俱舍論疏 1.58

1.58

論「釋此名者至故稱對法」，此第二釋對法名。於中有三：一釋法名、二釋對義、三總結成。「持自相故名為法」者，釋法名也。將釋能對，先釋所對。法有二種：一持自相，謂一切法皆持自體相故；二法式軌則，法謂七眾律儀等法，此法非此所明。若依大乘，軌、持二義俱通一切，皆能持自相、軌生解故。此中唯取持自相義釋一切法。虛空、非擇滅雖持自相，非勝義對法所緣境故，此中不說。由此但言若法相法通四聖諦。法相法中，是善是常，名勝義法。亦名涅槃，是極圓寂勝義善故。又持自相常無改變。「此能對向或能對觀」者，第二正釋對法名也。此者，此阿毘達磨無漏般若。能對向者，謂無漏慧對向涅槃。及能對觀者，謂觀四諦。望法相法唯有對觀，望勝義法具有對觀及對向義。真諦法師以無漏慧望其涅槃，觀、向不同以為四句。無間道、趣解脫道名為趣向至得對。趣解脫道中，得擇滅故，名為至得。慧心緣滅理，名如實相知對。諸道不同以為四句。有是趣向至得對非如實相知對者，謂無漏惠觀三諦無間道時。有如實相知對非趣向至得對，謂緣滅諦加行、勝進、解脫道時。有是如實相知對亦是趣向至得對，謂緣滅諦無間道時。俱非者，謂緣三諦餘三道時。《婆沙》有惠證身不證，有身證慧不證。有一剎那四句，有多剎那四句。一剎那四句者，謂以滅智得一來果時一剎那頃。有慧證身不證者，謂欲界後三品滅，滅智觀故是慧證，非第二果故身不證。有身證非慧證者，謂色無色見道所斷諸滅，非法智境故非慧證，第二果故是身證。俱者，謂欲界修斷前六品滅，及欲見所斷一切滅，法智境故是慧證，第二果故是身證。俱非者，謂上二界修斷惑滅。多剎那四句者，慧證身不證者，謂於見道緣滅諦無間道時。身證慧不證者，謂緣三諦解脫道時。俱者，謂緣滅諦解脫道時。俱非者，謂緣三諦無間道時。既慧對觀四諦對向涅槃，名為對法。如何涅槃是對法耶？故稱對法者，第三總結成也。言對法者，法之對故名為對法也，依士釋也。古師立有五種對法：一自性，謂無漏慧。二共有，即隨行。三方便，謂諸慧。四名字，謂傳生教。五境界，謂四諦。有人非古師說數多法少，更自立有四種對法，謂理、教、行、果，理謂四諦，教謂諸論，行謂能觀，果謂涅槃。立數雖少，攝法多也。古師兼取境界為一失，有人又加涅槃為二失也。傳習時久人多費耳，若不廣述固執難迴。今出所對法為失，總有八過：若釋三藏之中對法藏有其六失，若釋經中對法有其二失。言六失者，一無文立義失、二違論出體失、三違論釋名失、四違二藏例失、五妄釋論文失、六釋名違論失。一、無文立義失者，夫立義法須有聖教及不違文。古師所立五種對法，前四名體同此論，第五無文。有人更立理、教、行、果四種對法，理、果名體俱違論說。既違聖教復無文證，豈堪傳習？二、違論出體失者，一切諸論出對法體，皆云勝義唯無漏慧；若兼隨行通五蘊性世俗對法，謂諸慧及論。今取境果，豈不違文？三、違論釋名失者，大小乘論略有三十六種釋對法名，竝不取境果。《婆沙》有十二論師二十四釋，《分別功德》論有二釋，《雜心論》有二釋，世親《攝論》有四義釋，無性《攝論》有二義。此釋論二釋，總無取境、果以為對法。此論二釋，即是《婆沙》世友六釋之中第三、第五釋對法也。第三釋云：復次能現觀四聖諦法故名對法。第五釋云：復次能證涅槃故名對法。四、違二藏例失者，依增上心論道，說素呾纜不取所觀境，依增上戒論道說毘奈耶不取所防，因何依增上慧論道說阿毘達磨即取所對？五、妄釋論文失者，有人為成所對以為對法，釋此論云：頌中雖取能對，長行兼取所對。惑之甚也。一、長行釋頌，豈出對法體數與頌相乖反耶？若必有異釋，應分明標別。二、若長行中取所對為體，應於出體中說，何故於釋名中說？此是長行中欲釋能對名對法故，先舉二種法以釋法名，後將無漏慧對此法故，名為對法。此是先釋所對法也。六、釋名違論失者，有人數十翻釋名，竝非諸論釋名，多是自意穿鑿妄通境、果以釋論名，言義繁理不堪述也。若言是釋經中對法有二失者，一違經失、二違論失。違經失者，《婆沙》引八經釋對法：一引《藥叉經》、二引《筏縒經》，若依此二經，唯無漏慧。三引《西彌迦經》，以空、無我及如實覺為性，准此經文，通一切法。四引《鄔陀夷經》，以滅定退為體。此即唯以非得為體。五引《阿難陀經》，以因緣性及如實覺為性。此經若取親因緣或十二因緣，即唯有為；若通取六因，即一切法。六又引經取因緣性及彼寂滅并如實覺為性，准此經云「因緣性即是十二因緣性，及彼寂滅即是擇滅。」若言寂滅通非擇滅，此之寂滅即通非諦，非擇體非諦攝故。并如實覺，即是覺緣起智，非攝一切智也。此是經中種種異說，非是三藏之中阿毘達磨。七引《阿難陀經》，謂諸見取及如實覺為性，此即唯以苦集道一分，不通滅諦。八又引經，一切諸法及以如實覺為體，此即通一切法。今立理對法謂四聖諦，果對法謂涅槃，行對法謂能觀，此即不攝虛空非擇滅也。此立對法，八經之中為依何經皆有增減失，無有一經唯除虛空及非擇滅立對法故，此即第一違經失也。二違論失者，《婆沙》第一引八經釋對法已，論自釋云「雖此等經中各隨意趣作種種異說，然阿毘達磨勝義自性唯無漏慧根，乃至兼取世俗對法。」論既不取異說對法，今既釋論文，因何違論取異說耶？

Regarding the commentary statement, "To explain this name... hence it is called Abhidharma": this is the second [part], explaining the name "Abhidharma". Herein there are three [points]: first, explaining the name "dharma"; second, explaining the meaning of "abhi" (face-to-face / facing toward); third, summarizing the conclusion. As for "Because it upholds its own characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), it is called dharma": this explains the name "dharma". Intending to explain that which faces toward (the active subject), it first explains that which is faced toward (the object). There are two kinds of dharma: first, upholding its own characteristic, meaning all dharmas uphold their own essential characteristic; second, model and rule (norm), where "dharma" refers to dharmas such as the rules of discipline (saṃvara) of the seven classes of disciples; this [second kind of] dharma is not what is elucidated here. If one relies on the Mahāyāna, the two meanings of "model" and "upholding" both apply to all [phenomena], because they can all uphold their own characteristics and serve as models that produce understanding. Here, only the meaning of upholding its own characteristic is taken to explain all dharmas. Although space (ākāśa) and apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha uphold their own characteristics, because they are not the cognitive objects (ālambana) of absolute Abhidharma, they are not mentioned here. Because of this, it merely states that phenomenal dharmas (dharmalakṣaṇa-dharma) pervade the four noble truths. Among phenomenal dharmas, that which is wholesome and permanent is called the ultimate dharma. It is also called nirvāṇa, because it is the supreme wholesome of ultimate pacification (vyupaśama). Furthermore, it upholds its own characteristic and is eternally changeless. As for "This actively faces toward or actively contemplates face-to-face": this is the second [point], properly explaining the name "Abhidharma". "This" refers to this Abhidharma of uncontaminated wisdom (anāsrava-prajñā). "Actively faces toward" means uncontaminated wisdom faces toward nirvāṇa. And "actively contemplates face-to-face" means contemplating the four truths. In relation to phenomenal dharmas, there is only contemplating face-to-face; in relation to the ultimate dharma, it