俱舍論疏 29.108

29.108

論「然犢子部至不一不異」，大文第二破異部也。文中有二：一述宗計、二問答應破。此文初也。諸部之中唯犢子部執有實我，謂所知法中有五法藏，謂有為法分為三世，無為第四，不可說法藏第五。與前有為、無為非一非異。此中且說與蘊不一不異，即執此法以為我體。此五法藏，同《大般若》五種法海，謂三世、無為及不可說。不可說者是勝義諦，犢子部不染邪智，謂勝義諦是其我體。不同外道染污邪智，執有實我是我見攝。

On the Śāstra's statement: "However, the Vātsīputrīyas […] neither identical nor different": This is the second major section, refuting other schools. Within the text there are two parts: first, setting forth their doctrinal tenet; second, refuting it through questions and answers. This passage is the first. Among all the schools, only the Vātsīputrīyas maintain that there is a real self. They say that among knowable phenomena (jñeya) there are five repositories of phenomena (dharma-piṭaka): conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta) are divided across the three times, the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) is the fourth, and the ineffable repository of phenomena (anabhilāpya-dharma-piṭaka) is the fifth. It is neither identical with nor different from the preceding conditioned and unconditioned [repositories]. Here it is spoken of provisionally as neither identical with nor different from the aggregates, and they hold this very phenomenon to be the entity of the self. These five repositories of phenomena are identical to the five kinds of ocean of phenomena in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra, namely, the three times, the unconditioned, and the ineffable. The ineffable is the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya); the Vātsīputrīyas, with non-defiled errant cognition, hold that the ultimate truth is their self-entity. This is unlike non-Buddhists who, with defiled errant cognition, hold that there is a real self, which is subsumed under the view of self (satkāyadṛṣṭi).