俱舍論疏 19.126

19.126

論「有餘部說至寧起欲貪」，此敘異說。《婆沙》云「是分別論者，彼計想、心、見三皆是顛倒。有想、心倒見不相應，婆沙正義。見是顛倒，亦名為倒。想、心假名為倒，實非顛倒。想、心二倒實見相應。彼師所計十二倒中，我、常。想、心、見六倒，及樂、淨見二倒，此八唯見道斷。樂、淨、想、心四倒通見、修斷。若謂樂、淨、想、心四顛倒不通修斷唯見斷者，未離欲聖。既已斷樂、淨二倒，因何於不淨之境而取淨相，無樂之中而求於樂起貪欲也。」

On the treatise's: "Other schools say […] how could sensual desire arise?" this relates a different position. The Vibhāṣā says: "These are the Vibhajyavādins. They posit that the three—perception, mind, and view—are all inversions. There are inversions of perception and mind that are not associated with view." The orthodox position of the Vibhāṣā is: Views are inversions, and are also named inversions. Perception and mind are metaphorically called inversions, but are not real inversions. The two inversions of perception and mind are actually associated with view. According to what that master posits, among the twelve inversions, the six inversions of perception, mind, and view regarding self and permanence, and the two inversions of view regarding pleasure and purity—these eight are abandoned only by the path of seeing. The four inversions of perception and mind regarding pleasure and purity pertain to both abandonment by seeing and abandonment by cultivation. If one claims that the four inversions of perception and mind regarding pleasure and purity do not pertain to abandonment by cultivation and are abandoned only by seeing, then how could an arya who has not yet abandoned sensual desire, having already abandoned the two inversions of pleasure and purity, seize upon the aspect of purity in an impure object, and seek pleasure where there is no pleasure, giving rise to sensual desire?