俱舍論疏 2.120

2.120

論「應知同分至故如色說」，此即第二對根顯差別。得同分名有二：一諸不可共用之法，若於用者名為同分，於不用者亦得說名此是同分，彼同分亦爾。二諸可共用者各於用者名為同分，於不用者不名同分，彼同分亦爾。「應知同分至乃至意界亦爾」者，此是初不共用。言「色即不然至相撲等色」者，此是第二共受用也。《正理論》云「亦有色界於一切眾生不名同分，如妙高山中色。」言「眼無是事至建立同分及彼同分」，釋共、不共得名所以。言「如說色界，聲香味觸應知亦爾」者，類釋餘四境。言「聲可如色至不應如色說」者，外難。聲離中知，可如色說。三境合知，一取餘不取，如何是共？言「雖有是理至故如色說」者，通難。雖此三境正與根合不共覺等，未根合前可共受用。謂或與彼此根合不決定故，故如色說。眼不如是，不如眼說。《正理論》云「何緣說眼同分及彼同分異於色耶？容多有情同見一色，無用一眼二有情觀。聲如色說，是共境故。香、味、觸三如內界說，非共境故。然諸世間依假名想，有言我等同嗅此香、同甞此味、同覺此觸。」准《正理》文，三境如眼說，此論如色說。二論各依《婆沙》一，說意各別。此論以未來香可容生二鼻根，由不定故，如色說。《正理論》據正嗅香，不可共嗅，故如眼說。今詳二說，此論理長。所以知然？鼻根、鼻識境界必同。一切眾生鼻識既於一切香有其三定，此即香境，是其共緣。識既是共，故知於根亦共。眼即不爾，唯自識望眼有其三定，他識望眼全無依義，何得同香？如何謂其三境如眼說耶？三境雖與色不全同，然是共境，其義決定。

The Śāstra says: "It should be known that the sabhāga [dhatus]... is therefore explained like the rūpa-[dhātu]." This is the second [section], which clarifies the differences in contrast to the sense-faculties. There are two ways to obtain the designation 'sabhāga': First, for all phenomena that cannot be shared in use, if they are [sabhāga] with respect to the user, they may also be called sabhāga with respect to the non-user, and the tat-sabhāga is likewise. Second, for all phenomena that can be shared in use, they are each called sabhāga with respect to their user, but are not called sabhāga with respect to their non-user, and the tat-sabhāga is likewise. What is stated from "It should be known that the sabhāga [dhātus]... up to the mano-dhātu is also like this" refers to the former, which are not shared in use. What is stated from "Rūpa is not like this... up to rūpa such as wrestlers" refers to the latter, which are shared in use. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "There are also rūpa-dhātus that are not called sabhāga with respect to all sentient beings, such as the rūpa within Mount Sumeru." The statement "The eye is not like this... establishes the sabhāga and tat-sabhāga" explains the reasons for obtaining designations as shared or not shared. The statement "As said of the rūpa-dhātu, sound, smell, taste, and tangibles should be known to be likewise" analogously explains the remaining four sense-objects. The statement "Sound may be like rūpa... it should not be spoken of like rūpa" is an external objection: sound is known at a distance, so it may be spoken of like rūpa; but the three sense-objects are known upon contact—when one apprehends them, others do not apprehend them—how can they be shared? The statement "Although this reasoning exists... is therefore explained like the rūpa-[dhātu]" resolves the objection: although these three sense-objects are not shared in perception when directly contacted by the faculty, before being contacted by the faculty they can be shared in use. Because their contact with this or that faculty is not predetermined, they are explained like rūpa. The eye is not like this, so they are not explained like the eye. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "For what reason are the sabhāga and tat-sabhāga of the eye said to differ from rūpa? It is possible for many sentient beings to see one single rūpa together, but there is no case of two sentient beings using a single eye to look. Sound is explained like rūpa because it is a shared object. The three—smell, taste, and tangibles—are explained like the internal dhātus because they are not shared objects. However, worldly people, relying on conventional designations and notions, say: 'We smell this same fragrance, taste this same flavor, and feel this same tangible together.'" According to the text of the *Nyāyānusāra*, the three sense-objects are explained like the eye, whereas this śāstra explains them like rūpa. The two treatises each rely on one explanation in the *Vibhāṣā*; their viewpoints are distinct. This śāstra considers that a future fragrance may possibly give rise to two nose-faculties, and because it is undetermined, it is explained like rūpa. The *Nyāyānusāra* is based on the moment of actually smelling the fragrance, when it cannot be smelled together, and therefore explains it like the eye. Examining the two explanations now, the reasoning of this śāstra is superior. How is this known? The nose-faculty and the nose-consciousness must have the same object. Since the nose-consciousnesses of all sentient beings have their three determinations regarding all smells, this sense-object of smell is their shared object. Since the consciousness is shared, we know that with respect to the faculty it is also shared. The eye is not like this: only one's own consciousness has its three determinations with respect to one's eye; another's consciousness has no relation of reliance on one's eye at all, so how could it be the same as smell? How could it be said that the three sense-objects are explained like the eye? Although the three sense-objects are not entirely identical to rūpa, they are nevertheless shared objects; that meaning is definite.