俱舍論疏 5.47

5.47

論「例無想定至名滅盡定」，答也。此亦然者，但例滅心、心所，非同例餘也。《婆沙》一百五十二云「問：此滅盡定幾物為體？有說：此定一物為體，若滅現前即名無心故。問：云何一滅剎那現前即名無心？答：如一受剎那現前即名有受，一想剎那現前即名有想，一識剎那現前即名有識。如是一滅剎那現前即名無心，斯有何過？有說：此定十一物為體，以十大地法及心滅故。有說：此定二十一物為體，以十大地、善大地法及心滅故。如是說者，隨滅爾所心、心所法，即有爾所物現前為此定體。」此與第三師別者，評家兼取欣、厭，第三唯二十一，故不同也。准義，無想有二十二，謂加欣；滅定有二十二，謂加厭也。二定既唯滅心、心所為數，故知無想亦唯滅心、心所，四相准同。又《婆沙》一百五十三云「問：入滅定時滅何等心、心所法？為過去？為未來？為現在？若過去者，過去已滅，復何所滅。若未來者，未來未生，云何所滅。若現在者，現在不住，復云何滅。設非定力，亦自滅故。答：應作是說，滅於未來。問：未來未至云何可滅？答：住於現在，遮於未來心、心所法令不相續，故說為滅。如斷城路、閉門竪幢，不令人入出，故名除寇。此亦如是。有說：通滅未來、現在。問：現必不住，復云何滅？設非定力，亦自滅故。答：先現在世心、心所法，令有緣法續起而滅。今現在世心、心所法，不令有緣法續起而滅。此由誰力？所謂定力。上二說中應取前釋，順餘文故。」有人云：以是有說不是正者，即違多例。又一百五十三云「評曰：應說此入定心緣未來定，而不可說緣何剎那、不緣何剎那，以未來定有多剎那，未有先後雜亂住故。」又云「評曰：應說此出定心緣過去定，而不可說緣何剎那、不緣何剎那，以過去定有多剎那相雜住故。」准上論文，既相雜住不可別說，即是總緣過、未定也。然味定即緣次前淨定，以味定是貪相應心緣別相惑，所以別緣次前定心而起。出二定心是善心故，總緣前定，不別取也。

[On] the treatise's: 'It takes as an analogy the non-conception absorption ... it is called the absorption of cessation': this is the answer. 'So too' merely analogizes the cessation of mind and mental factors, not the rest. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 152, says: 'Question: How many real entities constitute the nature of this absorption of cessation? Some say: This absorption has one real entity as its nature, because when a cessation is present, it is called mindless. Question: How can the presence of a single moment of cessation be called mindless? Answer: Just as the presence of a single moment of sensation is called having sensation, a single moment of ideation is called having ideation, and a single moment of consciousness is called having consciousness, so too, what fault is there if the presence of a single moment of cessation is called mindless? Some say: This absorption has eleven entities as its nature, because the ten mahābhūmikas and the mind are stopped. Some say: This absorption has twenty-one entities as its nature, because the ten mahābhūmikas, the [ten] kuśalamahābhūmikas, and the mind are stopped. The correct view is: according to however many minds and mental factors are stopped, there are that many real entities present constituting the nature of this absorption.' The difference between this and the third master's view is that the redactor also includes delight and aversion, whereas the third master has only twenty-one; thus they differ. According to this reasoning, non-conception has twenty-two, meaning delight is added; the absorption of cessation has twenty-two, meaning aversion is added. Since the two absorptions are numbered solely by the cessation of mind and mental factors, we know that non-conception also consists solely in the cessation of mind and mental factors, and the four characteristics (lakṣaṇas) are analogous. Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā, fascicle 153, says: 'Question: When entering the absorption of cessation, what kind of mind and mental factors are stopped? Are they past, future, or present? If they are past, the past has already ceased; what is left to be stopped? If they are future, the future has not yet arisen; how could it be stopped? If they are present, the present does not endure; how could it be stopped? Even without the power of absorption, it would cease of itself. Answer: It should be stated that it stops the future. Question: Since the future has not arrived, how can it be stopped? Answer: Abiding in the present, it blocks future minds and mental factors from continuing, and therefore it is called cessation. Just as cutting off the city roads, closing the gates, and erecting banners prevents people from entering or leaving, and is thus called removing bandits, this is also like that. Some say: It stops both the future and the present. Question: The present definitely does not endure; how could it be stopped? Even without the power of absorption, it would cease of itself. Answer: Formerly, the mind and mental factors of the present caused things having conditions to arise in continuation and then ceased. Now, the mind and mental factors of the present do not cause things having conditions to arise in continuation and then cease. By whose power is this? It is by the power of the absorption. Between the two explanations above, the former should be accepted, as it accords with the rest of the text.' Someone says: taking 'some say' as incorrect violates many analogies. Furthermore, fascicle 153 says: 'Evaluation: It should be said that this mind entering absorption takes future absorption as its object, but one cannot specify which kṣaṇa it takes or does not take, because the future absorption has many kṣaṇas abiding intermingled without prior or posterior.' It also says: 'Evaluation: It should be said that this mind emerging from absorption takes past absorption as its object, but one cannot specify which kṣaṇa it takes or does not take, because the past absorption has many kṣaṇas abiding intermingled.' Based on the above text, since they abide intermingled and cannot be differentiated, it takes past and future absorption generally as its object. However, absorption with attachment takes the immediately preceding pure absorption as its object, because absorption with attachment is a mind associated with craving that takes particular characteristics as delusion, so it arises by taking the immediately preceding absorption mind specifically as its object. Because the mind emerging from the two absorptions is a wholesome mind, it takes the preceding absorption generally as its object and does not single it out.