俱舍論疏 19.217

19.217

論「以諸愚夫至為無記根」，答也。准此師意說，此四能生無記染法，故立為根。《正理論》云「彼作是言：無覆無記慧力劣故非無記根。根義必依堅牢立故。由慢力故，諸瑜伽師退失百千殊勝功德，故慢力勝，立無記根。此四能生無記染法。」已上論文。此說無覆無記力劣、慢力強者、破婆沙師也。無記愛、慢，唯上二界。無記見者，上二界五見，欲界身、邊見無記癡者，上二界全，欲界與身、邊見相應者。《婆沙》云「問：何故西方諸師立慢為無記根？答：彼說力堅強義是根義，慢力堅強，故立為根。謂瑜伽師所謂退失百千善品皆由慢力。問：何故此國諸師不立為根耶？答：此說下義是根義。慢令心舉，於下不順，故不立根。問：何故此國諸師立無覆無記慧為無記根？答：此說為依因義是根義。無覆無記慧為依因，勝故立為根。問：何故西方諸師不立為根？答：彼說力堅強義是根義。無覆無記慧勢力微劣，故不立根。問：何故此彼國師俱不立疑為無記根？答：俱說定住義是根義。疑不定住，二門轉故，不立為根。如是說者，如善、不善根俱有三種，無記亦應爾。又如不善慢不立不善根，無記慢亦應爾。故無記根唯三者善。」《正理論》云「上座於此作如是言：無無記根，無聖教故。善、惡猛利起必由根，無記微劣不由功用任運而起，何藉根為（已上座立二義，不立根也。一無教、二微劣）。」《正理》破云「無聖教言，且為非理，無記煩惱有極成故。謂何緣故？少分染起，籍同類根。少分不爾，無記染法有同類根，是染法故，如不善法。又何定執此無聖教？非彼上座耳所未聞，便可撥言此非聖教。無量聖教皆已滅沒，上座不聞，豈非聖教？然於古昔諸大論師皆共詳論無記根義，故知必有聖教明文。標以總名，無別名數，由斯諍論，或四、或三。又聖教中處處說有記、無記法。又處處說記、無記法從根而生。乃至故不應言此無聖教（已上破無教也）。又微劣法轉，應計為由根力生非猛利者。是故非彼所立理趣，能遮我等立無記根（已上破理）。」

Regarding the treatise passage from "Because all foolish persons" to "serve as indeterminate roots": this is the answer. According to the intention of these masters, these four can generate indeterminate defiled dharmas; therefore, they are established as roots. The Nyāyānusāra states: "They say this: 'Because the power of unveiled indeterminate prajñā is weak, it is not an indeterminate root. The meaning of a root must be established based on being firm and solid. Through the power of conceit, yogis regress and lose hundreds of thousands of superior qualities; hence the power of conceit is superior, and it is established as an indeterminate root. These four are capable of generating indeterminate defiled dharmas.'" The above is the treatise passage. This statement that unveiled indeterminate [prajñā] is weak in power while conceit is strong in power refutes the Vibhāṣā masters. Indeterminate craving and conceit belong exclusively to the upper two realms. Indeterminate views comprise the five views in the upper two realms, and satkāyadṛṣṭi and antagrāhadṛṣṭi in the desire realm. Indeterminate ignorance comprises the entirety of the upper two realms, and that associated with satkāyadṛṣṭi and antagrāhadṛṣṭi in the desire realm. The Vibhāṣā says: "Question: Why do the Western masters establish conceit as an indeterminate root? Answer: They say that the meaning of being firm and strong is the meaning of a root; the power of conceit is firm and strong, so it is established as a root. That is, a yogi's so-called regression and loss of hundreds of thousands of wholesome qualities is entirely through the power of conceit. Question: Why do the masters of this country not establish it as a root? Answer: They say that the meaning of going downward is the meaning of a root. Conceit causes the mind to be elevated and is not in accord with going downward; therefore it is not established as a root. Question: Why do the masters of this country establish unveiled indeterminate prajñā as an indeterminate root? Answer: They say that the meaning of serving as a supporting cause is the meaning of a root. Unveiled indeterminate prajñā is superior as a supporting cause, so it is established as a root. Question: Why do the Western masters not establish it as a root? Answer: They say that the meaning of being firm and strong is the meaning of a root. The force of unveiled indeterminate prajñā is subtle and weak; hence it is not established as a root. Question: Why do the masters of both this and that country not establish doubt as an indeterminate root? Answer: Both say that the meaning of being fixed and stable is the meaning of a root. Doubt is not fixed and stable, proceeding through two gates; hence it is not established as a root. To state the correct view: Just as wholesome and unwholesome roots each have three kinds, the indeterminate should also be like this. Furthermore, just as unwholesome conceit is not established as an unwholesome root, indeterminate conceit should also be like this. Therefore, it is good that indeterminate roots are only three." The Nyāyānusāra states: "The Sthavira, regarding this, made the following statement: 'There are no indeterminate roots, because there is no sacred teaching. Wholesome and unwholesome [dharmas] are fierce and acute; their arising must be due to roots. Indeterminate [dharmas] are subtle and weak; they arise spontaneously without effort, so what need is there for roots?' (The above Sthavira establishes two points for not establishing roots: first, no teaching; second, subtle and weak.)" The Nyāyānusāra refutes this, saying: "The claim that there is no sacred teaching is, to begin with, unreasonable, because indeterminate afflictions are firmly established. That is, for what reason would one fraction of defilement arise relying on roots of the same kind, while another fraction would not? Indeterminate defiled dharmas have roots of the same kind, because they are defiled dharmas, like unwholesome dharmas. Moreover, why persistently adhere to the view that there is no sacred teaching on this? It is not permissible that just because that Sthavira's ears have not heard it, one may dismiss it by saying this is not sacred teaching. Countless sacred teachings have already been lost; just because the Sthavira has not heard them, how could they not be sacred teaching? However, in ancient times the great treatise masters all discussed together the meaning of indeterminate roots; thus one knows there must be explicit statements in the sacred teaching. Because it was designated with a general name without specific names and numbers, dispute arose on this account, [saying] either four or three. Moreover, in the sacred teachings it is said in various places that there are determined and indeterminate dharmas. Also, in various places it is said that determined and indeterminate dharmas arise from roots. And so on; hence one should not say that this lacks sacred teaching (the above refutes the lack of teaching). Furthermore, subtle and weak dharmas should be considered to arise by the power of roots that are not fierce and acute. Therefore, the reasoning established by him cannot prevent us from establishing indeterminate roots (the above refutes the reasoning)."