring the fault of falling into eternalism': the Vātsīputrīya replies. For fear of falling into the fault of eternalism, the Buddha did not declare it.

30.35

Regarding 'If so, for what reason [did the Buddha declare ...] is not omniscient': the author of the treatise challenges. If so, for what reason did the Buddha prophesy concerning Maitreya Bodhisattva, and prophesy future events concerning his disciples? Would this not also incur the fault of falling into eternalism? Moreover, if you say that the Buddha previously saw the self, but after that person entered parinirvāṇa he no longer saw the self, and because he did not know it he did not declare its existence, the refutation is: Then you deny that the Great Teacher possesses omniscience, because he would be unable to know the liberated self. Alternatively, you ought to accept that he did not declare it because the entity of the self is completely non-existent. If you maintain that the Buddha saw the liberated self but did not speak of it, the refutation is: Then there is the fault of it being separate from the aggregates, since you posit that upon entering nirvāṇa the aggregates are destroyed while the self is not destroyed; and there is the fault of permanence, so how could you say that the self is not different from the five aggregates and not impermanent? If you say that regarding the already-liberated self, whether the Buddha saw or did not see the self is inexpressible, the refutation is: Then one should pose the dilemma: it is inexpressible whether the Buddha is omniscient, and it is inexpressible whether the Buddha is not omniscient. Or one should pose the dilemma: it is inexpressible that the Buddha is omniscient, because he does not see the self; and it is inexpressible that the Buddha is not omniscient, because he sees the self.

30.36

Regarding 'If one maintains that it is real [because the sūtra says ...] clearly stated': the author of the treatise takes up their thesis and scriptural proof to refute it. If you maintain that a self exists because a sūtra states: 'Dwelling in careful consideration; those who determinately grasp that there is no self fall into the locus of evil views', the refutation is: This does not constitute proof. That sūtra also states that those who determinately grasp that there is a self fall into the locus of evil views, so one should not posit a self. The Abhidharmikas say: Grasping at the existence or non-existence of a self are both subsumed under extreme views (antagrāha-dṛṣṭi). If one grasps that a self exists, one falls into the extreme of eternalism; if one grasps that a self does not exist, one falls into the extreme of annihilationism. The author of the treatise agrees, saying: What that master said is deeply reasonable, because grasping at existence or non-existence falls into the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism, as was clearly stated earlier in the Vatsagotra-sūtra; he cites this teaching to substantiate it.

30.37

Regarding 'If there is definitely no [self ...] a person': the Vātsīputrīya objects by citing scripture for confirmation. If there is definitely no self, who can be said to transmigrate in saṃsāra? For it should not transmigrate on its own. The sūtra states that sentient beings, shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving, course and transmigrate in saṃsāra. Therefore, there is definitely a self.

30.38

Regarding 'How does this [self] again transmigrate in saṃsāra?': the author of the treatise asks. How does this self again transmigrate in saṃsāra?

30.39

Regarding 'By relinquishing previous aggregates and grasping subsequent aggregates': the Vātsīputrīya replies. Because the self relinquishes the previous aggregates and is able to grasp subsequent aggregates, the self is said to transmigrate in saṃsāra.

30.40

Regarding 'Such a tenet [...] transmigration in saṃsāra': the author of the treatise points to the earlier refutation and then states the correct doctrine. Just as a forest fire, though perishing moment by moment, is said to undergo a transition from here to there because its succession is uninterrupted before and after; in the same way, over the aggregation of the skandhas one conventionally designates a sentient being. With craving and clinging as conditions, the fruition of maturation arises in an uninterrupted continuum, which is called transmigration in saṃsāra.

30.41

Regarding 'If there are only skandhas [...] called Sunetra': the Vātsīputrīya objects. If there are only skandhas and no self, why did the Buddha say, 'I, who am now, was in the past the guide of the world'? Since he spoke the words 'I now was the teacher in the past', one clearly knows that there is a self.

30.42

Regarding 'What fault is there in this statement?': the author of the treatise interrogates in return.

30.43

Regarding 'Because the skandhas are distinct': the Vātsīputrīya replies. The present skandhas and the past skandhas are distinct from each other before and after; if there were no self, how could it be said that 'I, who am now, was in the past the guide of the world'?

30.44

Regarding 'If so, what kind of thing is it?': the author of the treatise asks. If so, what thing is this 'I now was the guide of the world in the past'?

30.45

Regarding 'It refers to the pudgala': the Vātsīputrīya replies.

30.46

Regarding 'If the self of the past is the self of the present [...] once burned that thing': the author of the treatise objects. If the past self is identical to the present self, its substance would have to be eternal; how could you say that the self is not eternal? Having concluded the objection, he resolves the sūtra. Therefore, the statement 'I now was the teacher in the past' indicates that the past and the present are a single continuum of a nominal entity. It is just like saying 'this fire once burned that thing', which also indicates that the past fire and the fire of the present time belong to one and the same continuum of fire; thus one says, 'this fire once burned that thing'.

30.47

Regarding 'If you claim that it is definitively [...] far removed from liberation': the author of the treatise again takes up their thesis to refute it. He presents the thesis, refutes it directly, and cites teachings to substantiate [the refutation]. If that were so, one would be slandering the Buddha, bound by afflictions, and far removed from liberation.

30.48

Regarding 'If you claim that toward the self [...] these words are meaningless': the author of the treatise again takes up their rescue to refute it. If you claim that toward the self one does not give rise to a view of self that co-arises with self-craving, and thus there is no binding by craving; he refutes it, saying: 'These words are meaningless.'

30.49

Regarding 'Why is that?': the Vātsīputrīya inquires.

30.50

Regarding 'In what is not a self [...] erupting into the blister of views': the author of the treatise answers. If you maintain that: 'It is only in what is not a self that one falsely imagines a self, where self-craving can arise, but not in a real self'; he refutes it, saying: 'What is thus stated has no reasoning to substantiate it.' Therefore, that Vātsīputrīya, within the Buddha's teaching, without any cause or condition, suddenly and groundlessly erupts into the blister of the view of self.

30.51

Regarding 'In this manner, one class [...] the fault of lacking liberation': the author of the treatise concludes the refutation of the Vātsīputrīya. As an incidental benefit, he also reveals the errors of the others. In this manner, one class—the Vātsīputrīyas—cling to an ineffable pudgala. Furthermore, another class—the non-Buddhists of nihilistic views—completely repudiate the substantial nature of all dharmas as non-existent. Non-Buddhists such as the Sāṃkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas cling to an independent, real nature of the self. All of these, having improper views, can none of them avoid the fault of lacking liberation.

30.52

Regarding 'If of all kinds [...] how could it remember and recognize?': the Vātsīputrīya asks. If the substance of the self of all kinds is completely non-existent, how could a mind that perishes moment by moment remember what was previously experienced and what is remotely similar, and how could it recognize it? A past object resembling the present is called a 'similar object'.

30.53

Regarding 'Such remembering and recognizing [...] arises from a specific state of mind': the author of the treatise replies. Such remembering and such recognizing are perfumed into seeds from the ideation of an object of mindfulness within one's own continuum, which is called 'homogenous with the object of mindfulness'. When these seeds reside in the mind, their specific capacity is called 'specific state of mind'. Subsequent remembering and recognizing arise from this specific capacity in the mind consisting of seeds homogenous with the ideation of the object of mindfulness. In the Sautrāntika view, mindfulness and recognition have no separate substantial entity, and therefore they arise from ideation-seeds. Alternatively, it is explained: such remembering and recognizing arise from the seeds homogenous with the object of mindfulness and the seeds homogenous with the object of ideation within the continuum of the body. 'Object' applies to both places; here the text should only say 'seeds homogenous with mindfulness', yet it says 'ideation' because ideation is strong and separately singled out. The reason it does not say 'homogenous with the object of recognition' is that recognition is induced by mindfulness, and so it is not separately mentioned. Thus the treatise below says: 'By the force of this remembrance, subsequent recognition arises.' Alternatively, it is explained: remembrance arises from what is homogenous with the object of mindfulness, while recognition arises from what is homogenous with the object of ideation, because according to the Sautrāntikas, recognition has no separate entity. The specific capacity perfumed into the mind by these seeds of mindfulness and ideation is called a 'specific state of mind'. The active states of remembering and recognizing arise from those seeds.

30.54

Regarding 'First, as for initial remembrance [...] arises without interval': the Vātsīputrīya asks, between the two kinds—remembering and recognizing—first, from what kind of seed of a specific state of mind does the initial remembrance arise without interval after the preceding moment ceases without interval? For the Sautrāntikas, cause and effect occur at distinct times, before and after; therefore, subsequent remembrance arises from the seed of the preceding moment, which is why he asks this question.

