俱舍論疏 1.120

1.120

論「或名有事至傳說如此」，釋有事也。以有因故。事是因義。故正理論云。事謂所依。或是所住，即是因義，果依於因、從因生故，如子依母。或果從因、能覆因故，如人住床。是因為果所映蔽義，因果前後性故，及細麁性故。此有事故，說名有事。喻如前說。准二論釋，因名為事，果有因故名為有事。一切有為皆有其因，所以亦攝一切有為。「毘婆沙師傳說如此」者，意非全許說因名事。經部釋有事者，名有體事。一切有為有體，無為無體，有事唯攝有為。

The treatise says, "Or they are called 'having matters' (savastu)… so it is traditionally recounted", which explains "having matters." This is because they have causes. "Matter" (vastu) means "cause." Thus the Nyāyānusāra states: "Matter means support (āśraya). Or it means abode (sthāna), which is precisely the meaning of cause, because an effect relies upon a cause and arises from a cause, just as a child relies on a mother. Or because an effect arises from a cause and covers the cause, just as a person rests on a bed. This means that a cause is obscured by its effect, due to the cause and effect having a before-and-after nature, as well as a subtle-and-coarse nature. Because these have matters, they are said to be 'having matters.' The analogy is as explained before." In accord with the explanations of both treatises, the cause is called "matter," and because effects have causes, they are called "having matters." All conditioned phenomena have their causes, which is why it also subsumes all conditioned phenomena. As for "the Vaibhāṣikas traditionally recount this so," the intention is that it is not fully conceded that a cause is called a matter. The Sautrāntika explanation of "having matters" takes it to mean possessing a real entity (dravya). All conditioned phenomena have entities, whereas unconditioned phenomena have no entities; thus "having matters" subsumes only the conditioned.