俱舍論疏 5.265

5.265

「論曰至然不可說」，第一界地門也。於中有二：一云唯欲、色界；一云通無色界，然不可說。二說之中，前說為正。就前說中，有其二說：一云唯隨語繫，謂唯二地，謂欲界、初定；二云隨身繫，謂通五地，謂欲、四禪。舊《婆沙》有四說、兩重評文。初二說，一云隨語、一云隨身，評取隨語。後兩說，一云欲色界、二云通無色，評取前說。深法師云：「一論不可有二評故。隨語繫者是後評，但說不許無色有名，非是欲許隨身繫也。」法師此釋深有理趣。准《正理論》等解名、句、文、身，皆依聲有文，依文有名。又此論云「有情名聲謂語表業」，故知餘聲無有名也。所依語業既唯二地，如何能依之名通於五地？若謂《正理》等論雙舉二故則容兩是，亦不應理。此論亦舉無色界名而不是非，豈亦兼取？故知名隨語繫，義決定也。問：若爾，何故但法無礙解通其五地，而無論文說唯二地？答：准論所說，名繫地中即敘二說。法無礙解繫地之中即唯說通五地，故知法無礙解據能緣說。若隨語、隨身，皆容五地，心能緣故。由此無文敘二說也。法無礙解是了法慧，如何即令與所解名定同地也。詞無礙解是其能作諸方語慧，由此唯於發語地有，不通餘地。有人自作問答云：問：發語通果心不緣三界，如何名等能詮三界？解云：雖發語通果心不緣三界，然通果加行遠能發心能緣三界，故所發名能詮三界。詳此問答，未達一切發語心也。一切近因等起發業之心，皆緣色聲為境，因何偏問通果心也。加行之中有緣其名，未必定緣所詮義也。如多人不識摩尼寶等，豈不得有此寶與名。

On the Śāstra's statement: "The Śāstra says ... but they cannot be spoken," this is the first section, on realm and plane (dhātu-bhūmi). Within this there are two positions: one says they pertain only to the desire and form realms; the other says they also extend to the formless realm, but cannot be spoken. Between these two positions, the former is correct. Within that former position, there are two views: one says they are bound strictly along with speech, meaning they belong to only two planes, namely the desire realm and the first dhyāna; the second says they are bound along with the body, meaning they extend to five planes, namely the desire realm and the four dhyānas. The old Vibhāṣā has four views and two tiers of evaluative judgments. In the first two views, one says they are bound along with speech, and the other says along with the body; the judgment selects "bound along with speech." In the latter two views, one says they belong to the desire and form realms, and the second says they extend to the formless realm; the judgment selects the former view. Dharma Master Shen says: "Because a single śāstra cannot have two judgments, 'bound along with speech' is the subsequent judgment, which merely states that names are not admitted in the formless realm, not that it intends to admit their being bound along with the body." The Dharma Master's explanation here is deeply reasonable. According to texts such as the Nyāyānusāra explaining name-collections, phrase-collections, and syllable-collections, syllables are always based upon sound, and names are based upon syllables. Moreover, this Śāstra states: "Sound pertaining to sentient beings is called vocal informative karma." From this we know that other sounds have no names. Since the vocal karma that serves as their basis belongs to only two planes, how could the names based upon it extend to five planes? If one claims that because treatises like the Nyāyānusāra present both views, both are admissible, this also does not stand to reason. This Śāstra also presents the view that names exist in the formless realm without passing judgment on right or wrong—could it be that it accepts both as well? Therefore, we know that the doctrine that names are bound along with speech is definitive. Question: If so, why is it that only the unhindered comprehension of phenomena (dharma-pratisaṃvid) extends to the five planes, while no treatise says it belongs to only two planes? Answer: According to what the Śāstras state, in determining the plane to which names are bound, two views are recorded. But in determining the plane of the unhindered comprehension of phenomena, it is said exclusively to extend to the five planes; thus we know that the unhindered comprehension of phenomena is stated in terms of what can be cognized [by it]. If one considers being bound along with speech or bound along with the body, both can be admitted into the five planes because the mind can cognize them. For this reason, no text records two views [for dharma-pratisaṃvid]. The unhindered comprehension of phenomena is the wisdom that thoroughly understands dharmas; how could it be made necessarily of the same plane as the names understood? The unhindered comprehension of language (nirukti-pratisaṃvid) is the wisdom capable of producing speech in various local languages; on this account, it exists only in planes where speech is produced, and does not extend to other planes. Someone raised a question and answer on his own, saying: Question: The mind resulting from mastery (abhijñā-phala-citta) that produces speech does not cognize the three realms; how then can the names and so forth it produces express the three realms? The explanation says: Although the mind resulting from mastery that produces speech does not cognize the three realms, the preparatory application (prayoga) for mastery, which can distantly motivate that mind, can cognize the three realms; therefore, the names produced can express the three realms. When we scrutinize this question and answer, it fails to understand all minds that produce speech. All minds that instigate karma through immediate motivating causation (samutthāna) take visible form and sound as their cognitive object; why single out the mind resulting from mastery in the question? Within preparatory application there is cognition of names, yet it does not necessarily cognize the meaning expressed. Just as many people do not recognize a maṇi jewel or the like—how could it be that this jewel and its name do not exist?