俱舍論疏 2.209
俱舍論疏 2.209
- Language
- Classical Chinese
2.209
論「又許極微至亦無斯過」,破初師也。《正理》救云「經主復說又許極微若有方分,觸與不觸皆應有分。若無方分,設許相觸亦無過者。此說非理。有分、方分名異義同,立無分言已遮方分,如何於此復更生疑,謂許極微若有方分,既無方分如何可觸?又遍體相觸或觸一分,二皆有過,前已具論。如何復言若無方分,設許相觸亦無斯過。是故所言,無極微量觸色所間,故名無間。如是無間大種極微,隣近生時假說為觸。其義成就。」若作俱舍師救,應反詰言:汝立無方分極微何不相觸?若言相觸成過失者,言不相觸亦不免過,對向六方面不同故。若言極微各有勢用,更相拒遏不相觸者,此之勢用為離體不?若離體者,便同勝論業句義也。若不離體,體外無用何不相觸?故亦成過。
The passage in the treatise from 'Furthermore, if it is accepted that atoms' up to 'there would also be no such fault' refutes the first master. The Nyāyānusāra rescues [the position], stating: 'The author of the sūtra-commentary further says: "Furthermore, if it is accepted that atoms have directional parts, then whether touching or not touching, they must possess parts. If they lack directional parts, even if contact is accepted, there would be no fault." This statement is unreasonable. Possessing parts (āvayava) and directional parts (digbhāga) differ in name but are identical in meaning; stating that they have no parts has already excluded directional parts. How can a doubt arise regarding this again, saying: "if it is accepted that atoms have directional parts"? Since they lack directional parts, how can they touch? Moreover, touching with the entire body or touching by a single part—both entail faults, as has already been fully discussed previously. How can he say again: "If they lack directional parts, even if contact is accepted, there would also be no such fault"? Therefore, what is meant by "no tangible matter of the measure of an atom intervening, hence called contiguous," is that when primary element atoms that are contiguous arise in proximity, they are metaphorically called contact. Its meaning is established.' If the master of the Kośa were to mount a defense, he should cross-examine: "Why do the atoms without directional parts that you establish not touch? If you say that contact entails a fault, saying they do not touch also cannot avoid fault, because their facing the six directions is not identical. If you say that atoms each possess dynamic efficacy that mutually resists so that they do not touch, is this dynamic efficacy separate from their substantial entity or not? If it is separate from the entity, then it would be identical to the category of action (karman) in the Vaiśeṣika system. If it is not separate from the entity, then since there is no efficacy outside the entity, why do they not touch? Therefore, it also entails a fault."
Translations (1)
- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation
Linked texts (1)
- 俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese