俱舍論疏 17.157

17.157

論「勿眾同分分分差別者」，與多業引一生果出過。若多業引一生，眾同分前、後因別故，果應隨因分分有別。《正理》出過云「若說一生由多業引，或說一業能引多生，如是二言於理何失？且初有失，謂一生中前業果終、後業果起，業、果別故，應有死生。或應多生無死、生理，業果終起如一生故。二俱有過，一本有中應有眾多死、生有故。或應乃至無餘涅槃中間永無死及生故。何緣定限一趣處中有異業果生便有生死，有異業果起而無死生？一業果終，餘業果起，理定應立有死有生。」乃至廣說。

On the Śāstra's statement, 'lest there be piecemeal differences in the generic similarity (nikāya-sabhāgatā)': This points out the flaw in [the view that] multiple karmas project a single lifetime's result. If multiple karmas were to project a single lifetime, then because the preceding and succeeding causes of the generic similarity would differ, its results would necessarily vary piecemeal in accordance with the causes. The Nyāyānusāra points out the flaw, saying: 'If one says that a single lifetime is projected by multiple karmas, or if one says that a single karma can project multiple lifetimes, what fault is there in reason with these two assertions? First, there is a fault [in the former]: within a single lifetime, when the result of a preceding karma ends and the result of a subsequent karma arises, because the karmas and results are distinct, there ought to be death and birth. Or [in the latter], through multiple lifetimes there should reasonably be no death or birth, because the cessation and arising of karmic results would be like a single lifetime. Both entail errors: within a single state of existence (bhava) during life, there would have to be numerous death-existences (maraṇabhava) and birth-existences (upapattibhava); or, all the way until nirvāṇa without remainder, there would permanently be no death and birth in the interim. For what reason should it be strictly determined that in one destiny (gati) or state of existence, when the result of a distinct karma arises there is birth and death, while [in another case] when the result of a distinct karma arises there is no birth and death? When the result of one karma ends and the result of another karma arises, in principle it must definitely be established that there is death and birth.' And so on at length.