俱舍論記 6

English (machine translation) 6

Language: English

"Having thus explained […] they are called causes and conditions:" below this begins the third major section of the present chapter, clarifying causes and conditions. In this, first, there is concluding the preceding and asking the question; second, directly distinguishing their essential natures. This is concluding the preceding and asking the question.

6.4

"First, causes are of six kinds:" below this is the second part, directly distinguishing their essential natures. In this: first, clarifying the six causes; second, clarifying the four conditions. Under clarifying the six causes: first, directly clarifying the essence of the causes; second, clarifying the causes obtaining their fruits; third, clarifying that phenomena arise from causes. Under directly clarifying the essence of the causes: first, generally presenting the names; second, specifically revealing their essences; third, distinguishing the three periods of time. Below this is the first, generally presenting the names. Thus it first answers by stating that causes are of six kinds.

6.5

"What are the six?" inquiry.

6.6

"The verse says: […] these are the six kinds:" answer. Accepting that causes are only six differentiates this from other tenets. Because it can produce an effect, it is called the efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu). The cause is the efficient producer; the fruit is what is produced. That which is efficient is itself the cause, hence 'efficient cause'—a karmadhāraya compound. Or, the cause of what is produced is called 'efficient cause'—a tatpuruṣa compound. That is, the efficient producer is the direct cause, while the remaining non-obstructing factors are the indirect causes. This indirect cause is the cause of what is produced, hence called 'efficient cause', because it serves as an indirect cause through succession, capable of generating an effect. Thus the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle nineteen, says: "Or this is the cause of that which is produced, hence called efficient cause. This means that this and that serve successively as cause (end of treatise citation)." Because they have simultaneous function, they are called 'coexistent' (sahabhū). That which is coexistent is itself the cause, hence 'coexistent cause'—a karmadhāraya compound. Or, because the cause is simultaneous with the fruit, it is called 'coexistent'; the cause of coexistence is called 'coexistent cause'—a tatpuruṣa compound. Cause and effect being similar is called 'homogeneous' (sabhāga). If the homogeneous is itself the cause, it is called 'homogeneous cause'—a karmadhāraya compound. If it is the cause of what is homogeneous, it is called 'homogeneous cause'—a tatpuruṣa compound. Mind and mental factors being equal in five aspects is called 'associated' (saṃprayukta). If the associated is itself the cause, it is called 'associated cause'—a karmadhāraya compound. If it is the cause of the associated, it is called 'associated cause'—a tatpuruṣa compound. Because it universally serves as a cause for the defiled phenomena of the five categories, it is called 'omnipresent' (sarvatraga). That which is omnipresent is itself the cause, hence 'omnipresent cause'—a karmadhāraya compound. One cannot say 'cause of the omnipresent', because it also universally serves as a cause for what is non-omnipresent. The cause of maturation is called 'maturation cause' (vipāka-hetu)—a tatpuruṣa compound. If one says that maturation is itself the cause, it is called 'maturation cause'—a karmadhāraya compound. None of these six causes can be interpreted as a bahuvrīhi compound. If one were to say that having efficiency and so forth as its cause is called 'efficient cause' and so forth, this would imply that the essence of these six is not a cause, but takes another as its cause; however, these six kinds are themselves intrinsically causes.

6.7

"First, the efficient cause […] with the exception of itself, the rest are efficient:" below this is the second section, specifically revealing their essences. The six causes are different, so the text is divided into six. This is the first passage, posing the question and answering in verse.

6.8

"The treatise says: […] because they abide without obstruction:" within the prose, first is the explanation of the verse, and second is the question and answer. Within the explanation of the verse, first is identifying the essence, and second is explaining the name. This is identifying the essence. In general, among all conditioned phenomena, with the sole exception of its own self-entity, all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena are the essence of the efficient cause, because when that fruit arises, the cause abides without obstruction. A thing is always an obstruction to itself; therefore, viewed in relation to itself, it is not an efficient cause, as explained at length in the Nyāyānusāra. Question: Can it also serve as a cause for non-arising? Master Yue explained: "It does not serve as a cause." The present explanation: Not so, it also serves as a cause for it. However, when the treatise speaks of serving as a cause for arising, it is speaking provisionally based on what is manifest.

6.9

"Although the nature of the other causes […] the general is itself the specific name:" this explains the name. Among the six causes, although the other five causes could also be called efficient causes in terms of abiding without obstruction, each has a specific designation and is named according to that specific distinction. However, the efficient cause has no other specific designation, just like the sense-sphere of form (rūpāyatana) and so forth: the general is itself the specific name.

6.10

"Is it not so that without knowledge […] serve as an efficient cause:" below this is the analysis through questions and answers. Question: Is it not so that because one does not know the truth of the four noble truths, the outflows will arise, while because one has known the truth of the four noble truths, the outflows do not arise, so knowledge can act as an obstruction to the arising of outflows? Furthermore, sunlight can obstruct the eye from visibly seeing the light of the stars, acting as an obstruction to the arising of the eye's functioning. How can conditioned phenomena, with the sole exception of their own self-entity, take all phenomena as their efficient cause?

6.11

"It should be known that when this arises […] is an efficient cause:" answer. When knowledge arises and sunlight is generated, they can indeed act as obstructions to those outflows and the eye. It should be known that when this outflow arises and when the seeing of the stars arises, that knowledge and sunlight both abide without obstruction; therefore, knowledge and sunlight are efficient causes with respect to this outflow and the eye.

