俱舍論疏 1.230

1.230

「論曰至意觸所生受」，述曰：長行釋中文有二：初明三蘊，後分處、界。此明三蘊。文中有三：即釋三蘊以為三也。此文是初受體也。文復有三：一示體、二分三受、三分六受。「領隨觸」者，示自性受，體異餘心所也。諸心、心所雖與受同領所緣境，而不領隨觸非自性受，自性受領所隨觸。若時為所緣，爾時非所領；若時為所領，爾時非所緣。有人云：諸心、心所同緣一境，皆能執受，與受何別？解云：諸心、心所雖復同緣，俱名執受，受領納強，名自性受。猶如十人同一處坐，一人是賊。傍忽有人叫喚呼賊，雖復十人同聞賊聲，實是賊者領即偏強，不同餘九。受領境強，想等領境弱，應知亦爾。又解：諸心、心所雖復同緣皆執受境，想等諸法從別立名，受無別名。雖標總稱，即受別名。如色處等，雖有兩解，前解為勝。准此兩解，皆約領境名受，然與論意並不相當。又准此釋，受與想等皆同，但強弱有異，立名不同。受既如此，餘亦應然。豈非雜亂？又此論云「受蘊謂三，領納隨觸，即樂及苦、不苦不樂。」《正理》云「隨觸而生，領納可愛及不可愛、俱相違觸，名為受蘊。領納即是能受用義。」准此二論，俱以領納隨觸為受，不取領境。又此論第十云「如何觸為受所領行相依？行相極似觸，依觸而生。」故《正理》第二云「又說諸受略有二種：一執取受、二自性受。執取受者，謂能領納自所緣境。自性受者，謂能領納自所隨觸，乃至領所緣受，與一境法差別之相難可了知。乃至雖受亦能領納境界，而此領納自性難知。故領納觸為自性受，此不共餘，易了差別。如是諸受，與心等法同所緣故，領納異故，所緣事別、所領事別。由此觸於受，若時為所領，是時非所緣；若時為所緣，是時非所領。故緣、領事別。」准此，豈得取境勝故偏得受名？又《顯宗》第二云「云何此受領納隨觸？謂受是觸隣近果故。此隨觸聲，為顯因義能順受故。受能領納，能順觸因，是故說受領納隨觸，領納順觸名自性受。」有人又云：言領納觸名自性受者，謂即此受領納自體。言領觸者，觸是其因，受是其果。受能領觸順、違、俱相。領納觸果，果即是受，還領自體以領觸相故。故《正理論》釋果云「如言王食國土，非食地土，食地中所出。言食國土，舉因顯果，領觸亦然。又如父生子，子媚好皆似於父。亦如果從種生，果似於因。」准上所引，證受自領，皆非應理。若受還領，受即違文。若時為所緣，爾時非所領；若時為所領，爾時非所緣。若領自體，誰為能所？故《婆沙》第九云「若自性知自性者，不應建立能取所取。」准此，既言能領所領，故知不是自領。又與所引喻不同，王食國土等，豈是自食？此中言領者，即是自體有彼相故，自為能領，彼為所領。如印物印，物領印相，不可說物自領物也。有人妄敘《唯識》轉計破有部之義，將為正宗，誤也。又云：若作俱舍師破云：諸心、心所同一剎那俱緣前境，如何可言領相應觸？若從他生，及相似者即名為受，子從父生、果從因生，皆應名受者。此皆亦謬也。論主自以領納為自性受，與《正理》同。何勞此中輒引《唯識》論破以為破也。又諸法得名不同，豈可以一例餘皆同名受？

On the passage in the treatise from "The treatise says:" to "feeling arisen from mental contact": Commentary: The explanation in the prose contains two sections: first, explaining the three skandhas; second, distinguishing the āyatanas and dhātus. This [section] explains the three skandhas. In the text there are three parts: that is, explaining the three skandhas to make three [parts]. This text is first the intrinsic nature of feeling. This text again has three parts: first, showing its nature; second, distinguishing the three feelings; third, distinguishing the six feelings. "Experiencing what conforms to contact" shows intrinsic feeling, whose nature is distinct from the other mental factors. Although all minds and mental factors together with feeling experience the cognitive object, they do not experience what conforms to contact and are not intrinsic feeling; intrinsic feeling experiences what it conforms to—contact. When it is the cognitive object, at that time it is not what is experienced; when it is what is experienced, at that time it is not the cognitive object. Someone says: "All minds and mental factors jointly cognize a single object and can all apprehend it; what distinction is there between them and feeling?" The explanation says: "Although all minds and mental factors jointly cognize [the object] and are all called apprehending it, feeling's experiencing is intense, so it is called intrinsic feeling. Just as when ten people sit together in one place, and one person is a thief: if someone nearby suddenly shouts calling out 'Thief!', although the ten people all hear the sound of 'thief', the one who is truly the thief experiences it with particular intensity, unlike the other nine. Feeling's experiencing of the object is intense, while conception and the rest experience the object weakly; one should know that it is also like this." Another explanation says: "Although all minds and mental factors jointly cognize and all apprehend the object, conception and the other factors are given names based on their distinct functions, while feeling has no distinct name. Although a general term is designated, it is precisely the distinct name of feeling, like the form āyatana and so forth." Although there are two explanations, the former explanation is superior. According to these two explanations, both designate feeling on the basis of experiencing the object; however, they do not correspond at all to the intent of the treatise. Furthermore, according to this interpretation, feeling and conception, etc., would all be identical, differing only in strength and weakness, with names established differently. If feeling were like this, the rest should also be so; would this not be utter confusion? Moreover, this treatise says: "The feeling skandha refers to three: experiencing what conforms to contact, namely pleasure, pain, and neither-pain-nor-pleasure." The Nyāyānusāra says: "Arising in conformity with contact, experiencing contact that is agreeable, disagreeable, or contrary to both, is called the feeling skandha. Experiencing is precisely the meaning of being able to enjoy." Relying on these two treatises, both take experiencing what conforms to contact to be feeling, and do not take experiencing the object [as its definition]. Furthermore, the tenth fascicle of this treatise says: "How is contact the basis of the cognitive aspect experienced by feeling? The cognitive aspect is extremely similar to contact and arises dependent on contact." Therefore the second fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra says: "Moreover, it is said that all feelings are briefly of two kinds: first, apprehensional feeling; second, intrinsic feeling. Apprehensional feeling refers to being able to experience one's own cognitive object. Intrinsic feeling refers to being able to experience that which conforms to oneself—contact. Up to: the difference between feeling that experiences the cognitive object and factors belonging to the same object is difficult to discern. Up to: although feeling can also experience the objective sphere, this experiencing of its own intrinsic nature is difficult to know. Therefore, experiencing contact is intrinsic feeling; this is not shared with others, and its difference is easily discerned. Thus, because all feelings share the same cognitive object with factors such as the mind, but their experiencing is different, the matter that is the cognitive object is distinct, and the matter that is experienced is distinct. Because of this, with respect to feeling, when contact is what is experienced, at that time it is not the cognitive object; when it is the cognitive object, at that time it is not what is experienced. Therefore the matters of cognizing and experiencing are distinct." Based on this, how could it solely receive the name of feeling because of excelling in grasping the object? Moreover, the second fascicle of the Samayapradīpikā says: "How does this feeling experience what conforms to contact? It is because feeling is the proximate fruit of contact. This word 'conforming to contact' is to reveal the meaning of the cause being capable of conforming to feeling. Feeling can experience the cause—contact—which can conform [to it]; therefore it is said that feeling experiences what conforms to contact, and experiencing conforming contact is called intrinsic feeling." Someone also says: "The statement that experiencing contact is called intrinsic feeling means that this feeling experiences its own nature. The statement 'experiencing contact' means that contact is its cause and feeling is its fruit. Feeling can experience the agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral aspects of contact. Experiencing the fruit of contact—the fruit is precisely feeling—means it returns to experience its own nature because it experiences the aspects of contact." Therefore the Nyāyānusāra explains the fruit: "Just as when it is said that a king eats the land, he does not eat the soil of the earth, but eats what is produced from the earth. Saying he eats the land cites the cause to reveal the fruit; experiencing contact is also like this. Moreover, just as a father fathers a son, the son's charms and features all resemble the father; and just as a fruit arises from a seed, the fruit resembles the cause." Based on what was cited above, to prove that feeling experiences itself is entirely unreasonable. If feeling returned to experience feeling, it would contradict the text: "When it is the cognitive object, at that time it is not what is experienced; when it is what is experienced, at that time it is not the cognitive object." If it experienced its own nature, what would be the subject and what would be the object? Therefore the ninth fascicle of the Vibhāṣā says: "If intrinsic nature knew intrinsic nature, one should not establish the grasper and the grasped." Based on this, since it speaks of that which experiences and that which is experienced, one therefore knows that it is not self-experiencing. Furthermore, it is not the same as the analogies cited: when a king eats the land, etc., how could that be eating himself? What is called "experiencing" here means that because its own nature possesses those aspects, it itself is that which experiences and that [contact] is what is experienced. Just as when a seal stamps an object, the object receives the mark of the seal; one cannot say the object experiences itself. Someone falsely recounted the Vijñānavāda's altered position refuting the Sarvāstivāda's meaning, taking it to be the correct school; this is an error. Furthermore, [the person] says: "If one takes the Kośa master's refutation, saying: 'All minds and mental factors in the same single moment all cognize the object before them; how can one say that they experience associated contact? If arising from another and being similar to it were termed feeling, then a son arising from a father and a fruit arising from a seed should all be termed feeling.'" All of this is also mistaken. The author of the treatise himself takes experiencing as intrinsic feeling, identical with the Nyāyānusāra. Why bother here arbitrarily citing the refutations of the Vijñaptimātratā treatises as refutations? Moreover, phenomena receive their names differently; how could one use one case as a rule for the rest to all be called feeling?