俱舍論疏 2.104

2.104

論「如是已說異熟生等」，下半頌，第十五明成就門。今應略述得與成就二名通別。准《婆沙》一百六十二云「得唯在初，成就通初後。」准此論意，先不成就，及得已捨，後獲此法。初念之得，名通二種，名得亦名成就。後念之得，唯名成就，不名得也。又《正理論》第十二云「豈不盡智於成佛時亦不名得，況滅盡定。以諸菩薩任金剛喻三摩地時名得盡智，得體生時名為得故。」《婆沙》得、捨文中，大意亦同。准此論意，先不成就，及得已捨後獲此法，不簡所得之法生與不生。但初得之得，至生相時名之為得，若至現在即名成就。故知第一念得有其二名，名得亦名成就，後念之得但名成就。《婆沙》以初念得有其二名，後念之得唯有一名，故言得唯在初，成就通其初後。《正理》辨得時故，說唯得至生相。此論辨得門中，云「先不成就今得成就」者，即是說初念得。於生相時名之為得，至現在時名為成就，合二義說故，言今得成就。古諸師云：成通新舊，得據新論，不成通新舊，捨據新論者。此同《婆沙》得唯在初，成通初後，捨時即名不成，得時即名成者。應改一字餘義無失，應云捨體即名不成，得體即名成就，雖時不同，其體一故。若就用明，得時非是成就時，成就時非得時，生時、現在時不同故。有人云：問得與成就何別？捨與不成就何別？解云：若法爾時創至生相，爾時名得。若流至現，方名成就。得時不名成就，成就時不名得。故《正理》第十二云「豈不乃至得體生時名為得故」。《正理》既言得體生時名得，故知法至生時名得，流至現在方名成就。若准此釋，不得論意。論既自云「得體生時名之為得」，因何妄謂法至生時。若謂要法至生相時方名得者，三類智邊得世俗智，此法豈是至生相耶？住世第一法時，於無漏根非捨而得、非滅而起，爾時所得諸無漏根，此時皆悉說能起耶？諸不起者皆不名得耶？如何唯說法至生時名之為得？又得時雖實，不得名成就，取共當名亦得名成就。此論於得門中云「或有眼界先不成就今得成就，非眼識，謂生欲界漸得眼根。」故知即於得時取其當名亦得名為成就眼也。捨、不成就，准上以釋。此上所辨皆是別義。若據通名，自有兩類。若就體以說，一切得皆亦得名成就，一切成就皆亦名得。若就時論，成就時亦名得，得時不名成就，以即前流至現在故。若得正在生相時，但名得不名成就，不可住世第一時成聖法故。又若然者，即有一時亦聖亦凡過也，應更思之。問：准下文「二通變化有三世得」，何故此中生上三禪中，眼識不現在前即不成就。答：泰法師引三藏釋，云：二通初禪繫，依初禪地發自地通，三世成就，如善習自地威儀、工巧有三世得。下文言二通三世得者，據初禪說。此中據身生上地起下地二通故，唯有法俱得，如汎借識說。問：生上三定起下眼、耳二通，是何無記？解言：《雜心》論主達磨多羅造《對法藏論》中說天眼、耳通是威儀無記，工巧唯欲，不通上界異熟，非異地起。變化唯意。既非餘三，明知二通定是威儀。有人破云：此解不然。違理、教故。如下論云「色界威儀心，二十心中從五心生，謂自界五，除通果心」者。此不成證，二十心中說威儀、工巧、通果唯是意識，威儀、工巧加行亦通四識、五識，然明相生不明加行，由彼不是正緣威儀、工巧心故。如說七業道色為體性，此七加行亦通非色，明七業道不辨非色。此亦如是，此四識雖是加行，然辨相生不取加行。然《婆沙》說四識、五識有威儀、工巧者，此就威儀、工巧加行中說為威儀、工巧。如殺加行亦名殺生，其通果心唯是意識，不通五識故。此論廣心云「欲界無覆無記分為四心，乃至威儀路等三無覆心。色、香、味、觸為所緣境，工巧處等亦緣於聲，如是三心唯是意識。」既言唯是意識，故知定遮五識。《婆沙》亦同應檢。既言工巧處亦緣於聲，故知威儀不緣聲也。威儀路、工巧處加行亦通四識、五識，故知四識是威儀加行，五識唯是工巧加行。四識、五識不通根本。有餘師說：有威儀路及工巧處所引意識具緣十二處境。此師亦唯意識。故知廣心說威儀心相生者，說意識威儀心。雜心論師二通為威儀心者，加行類故亦名威儀。將意識正威儀相生，難五識加行類威儀，豈相關預？然廣心中工巧、威儀加行通四識、五識，其通果心定唯意識，更無異端。因何引來將破雜心師義？必欲破斥，應求異理。言異理者，《雜心》既用四識為威儀加行可說是威儀。耳識非威儀加行，如何天耳通是威儀也？非威儀加行故。又威儀意識尚不緣聲，如何耳識是加行也？若言似威儀心，以能通緣十二處境者。此亦不然，論文唯說在意地故。准此等理，《雜心》所立非為正也。應言四無記心攝心不盡，借識之類非四攝也。耳識非威儀，上地無工巧，變化唯意識故。頌第二句云「獨得」者，初兩偏句「俱得」者，第三俱得句。「非」者，第四俱非句。「等」者，等成就門。長行中有二：先明得門、二明成就門也。得門中有將眼對識成四句，將眼對色成兩句。若得色必得眼，自有得眼不得色故。將識對色成四句，將鼻、舌對二識成四句。將鼻、舌對香、味亦成四句。將識對香、味述可句，將身對識成四句。將身對觸述可句，將觸對識成四句。成就門中准釋。然若成就眼定成就色，自有成就色不成就眼。餘文可解。

The treatise says: "Having thus discussed vipākaja and so forth..." The lower half of the stanza is the fifteenth topic, explaining the gate of possession. Now one should briefly expound the general and specific meanings of the two terms "acquisition" (prāpti) and "possession" (samanvāgama). According to the Vibhāṣā, fascicle 162: "Acquisition is only at the beginning; possession applies to both the beginning and what follows." According to the intent of this treatise, having previously not possessed, or having abandoned after acquiring, one subsequently attains this dharma. The acquisition of the first moment has a name that applies to both: it is called acquisition and is also called possession. The acquisition of subsequent moments is only called possession, not called acquisition. Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 12, says: "Is it not the case that even kṣayajñāna is not called acquired at the time of attaining Buddhahood, much less nirodhasamāpatti? Because when bodhisattvas assume the vajropamasamādhi, it is called acquiring kṣayajñāna, since when the entity of acquisition arises, it is called acquisition." The general meaning in the passages on acquisition and abandonment in the Vibhāṣā is also the same. According to the intent of this treatise, whether one previously did not possess, or after acquiring and abandoning later attains this dharma, it does not distinguish whether the dharma acquired has arisen or not arisen. It is simply that when the acquisition of the first attainment reaches the arising-characteristic (utpādalakṣaṇa), it is called acquisition; if it reaches the present, it is called possession. Therefore we know that the acquisition of the first moment has two names: it is called acquisition and is also called possession; the acquisition of subsequent moments is only called possession. Because the Vibhāṣā takes the acquisition of the first moment as having two names and the acquisition of subsequent moments as having only one name, it says: "Acquisition is only at the beginning; possession applies to both the beginning and what follows." Because