30.55

Regarding 'From having attention directed to that [...] because it possesses the capacity': the author of the treatise answers. The arising of initial remembrance occurs, first, from conditions, and second, from a cause. Arising from conditions means: it arises with the force of attention directed toward that past object as a condition. A past object that is equal to the object of mindfulness is called 'similar'; by the force of that similar object acting as a condition, mindfulness arises. Or, seeing a present object similar to the past can induce mindfulness directed toward the past object; hence it is called 'similar'. Or, it is induced as a condition because the preceding moment resembles the subsequent moment. 'Connected with mindfulness' means being connected to conditions such as attention in one's own body, distinguishing it from another's body. Or, being connected as cause and effect acts as a condition to give rise to mindfulness. 'Ideation and so forth' includes craving and so forth. By the force of conditions such as attention directed toward that, initial remembrance arises. Arising from a cause means: from the basis, the body, whose capacity is not damaged by conditions such as distinct sorrow, distraction, and so forth. By the force of the cause consisting in a specific state of mind, initial remembrance arises. Although the arising of remembrance has such conditions as attention, if there is no cause of that class of specific state of mind, there will be no capability to cultivate this remembrance. Although there is a cause of that class of specific state of mind, if there are no such conditions as attention, there is likewise no principle by which remembrance could be cultivated. One must possess both the force of the cause and the conditions before one can cultivate it. The arising of all instances of remembrance occurs solely by the power of these causes and conditions; apart from these two kinds of cause and conditions, no distinct, real self is observed to possess the capacity for remembrance.

30.56

Regarding 'How could an object seen by one mind [...] principle of having remembrance?': the Vātsīputrīya objects. If there is no self, how could an object seen by one mind at an earlier time be remembered by a different mind at a later time? It is not the case that an object once seen by Devadatta's mind could admit of any principle of being remembered later by Yajñadatta's mind. 'Devadatta' is in Sanskrit Devadatta. He was begged for from a deity, meaning 'given by a god'; named after the place from which he was begged, he is called 'God-given'. 'Yajñadatta' is in Sanskrit Yajñadatta. A son obtained by begging through sacrificing to a deity, he is called 'Sacrifice-given'. Among Indian personal names, there are truly many of the types Devadatta and Yajñadatta; hence they are singled out as examples.

30.57

Regarding 'This objection is unreasonable [...] subsequent recognition arises': the author of the treatise answers. This objection is unreasonable, because they are not mutually connected. That is, the two minds of Devadatta and Yajñadatta, viewed in relation to each other, lack the nature of cause and effect and are mutually unconnected. An object once seen by Devadatta's mind cannot be remembered by Yajñadatta's mind later; unlike in the continuum of a single person, where there is the nature of cause and effect and before and after are mutually connected, so that what was once seen by the earlier mind can be remembered by the later mind. We do not say that an object seen by one mind is remembered by another mind, because the continuum before and after belongs to a single homogenous class. The earlier mind of the same class is capable of remembering, and then the past mind taking that object as cognitive object perfumes and forms a seed, and from this seed the present consciousness capable of remembering is induced. That is to say, as previously explained, by the power of (1) the continuum, (2) transformation, and (3) differentiation, what fault is there in mindfulness arising? By the force of this seed of preceding remembrance, there arises subsequent memory and recognition.

30.58

Regarding 'Since the self is non-existent in substance, who is the rememberer?': the Vātsīputrīya asks. Since the substance of the self is non-existent, who is the rememberer?

30.59

Regarding 'What is meant by "the rememberer"?': the author of the treatise asks in return.

30.60

Regarding 'That which through mindfulness can apprehend an object': the Vātsīputrīya replies.

30.61

Regarding 'Is this apprehending of an object distinct from mindfulness?': the author of the treatise again interrogates.

30.62

Regarding 'Although not distinct from mindfulness, it is solely due to an agent': the Vātsīputrīya replies. Although when apprehending that object it is not distinct from mindfulness, it is only through the agent, the self, that mindfulness is able to apprehend the object.

30.63

Regarding 'The agent is precisely [...] one says that it remembers': the author of the treatise states his tenet to provide a thorough explanation. The 'agent' is precisely the previously explained cause of mindfulness, not a real self. That is, because that seed consisting in a specific state of mind homogenous with mindfulness can cause the subsequent fruition—mindfulness—to apprehend the object, the preceding cause of mindfulness is spoken of as an 'agent'. However, what the world speaks of as 'Caitra remembers'—this Caitra is not a real self; over the continuum of skandhas as a nominal self, the name Caitra is established. With the perfumed seed from the mind that previously saw as cause, the subsequent fruition of remembrance arises. Over the fruition of remembrance the name Caitra is established; therefore it is said that in accordance with this principle one says that 'he can remember'. 'Caitra' is the name of a constellation that appears in the first month, and the first month takes its name from this constellation. Because one is born in this month, one is named after this constellation. If one who grasps at a self is born in this month, he says that the real self is named Caitra; therefore it is now explained in this way.

30.64

Regarding 'If the self has no substance, whose mindfulness is it?': the Vātsīputrīya asks. If the self had substance, mindfulness could belong to the self, and the genitive case would be established. If the self has no substance, whose mindfulness is it?

30.65

Regarding 'Based on what meaning is the sixth case spoken of?': the author of the treatise asks in return.

30.66

Regarding 'This sixth case is based on the meaning of belonging to a master': the Vātsīputrīya replies.

30.67

Regarding 'How does what object belong to what master?': the author of the treatise inquires further.

30.68

Regarding 'This is like oxen and the like belonging to Caitra': the Vātsīputrīya replies. This is like things such as oxen belonging to the human master, Caitra.

30.69

Regarding 'How is he the master of the oxen?': the author of the treatise asks again.

30.70

Regarding 'Because with respect to their [...] he has mastery': the Vātsīputrīya replies. Because with respect to their various riding, milking, employing, and so forth, that Caitra has mastery, he is called the 'master of the oxen'.

30.71

Regarding 'In what respect do you wish [...] seek a master of mindfulness?': the author of the treatise asks again. In what respect do you wish to employ mindfulness, such that you exert effort and means to seek a master of mindfulness, a self?

30.72

Regarding 'Employing mindfulness in the object to be remembered': the Vātsīputrīya replies.

30.73

Regarding 'Why employ mindfulness?': the author of the treatise asks again.

30.74

Regarding 'In order to make mindfulness arise': the Vātsīputrīya replies.

30.75

Regarding 'How wondrous is this mastery [...] in order to make mindfulness go': the author of the treatise again interrogates and criticizes. How wondrous is this mastery! Giving rise to unreasonable words. Would it be that this self arises to employ this mindfulness? Alternatively, it is explained: would it be for the sake of this mindfulness? Again he sets up a dilemma to interrogate and determine: furthermore, how does the self employ mindfulness? Is it to make mindfulness arise? Or is it to make mindfulness go?

30.76

Regarding 'Because mindfulness has no motion, it should only be made to arise': the Vātsīputrīya replies.

30.77

Regarding "Then the cause is called the master... nor is it apart from causes": the author of the treatise shows the correct doctrine. If causing memory to arise is called being the 'master of memory', then the cause of memory is called the 'master' because it is what it belongs to, and the result, memory, is called that which belongs [to it]. Since, by the sovereign power of the cause of memory, the result, memory, is brought into being, the cause is therefore called the master. When the result arises, it belongs to the cause, and hence is called that which belongs [to it]. The cause that brings about memory is indeed sufficient to be the master of memory; what need is there to establish a self as the master of memory? That is, the aggregates of the five skandhas of conditioned forces (saṃskāras) are a conceptual designation based on causal conditions (pratītyasamutpāda). The succession of a homogeneous series before and after is a conceptual designation based on relation. The world conventionally designates this as 'Caitra's ox', establishing Caitra as the ox's master. This very ox-master is the ox's continuum. Because it is the cause of transformation and arising—[causing it to go] from here to there and to arise in a different location—it is called the ox's master. In this there is no single real self that is the ox-master Caitra, nor is there a real self that is the ox; it is merely a conventional designation. Therefore it says: 'The ox's master is also not apart from causes.' The ox is what is driven and is called the result; the ox's master is the one capable of driving and is called the cause; this is the same as the master of memory not being apart from the cause of memory.

30.78

Regarding "Memory having been explained... should be understood accordingly": this is an explanation by analogy. It clarifies that since the meaning of recollection at first was like this, the explanation of subsequent recognition is also like that. All are patterned on recollection and recognition. Questions such as 'who is the cognizer?' and 'whose consciousness is it?' should also be explained by analogy; their coarse categories are largely the same, though not without differences. For now, regarding how the causes and conditions of consciousness differ from the former [mental factors]: this refers to the six faculties, six objects, and so forth, which should be understood accordingly. Or, the seed of consciousness is called the cause, while the faculties and so forth are called the conditions; recollection and recognition exist only in the mental sphere (manobhūmi), and hence are distinct from consciousness.

30.79

Regarding "Some say... a cognizer and so forth": from here below is the second major section within the specific refutations, refuting the Sāṃkhya masters. Within this: first, recounting their tenet; second, the direct refutation; third, resolving objections. This is the first, recounting their tenet. The Sāṃkhya says: There definitely exists a self, because an activity must depend on an agent. That is, all activities depend on agents. Just as the activity of Devadatta walking must depend on the self of Devadatta who performs this activity—Devadatta being the name of the agent—likewise, all activities such as cognition by consciousness and so on must depend on a real substantial self that is their support and acts as the cognizer and so forth.

30.80

Regarding "Now he should be interrogated... the consciousness cognizing is also like this": this is the second part, the direct refutation. The author of the treatise refutes: Now he should be interrogated as to what is meant by 'Devadatta'. If it is a real self, this has already been refuted earlier. If it is a nominal person established upon the five skandhas, its substance is not a single thing, because the name 'Devadatta' is provisionally established upon a continuum of conditioned forces (saṃskāras). Just as a nominal Devadatta is said to be an agent of walking, the cognizing of consciousness should be known to be likewise. The term 'cognizer' is merely applied to a conceptual self, not to a distinct real self.

30.81

Regarding "Based on what principle is it said that Devadatta is able to walk?": from here below is the third part, resolving objections. The Sāṃkhya objects: If there is no real self, based on what principle is it said that Devadatta is able to walk?

30.82

Regarding "It refers to, in momentary... is spoken of in this way": the author of the treatise answers. That is to say: conditioned forces (saṃskāras) that arise and perish from moment to moment are a conceptual designation based on causal conditions; their non-different continuum is a conceptual designation based on continuity. The name 'Devadatta' is established upon these two conceptual designations, and fools grasp onto this as a single, real, substantial self. This conceptual self is the cause for its own bodily continuum arising in a different place. The arising of a later moment in a different place is called 'walking', and the cause in the prior moment is called 'the walker'. It is based on this principle that Devadatta is said to be able to walk. It is like taking a lamp's flame to move, or conveying a voice to call a person—continuing from here to there in different places—and the world, relying on this, says that the flame or the sound can move. In this manner, because the body in the prior moment of Devadatta can serve as the cause for the consciousness in that [subsequent] moment, the world also says that Devadatta can cognize. However, the noble ones, in order to conform to worldly linguistic conventions, also say that Devadatta can cognize.

30.83

Regarding "The sūtra says that consciousnesses... what action does it perform?": the Sāṃkhya asks. The sūtra says that consciousnesses can cognize their intentional objects (ālambana); what action does consciousness perform with regard to its intentional object?

30.84

Regarding "It performs nothing at all... is said to cognize the object": the author of the treatise answers. Consciousness performs nothing at all with regard to its intentional object; it is merely because it arises bearing resemblance to the object that it is said to 'cognize the object'. Just as a barley grain or the like rewards a barley seed or the like, although it performs no action, because it arises resembling the cause, it is said to 'reward the cause'. In this way, when consciousness arises, although it performs no action, because it resembles the object, it is said to 'cognize the object'.

30.85

"How does it resemble the object?": the Sāṃkhya asks.

30.86

Regarding "It means bearing its aspect... consciousness cognizing is also like this": the author of the treatise answers. This means that upon the cognizing consciousness, the cognitive aspect (ākāra) of that intentional object appears. For instance, when taking blue as an object, the cognizing consciousness appears bearing the aspect of blue; because the consciousness resembles the object, it is said that the consciousness can grasp the object. Just as when a mirror confronts a physical form, it arises bearing the reflection of the form and is said to resemble the original form and be capable of reflecting. Therefore, although the various consciousnesses also arise relying on the faculties, because consciousness lacks the aspect of the faculties and does not resemble the faculties, it is not said to cognize the faculties, but only to cognize the object. Alternatively, when consciousness arises in a continuum with respect to an object, with the prior consciousness serving as the cause for the subsequent consciousness to arise, there is no fault in saying that the prior causal consciousness is the cognizer, because in the world an agent is spoken of in terms of the cause. Just as the world says that a bell or a drum can ring—because it is able to produce the result of ringing, the term 'capable of ringing' is applied to the cause. Or, just as a lamp can move without there being a distinct mover, so too consciousness cognizes without there being a distinct cognizer.

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese