俱舍論疏 1.108

1.108

論「得不因擇但由闕緣」，釋得因也。准此論文但由闕緣，即是更無餘力。准《正理》、《顯宗》，由二因得：一由闕緣、二由非擇，非擇鄣故。若遇勝緣法即得生，若遇劣緣法即不起。《正理》云「擇謂如理勤所成慧。不由此慧，有法永礙未來法生，名非擇滅。乃至若法能礙彼法生用，此法離慧定礙彼法，令住未來永不生故，得非擇滅。此法實有，後當成立。」又《顯宗》云「非唯緣闕便永不生，後遇同類緣，彼復應生故。」詳此論意，諸不生由其二緣：一由闕緣、二由非擇滅。以後遇同類緣法得生者，此擇非理。後遇同類緣，為是生緣、為非生緣？若後有生緣，前非闕緣；若後非生緣，如何得生？由無生緣法永不生，何關滅力？問：《顯宗》云「法非唯緣闕」，此論云「但由闕緣」，兩論不同，何者為正？答：准《婆沙》釋，得不同。有為三性法得，同所得判性，由所得法力令得起故。擇滅得從道，依道起故。非擇滅得從眾同分，依同分起故。以無為無用，二滅不從所得判也。《婆沙》亦云「虛空等無用」，故知此論但由闕緣理勝。問：若爾，何故《婆沙》云「虛空與四大等近增上緣」耶？答：虛空無礙；大種有礙，故名為近，非謂有力名為近也。問：若爾故，《婆沙》三十二云「此非擇滅，唯於未來不生法得。所以者何？此滅本欲遮有為法令永不生。若永不生，此得便起。如與欲法繫屬有情，現在正行、過去已行、未來當行皆有生義，故於彼法不得此滅耶？答：雖本欲遮有為法，如與欲法者，此是義言，非實爾也。由如擇滅本欲遮有漏法煩惱繫縛，法若離繫，如與欲法而起滅得。然此滅得，由斷道力，不由擇滅。非擇滅得，義亦准此。若不爾者，此非擇滅，應於自得是有力用，非但不障。」有人云：此法本欲礙法不生，若法不生便即起得送與行者。此釋誤也。應言法永不生得非擇滅，不應言非擇滅有力送得與行者。兩說相違，應依此論。《婆沙》三十二云「問：諸有情類於非擇滅為共得？為不共得耶？答：此不決定。於共有法非擇滅則共得，不共法非擇滅則各別得。」准評家云：「如是說者，應作是說：非擇滅多、擇滅少。所以者何？非擇滅如有為法數量，擇滅但如有漏法數量故。若不爾者，諸可生法若得不生，應不得非擇滅。」准此論文，一切外物皆有非擇滅，皆可證得。然於中有共、不共，若共者共得，如共財等；若不共者，即唯別得。《婆沙》云「問：因勝進道，得煩惱不生及諸生處得非擇滅，何故非道果耶？答曰：不為此滅而修道故。謂為涅槃及為離染勤修於道，以修道故於惡趣等得非擇滅。若為此滅而修道者，於惡趣等不得此滅，非於生死不深厭患可於惡趣得非擇滅故，故得非擇滅不名道果。」述曰：求擇滅得涅槃，深厭患染法永斷入聖，可得惡趣非擇滅故。若求非擇滅，不得不生惡趣，非擇滅也，以厭心劣後容退故。言厭惡趣，即不厭人、天，故厭心劣。

On the Śāstra's statement: 'Its attainment is not due to deliberation, but solely by virtue of the deficiency of conditions': this explains the cause of attainment. Relying on this text of the Śāstra, it is solely by virtue of the deficiency of conditions, meaning that there is no other capacity. According to the Nyāyānusāra and the Samayapradīpikā, it is attained by two causes: first, by virtue of the deficiency of conditions; second, by virtue of apratisaṃkhyā, because apratisaṃkhyā obstructs. If it meets superior conditions, the dharma is able to arise; if it meets inferior conditions, the dharma does not arise. The Nyāyānusāra says: 'Pratisaṃkhyā refers to discernment accomplished through proper exertion. Not through this discernment, there is a dharma that perpetually obstructs the arising of future dharmas; this is called apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. [...] If a dharma can obstruct the arising function of that dharma, this dharma, apart from discernment, definitely obstructs that dharma, causing it to abide in the future and never arise; hence it is called apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. This dharma is real, as will be established later.' Furthermore, the Samayapradīpikā says: 'It is not solely through the deficiency of conditions that it perpetually does not arise; for if it later meets conditions of the same kind, it would arise again.' Examining the intention of these treatises, non-arising is due to two conditions: first, due to the deficiency of conditions; second, due to apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. Claiming that because it later meets conditions of the same kind the dharma would arise—such an assessment is unreasonable. When it later meets conditions of the same kind, is that a condition for arising or not a condition for arising? If there is later a condition for arising, the former was not a deficiency of conditions; if it is later not a condition for arising, how could it arise? Since a dharma perpetually does not arise due to the absence of a condition for arising, what does it have to do with the power of nirodha? Question: The Samayapradīpikā says: 'a dharma is not solely through the deficiency of conditions,' while this Śāstra says: 'solely by virtue of the deficiency of conditions.' The two treatises differ; which is correct? Answer: Following the explanation in the Vibhāṣā, their attainments differ. The attainments of conditioned dharmas of the three natures are determined as to their nature in accordance with what is attained, because the power of the attained dharma causes the attainment to arise. The attainment of pratisamkhyā-nirodha follows the Path, because it arises in dependence on the Path. The attainment of apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha follows the nikāya-sabhāga, because it arises in dependence on the sabhāga. Because the unconditioned has no activity, the two cessations are not judged in accordance with what is attained. The Vibhāṣā also says: 'Space and so forth have no activity'; hence we know that this Śāstra's 'solely by virtue of the deficiency of conditions' is superior in principle. Question: If so, why does the Vibhāṣā say: 'Space is a proximate adhipati-pratyaya for the great elements and so forth'? Answer: Space is unimpeded, while the great elements are obstructive; hence it is called proximate, not because it has efficacy. Question: If so, why does Vibhāṣā 32 say: 'This apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha is attained only with respect to future dharmas that do not arise. Why is this? This cessation originally intends to block conditioned dharmas, making them perpetually not arise. If they perpetually do not arise, this attainment arises. Just like dharmas associated with desire are bound to sentient beings: those currently proceeding in the present, those already proceeded in the past, and those that will proceed in the future all have the nature of arising; therefore, with respect to those dharmas, one does not attain this cessation'? Answer: Although it is said that it originally intends to block conditioned dharmas, just like dharmas associated with desire, this is a figurative expression, not literally so. Just as pratisamkhyā-nirodha originally intends to block the bonds of defilement of sāsrava dharmas, if the dharma is freed from bondage, its attainment of cessation arises as if it were a dharma associated with desire. However, this attainment of cessation is due to the power of the path of abandonment, not due to pratisamkhyā-nirodha. The attainment of apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha should be understood similarly. If it were not so, this apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha would have active capacity with respect to its own attainment, rather than merely not obstructing. Someone says: This dharma originally intends to obstruct dharmas from arising; if a dharma does not arise, it immediately gives rise to attainment and delivers it to the practitioner. This explanation is erroneous. One should say that because a dharma perpetually does not arise, one attains apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha; one should not say that apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha has the power to deliver attainment to the practitioner. The two statements conflict; one should rely on this treatise. Vibhāṣā 32 says: 'Question: Do sentient beings attain apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha collectively or individually? Answer: This is not fixed. With respect to common dharmas, apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha is attained collectively; with respect to uncommon dharmas, apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha is attained individually.' Following the appraisal: 'One should state it thus: apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha is numerous, while pratisamkhyā-nirodha is few. Why is this? Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha corresponds to the quantity of conditioned dharmas, while pratisamkhyā-nirodha corresponds only to the quantity of sāsrava dharmas. If it were not so, then if dharmas capable of arising attain non-arising, they would not attain apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha.' Relying on this text of the treatise, all external objects have apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha and all can be realized and attained. However, among them there are common and uncommon: if common, they are attained collectively, like common property and so forth; if uncommon, they are attained only individually. The Vibhāṣā says: 'Question: If by reason of the path of excellence one attains the non-arising of defilements and apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha in various birthplaces, why is it not a fruit of the Path? Answer: Because one does not cultivate the Path for the sake of this cessation. That is, one zealously cultivates the Path for the sake of nirvāṇa and for the sake of detachment; because of cultivating the Path, one attains apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha with respect to the bad destinies and so forth. If one cultivated the Path for the sake of this cessation, one would not attain this cessation with respect to the bad destinies and so forth, because it is not the case that without deep revulsion toward saṃsāra one can attain apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha with respect to the bad destinies; therefore, the attainment of apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha is not called a fruit of the Path.' Commentary: One seeks pratisamkhyā-nirodha to attain nirvāṇa; deeply revulsed by defiled dharmas, one perpetually abandons them and enters the noble state, and thus can attain apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha regarding the bad destinies. If one sought apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, one would not attain apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha of non-arising in the bad destinies, because the mind of revulsion being inferior, one might later fall back. To say one is revulsed by the bad destinies means one is not revulsed by humans and devas; therefore, the mind of revulsion is inferior.