俱舍論疏 15.174

15.174

「論曰至四業相故」，論主評取四業為正。此中唯顯時定、不定，釋經所說四業相故。故知時定即是順現等三，不定即是第四不定業也。《正理》云「此中唯顯順樂等業於現等時有定、不定，釋經所說順現受等四業相殊。故定業中分為三種，并不定業合而為四。是說為善，理必無有異熟不定、時分定業。時定，唯是異熟定中位差別故，非離異熟別有時體，如何時定非異熟耶？此中但依異熟定業得果位差別立順現等故。若謂有業於時定者，謂熟必在此時非餘；若越此時，畢竟不受。故於時定，非於異熟。此於異熟亦應決定，義相似故。相似者何？謂如於時有或非理，而名時分定，如是於熟有或非理，應名異熟定。或復應許二俱不定。是故若業於時分定，彼於異熟亦應決定。若於異熟名不定者，彼於時分亦應不定。由此理故，定無八業。以於諸業中有不定義者，應總立一順不定受。所以者何？義相似故。謂如熟定、時不定業，時不定故，既共許為順不定受，如是時定熟不定業，熟不定故，何不許為順不定受？故譬喻者於此義中安立八業，極為雜亂。」准上論文，五業亦非正義。又云「譬喻者說：順現受業等，於餘生中亦得受異熟。然隨初熟位立順現等名，非但如名招爾所果。謂彼意說：諸所造業，若從此生即能為因與異熟果者，名順現法受。若從次生方能為因與異熟者，名順次生受。若越次生從第三生方與異熟者，名順後次受。何緣彼作如是說耶？勿強力業異熟少故。彼執非善。所以者何？彼業先時已生異熟，中間間斷異熟復生，理必不然，如種芽故。若謂無間而生後身，應無死生，業無異故。或身無異，應數死生。又一業招二、三生等，是諸果相為異？為同？相若異者，應如別業所感相續非一業果。或一業果，其相應同，應說何緣前後相別？若謂滿業助力使然，應唯一生前後有別。現見引業所引一生，雖有眾多滿業果異，而引業一但名一生。此亦應然，無別因故。相若同者，應是一生，非一生中前後相等，而可見有前後生殊。此亦應然，一業果故（云云多破，略而不錄）。」又云「勿強力業異熟果少。此亦非證。所以者何？非要果多，業名強力。順現受業名強力者，能速得果，故立此名。又若執業要感多果方得名強，則感輪王異熟果業，望感佛業應說名強，感多果故。若感佛業妙故名強，是則名強業有多種，以業強理有多品故。謂或有業果近名強，或由果多、或由果妙，然順現受果近故名強，寧以強名證感多果。」又云「又譬喻者說：一切業乃至無間皆悉可轉。若無間業不可轉者，應無有能越第一有。乃至此亦但是虛妄僻執，以無間業異熟分位二俱決定，有頂不然，故所引例無能證力。若有頂業皆不可轉，起彼定者應定招生，是則無容起彼定已證無學果及般涅槃。若一切業皆可轉者，世尊不應說有定業。」