the Nyāyānusāra distinguishes the time of acquisition, it says that it is only when acquisition reaches the arising-characteristic. When this treatise, in the gate of acquisition, says "previously not possessing, now acquiring possession," it speaks of the acquisition of the first moment. When it is at the arising-characteristic, it is called acquisition; when it reaches the present, it is called possession; combining the two senses, it says: "now acquiring possession." Ancient masters said: "Possession applies to both new and old; acquisition is based on the new. Non-possession applies to both new and old; abandonment is based on the new." This is the same as the Vibhāṣā's statement that acquisition is only at the beginning, possession applies to the beginning and what follows; when abandoned, it is immediately called non-possession, and when acquired, it is immediately called possession. If one character is changed, the remaining sense has no flaw: one should say "the entity of abandonment is immediately called non-possession, the entity of acquisition is immediately called possession; although their times differ, their entity is one." If explained in terms of function: the time of acquisition is not the time of possession, and the time of possession is not the time of acquisition, because the time of arising and the time of the present are different. Someone says: "Question: What is the difference between acquisition and possession? What is the difference between abandonment and non-possession? The explanation is: When a dharma at that time first reaches the arising-characteristic, at that time it is called acquisition. If it flows into the present, only then is it called possession. At the time of acquisition it is not called possession; at the time of possession it is not called acquisition. Therefore the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 12, says: 'Is it not the case that... up to: when the entity of acquisition arises, it is called acquisition.' Since the Nyāyānusāra says that when the entity of acquisition arises it is called acquisition, we know that when a dharma reaches arising it is called acquisition, and only when it flows into the present is it called possession." If following this explanation, one does not grasp the intent of the treatise. Since the treatise itself says "when the entity of acquisition arises, it is called acquisition," why falsely claim that it is when the dharma reaches arising? If one claims that only when a dharma reaches the arising-characteristic is it called acquisition, then when worldly knowledge (saṃvṛtijñāna) is acquired alongside the three kinds of anvayajñāna, has this dharma reached the arising-characteristic? When abiding in laukikāgradharma, regarding the anāsrava faculties, without abandoning them they are acquired, and without cessation they arise—can all the anāsrava faculties acquired at that time be said to arise at this time? Would all those that do not arise not be called acquired? How could one say only that when a dharma reaches arising it is called acquisition? Furthermore, although strictly speaking at the time of acquisition it cannot be called possession, taking its impending name, it may also be called possession. In the gate of acquisition, this treatise says: "Or there is the eye element which was previously not possessed and is now possessed, but not the eye consciousness: namely, one born in the desire realm gradually acquiring the eye faculty." Therefore we know that right at the time of acquisition, taking its impending name, it can also be called possessing the eye. Abandonment and non-possession are to be explained following the above. What has been analyzed above are all specific meanings. If based on general terms, there are naturally two categories: if spoken of in terms of entity, all acquisitions may also be called possession, and all possessions may also be called acquisition. If discussed in terms of time, at the time of possession it is also called acquisition, but at the time of acquisition it is not called possession, because that which preceded flows into the present. If acquisition