俱舍論疏 6.131

6.131

論「由互為果義至互為因義」，答別相也。如商侶相依共遊險道，由互相依得度險道，即是互為果義，亦是互為因義。即如商侶同受同作食等事業，其中闕一皆不相應，是故極成互為因義。問：如商侶同行，闕一如何皆不相應？此如商侶同時行者食等事業，住必同住、行必同行、食必同食。若於一人不同所作，則不住、不行、不食等也。《正理》云「若相應因則俱有因，此中二因義有何別？答云：非相應因即俱有因，由此二因義各別故。然即一法是相應因亦俱有因義。差別者，不相離義是相應因，同一果義是俱有因。又展轉力同生、住等是俱有因，若展轉力同緣一境是相應因。」准此二論辨因差別，故知六因辨異就用非體，其相攝亦用非體。

The treatise says, "Through the meaning of mutually being fruits [...] through the meaning of mutually being causes," which answers regarding their distinct characteristics. It is like traveling merchants who rely on one another to traverse a perilous road together: because of mutually relying on one another, they are able to cross the perilous road, which is the meaning of mutually being fruits and also the meaning of mutually being causes. It is like merchants sharing the experience and execution of activities such as eating: if one among them is missing, they are all uncoordinated; therefore, the meaning of mutually being causes is fully established. Question: If it is like merchants traveling together, how does the absence of one cause all to be uncoordinated? This is like merchants traveling at the same time in activities such as eating: if they stay, they must stay together; if they travel, they must travel together; if they eat, they must eat together. If one person does not do the same, then they do not stay, travel, eat, and so forth. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "If it is an associated cause, then it is a coexistent cause; what is the difference in meaning between the two causes here? The answer is: an associated cause is not simply a coexistent cause, because the meanings of these two causes are distinct. Yet a single phenomenon is both an associated cause and a coexistent cause. As for the difference: the meaning of inseparability is the associated cause, while the meaning of having the same fruit is the coexistent cause. Furthermore, through mutual power having the same arising, abiding, and so forth is the coexistent cause, while through mutual power having the same single objective sphere is the associated cause." According to the discrimination of causes in these two treatises, we know that the distinction between the six causes is determined by function, not substance; and their mutual subsumption is also determined by function, not substance.