俱舍論疏 1.27

1.27

論「以諸無知至故說為冥」，第二別釋冥也。此二無知能覆諸境自、共相等，及一切種味、熟、勢等真實義故；能障諸境自、共相等，及一切種味、熟、勢等真實見故，說為冥也。如闇能覆人、杌實義，及障實見，故說為闇。有人云：若染無知，能覆理、事二種實義；不染無知，能障理、事二種真見。破曰，二種無知，一種是冥，何能證知一覆實義、一障真見？必若爾者，論何不言如其次第能覆實義、能障真見？又二乘無學豈見實義？若見實義即是真見。又云：能覆實義是不染無知，能障真見染無知。破曰：二乘無學豈無真見之障？又論亦應說如其次第言。又云：能覆實義謂覆外境，能障真見謂障內心。能覆、能障皆是冥義，通二無知。破曰：能覆、能障通二無知雖不違理，何須於境以外簡內？內門不了，豈非冥也。言障內心，意趣難解，為障緣內之心？為障內心緣外？為障緣內外心？三皆有過。若謂障緣內心，緣外因何不障？若謂障緣外心，緣內因何不障？若謂障緣內外心，因何境唯覆外、心兼障內？諸障實義豈唯六境？縱令有救，亦乃言中有迷。

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Because all kinds of ignorance... therefore it is called darkness," this is the second part, specifically explaining the word "darkness." Because these two kinds of ignorance can cover the true reality of the own-characteristics, common characteristics, and so forth of all objects, as well as the savor, potency, maturation, and so on of all kinds; and because they can obstruct true seeing of the own-characteristics, common characteristics, and so forth of all objects, as well as the savor, potency, maturation, and so on of all kinds, they are called darkness. Just as physical darkness can cover the true reality of a person or a tree stump and obstruct true seeing, it is therefore called darkness. Some say: defiled ignorance can cover the two kinds of true reality, of principle and of facts; undefiled ignorance can obstruct the two kinds of true seeing, of principle and of facts. To refute this: of the two kinds of ignorance, both are darkness; how could one verify that one covers true reality and the other obstructs true seeing? If it were indeed so, why does the treatise not state that respectively they can cover true reality and obstruct true seeing? Furthermore, do the non-learners (aśaikṣa) of the two vehicles not see true reality? If they see true reality, that is precisely true seeing. Others say: that which can cover true reality is undefiled ignorance, and that which can obstruct true seeing is defiled ignorance. To refute this: do the non-learners of the two vehicles lack the obstruction to true seeing? Moreover, the treatise should also have used the word "respectively." Yet others say: covering true reality refers to covering external objects, and obstructing true seeing refers to obstructing the internal mind; both covering and obstructing are the meaning of darkness and apply to both kinds of ignorance. To refute this: although it does not contradict principle that both covering and obstructing apply to both kinds of ignorance, why must one differentiate internal from external with respect to objects? If one does not comprehend what belongs to the internal sphere, is that not also darkness? As for saying that it obstructs the internal mind, the meaning is difficult to comprehend: does it obstruct the mind that conditions the internal? Does it obstruct the internal mind from conditioning the external? Or does it obstruct the mind that conditions both internal and external? All three entail flaws. If you say it obstructs the mind conditioning the internal, why does it not obstruct that which conditions the external? If you say it obstructs the mind conditioning the external, why does it not obstruct that which conditions the internal? If you say it obstructs the mind conditioning both internal and external, why would objects only cover the external while the mind concurrently obstructs the internal? Can the obstructions to true reality be limited only to the six sense objects? Even if there were a defense, the words still harbor confusion.