俱舍論疏 19.111

19.111

論「又若有緣至應更思擇」，此即第四難也。謂有先以餘解脫更蘊在心中，後執謗真解脫邪見為如理覺，以如理故執為淨因，如前道下應成戒取。《正理》釋云「無如是理。總許解脫是常是寂，執謗彼心為清淨因，理不成故。如許涅槃體實、非實，謂若希求解脫方便，彼應必定許有解脫。諸許解脫決定有者，必應許彼體是常寂。若不許爾，不應希求。如正法中於涅槃體，雖有謂實、謂非實異，而同許彼是常是寂，故於非撥俱見為過。如是若有以餘解脫蘊在心中，彼必總許涅槃常寂，由此不執謗解脫見為如理解。故見滅所斷，戒禁取定無。又如天授雖總計有常寂涅槃，而離八支別計五法為解脫道。外道所計，理亦應然，是故有於八支聖道能謗邪見謂如理覺，無於謗滅謂如理解。以戒禁等自體行相與聖道殊，無謂涅槃常寂體相有差別者，是故無滅與道同義。」述曰：此以計能證道有多，故謗於正道，執餘邪道為清淨因，謂此邪見為如理道。內、外二道同計涅槃是常、是寂，若撥滅無，即不別計得滅之道，由此不執謗滅邪見為如理覺。集諦亦爾，內、外諸道欲斷苦因而修斷道，若謗因無，必不更計有餘斷道，由此不執謗集邪見為清淨因。由此集、滅所斷無戒取也。有人敘《俱舍》釋云：如撥無道，應無能證。雖撥無道，計有餘道能證，何妨雖撥無集、滅，計有餘集、滅為其斷、證。今詳此救非《俱舍》釋，不應理故。撥道有二：一許有苦及有苦滅，撥於正道，別執邪道為清淨因，將撥道見為如理覺，助執邪道名清淨因，是戒取攝。二撥無道及無苦滅，此撥無道，即無能證計為苦因及有苦滅修道斷、證。若無集、滅，修道何用？無斷、證故。別計非滅以為真滅撥涅槃者，此是見取。若將邪見為如理覺，此順見取，何得名道？若將非集而名集者，此是邪智，非戒取攝不，同淨因名戒取也。何得將此名為戒取？故救無理。

On the treatise's: "Again, if having an object of awareness […] should be further investigated," this is the fourth objection. It means: suppose someone previously harboured in mind another liberation, and later adhered to the wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi) that repudiates the true liberation, taking it to be correct comprehension, and because of its correctness adhered to it as the cause of purity, then just as in the case of the path discussed above, it ought to constitute attachment to precepts and vows (śīlavrataparāmarśa). The Nyāyānusāra explains: "There is no such principle. It is universally accepted that liberation is eternal and peaceful; to grasp the mind that repudiates it as a cause of purity is logically impossible. Just as when admitting that the substance of nirvāṇa is real or unreal: one who aspires to the means to liberation must definitely accept that liberation exists. All who accept that liberation definitely exists must accept that its substance is eternal and peaceful. If they did not accept this, they would not seek it. Just as in the true Dharma, although there is a difference between asserting that the substance of nirvāṇa is real and asserting that it is unreal, both equally accept that it is eternal and peaceful; hence, they both view repudiating it as an error. Thus, if someone harbours another liberation in mind, they must universally accept that nirvāṇa is eternal and peaceful; because of this, they do not grasp the view that repudiates liberation as correct comprehension. Therefore, attachment to precepts and vows abandoned by seeing the truth of cessation definitely does not exist. Furthermore, just as Devadatta, although universally positing an eternal and peaceful nirvāṇa, posited five phenomena outside the eightfold path as the path to liberation—and what is posited by non-Buddhists must logically also be like this—for this reason there can be wrong views repudiating the eightfold noble path taken to be correct comprehension, but there is none taking repudiation of cessation to be correct comprehension. Since the nature and aspect of precepts and vows differ from the noble path, and no one claims that the nature and aspect of the eternal and peaceful nirvāṇa have differences, cessation does not share the same meaning with the path." Expounding: Because they posit that paths capable of realization are manifold, they repudiate the correct path and grasp another, false path as the cause of purity, taking this wrong view to be the correct path. Both Buddhists and non-Buddhists equally posit that nirvāṇa is eternal and peaceful; if one repudiates cessation as non-existent, one will not separately posit a path to attain cessation, and because of this one does not grasp the wrong view repudiating cessation as correct comprehension. The truth of origin is also like this: both Buddhists and non-Buddhists, desiring to sever the cause of suffering, cultivate a path of abandonment; if one repudiates the cause as non-existent, one will definitely not further posit another path of abandonment, and because of this one does not grasp the wrong view repudiating origin as a cause of purity. Because of this, what is abandoned by [seeing the truths of] origin and cessation has no attachment to precepts and vows. Someone related the Kośa's explanation: "Just as when repudiating the path as non-existent, there should be nothing capable of realization, yet though repudiating the path, they posit another path capable of realization; what prevents them, though repudiating origin and cessation as non-existent, from positing other origin and cessation for their abandonment and realization?" Now examining this defense, it is not the Kośa's explanation, because it is unreasonable. Repudiating the path has two types: First, admitting suffering and the cessation of suffering exist, one repudiates the correct path and separately grasps a false path as the cause of purity, taking the view repudiating the path to be correct comprehension, which aids in grasping the false path as the cause of purity; this is subsumed under attachment to precepts and vows. Second, repudiating that the path exists and that the cessation of suffering exists: this repudiating of the path means that there is nothing capable of realization, posited as the cause of suffering, and having the cessation of suffering to cultivate the path for abandonment and realization. If there is no origin or cessation, what is the use of cultivating the path? Because there would be no abandonment or realization. If one separately posits what is not cessation as true cessation while repudiating nirvāṇa, this is attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa). If one takes a wrong view as correct comprehension, this accords with attachment to views; how could it be called the path? If one takes what is not origin as origin, this is false cognition; it is not subsumed under attachment to precepts and vows, not being called attachment to precepts and vows on the model of the cause of purity. How could one call this attachment to precepts and vows? Therefore the defense is unreasonable.