俱舍論疏 21.111

21.111

論「等言為明舉事未盡」者，四遠之中，此略舉故，義未盡也。《正理》釋云「與現相隣，如何名遠？彼非一切五識境故，亦非一分意識境故。或時分中有作用者說名為近，過去、未來定無作用，故說名遠。不可難言：諸無為法永無作用應名為遠。以時遠近依時而立，故於三時若有作用說名為近，若無作用說名為遠。諸無為法越一切時，如何約時難令成遠？如處遠近依處而立，非處不然。若難無為相有異故應成相遠，理亦無遮，相遠貫通一切法故。若爾，何故無為名近？且虛空體遍一切處，相無礙故說名為近。非擇滅體不由功用，於一切體一切處時皆可得故，說名為近。擇滅無為，諸有精進正修行者斷諸惑時，於一切體無有差別，速證得故，說名為近。無為名近理趣既然，而經主說去、來二世例亦應然，謂在去、來靜慮等法，如無為法等，速得故亦應近者，由先釋理，為例不成。無多有情於一切體，無有差別共得義故。或許例然亦無有失，如一切法雖互相望相有異故皆名相遠，而依餘理許說少分名近無失。如是去、來雖約時分無作用故皆名時遠，而依餘理許說少分名近無失。非依餘理名為遠故，與相、時分遠義相違。經主此中作如是說：若依正理應說去、來離法自相故名為遠，未來未得法自相故，過去已捨法自相故。彼說偏與正理相違，諸自相無皆非遠性，此成遠性必有自相，遠性攝故，如餘遠性。謂見所餘相違性等是遠性攝，自相非無。既許去、來是遠性攝，必應許彼自相非無。說自相無而名遠性，故彼偏與正理相違。」

On the Śāstra's statement: "The word 'and so forth' is meant to make clear that the cited instances are not exhaustive": among the four kinds of distance, because this was merely an abbreviated citation, the meaning was not exhaustive. The Nyāyānusāra explains: "Although adjacent to the present, how are they called distant? Because they are not the objects of any of the five consciousnesses, nor are they the objects of a part of the mental consciousness. Alternatively, that which possesses activity within temporal duration is called 'near'; the past and future are definitely without activity, and therefore are called 'distant'. One cannot raise the objection: 'All unconditioned phenomena are perpetually without activity, and therefore ought to be called distant.' Because temporal distance and nearness are established on the basis of time, within the three times, if there is activity it is called 'near', and if there is no activity it is called 'distant'. All unconditioned phenomena transcend all time; how could one press them with temporal terms to establish distance? Just as spatial distance and nearness are established on the basis of space, non-spatial [phenomena] are not like that. If one objects that because their characteristics are different, unconditioned phenomena ought to be 'distant in characteristic', in principle there is no objection to this either, because distance in characteristic runs through all phenomena. If that is so, why are unconditioned phenomena called 'near'? First, space as an entity is omnipresent, and because its characteristic is unimpeded, it is called 'near'. Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha as an entity does not depend on effort and can be obtained across all entities, places, and times, and therefore is called 'near'. As for the unconditioned pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, when those who have vigor and practice properly sever defilements, they swiftly realize it without distinction across all entities, and therefore it is called 'near'. Since the rationale for calling unconditioned phenomena 'near' is like this, yet the author of the Śāstra says that the past and future periods should by analogy also be like this—meaning that phenomena such as dhyānas in the past and future, like unconditioned phenomena, are quickly attained and thus should also be near—by the rationale explained previously, the analogy does not hold. For there is no meaning of multiple sentient beings commonly attaining them without distinction across all entities. Alternatively, even if one concedes that the analogy holds, there is no error: just as all phenomena, though called 'distant in characteristic' with respect to one another because their characteristics differ, can without error be conceded in a small part to be called 'near' based on another rationale; so too, past and future, though called 'temporally distant' because they lack activity with respect to temporal duration, can without error be conceded in a small part to be called 'near' based on another rationale. Being called distant based on another rationale does not contradict the meaning of distance in characteristic or temporal duration. Here the author of the Śāstra makes the following statement: 'If one follows correct principle, one should say that the past and future are called distant because they are separated from the own-characteristic of phenomena: the future has not yet obtained the own-characteristic of phenomena, and the past has already relinquished the own-characteristic of phenomena.' What he says entirely contradicts correct principle: that which lacks own-characteristic is never of the nature of distance; this which constitutes the nature of distance must possess an own-characteristic, because it is subsumed under the nature of distance, like other natures of distance. That is to say, we see that the other contradictory natures, etc., are subsumed under the nature of distance and are not without an own-characteristic. Since it is conceded that the past and future are subsumed under the nature of distance, it must be conceded that their own-characteristics are not non-existent. To say that they lack own-characteristic and yet are named the nature of distance entirely contradicts correct principle."