俱舍論疏 19.169

19.169

論「不執彼為至身見起故」，答也。《婆沙》十八云「何故此二不緣他界耶？復次此二見唯於麁法轉故。謂此二見唯於麁顯，現見諸蘊執我、我所，及計斷、常。若生欲界，於色、無色界微細諸蘊不能現見，故不執為我、我所等。」《正理論》云「身、邊見何緣不緣上界地？緣他界地執我、我所，及計斷、常，理不成故。謂非於此界此地中生他界地蘊中有計為我，執有二我理不成故。執我不成故，執我所不成，所執必依我執起故。邊見隨從有身見生，故亦無容緣他界地。由此唯九緣上理成。有餘師言：身、邊二見愛力起故，取有執受為己有故，以現見法為境界故，必不上緣。」

On the Śāstra's: "They do not grasp those as... because of the arising of the view of self," this is the reply. Chapter eighteen of the *Vibhāṣā* states: "Why do these two views not condition other realms? Furthermore, it is because these two views operate only upon coarse phenomena. That is, these two views grasp only coarse, obvious, and presently visible skandhas as 'self' and 'mine', and conceive annihilation or permanence. If one is born in the desire realm, one cannot directly see the subtle skandhas of the form and formless realms; therefore, one does not grasp them as 'self', 'mine', and so forth." The *Nyāyānusāra* states: "For what reason do the view of self and the view of extremes not condition higher realms and stages? Because grasping 'self' and 'mine' and conceiving annihilation or permanence by conditioning other realms and stages is logically untenable. That is, being born in this realm and this stage, one does not conceive a self among the skandhas of other realms and stages, for the grasping of two selves is logically untenable. Because grasping a self is untenable, grasping what belongs to a self is untenable, for what is grasped [as belonging to a self] necessarily arises dependent upon grasping a self. The view of extremes arises following the view of personal identity; therefore, there is no way it can condition other realms and stages. Thus, it is logically established that only nine condition what is above. Other masters say: Because the two views of self and extremes arise through the force of craving, grasp what is appropriated as one's own, and take presently seen phenomena as their object-domain, they necessarily do not condition what is above."