俱舍論疏 6.101

6.101

論「無如是失至未來非無」，論主通也。如文可解。《正理論》云「若爾，異熟因亦勿未來有，此、彼非類。所以者何？此同類因與等流果善等無別，若無先後應互為因，既互為因應互為果，互為因果與理相違。既無理能遮互為果，則應許有果在因先，亦有二心互為因義。是則違害《發智論》文。」已上即是互為因果難也。《婆沙》云「問：若未來世有同類因，即應二心互為因果。答：如四行相各有繫屬，餘法亦然，故無斯過。謂未來世無常行相，有四行相應無間生，彼是所修繫屬於此。無常行相與彼為因，彼非此因，繫屬此故，無常行相起必先故。苦、空、無我行相亦爾，餘有為法類此應知。故無二心互為因果。若作是說：有依第四靜慮得阿羅漢果，能修未來九地無漏，所修無漏皆繫屬此，故後依餘地聖道現在前，更不能修未來無漏。無餘聖道繫屬此故，應在過、現非同類因。是則違害此中所說前生善根與後生者為同類因。乃至廣說，勿有此失。故未來世無同類因，於理為善。」

The treatise says: "There is no such fault... it is not non-existent in the future." The author of the treatise resolves it. This can be understood from the text. The Nyāyānusāra says: "If so, the maturation cause should also not exist in the future; yet this and that are not of the same kind. Why is that? This similar cause and its outflow fruit have no difference in being wholesome and so forth; if there is no prior and subsequent, they should mutually be causes. Since they would mutually be causes, they should mutually be fruits; but mutual causality contradicts reason. Since there is no reasoning that can prevent their being mutual fruits, one would have to accept that a fruit can precede its cause, and also that two minds mutually serve as causes. This would then contradict the text of the Jñānaprasthāna." The above is the objection of mutual causality. The Vibhāṣā says: "Question: If there is a similar cause in the future period, then two minds would mutually be cause and fruit. Answer: Just as the four aspects (ākāra) each have their own subordination, so it is with other dharmas; therefore, there is no such fault. That is, for the aspect of impermanence in the future period, there are four aspects that should arise immediately thereafter; those are what are cultivated and subordinated to this. The aspect of impermanence serves as cause for them, while they are not the cause of this, because they are subordinated to this, and because the aspect of impermanence necessarily arises first. The aspects of suffering, emptiness, and non-self are also like this; the remaining conditioned dharmas should be understood by analogy with this. Therefore, two minds do not mutually serve as cause and fruit. If it were stated thus: one who attains the fruit of arhatship relying on the fourth dhyāna is able to cultivate uncontaminated [dharmas] of the nine stages in the future, and all cultivated uncontaminated [dharmas] are subordinated to this; therefore, when the noble path relying on other stages subsequently manifests, it can no longer cultivate future uncontaminated [dharmas], because no other noble path is subordinated to this, and it should be in the past or present and not be a similar cause. This would then contradict what is stated here, that wholesome roots arisen previously serve as similar causes for those arisen subsequently—and so on at length—lest there be this fault. Therefore, that there is no similar cause in the future period is well-founded in principle."