俱舍論疏 13.78

13.78

論「經部亦說至無色相故」，論主述經部也。前說身表無有實體，無表同表亦無實體，故言此亦非實有故。所以得知？有三因證：一由先誓限唯不作故。本誓既不願別有色生，但唯誓不作此業，如何與誓不同別生於色？二所依大種體非有故。既依過去大種施設無表色，過去大種既體是無，故知無表亦無有體。三若實有體應有其色對礙之相。此相既無，故知無體。

On the treatise's statement, "The Sautrāntikas also say ... because it lacks the mark of matter": the author of the treatise sets forth the Sautrāntika position. Above, it was said that bodily information has no real substantial entity; non-information is like information in that it likewise has no real substantial entity, which is why it is said, "because this too is not a real entity." How is this known? There are three inferential proofs. First, because the prior resolve has as its limit merely not doing. Since the original vow did not intend any distinct matter to arise, but was only a vow to refrain from this action, how could a distinct matter arise in divergence from the vow? Second, because the primary elements upon which it depends lack substantial reality. Since non-informative matter is posited depending on past primary elements, and past primary elements already lack substantial reality, one knows that non-information also lacks substantial reality. Third, if it had a real substantial entity, it ought to possess the characteristic of material obstruction. Since this characteristic is absent, one knows that it has no substantial entity.