is right at the arising-characteristic, it is only called acquisition and not called possession, because one cannot possess noble dharmas while abiding in laukikāgradharma. Furthermore, if that were the case, there would be the fault of being both noble and ordinary at the same time; this should be considered further. Question: According to the text below, "The two abhijñās and transformation minds have acquisition in the three times." Why is it that here, when born in the upper three dhyānas, if the eye consciousness is not present, it is not possessed? Answer: Dharma Master Tai cited the Tripiṭaka Master's explanation, saying: The two abhijñās are bound to the first dhyāna; relying on the first dhyāna stage, when one produces the abhijñās of one's own stage, they are possessed in the three times, just as through being well-practiced in the deportment (īryāpatha) and crafts (śilpasthāna) of one's own stage there is acquisition in the three times. When the text below says that the two abhijñās have acquisition in the three times, it speaks based on the first dhyāna. Here, it is based on the body being born in an upper stage and giving rise to the two abhijñās of a lower stage; therefore there is only simultaneous acquisition with the dharma, just like the general explanation of borrowing consciousness. Question: When one born in the upper three concentrations gives rise to the lower eye and ear abhijñās, what kind of indeterminate (avyākṛta) are they? The explanation says: In the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra composed by the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya master Dharmatrāta, it says that the divine eye and ear abhijñās are deportment indeterminate (īryāpathāvyākṛta); crafts are only in Kāmadhātu, not extending to the upper realms; vipāka does not arise in a different stage; and transformation is mental consciousness only. Since they are not the other three, it is clear that the two abhijñās are definitely deportment. Someone refutes this, saying: This explanation is incorrect, because it contradicts reason and teaching. As the treatise below says: "The deportment mind in the form realm, among the twenty minds, arises from five minds: namely, five of its own realm, excluding the transformation-fruition mind." This does not constitute proof. Among the twenty minds, it is said that deportment, crafts, and transformation-fruition are mental consciousness only; the preparatory stages (prayoga) of deportment and crafts also extend to the four consciousnesses and five consciousnesses, but when explaining reciprocal arising, it does not explain the preparatory stages, because those are not minds that directly take deportment and crafts as their object. Just as it is said that the entity of the seven paths of action (karmapatha) is form (rūpa), the preparatory stages of these seven also extend to non-form, yet in explaining the seven paths of action one does not differentiate non-form. This is also like that: although these four consciousnesses are preparatory stages, when analyzing reciprocal arising, one does not take the preparatory stages. However, when the Vibhāṣā says that the four consciousnesses and five consciousnesses have deportment and crafts, this is spoken of within the preparatory stages of deportment and crafts as being deportment and crafts. Just as the preparatory stage of killing is also called taking life, its transformation-fruition mind is mental consciousness only, not extending to the five consciousnesses. Therefore, this treatise in "Broadening the Mind" says: "The non-obscured indeterminate (anivṛtāvyākṛta) of Kāmadhātu is divided into four minds... up to: the three non-obscured minds such as deportment paths take visible form, smell, taste, and tangibles as their cognitive objects; crafts and so forth also take sound as object; these three minds are mental consciousness only." Since it says they are mental consciousness only, we know it definitely excludes the five consciousnesses. The Vibhāṣā is also the same and should be examined. Since it says that crafts also take sound as object, we know that deportment does not take sound as object. The preparatory stages of deportment paths and crafts also extend to the four consciousnesses and five consciousnesses; therefore we know that the four consciousnesses are the preparatory stages of deportment, and the five consciousnesses are the preparatory stages of crafts only. The four consciousnesses and five consciousnesses do not extend to the fundamental [minds]. Other masters say: The mental consciousness induced by deportment paths and crafts comprehensively takes the twelve sense-spheres as its cognitive object. These masters also hold it to be mental consciousness only. Therefore we know that when "Broadening the Mind" speaks of the reciprocal arising of deportment minds, it speaks of the deportment mind of mental consciousness. For the master of the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, the two abhijñās being deportment minds are also called deportment because they belong to the category of preparatory stages. If one takes the reciprocal arising of the actual deportment of mental consciousness to refute the deportment of the preparatory-stage category of the five consciousnesses, how are they related? However, in "Broadening the Mind," the preparatory stages of crafts and deportment extend to the four consciousnesses and five consciousnesses, and the transformation-fruition mind is definitely mental consciousness only, without any alternative view. Why cite it to refute the position of the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya master? If one insists on refuting it, one should seek another rationale. As for another rationale: since the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya uses the four consciousnesses as the preparatory stages of deportment, they can be called deportment; but ear consciousness is not a preparatory stage of deportment, so how can the divine ear abhijñā be deportment? Because it is not a preparatory stage of deportment. Furthermore, the deportment mental consciousness does not even take sound as its object, so how could ear consciousness be its preparatory stage? If one says that it resembles the deportment mind because it can comprehensively take the twelve sense-spheres as its object, this is also incorrect, because the text of the treatise speaks of this only in the mental stage. According to such reasoning, what the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya establishes is not correct. One should say that the four indeterminate minds do not subsume all minds: instances such as borrowing consciousness are not subsumed under the four, because ear consciousness is not deportment, the upper stages have no crafts, and transformation is mental consciousness only. When the second line of the verse says "acquired alone," it refers to the first two single alternatives; "acquired together" refers to the third alternative of being acquired together; "neither" refers to the fourth alternative of neither being acquired; "and so forth" equals the gate of possession. In the prose commentary there are two parts: first, explaining the gate of acquisition; second, explaining the gate of possession. In the gate of acquisition, pairing the eye with consciousness forms four alternatives; pairing the eye with visible form forms two alternatives: if one acquires visible form, one definitely acquires the eye, but there are cases of acquiring the eye without acquiring visible form. Pairing consciousness with visible form forms four alternatives; pairing the nose and tongue with the two consciousnesses forms four alternatives; pairing the nose and tongue with smells and tastes also forms four alternatives; pairing consciousness with smells and tastes forms affirmative propositions; pairing the body with consciousness forms four alternatives; pairing the body with tangibles forms affirmative propositions; pairing tangibles with consciousness forms four alternatives. In the gate of possession, it is explained accordingly. However, if one possesses the eye, one definitely possesses visible form, but there are cases of possessing visible form without possessing the eye. The remaining text is easy to understand.