possesses both the meanings of contemplating face-to-face and facing toward. Master Paramārtha, taking uncontaminated wisdom in relation to nirvāṇa, treated contemplating and facing toward differently to formulate a tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi). The path of uninterrupted progress (ānantarya-mārga) and the path tending toward liberation [are both said to be] facing-toward; the path tending toward liberation is called the "facing-toward of attainment" (prāpti). In the path tending toward liberation, because one attains analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), it is called attainment. The mind of wisdom taking the principle of cessation as its cognitive object is called the "facing-toward of knowing reality as it is". Taking the different paths, it forms a tetralemma: there is that which is the facing-toward of attainment but not the facing-toward of knowing reality as it is, which is the time of the path of uninterrupted progress of uncontaminated wisdom contemplating the [other] three truths. There is that which is the facing-toward of knowing reality as it is but not the facing-toward of attainment, which is the time of the preparatory (prayoga), advanced (viśeṣa), and liberation paths taking the truth of cessation as cognitive object. There is that which is both the facing-toward of knowing reality as it is and the facing-toward of attainment, which is the time of the path of uninterrupted progress taking the truth of cessation as cognitive object. There is that which is neither, which is the time of the remaining three paths taking the [other] three truths as cognitive objects. In the Vibhāṣā, there is "wisdom-realization without bodily realization", and "bodily realization without wisdom-realization". There is a single-instant tetralemma and a multiple-instant tetralemma. The single-instant tetralemma refers to the single instant when one attains the fruit of a once-returner (sakṛdāgāmin) through the knowledge of cessation (nirodha-jñāna). That which is wisdom-realization without bodily realization refers to the cessation of the final three grades of the desire realm: because it is contemplated by the knowledge of cessation, it is wisdom-realization; because it is not the second fruit, it is not bodily realization. That which is bodily realization and not wisdom-realization refers to all cessations of what is abandoned by the path of seeing in the form and formless realms: because they are not the domain of the knowledge of phenomena (dharma-jñāna), they are not wisdom-realization; because of the second fruit, they are bodily realization. That which is both refers to the cessation of the first six grades abandoned by cultivation in the desire realm, as well as all cessations of what is abandoned by seeing in the desire realm: because they are the domain of the knowledge of phenomena, they are wisdom-realization; because of the second fruit, they are bodily realization. That which is neither refers to the cessation of defilements abandoned by cultivation in the upper two realms. As for the multiple-instant tetralemma: wisdom-realization without bodily realization refers to the time of the path of uninterrupted progress taking the truth of cessation as cognitive object in the path of seeing. Bodily realization without wisdom-realization refers to the time of the path of liberation taking the [other] three truths as cognitive objects. That which is both refers to the time of the path of liberation taking the truth of cessation as cognitive object. That which is neither refers to the time of the path of uninterrupted progress taking the [other] three truths as cognitive objects. Since wisdom contemplates face-to-face the four truths and faces toward nirvāṇa, it is called Abhidharma. How could nirvāṇa be Abhidharma? "Hence it is called Abhidharma": this is the third [point], summarizing the conclusion. Calling it "Abhidharma" means it is the facing of/toward dharma, hence called Abhidharma; this is a tatpuruṣa compound. Former masters established five kinds of Abhidharma: 1. essential nature (svabhāva), namely uncontaminated wisdom; 2. co-existent (sahabhū), namely the concordant factors; 3. expedient means (upāya), namely the various [contaminated] wisdoms; 4. designation (nāma), namely the teaching that conveys and produces it; 5. cognitive object (gocara/ālambana), namely the four truths. Someone criticized