俱舍論疏 21.102

21.102

論「自相續中至究竟斷故」，論主自為有部釋出斷所從也。由無間道力，令自相續煩惱得斷。由得斷故，過去、未來於其所緣無隨增力，不能繫縛於所緣境。由斯他相續中諸煩惱，及一切色、不染污法，亦名為斷，不為自相續中煩惱縛故。准《正理》釋，一切煩惱斷，皆由見彼煩惱所緣斷是其根本，餘之三斷是其末也。故《正理》云「諸惑永斷定從所緣，以於所緣遍知力故令惑永斷，如前已說。然惑所緣總有二種，謂有繫事及無繫事。緣有繫事為境諸惑，及從此惑力所引生，不緣此事為境諸惑。」解云：緣有繫是自界緣。或力引生不緣此事，為境諸惑是，及他界緣惑。如是二惑，於一有情現相續中引起諸得。設無染污心現在前，此得恒行無有間斷，為去、來世諸惑果因（已上緣有繫事）。如是應知、緣無繫事為境諸惑、及因此惑勢力所引、隨後現行不緣此事為境諸惑、所引起得類亦同前。緣無繫事為境諸惑、是滅、道下無漏緣惑，此惑勢力所引。乃至言不緣此事為境諸惑，是滅、道下有漏緣。言為去、來惑果因者，謂此諸得在現世時，是過去惑等流性故說之為果，是未來惑生緣性故說之為因。有得可生，無得不生。然此諸得與斷對治等流諸得現行相違，能持去、來所斷諸惑，故令一切緣此事惑及緣餘惑相續而轉，緣此事境諸斷對治等流起時惑得便絕。所得諸惑於自所緣雖體猶有，而由因、果得永絕故，可說名斷（由道知自界緣惑境故，他界緣亦斷。由道知無漏緣惑境故，有漏緣亦斷）。以於少境若未遍知，緣此境惑及因此惑力所引起緣餘境惑，所引去、來惑果因得，現相續中無間而轉。若於少境得遍知時，惑所引得便不復轉，故知惑斷定從所緣。准上道理，證知惑斷定從所緣。要由道見此根本惑所緣境故，餘緣此境惑斷及所引惑斷故。故知惑斷定從所緣斷。然於此中雖惑與道無俱行理，而道觀見苦等境故諸惑便斷。此義難了，應舉喻明。譬如有人為鼠所囓，雖無熱悶迷亂等時，而由熱等因毒在身，故恒名有病者，非無病人。要服毒相違阿揭陀藥方名無病者，非有病人。雖阿揭陀與熱等病不俱時在一身中行，而阿揭陀威德力故，滅身中毒，熱等不生，說阿揭陀能除眾病。如是聖道雖與諸惑不俱時在一身中行，而聖道生威德力故，滅果、因得諸惑不生，能令行者身器清淨惑不續故，說名為斷。准上論文，應知從所緣可令諸惑斷，非是自身中結法及一果等，由斷同部同品能縛故得無為也。是由治道見惑所緣斷其得故，於其所緣不復現縛，亦斷過、未性縛之用。准此論文、即是自身結法及一果等，由道力故，令果、因得斷，於所緣境無縛能故名之為斷，不是不被他緣縛故名之為斷。《婆沙》亦爾，非是明斷所緣縛得無為義也。因何古今諸德誤解此文？

