俱舍論疏 19.173

19.173

論「以宗為量故作是說」，答也。《正理》答此難云「以欲界生，不作是執：我是大梵。亦不執言：梵是我所。故非身見。身見無故，邊見亦無，邊見必隨身見起故。非有餘見作此行相，故是身見所引邪智。諸作是說：生欲界中緣梵計常，此非邊見，於劣計勝是見取攝。彼說非理，違本論故。如本論說『無常見常，是邊見中常邊見攝。』」准上論所釋，邪智即是不染污邪行相智，不與疑等煩惱相應，行相異故。又非貪等別相煩惱相應，不上緣故，無覆無記亦緣於上故。有人云：疑相應邪智，及緣梵王名者，恐非論意。

On the Śāstra's: "This is stated because the school's doctrine is taken as the authority," this is the reply. The *Nyāyānusāra* answers this objection, saying: "Because one born in the desire realm does not form this grasping: 'I am the Great Brahmā,' nor does one grasp, saying: 'Brahmā is mine,' it is not the view of self. Since the view of self is absent, the view of extremes is also absent, for the view of extremes necessarily arises following the view of self. It is not that any other view has this cognitive aspect; therefore, it is false knowledge induced by the view of self. As for those who say: 'Born in the desire realm, conditioning Brahmā and conceiving permanence is not the view of extremes, but conceiving what is inferior as supreme, and thus is subsumed under attachment to views'—what they say is unreasonable, because it contradicts the root treatise. For the root treatise says: 'Conceiving the impermanent to be permanent is subsumed under the extreme view of permanence among the views of extremes.'" By inference from the explanation in the treatise above, false knowledge is non-defiled knowledge with a false cognitive aspect; it is not associated with afflictions such as doubt, because its cognitive aspect is different. Moreover, it is not associated with specific afflictions like greed, because they do not condition what is above, and non-obscured indeterminate [minds] also condition what is above. Someone said: "False knowledge associated with doubt, and conditioning the name of King Brahmā," which, one fears, is not the intention of the treatise.