the former masters' explanation as having many categories but few dharmas, and independently established four kinds of Abhidharma: principle (yukti/tattva), teaching (śāsana), practice (cāritra/pratipatti), and fruit (phala). Principle refers to the four truths; teaching refers to the treatises; practice refers to that which actively contemplates; fruit refers to nirvāṇa. Although the established categories are fewer, they subsume more dharmas. The former masters' inclusion of the cognitive object is one error; this person further adding nirvāṇa constitutes two errors. Because this transmission has been practiced for a long time, many people lend an ear to it; unless it is refuted in detail, obstinate clinging will be difficult to overturn. Now, pointing out [the inclusion of] the dharma that is faced toward as an error, there are eight faults in total: if explaining the Abhidharma-piṭaka among the three piṭakas, there are six faults; if explaining the Abhidharma in the sūtras, there are two faults. As for the six faults: 1. the fault of establishing a thesis without canonical text; 2. the fault of identifying the essential nature contrary to the treatises; 3. the fault of explaining the name contrary to the treatises; 4. the fault of violating the precedent of the other two piṭakas; 5. the fault of misinterpreting the treatise text; 6. the fault of explaining the name in contradiction to the treatises. 1. The fault of establishing a thesis without canonical text: establishing a doctrinal principle requires having sacred teachings and not contradicting texts. Of the five kinds of Abhidharma established by former masters, the names and essences of the first four are identical to this treatise, but the fifth lacks textual basis. Someone further established the four kinds of Abhidharma as principle, teaching, practice, and fruit; the names and essences of both principle and fruit contradict what the treatises state. Contradicting the sacred teachings and lacking textual evidence, how could it be fit for transmission? 2. The fault of identifying the essential nature contrary to the treatises: all treatises, when identifying the essential nature of Abhidharma, state that the absolute is solely uncontaminated wisdom; if including concordant factors, it extends to the nature of the five aggregates; conventional Abhidharma refers to the various wisdoms and the treatises. Now taking the cognitive object and fruit, does this not contradict the text? 3. The fault of explaining the name contrary to the treatises: in the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna treatises, there are briefly thirty-six explanations of the name "Abhidharma", none of which takes the cognitive object or fruit. The Vibhāṣā has twenty-four explanations by twelve treatise masters; the Fenbie gongde lun has two explanations; the Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya has two explanations; Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya has four explanations; Asamaspanna's (Asaṅga's/Asvamabhāva's) Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya has two explanations. In the two explanations of this explanatory treatise, none whatsoever takes the cognitive object or fruit as Abhidharma. The two explanations in this treatise are precisely the third and fifth of Vasumitra's six explanations of Abhidharma in the Vibhāṣā. The third explanation states: "Furthermore, because it directly realizes (abhisam-eti) the dharmas of the four noble truths, it is called Abhidharma." The fifth explanation states: "Furthermore, because it can realize (sākṣāt-kṛ) nirvāṇa, it is called Abhidharma." 4. The fault of violating the precedent of the other two piṭakas: expounding the path relying on higher mind (adhicitta), the Sūtra does not take the contemplated object [into its definition]; expounding the path relying on higher moral discipline (adhiśīla), the Vinaya does not take that which is guarded against [into its definition]. Why, when expounding the path relying on higher wisdom (adhiprajñā), should the Abhidharma take that which is faced toward? 