俱舍論疏 5.135

5.135

論「《施設論》說至捨壽行故」，引論四句答也。「第一句者感壽異熟業力盡故」者，此通二義：一任業自力盡故不能招果、二由邊際定等損其業力不能招果。捨壽行復有二義：一亦得同其外緣損壽、二亦得同其壽盡故死，與外緣損義不全同。外緣損壽，非令業力不招異熟，但緣強於業，壽隨緣損。捨壽行義轉其業力令招富果，與壽業盡亦不全同，壽業力盡非是他緣，捨壽行力是別緣令盡，各有片同。《正理》將同業盡，此論謂同橫緣。兩師各據一途，互無全是亦不全非。《正理》先彈，自招其失。此第一句壽盡故死。第二句即福盡故死；第三句是俱盡故死；第四句是俱不盡死，但由抂橫緣死。「又亦應言捨壽行故」者，以其片同第四句故引入此中。故《正理》云「不應復言捨壽行故，義已攝在初句中故者，以其片同初句義故。」廣如前釋。

The treatise says: "The Prajñaptiśāstra says, up to: because of relinquishing the formations of life." It adduces the treatise's four alternatives to answer. As for "the first alternative is because the power of karma projecting the vipāka of life is exhausted": this covers two senses: first, because the karma's own power is naturally exhausted, it cannot bring about the fruit; second, because borderline absorption (prāntakoṭika-dhyāna) and the like impair its karmic power, it cannot bring about the fruit. Relinquishing the formations of life also has two senses: first, it can also be assimilated to external conditions impairing life; second, it can also be assimilated to death due to exhaustion of life, not being entirely identical with impairment by external conditions. Impairment of life by external conditions does not prevent karmic power from bringing about vipāka, but rather the conditions are stronger than the karma, so life is impaired in accordance with conditions. Relinquishing the formations of life diverts its karmic power to bring about the fruit of wealth, which is also not entirely identical with the exhaustion of the karma of life; the exhaustion of the power of the karma of life is not due to other conditions, whereas the power of relinquishing the formations of life is caused to be exhausted by a distinct condition, so each shares a partial similarity. The Nyāyānusāra assimilates it to the exhaustion of karma; this treatise assimilates it to accidental external conditions. The two masters each rely on one approach; neither is entirely right nor entirely wrong. The Nyāyānusāra criticized first and incurred its own fault. This first alternative is death due to exhaustion of life. The second alternative is death due to exhaustion of merit. The third alternative is death due to the exhaustion of both. The fourth alternative is death when neither is exhausted, dying merely through violent accidental conditions. As for "and one should also say: 'because of relinquishing the formations of life'": because it shares a partial similarity with the fourth alternative, it is brought into this. Hence the Nyāyānusāra says: "One should not say further 'because of relinquishing the formations of life', because its meaning is already subsumed under the first alternative"—this is because it shares a partial similarity with the meaning of the first alternative. This is fully explained as above.