In the treatise, "In one's own continuum […] because they are completely severed", the author of the treatise himself explains for the Vaibhāṣikas that from which abandonment occurs. By the power of the uninterrupted path, the acquisitions of afflictions in one's own continuum are severed. Because the acquisitions are severed, past and future have no power of increased growth with respect to their cognitive objects and cannot bind the objective realms. On account of this, the afflictions in other continuums, as well as all matter and undefiled dharmas, are also called abandoned, because they are not bound by the afflictions in one's own continuum. Based on the explanation in the Nyāyānusāra, the abandonment of all afflictions is rooted in abandonment through seeing the cognitive objects of those afflictions; the remaining three abandonments are its branches. Hence the Nyāyānusāra states: "The perpetual abandonment of defilements is determinately from the cognitive object, because through the power of thoroughly knowing the cognitive object, the defilements are perpetually abandoned, as was said before. However, the cognitive objects of defilements are in total of two kinds: things with bondage and things without bondage. Defilements having things with bondage as their objective domain, and defilements induced by the power of these defilements that do not have this thing as their objective domain." Explanation: Taking things with bondage as object refers to taking one's own realm as object. The defilements induced by their power that do not take this thing as their objective domain are those defilements taking other realms as object. These two kinds of defilements induce acquisitions in the present continuum of a single sentient being. Even if an undefiled mind is currently manifest, these acquisitions constantly operate without interruption, serving as the fruit and cause of the defilements of the past and future worlds (the above concerns taking things with bondage as object). In this way one should know: for defilements having things without bondage as their objective domain, and defilements induced by the power of these defilements that subsequently manifest without taking this thing as their objective domain, the acquisitions induced by them are of the same class as before. Defilements having things without bondage as their objective domain are the defilements taking the anāsrava as object under cessation and the path; [those defilements] induced by the power of these defilements, up to the words 'defilements not taking this thing as their objective domain', are those taking the sāsrava as object under cessation and the path. When it says they serve as the fruit and cause of past and future defilements, this means that when these acquisitions are in the present world, because they are the commensurate nature (niṣyanda) of past defilements, they are called their fruit; and because they are the generative condition of future defilements, they are called their cause. Where there is acquisition, they can arise; where there is no acquisition, they do not arise. However, these acquisitions run contrary to the manifestation of the acquisitions that are commensurate with the antidote of abandonment; being capable of retaining the defilements abandoned in the past and future, they cause all defilements taking this thing as object and those taking other things as object to roll on in continuous succession. When the commensurate states of the various antidotes of abandonment taking this objective thing as their domain arise, the acquisitions of defilement are immediately cut off. Although the defilements to be acquired still exist in their own substance with respect to their own cognitive objects, because the acquisitions that are cause and fruit are perpetually cut off, they can be said to be abandoned (because the path knows the objective domain of defilements taking one's own realm as object, those taking other realms as object are also abandoned; because the path knows the objective domain of defilements taking the anāsrava as object, those taking the sāsrava as object are also abandoned). For if one has not yet thoroughly known a small objective domain, the defilements taking this domain as object and the defilements taking other domains as object induced by the power of these defilements—the acquisitions that are fruit and cause of past and future defilements induced by them—will roll on without interruption in the present continuum. When one attains thorough knowledge with respect to a small domain, the acquisitions induced by the defilements no longer roll on; therefore we know that the abandonment of defilements is determinately from the cognitive object. Based on the reasoning above, it is proven that the abandonment of defilements is determinately from the cognitive object: it is necessary that the path sees the cognitive objective domain of these root defilements so that the other defilements taking this domain as object are abandoned, as well as the defilements induced by them. Therefore we know that the abandonment of defilements is determinately abandonment from the cognitive object. Yet in this context, although it is impossible for defilement and path to proceed simultaneously, because the path contemplates and sees the objective domains such as suffering, the defilements are immediately abandoned. This meaning is difficult to comprehend, so a metaphor should be cited to clarify it: For example, if a person is bitten by a rat, even at times when they do not have fever, stupor, confusion, etc., because the poison that is the cause of fever and so forth is in the body, they are constantly called a diseased person, not an undiseased person. It is only when they take the agada medicine that counters the poison that they are called an undiseased person, not a diseased person. Although the agada medicine and illnesses such as fever do not operate simultaneously in a single body, through the sovereign power of the agada medicine the poison in the body is extinguished, fever and the like do not arise, and the agada medicine is said to be able to eliminate the multitude of illnesses. In the same way, although the noble path and the defilements do not operate simultaneously in a single body, through the sovereign power of the arising of the noble path the acquisitions that are fruit and cause are extinguished, defilements do not arise, and it can cause the practitioner's physical vessel to become pure so that defilements do not continue; hence it is called abandoned. Based on the text above, one should know that defilements can be caused to be abandoned from the cognitive object; it is not that the fettering dharmas and single fruits within one's own body attain the unconditioned through severing the binding capacity of the same category and same grade. It is because the antidote path sees the cognitive object of the defilements and severs their acquisitions that they no longer actively bind with respect to their cognitive objects, and it also severs the function of inherent bondage in the past and future. According to this text, it is simply that the fettering dharmas and single fruits within one's own body, through the power of the path, have their acquisitions that are fruit and cause severed; because they lack binding efficacy with respect to their objective cognitive domains, they are called abandoned—it is not that because they are not bound by other cognitive objects they are called abandoned. The Vibhāṣā is also like this; it does not explain that one attains the unconditioned through severing the bondage of cognitive objects. Why have past and present masters misunderstood this text?