From the commentary's "The śāstra says" down to "due to the characteristics of the four karmas," the author of the śāstra appraises and adopts the four karmas as correct. Here, it only demonstrates the determination or indetermination of time, explaining the characteristics of the four karmas spoken of in the sūtras. Thus, one knows that determination of time refers precisely to the three—namely, [karma] experienced in the present [life] and so forth—and indetermination refers to the fourth, indeterminate karma. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Here, it only demonstrates that karmas experienced as pleasure and so forth have determination or indetermination regarding the times such as the present [life], explaining the distinction in the characteristics of the four karmas spoken of in the sūtras, such as [karma] experienced in the present life. Therefore, determinate karma is divided into three kinds, which, together with indeterminate karma, make four. This statement is excellent, for in principle there can definitely be no karma that is indeterminate in ripening yet determinate in time. For determination in time is merely a difference of stage within determination of ripening; there is no separate substance of time apart from ripening—how could the time be determinate while the ripening is not? Here, [the division into] karmas experienced in the present and so forth is established merely based on differences of stage in obtaining the fruit of karmas determinate in ripening. If one says that there is karma determinate in time—meaning that the ripening must occur at this time and no other, and if this time is passed, it is definitively not experienced, and thus it is determinate in time but not in ripening—then it should also be determinate in ripening, because the meaning is similar. What is this similarity? It is said: just as there is a possibility [of ripening or not] with respect to time which is unreasonable, yet it is called determinate in time, so too, there being a possibility [of ripening or not] with respect to ripening should be called determinate in ripening; or again, one should admit that both are indeterminate. Therefore, if a karma is determinate in time, it must also be determinate in ripening. If it is called indeterminate in ripening, it must also be indeterminate in time. For this reason, there are definitively not eight karmas. Because if there is a meaning of indetermination in karmas, one should generally establish a single [category of] karma experienced indeterminately. Why is this? Because the meaning is similar. That is to say, just as a karma determinate in ripening but indeterminate in time, being indeterminate in time, is mutually accepted as experienced indeterminately, so too, for a karma determinate in time but indeterminate in ripening, being indeterminate in ripening, why not accept it as experienced indeterminately? Therefore, the Dārṣṭāntikas' establishing of eight karmas regarding this meaning is extremely confused and disordered." According to the above text of the treatise, five karmas are also not the correct doctrine. It also states: "The Dārṣṭāntikas say: Karmas experienced in the present life and so forth also obtain ripening in other lives; but their designations, such as experienced in the present life, are established according to the stage of initial ripening, not merely producing that amount of fruit according to their names. That is to say, their intention is: among all karmas performed, if it can serve as a cause to yield ripening fruit beginning from this very life, it is called experienced in the present life; if it can only serve as a cause to yield ripening beginning from the next life, it is called experienced in the next life; if it bypasses the next life and yields ripening only from the third life, it is called experienced in subsequent lives. For what reason do they speak thus? Lest the ripening of powerful karma be small. Their thesis is not good. Why is this? That karma had previously already produced ripening; that ripening should arise again after an intermediate interruption is in principle definitely not so, just as with a seed and a sprout. If one says that a subsequent body is produced without interruption, there should be neither death nor rebirth, because the karma has no difference. Or, the body having no difference, one should repeatedly die and be reborn. Furthermore, when a single karma brings about two or three lives, are the characteristics of these various fruits different or identical? If the characteristics are different, they should be a continuum brought about by different karmas, not the fruit of a single karma. Or if they are the fruit of a single karma, their characteristics should be identical; then what reason could be stated for the difference between the prior and subsequent? If one says that it is caused by the assistance of completing karma, there should only be a single life that has differences between prior and subsequent. We see that in a single life projected by projecting karma, although there are many different fruits of completing karma, because the projecting karma is one, it is called merely a single life. This should also be the case here, because there is no different cause. If the characteristics are identical, it should be a single life; it is not the case that, when the prior and subsequent within a single life are equivalent, a distinction between prior and subsequent lives could be seen. This should also be the case here, because it is the fruit of a single karma (they refute this extensively, which is omitted and not recorded here)." It also states: "Lest the ripening fruit of powerful karma be small: this is also not a valid proof. Why is this? It is not necessary that a karma is called powerful because its fruit is abundant. When a karma experienced in the present life is called powerful, it is because it can obtain its fruit quickly; therefore, this name is established. Furthermore, if one insists that karma must produce abundant fruit to be called strong, then the karma that brings about the ripening fruit of a cakravartin should be called stronger compared to the karma that brings about a Buddha, because it produces abundant fruit. If the karma that brings about a Buddha is called strong because it is sublime, then there are many kinds of karmas called strong, because the principle of a karma being strong has many grades. That is, a karma may be called strong because its fruit is proximate, or because its fruit is abundant, or because its fruit is sublime; but karma experienced in the present is called strong because its fruit is proximate—how could one use the designation 'strong' to prove that it produces abundant fruit?" It also states: "Furthermore, the Dārṣṭāntikas say: All karmas, up to and including the uninterrupted [sins], can all be diverted. If uninterrupted karma could not be diverted, none would be able to transcend the Peak of Existence. Down to: this is also merely a false and perverse clinging. Because for uninterrupted karma, both the ripening and the stage are determinate, whereas for the Peak of Existence this is not so; therefore, the example adduced lacks probative power. If all karmas of the Peak of Existence were non-divertible, then one who generated that concentration would definitively produce rebirth [there], and in that case, having generated that concentration, there would be no possibility of realizing the fruit of an aśaikṣa and parinirvāṇa. If all karmas could be diverted, the World-Honoured One would not have spoken of determinate karma."