俱舍論疏 15.151

15.151

論「故本論言至善無尋業」，引文證也。本論言「頗有業感心受異熟，非身受耶？曰：有，謂善無尋業。無尋業者，是中間定已上，感心受故，非不感受。唯感心受，故非根本地樂受。」問：此中三受作論根本地喜、樂受，總名樂受。雖不感依身樂受，感意樂受，豈違本論？答：此中意說不感身受，明知中間定業不感初定根本地果，上不感下故。若能感喜根，何為不感依身樂受？由此兩師俱違本論。

On the Śāstra's statement: "Hence the fundamental treatise says [...] wholesome actions free from vitarka": This cites the text as proof. The fundamental treatise says: "Is there action that experiences mental sensation as ripening, but not bodily sensation? Answer: There is, namely wholesome action free from vitarka." Action free from vitarka pertains to the intermediate meditation and above; because it experiences mental sensation, it is not the case that it does not experience sensation. Because it experiences only mental sensation, it is not pleasant sensation of the fundamental stages. Question: In this treatise, among the three sensations, joy and pleasure of the fundamental stages are collectively termed pleasant sensation. Though it does not experience pleasant sensation based on the body, it experiences pleasant sensation of the mind; how does this contradict the fundamental treatise? Answer: The intention here is to state that it does not experience bodily sensation, clearly showing that action of the intermediate meditation does not experience the fruit of the fundamental stage of the first dhyāna, because a higher [stage] does not experience [fruits of] a lower one. If it could experience the joy faculty, why would it not experience pleasant sensation based on the body? Therefore, both masters contradict the fundamental treatise.