6.12

Regarding '[If this arises, ... has no capacity to obstruct]', this is an objection: If, upon the arising of this dharma, that dharma could obstruct it but does not obstruct it, it could rightly be called a cause. But if it lacks any capacity to obstruct at all, even if it does not obstruct, how can it be a cause? The analogies are understandable.

6.13

Regarding '[Although it lacks the capacity to obstruct ... like seeds with respect to sprouts, etc.]', this is the resolution: With respect to the arising of that dharma, [things] like nirvāṇa, although lacking the capacity to obstruct such that they prevent it from arising, are nonetheless causes because they are entirely unhindered when the fruit arises; therefore they are called causes. Just as a powerless king, although incapable of doing harm, can still be spoken of as before: 'It is due to the ruler that I have peace and happiness.' This is the general explanation of all unobstructed efficient causes (kāraṇa-hetu). If one speaks in terms of preeminence among efficient causes, it is not that they lack productive efficacy. From 'Just as the eye ...' onward, the direct and preeminent efficacy is adduced.

6.14

Regarding '[Some raise this objection ... would all constitute the karma of killing]', this is an external objection: Since there is an absence of obstruction, all things should arise simultaneously; since there is an absence of obstruction, all should constitute killing.

6.15

Regarding '[This objection is not valid ... has direct productive efficacy]', this resolves the objection: It is only by virtue of being unobstructed that all dharmas are acknowledged as efficient causes; it is not that they have the direct productive efficacy of the other five causes with respect to the arising of the fruit; hence, dharmas do not all arise simultaneously. Nor is it that, with respect to killing, they have the direct productive efficacy arising from an intention to kill, etc.; therefore, they are not like the killer, all constituting the karma of killing.

6.16

Regarding '[Other masters say ... has efficient efficacy]', previously it was said that the efficient cause has both direct and indirect [aspects]—the direct has efficacy, while the indirect merely does not obstruct. Now, this master's intention is that all efficient causes have efficient efficacy with respect to the arising of the fruit.

6.17

Regarding '[Now, nirvāṇa and so forth ... has efficient efficacy]', this is a question. 'And so forth' includes unproduced dharmas and the like.

6.18

Regarding '[The mental consciousness takes that as an object ... has productive efficacy]', this is the answer: The mental consciousness arises taking dharmas such as that nirvāṇa as its objective domain, and either wholesome right views, etc., or unwholesome wrong views, etc., are produced. Conditioned by this mental consciousness, subsequent visual consciousness—whether wholesome or unwholesome—is able to arise in sequence as appropriate, as an indirect, mediated cause. Therefore, that nirvāṇa and so forth has efficient efficacy with respect to the arising of visual consciousness. The remaining dharmas likewise have productive efficacy by analogy. Question: Since the substantial nature is so broad and pervasive, how do dharmas relate to one another as cause and effect? Answer: As Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 15, states: 'Past dharmas are the efficient cause for the remaining two times; those dharmas of the two times in turn serve as the sovereign fruit (adhipati-phala) for the past. Future dharmas, by being unobstructed, are the efficient cause for the remaining two times. Since those dharmas of the two times are neither simultaneous with nor subsequent to [the future], they do not serve as sovereign fruits for the future. A fruit must be grasped by a cause, and therefore there are only two (Explanation: fruit dharmas are either simultaneous or subsequent; hence it says there are two). The cause is grounded solely in the absence of obstruction, so it is acknowledged to encompass all three [times]. Present dharmas are the efficient cause for the remaining two times; of those two times, only future dharmas are the fruit of the present. Saṃskṛta is both cause and fruit for saṃskṛta; saṃskṛta is neither cause nor fruit for asaṃskṛta; asaṃskṛta is neither cause nor fruit for asaṃskṛta; asaṃskṛta is a cause and not a fruit for saṃskṛta. On this account, it is said: Efficient causes are many, sovereign fruits are not. For all dharmas are efficient causes, but only saṃskṛta dharmas are sovereign fruits.'

6.19

Regarding '[Having thus explained ... the mind with respect to mind-conforming]', this next is the second section, clarifying the coexistence cause (sahabhū-hetu). First, it correctly analyzes coexistence; second, it analyzes mind-conforming [dharmas]. This is the correct analysis of coexistence. The first line explains the meaning of coexistence; the latter two lines designate its substantial identity.

6.20

Regarding '[The treatise says ... are coexistence causes]', this generally explains that the meaning of mutually being fruits is termed the coexistence cause.

6.21

Regarding '[What are its characteristics?]', this asks about the substantial identity.

6.22

Regarding '[Such as the four great elements ... are coexistence causes]', this next is the answer: The four great elements are coexistence causes with respect to one another. Thus the arbiter of the Mahāvibhāṣā states: 'Whether the substantial entities of the four great elements are predominantly increased or not, earth is the coexistence cause of three, and the three are the coexistence cause of earth. Why is this? Earth does not depend on earth to produce derived matter (upādāyarūpa), because all dharmas do not depend on their own intrinsic nature or homogeneous entities to serve as causes for another.' And so on, through the wind element, it is also like this.