5. The fault of misinterpreting the treatise text: someone, to establish what is faced toward as Abhidharma, interpreted this treatise saying: "Although the verse takes that which actively faces toward, the prose commentary additionally takes that which is faced toward." This is utterly deluded! First, when the prose commentary explains the verse, how could the number of essential natures of Abhidharma presented run contrary to the verse? If there were definitely an alternative explanation, it should have been explicitly distinguished. Second, if in the prose commentary that which is faced toward were taken as the essential nature, it should have been stated when identifying the essential nature; why was it stated when explaining the name? This is because in the prose commentary, desiring to explain that which actively faces toward as being named Abhidharma, it first brings up two kinds of dharma to explain the name "dharma", and afterwards, uncontaminated wisdom facing toward this dharma is called Abhidharma. This is first explaining the dharma that is faced toward. 6. The fault of explaining the name in contradiction to the treatises: someone made several dozen rounds of explaining the name, none of which are the explanations found in the treatises; most are far-fetched notions of their own mind, arbitrarily applying to cognitive object and fruit to explain the name of the treatise; the statements are convoluted and unreasonable, unworthy of being recounted. If it is said to be explaining the Abhidharma in the sūtras, there are two faults: 1. the fault of contradicting the sūtras; 2. the fault of contradicting the treatises. As for the fault of contradicting the sūtras: the Vibhāṣā cites eight sūtras to explain Abhidharma: 1. citing the Yakṣa-sūtra; 2. citing the Vatsa-sūtra; if relying on these two sūtras, it is solely uncontaminated wisdom. 3. Citing the Śamīka-sūtra, taking emptiness, non-self, and awakening to reality as its nature; according to this sūtra text, it extends to all dharmas. 4. Citing the Udāyin-sūtra, taking falling away from the attainment of cessation (nirodha-samāpatti) as its nature; this takes solely non-acquisition (aprāpti) as its nature. 5. Citing the Ānanda-sūtra, taking the nature of cause and condition and awakening to reality as its nature; if this sūtra takes direct causes and conditions or the twelve links of dependent origination, then it is solely conditioned dharmas; if it broadly takes the six causes, then it is all dharmas. 6. It further cites a sūtra taking the nature of cause and condition, its cessation, and awakening to reality as its nature; according to this sūtra, "the nature of cause and condition is the nature of the twelve links of dependent origination, and its cessation is analytical cessation." If it is said that cessation extends to apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, then this cessation extends to non-truths, because the essence of apratisaṃkhyā is not subsumed under the truths. And awakening to reality is the knowledge that awakens to dependent origination, not subsuming all knowledge. These are various different explanations in the sūtras, not the Abhidharma among the three piṭakas. 7. Citing the Ānanda-sūtra, taking the adherence to views (dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa) and awakening to reality as its nature; this takes solely a portion of suffering, origin, and the path, not extending to the truth of cessation. 8. It further cites a sūtra taking all dharmas and awakening to reality as its essence; this extends to all dharmas. Now, establishing the Abhidharma of principle as the four noble truths, the Abhidharma of fruit as nirvāṇa, and the Abhidharma of practice as that which actively contemplates, this fails to subsume space and apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. Whichever sūtra among the eight sūtras this establishment of Abhidharma relies upon, all have the fault of addition or omission, because there is no single sūtra that establishes Abhidharma by excluding only space and apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha; this is the first fault, of contradicting the sūtras. Second, the fault of contradicting the treatises: after the first [fascicle of the] Vibhāṣā cites the eight sūtras to explain Abhidharma, the treatise itself explains: "Although these sūtras each make various different statements according to their intent, the absolute essential nature of Abhidharma is solely the faculty of uncontaminated wisdom... up to and including conventional Abhidharma." Since the treatise does not adopt these divergent explanations of Abhidharma, now when explaining the text of the treatise, why contradict the treatise and adopt divergent explanations?