6.23

Regarding '[Thus the primary characteristics ... are also mutually causes]', this asks: Why is it not stated that the primary characteristics and the conforming [dharmas] are mutually causes among themselves? Answer: Nyāyānusāra says: 'In order to demonstrate this, it only speaks of different categories as coexistence causes, because that homogeneous ones are mutually causes is established without being stated.'

6.24

Regarding '[These are coexistence causes ... as appropriate]', this is the general conclusion. Whether the great elements with respect to one another, or the characteristics with respect to what is characterized, or the characteristics with respect to one another, or mind with respect to mind-conforming [dharmas], or mind-conforming [dharmas] with respect to one another—hence it says 'as appropriate.'

6.25

Regarding '[A dharma and its secondary characteristics ... should be distinguished here]', the treatise master exposes the error of the Sarvāstivāda masters. If one explains the coexistence cause by [dharmas] mutually being fruits, a dharma and its secondary characteristics are not mutually fruits. Although the secondary characteristic is the fruit of the dharma, the dharma is not the fruit of the secondary characteristic; hence it says 'they are not mutually fruits.' Yet the dharma is a coexistence cause for the secondary characteristic, while the secondary characteristic is not a coexistence cause for the dharma. This should be distinguished here. If one follows the arbiter in Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 16, it says: 'The meaning of having an identical fruit is the meaning of the coexistence cause.' Furthermore, Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 15, states: 'Saṃskṛta dharmas having one fruit can be coexistence causes.' The intent of the two treatises is the same. The intent of the treatise Nyāyānusāra is: because defining coexistence cause as mutually being fruits incurs errors, it further explains: among saṃskṛta dharmas, those that mutually possess efficacy and together obtain one fruit are called coexistence causes. If, as a master of the Kośa, one rescues this, saying to you: In calling having an identical fruit a coexistence cause, is it based on the same time, or based on different times? If it is based on an identical fruit at the same time, then just as mind, mental factors, and the like, with respect to their own natures, do not share an identical fruit, they should not be coexistence causes. If you say that, excluding their own natures, they share an identical fruit with other dharmas, then that is the secondary characteristics; if, with respect to the primary dharma, they together obtain one fruit of the primary characteristics, they should be mutual coexistence causes with respect to the primary dharma. If you say that some with an identical fruit are called coexistence causes, like mind and mental factors, while some with an identical fruit are not coexistence causes, like the secondary characteristics with respect to the primary dharma, [and argue:] 'I only state that among those with an identical fruit they can be coexistence causes, not that all which have an identical fruit are coexistence causes'—if you offer this defense, then the statement 'identical fruit' is not a definitive proof. If it is based on an identical fruit at a different time, then just as the primary dharma and the primary characteristics together obtain a single subsequent fruit, and the secondary characteristics and the primary characteristics also together obtain a single subsequent fruit, then the primary dharma, the characteristics, and the secondary characteristics, mutually with respect to one another, all together obtain a single subsequent fruit. This being so, the secondary characteristics, with respect to the primary dharma, should be called coexistence causes. Pushing forward or pulling back to cross-examine it, both sides incur many errors. Reflecting on this logically, the proof by 'mutually being fruits' has fewer errors. Whatever mutually are fruits are definitely coexistence causes; it does not say that whatever are coexistence causes are all mutually fruits. Although 'mutually being fruits' does not completely cover all coexistence causes, it can still explain coexistence cause, just as 'subject to alteration and obstruction' explains form (rūpa): non-communicative matter (avijñapti-rūpa) is not subject to alteration and obstruction, yet it is still called form. Why could one not resolve the objection regarding mutually being fruits, but instead resort to numerous errors? If one relies on the Abhidharmāvatāra-śāstra, it contains both explanations. Hence that treatise says: 'Saṃskṛta dharmas mutually being fruits, or having an identical fruit, are called coexistence causes.' The Kośa masters say: That treatise was composed later; when it speaks of 'mutually being fruits', it was learning from our ācārya Vasubandhu. Question: Both the associated cause (saṃprayuktaka-hetu) and the coexistence cause grasp simultaneous puruṣakāra-phala (fruit of virile activity); what is the specific intention of each? Explanation: The associated cause grasps simultaneous puruṣakāra-phala with the intention of mutually taking the same object. The coexistence cause grasps simultaneous puruṣakāra-phala with the intention of collaterally assisting simultaneous dharmas so that each exerts its function—either producing the function of an efficient cause, or producing the function of a homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu) or universal cause (sarvatraga-hetu), or producing the function of a maturation cause (vipāka-hetu)—each grasping its own fruit. Because what is produced by these two causes is different, their intentions are distinct. Question: As in the Pañcavastuka's explanation of mental factors as associated (saṃprayukta), one explanation says: 'Furthermore, identical time, identical support, identical mode of activity, identical intentional object, identical fruit, identical outflow, and identical maturation is the meaning of association.' In view of that text, associated mental factors also have an identical fruit, etc.; why then do you say that the associated cause intends to take the same object together, rather than assisting in grasping one fruit, etc.? Explanation: Associated mental factors encompass both the associated cause and the coexistence cause. If spoken of from the aspect of identical time, identical support, identical mode of activity, and identical intentional object, it is the associated cause; if spoken of from the aspect of identical fruit, etc., it is the coexistence cause. Another explanation: When that treatise speaks of 'associated', it does not intend to formally analyze the associated and coexistence causes.

6.26

Regarding '[What are called the mind-conforming dharmas?]', this next is the second section, clarifying the mind-conforming [dharmas]. Within this: first, adducing the substantial identities of the mind-conforming; second, explaining the meaning of mind-conforming. This is the initial question.

6.27

Regarding '[The verse says: ... are mind-conforming dharmas]', the upper two lines adduce the substantial identities, and the lower one line concludes with the name. It refers to all mental factors, path discipline, and concentration discipline. Those dharmas refer to those mental factors and the two forms of discipline, as well as the primary characteristics such as arising that exist on the mind. All such are called mind-conforming dharmas because the dharmas and the mind are mutually fruits. Since it says 'arising, etc.' and does not say 'arising of arising, etc.', it thereby shows that the secondary characteristics are not mind-conforming, as explained separately later.

6.28

Regarding '[How are these dharmas ... by time, fruit, wholesomeness, etc.?]', this next is the second section, explaining the meaning of mind-conforming (the question and the verse answer).

6.29

Regarding '[The treatise says: ... are called mind-conforming]', in the prose: first it explains the verse, and later clarifies coexistence with reference to dharmas. This next explains the verse. 'Fruit, etc.' includes maturation and outflow (niṣyanda). 'Wholesomeness, etc.' includes unwholesome and indeterminate. The four—arising and so forth—are collectively termed 'time'; therefore, this word 'etc.' does not apply to time, but only to fruit and wholesomeness.

6.30

Regarding '[First, as for "by time", it refers to having the same rising, cessation, remaining,] and falling into the same time period': below, this individually explains 'time'. Within time, there are four: one rising, one cessation, one remaining, and falling into one time period. This indicates that only when it is at the same time as the mind is it called 'following the turns [of the mind]'. Question: Among the four characteristics, why is the characteristic of difference (alteration) not mentioned? Explanation: Rising is in the future, causing the dharma to enter the present. Remaining is in the present, causing the dharma to abide. Cessation means ceasing and entering the past. Each having a prominent capacity, they are therefore spoken of individually. The characteristic of difference assists cessation in causing the dharma to pass into the past; having no distinct prominent capacity, it is therefore not mentioned. Another explanation: The word 'remaining' in this text is just another name for 'difference'. It explains difference in terms of remaining; thus Mahāvibhāṣā fascicle 155 states: 'Herein, arising means rising, remaining means aging, and cessation means impermanence.' Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra raises an objection: 'Could one not simply state "one rising, remaining, and cessation", and thereby know that it also falls into the same time period? (Explanation: Since one rising, remaining, and cessation already show falling into the future and so forth, is it not redundant to further say "falling into one time period"?)' The Nyāyānusāra explains: 'Although one would indeed know that it falls into one time period, it would still not be understood that these dharmas and the mind are also not separated in the past and future. Or, in order to show non-arising dharmas, it additionally states "and falling into one time period". (Explanation: By merely saying "one rising" and so forth, although one would indeed know that rising falls into the future time period and remaining and cessation fall into the present time period, it would still not be understood that these dharmas and the mind are not separated after lapsing into the past or in the rest of the future time period before reaching the phase of rising; therefore, stating "falling into one time period" reveals their non-separation. Or, someone might doubt: "Having already arisen in the past or being about to arise in the future, they may not be separated and are called 'following the turns of the mind'; but in the future when they do not arise, they might be separated and not follow the turns of the mind." Furthermore, in order to show that non-arising dharmas are also not separated, apart from one rising, remaining, and cessation, it further states "falling into one time period".)' Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra raises an objection: 'If so, one should only say "falling into one time period". (Explanation: The time period is broad and the characteristics are narrow; one may establish the time period distinct from the characteristics. Since the time period subsumes the characteristics, why is it necessary to speak of rising and so forth apart from the time period?)' The Nyāyānusāra explains: 'It is not so. [If one did so,] one would not make known that it definitely falls into the same time period. (Explanation: Time periods are not fixed, while rising and so forth are fixed. For instance, past dharmas have many moments; although at the present time they all fall into the same time period, whichever dharma among them, when it was previously in the present or future, belonged to a different time period? Future dharmas have many moments that have not reached the present; although they are in the same time period, whichever dharma among them, if it flows into the present, it is no longer in the same time period as the future dharmas. Thus it is not fixed, and in turn would not be "following the turns". In order to make known that it definitely falls into the same time period, therefore, apart from "falling into one time period", it further states "one rising, remaining, and cessation". Rising definitely falls into the future time period, and remaining and cessation definitely fall into the present time period. If there were no rising and so forth, one would not make known that it definitely falls into the same time period.)'

6.31

Regarding '[As for "by fruit, etc.", it refers to having the same fruit, the same maturation,] and the same outflow': within fruits, there are three: one fruit, one maturation, and one outflow. This indicates that only when it has the same fruit and so forth with the mind is it called 'following the turns'. The Nyāyānusāra states: 'Is it not the case that outflow and maturation are also subsumed under "one fruit"? Why are outflow and maturation spoken of apart from "one fruit"? (Explanation: The word "fruit" is broad and should subsume the other two. What is the intention in speaking of the two apart from fruit?)' The Nyāyānusāra explains: 'Indeed so. The mention here of "one fruit" only subsumes the virile fruit (puruṣakāra-phala) and the fruit of disconnection (visaṃyoga-phala). (Explanation: In terms of broad discourse, the name "fruit" is indeed so, also subsuming the other two. But when stating "one fruit" among these ten [factors of] following the turns, discussing it in particular, it only subsumes the virile fruit and the fruit of disconnection.)' Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra raises an objection: 'Because this word is broad, does it not also subsume outflow and maturation? (Explanation: Is it not the case that because the phrase "one fruit" is broad, it also subsumes the other two?)' The Nyāyānusāra explains: 'Although the word also subsumes them, they are not what is explained here. Now, virile fruits are of four kinds altogether: co-arising, immediate, separated, and non-arising. This shows fruits that do not occur simultaneously with their cause, in order to refute the sole attachment that a virile fruit exists within an aggregated collection co-arising with its cause. Because [the members of] this aggregated collection are mutually fruits, and since a self-entity is not the virile fruit of its own self-entity, this shows that within that co-arising, aggregated virile fruit there is no meaning of "one fruit"; therefore, outflow and maturation are adduced separately.' Explanation: Although the name 'one fruit' is broad and also subsumes outflow and maturation, they are not what is explained in this context of 'following the turns'. 'One fruit' here only subsumes the virile fruit and the fruit of disconnection. An external opponent raises a latent objection: 'Here, in explaining the meaning of "following the turns", simply stating "one fruit" is sufficient to explain following the turns; why is it necessary to speak separately of maturation and outflow?' Therefore, it is now explained: in order to dispel doubts and objections, it is necessary to speak of those two. Why is this? In general, virile fruits are of four kinds: 1. The co-arising virile fruit, which refers to the reciprocal fruit at the same time of coexistent causes and associated causes, and what is obtained through other simultaneous activities. 2. The immediate virile fruit, which refers to the immediately antecedent condition, and what is obtained through other contiguous activities. 3. The separated virile fruit, such as the fruit of maturation, or a farmer planting in spring and harvesting in autumn. 4. The non-arising virile fruit, which refers to analytical cessation, whose essence does not arise. This is a general explanation that virile fruits are of four kinds altogether. Now, when 'one fruit' is spoken of among these ten [factors of] following the turns, it does not mean the reciprocal co-arising virile fruit, because a self-entity is not the virile fruit of its own self-entity, and thus lacks the meaning of 'one fruit'. It takes what is obtained through other simultaneous activities; among the immediate, it excludes the same nature and takes the immediate of a different nature; among the separated, it excludes the fruit of maturation and takes other temporally distant virile fruits; and it takes the non-arising fruit of analytical cessation. Lest those who do not understand hear the phrase 'one fruit' and suppose it subsumes the reciprocal co-arising virile fruit, and cling to there being only co-arising virile fruits, therefore at this time, it additionally shows outflow and maturation as fruits that are definitely not simultaneous with their cause, in order to refute the sole attachment that a virile fruit exists within an aggregated collection co-arising with its cause. The word 'co-arising' excludes the immediate and so forth; the 'aggregated collection' excludes other things obtained through co-arising activity. The phrase 'aggregated collection' demonstrates their meaning of mutually being causes. Why is it necessary to exclude this virile fruit? Because it is not 'one fruit': mutually serving as fruit shows that oneself is also the fruit of the other, while a self-entity is not the fruit of its own self-entity. The parts show that it is not its own fruit; because it does not share its own fruit with the other, there is no meaning of 'one fruit'. Not only does this refute the sole attachment to the reciprocal co-arising virile fruit, it also concurrently reveals the absence of the meaning of 'one fruit'. By dispelling this objection, outflow and maturation are spoken of separately outside of 'one fruit'. Question: If we follow Mahāvibhāṣā fascicles 16 and 155, both state: '"One fruit" means the fruit of disconnection.' But the Nyāyānusāra states: '"One fruit" means virile and disconnection.' Are they not contradictory? Explanation: The Mahāvibhāṣā speaks only of the fruit of disconnection because, among these fruits, it speaks strictly of that which is definitive and free of confusion. The name 'virile fruit' is broad and indefinite, being either co-arising, immediate, and so forth. The Mahāvibhāṣā could also have spoken of the virile fruit, but did not, because it feared confusion with the reciprocal co-arising virile fruit, since a self-entity with respect to its own self-entity is not 'one fruit'. The reason why the Nyāyānusāra speaks of virile [fruit] is to exhaustively subsume the virile fruit within 'one fruit', and therefore speaks of it separately. Each relies on one perspective, and they do not contradict each other at all. Question: Which of the two does 'one fruit' in this treatise agree with? Explanation: Whether it agrees with the Mahāvibhāṣā or with the Nyāyānusāra, either is unproblematic. Question: Based on the text of the treatise below, among the five fruits, the virile fruit is said to be obtained only through associated causes and coexistent causes. Why does the Nyāyānusāra state that virile fruits are of multiple kinds, obtained through other causes as well? Explanation: Virile fruits are of two kinds: 1. Specific virile fruit, which is obtained only through associated and coexistent causes; 2. General virile fruit, where whatever is obtained through effort is called a virile fruit. The Nyāyānusāra speaks based on this general virile fruit. Accordingly, all four fruits and a minor portion of the dominant fruit are obtainable through the six causes; each relies on one perspective, and they do not contradict each other at all.

6.32

Regarding 'It should be known that herein, [the former "one" means the same, while the latter "one" means shared;] their meanings are not the same': it should be known that herein, the former 'one' refers to time, indicating simultaneous; the latter 'one' refers to fruit, indicating a shared fruit. Because one shows simultaneity and the other shows being shared, it says 'their meanings are not the same'.

6.33

Regarding 'As for "by wholesome, etc.", [it refers to having the same wholesome,] unwholesome, and indeterminate nature': this demonstrates that the nature is the same as that of the mind. Herein there are three: first, wholesome; second, unwholesome; third, indeterminate.

6.34

Regarding 'Because of these ten causes, they are called following the turns of the mind': this is the general summary.

6.35

Regarding the passage from "In this, the primary mind..." to "...are the simultaneous cause (sahabhū-hetu) of the mind": below this, [the text] clarifies the simultaneous cause with respect to conditioned phenomena (dharma). The scope of being causes, spoken of earlier, between the primary mind and the mental factors (caitta) is explained as follows: First, explaining provisionally in terms of a neutral and non-obscured (anivṛtāvyākṛta) mind in the Second Dhyāna and above, there are only the primary mind and the ten universal mental factors (mahābhūmika-dharma). Each of these eleven kinds has four major and [four] minor characteristics (lakṣaṇa), totaling ninety-nine dharmas. Taking the primary mind in relation to the ninety-eight dharmas, at the very least it still serves as a simultaneous cause for fifty-eight dharmas: namely, the ten universal mental factors and their forty primary characteristics (mūla-lakṣaṇa), plus the mind's own eight primary and secondary characteristics (anulakṣaṇa)—these are called the fifty-eight dharmas. The forty secondary characteristics on the universal mental factors are excluded, because being separated and distant, its force does not reach them, so it is not their simultaneous cause. If we turn back from the fifty-eight dharmas to the primary mind, excluding the mind's four secondary characteristics because their force does not reach it due to being inferior and weak, the remaining fifty-four dharmas are the simultaneous cause of the mind. Just as the primary mind is applied mutually against the ninety-eight dharmas, each of the eleven universal mental factors is applied likewise; this should be understood accordingly. If the major origination (jāti) on the mind is taken in relation to the ninety-eight dharmas, it serves as a simultaneous cause for fifty-eight dharmas: namely, the ten universal mental factors together with their forty primary characteristics, as well as the primary mind along with the three major and four minor characteristics on the primary mind, excluding the forty secondary characteristics on the universal mental factors. Turning from the fifty-eight dharmas to the mind's major origination, fifty-five are its simultaneous cause, excluding the minor subsistence (sthiti), decay (jarā), and cessation (anityatā) on the mind. Another explanation says: The major origination on the primary mind is the simultaneous cause for eighteen dharmas: namely, the ten universal mental factors, the primary mind, along with the major subsistence, decay, and cessation on the mind, and its four minor characteristics. When these eighteen dharmas turn back to the major origination on the mind, fifteen dharmas are its simultaneous cause, excluding the minor subsistence, decay, and cessation on the mind. Each of the two explanations has its own rationale. The intention of the former explanation is that because the power of the major origination is equal to that of the characterized mind, in relation to the forty major characteristics on those universal mental factors it can also serve as a simultaneous cause. The intention of the latter explanation is that just as that primary mind only serves as a cause for the major and minor characteristics on its back, and going forward it only serves as a cause for the associated dharmas and the four major characteristics on the associated dharmas—taking in each direction, forward and backward, only the second tier—it cannot serve as a cause for the four minor characteristics on the associated dharmas, because they are distant and its power does not reach the third tier. This major origination is also like this: it can serve as a cause for the primary mind and the associated dharmas, reaching only to the second tier. It also cannot serve as a cause for the four major characteristics on the associated [dharmas], because they are separated and distant, so its power does not reach the third tier. Just as these two explanations are made for the major origination on the primary mind, it should be understood that the major subsistence, decay, and cessation on the primary mind, as well as the forty major characteristics on the universal mental factors, all admit of two explanations; this should be understood accordingly. If the minor origination on the primary mind is taken in relation to the ninety-eight dharmas, it is the simultaneous cause only for major origination. Turning back from the ninety-eight dharmas to minor origination, there are five dharmas that serve as its causes: namely, the mind and the four major characteristics on the mind. As with minor origination on the mind, so should it be understood accordingly for minor subsistence, decay, and cessation on the primary mind, as well as the forty minor characteristics on the universal mental factors. Question: The minor characteristics on the mind do not characterize the primary mind, which resembles the major characteristics on the universal mental factors; why is it that the major characteristics on the universal mental factors serve as causes for the mind, while the minor characteristics on the mind do not serve as causes for the mind? The explanation of the venerable masters prior to Master Nian says: The universal mental factors, in relation to the primary mind, possess both associated cause (saṃprayuktaka-hetu) and simultaneous cause; therefore the major characteristics on the universal mental factors, in relation to the primary mind, are simultaneous causes. The major characteristics on the primary mind, in relation to the primary mind, are merely simultaneous causes. Therefore the minor characteristics on the major characteristics, in relation to the primary mind, are not simultaneous causes. Refutation: Take the major characteristics on morality that conforms to the mind (cittānuparivartin-śīla): they are dharmas conforming to the mind, and thus in relation to the mind are simultaneous causes. This characterized morality, in relation to the mind, has only simultaneous cause and no associated cause. How then can its characterizing [marks] in relation to the mind be simultaneous causes? Therefore, that explanation is unreasonable. The present explanation says: The forty major characteristics on the universal mental factors have strong power to generate dharmas, equal to the dharmas they characterize; hence in relation to the primary mind they serve as causes. The minor characteristics of the primary mind have inferior power to generate dharmas, not equal to the dharmas they characterize; hence in relation to the primary mind they do not serve as causes. Therefore, fascicle nine of the Samayapradīpikā (*Xianzong lun) states: 'Because the primary characteristics and the dharmas have equal power.' Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra states: 'For what reason are the secondary characteristics of the mind not simultaneous causes of the mind? Because the mind is not brought about through their power, because the mind and they are not mutually effects for each other, and because they have efficacy only with respect to a single dharma. Moreover, because they do not have a single effect together with the primary mind, and because the majority within the assemblage are not their effect. It is precisely due to such many reasons as these stated that the secondary characteristics are not called dharmas conforming to the mind. If so, how can the mind serve as a simultaneous cause for them? Because by conforming to the various states of the primary mind such as origination, they are able to function (thus far the treatise text).'

6.36

Regarding the passage from "Some say that those serving as causes for the mind..." to "...together with the primary characteristics of the mind": this is the explanation of the second master. Taking the fifty-eight dharmas in relation to the primary mind, only fourteen dharmas serve as simultaneous causes: namely, the ten universal mental factors together with the mind's four primary characteristics. It does not include the forty major characteristics on the universal mental factors, which differs from the previous master. The meaning of this master's statement is: Because the secondary characteristics on the mind are separated by the primary characteristics, in relation to the mind they are not simultaneous causes. Therefore one knows that on the universal mental factors, because the major characteristics are separated by the universal mental factors, in relation to the mind they are not simultaneous causes.

6.37

Regarding [the text from] "This explanation is not good" to "[one] should know that the teaching is incomplete": The author of the treatise refutes the second master. This explanation is not good. Why is that? If one claims that only fourteen dharmas are simultaneous causes with respect to the mind, this contradicts what is taught in the Prakaraṇapāda. The text here is brief, and the evidence is somewhat difficult to understand. Relying on the thirteenth chapter, "A Thousand Questions," of the Prakaraṇapāda, it says: "How many have the view of individuality (satkāyadṛṣṭi) as cause but are not causes of the view of individuality, and so on? Two are not causes of the view of individuality nor do they have the view of individuality as cause (explanation: the two refer to the two truths of cessation and the path). Two should be differentiated: namely, the noble truth of suffering either has the view of individuality as cause and is not a cause of the view of individuality, or has the view of individuality as cause and is also a cause of the view of individuality, or neither has the view of individuality as cause nor is a cause of the view of individuality. Those having the view of individuality as cause and not being causes of the view of individuality are: excluding past and present anusayas abandoned by seeing suffering, as well as their associated, coexistent, etc., truths of suffering; also excluding past and present universal (sarvatraga) anusayas abandoned by seeing origination, as well as their associated and coexistent truths of suffering; also excluding the truth of suffering associated with the future view of individuality; and also excluding the birth, aging, duration, and impermanence of the future view of individuality and of its associated dharmas, all other defiled truths of suffering. Those having the view of individuality as cause and also being causes of the view of individuality are: the aforementioned excluded dharmas. Those neither having the view of individuality as cause nor being causes of the view of individuality are: undefiled truths of suffering. The noble truth of origination is likewise (end of quotation from the treatise)." Explanation: That text uses the substance of the four truths to examine the extent to which they serve as causes with respect to the view of individuality. "Cause" refers to the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya) among the four conditions, having five causes as its nature, excluding the efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu). When compared among them, whatever number is present can serve as cause; it is not necessary to have all five. Because the two truths of cessation and path are uncontaminated (anāsrava), they do not have the view of individuality as cause, nor are they causes of the view of individuality. The two truths of suffering and origination should be differentiated. First, when comparing the truth of suffering with the view of individuality, three alternatives are formed, because there is definitely nothing that does not arise with the view of individuality as cause and yet serves as a cause of the view of individuality. Therefore, there is no single proposition of "being a cause of the view of individuality and not having the view of individuality as cause." Furthermore, whenever treatises formulate rules, if they take the many, they exclude the few; if they take the few, they specify their names—this is to abbreviate the discussion. In the first alternative, taking the many and excluding the few is employed: because all defiled truths of suffering arise from the view of individuality, when looking back, those that are causes of the view of individuality are few, while those that are not causes are many. Wanting now to take the many, it first excludes the few. Within the exclusions, the text has four sections. The first section excludes the past and present anusayas abandoned by seeing suffering, as well as their associated, coexistent, etc., truths of suffering. "Associated" means associated dharmas; "coexistent" means the four characteristics; "etc." means including acquisition (prāpti). When anusayas and associated dharmas are considered with respect to the view of individuality, they have four causes: homogeneous (sabhāga), universal (sarvatraga), associated (samprayuktaka), and simultaneous (sahabhū); they lack the maturation cause (vipāka-hetu). When the four characteristics are considered with respect to the view of individuality, they have homogeneous, universal, and simultaneous causes, lacking associated and maturation causes. When acquisition is considered with respect to the view of individuality, it has only the homogeneous cause, lacking the other four causes. The second section also excludes past and present universal anusayas abandoned by seeing origination, as well as their associated and coexistent truths of suffering. When these anusayas, etc., are considered with respect to the view of individuality, they are only universal causes, lacking the other four causes. Acquisition is not a universal cause, so it does not say "etc." The third section also excludes the associated truth of suffering on the future view of individuality; it does not exclude the view of individuality [itself], because the future view of individuality takes past and present views of individuality as causes, and because in the future there is no before and after, it cannot serve as a cause of the view of individuality; thus that view of individuality is included in the single proposition. Associated dharmas, with respect to the view of individuality, can have associated and simultaneous causes, lacking homogeneous, universal, and maturation causes. The fourth section also excludes the birth, aging, duration, and impermanence on the future view of individuality, as well as the birth, aging, duration, and impermanence on its associated dharmas. The text of this fourth section does not exclude the view of individuality [itself], because it is subsumed under the single proposition; nor does it exclude the associated dharmas, because they were excluded in the third section. It only excludes the four major characteristics on those dharmas. Since it only mentions birth, aging, duration, and impermanence, we clearly know they are the four major characteristics; if they were the four minor characteristics, it would say "secondary birth," and so on. Since there is no before and after in the future, these major characteristics on the view of individuality and on its associated dharmas, with respect to the view of individuality, cannot be called homogeneous or universal causes. Because they are not associated dharmas, they cannot be called associated causes. As for the maturation cause, it is unwholesome or wholesome-with-outflow, which produces an unobstructed-neutral maturation fruit; those four characteristics in substance are obstructed[-neutral], and the view of individuality is also defiled, so they cannot be said to be maturation causes either. Since they enter among the excluded [dharmas], they are subsumed under the joint alternative of having the view of individuality as cause and also being causes of the view of individuality. Since it is said that they have a cause, if it is not a simultaneous cause, what other cause could it be? Since the major characteristics on associated dharmas obtain [the status of] simultaneous causes with respect to the view of individuality, we know by analogy that the forty major characteristics on the universal mental dharmas (mahābhūmika) also obtain [the status of] simultaneous causes with respect to the primary mind. By this we know that the claim that only fourteen dharmas are simultaneous causes of the mind is definitively unreasonable. One should know that the Kośa cites only the fourth section of the Prakaraṇapāda text as proof. As for "all other defiled truths of suffering," one should know that these are defiled dharmas of the three times abandoned by seeing cessation, seeing the path, and cultivation; as well as the associated, coexistent, etc., [dharmas] of past and present non-universal anusayas abandoned by seeing origination; as well as the acquisitions on the associated and coexistent dharmas of universal anusayas; as well as the future view of individuality abandoned by seeing suffering, along with the four minor characteristics and acquisitions on that view of individuality; as well as the four minor characteristics and acquisitions on the dharmas associated with the view of individuality; as well as the associated, coexistent, etc., [dharmas] of the other nine anusayas abandoned by seeing suffering; as well as dharmas abandoned by seeing origination in the future. All of these have the view of individuality as cause, but are not causes of the view of individuality; these are called "all other defiled truths of suffering." In the second alternative, those having the view of individuality as cause and also being causes of the view of individuality are the aforementioned excluded dharmas. In the third alternative, those neither having the view of individuality as cause nor being causes of the view of individuality are undefiled truths of suffering abandoned by cultivation. Just like the noble truth of suffering, the noble truth of origination should be known to be the same with respect to the view of individuality: one merely substitutes the name "origination" in place of "suffering," and the remaining meanings are identical, because the truths of suffering and origination are one entity. This formulation is made based on the substance of the truths, so there is no difference in scope. Recent masters say: "The truth of origination is not without difference; namely, it excludes the view of individuality," which they consider to be delusion arising by being confounded about the truth. This explanation is incorrect and a grave mistake. The quotation from the Prakaraṇapāda takes only the first and second alternatives as proof; the others are cited merely because they belong to the same text. The Prakaraṇapāda corresponds to the old Zhongshifen, and that text has slight errors: in the first section for the past, it only says "excluding the past and present anusayas abandoned by seeing suffering, and their associated truths of suffering," without mentioning "coexistent, etc.," thus not excluding coexistent [dharmas] and acquisitions. In the second section, it only says "excluding all past and present universal anusayas abandoned by seeing origination, and their associated truths of suffering," again not excluding coexistent dharmas; the rest of the text is identical to the Prakaraṇapāda. Some other masters, wishing to establish that only fourteen dharmas are simultaneous causes of the mind, do not recite "and their associated dharmas," but only say: "excluding the birth, aging, duration, and impermanence of the future view of individuality." Since the four major characteristics on the dharmas associated with the view of individuality do not enter among the exclusions, one knows from this that the forty major characteristics on the universal mental dharmas are also not simultaneous causes of the mind. The Kashmirian Vaibhāṣikas say: That text of the Prakaraṇapāda must be recited thus: "excluding the future view of individuality, and the birth, aging, duration, and impermanence of its associated dharmas." Even supposing that treatise lacks "and its associated dharmas," one should infer from the meaning of simultaneous cause that the teaching is incomplete, because all treatises say that the four major characteristics on associated dharmas are dharmas that conform to the mind (cittānuvartin), which means that they are mutually simultaneous causes with the mind.

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese