俱舍論疏 6.24

6.24

論「如四大種至由互為果」，指事辨相狀也。故《婆沙》評家云「謂四大種若有偏增、若無偏增，地為三因，三為地因。所以者何？地不觀地生所造色，以一切法不觀自性，及同類體為他因故。餘大例爾。如是諸相與所相法、心與心隨轉，亦更互為因。」此舉三類互為因法，辨互為果相也。然於此中不說心隨轉法，及能相法自互為因者，《正理論》云「此中所說因相太少」，然自釋云「本論說故，此無過失。」然本論中曾不見說心隨轉色與心為因，應辨此中造論者意。《正理》敘兩師釋，皆彈有過。自釋云「我於此中見如是意：若法與心決定俱起，遍一切心依心而轉，即說彼法與所依心展轉相望為俱有因。諸心所法非定俱起，或少或多，現可得故。心所法自相對，多少不定，故論不說。身業、語業非遍諸心，不定心俱全無有故。不定心，無色定全無身、語二業。生等諸相皆依心轉，非互相依，生等皆以法為上首互相資故。由斯不說彼互為因。又於此中，為欲顯示但說異類為俱有因，同類互為因不說而成。故《顯宗論》云『一切心所、靜慮、無漏二種律儀、彼法及心之生等相，如是皆謂心隨轉法。何緣心隨相非心隨轉法？心隨相於心非俱有因故。何緣心隨相非心俱有因？不由彼力心得生故，彼於一法有功能故。又與心王非一果故，聚中多分非彼果故。若爾，云何心能與彼為俱有因？由隨心王生等諸位彼得轉故。豈不應如大種生等？心亦用彼為俱有因？諸如造色非生等果，生等非不與諸大種為俱有因，此亦應爾。』」（准上論意，大種生等與大種非一果，而得為俱有因。心與隨相雖非一果，何不許為俱有因耶？）如是所例，其理不齊。展轉果一果多，非彼果故，非諸造色。是諸大種展轉果中，一果所攝，何容造色非諸大種生等果？故例此為失。又如前說。前說者何？不由彼力心得生故。然諸大種與生等相展轉力生，故無此失。又云「又此俱起和合聚中，有是能轉而非隨轉，謂即心王；有唯隨轉，謂色及心不相應行；有是能轉亦是隨轉，謂心所法，隨心轉故，能轉色及心不相應行故；有二俱非，謂除前相。」准上論文，此中所明心隨轉法，與餘處說隨行隨轉義不同也。如對法中說惠為體，五蘊隨行，此即心王入隨轉攝。此中說心，唯為其轉非是隨轉，即說心王非隨轉也。然此中說，據王、臣理，心但為轉。對法中說，據對法理，惠為其轉。說雖不同，義無違也。

The commentary says: "Such as the primary elements... because they are mutually effects." This points to real instances to analyze the characteristic features. Therefore, the arbitrator in the Vibhāṣā says: "Whether the primary elements are predominantly augmented or not augmented, earth is the cause of three, and the three are the cause of earth. Why is this? Earth does not depend on earth to produce derived matter, because all phenomena do not depend on their own nature or an entity of their own kind to be a cause for others. The other primary elements are also like this. Likewise, the characteristics and the phenomena possessing the characteristics, as well as the mind and the things that conform to the movement of the mind, are also causes for one another." This adduces three classes of phenomena that are mutually causes, analyzing the characteristics of being mutual effects. However, regarding why it does not state here that phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind and the primary characteristics are causes among themselves: The Nyāyānusāra states, "The causal characteristics stated here are too sparse," but itself explains, "Because the fundamental treatise stated it, there is no fault in this." Yet in the fundamental treatise it has never been seen to state that matter conforming to the movement of the mind is a cause for the mind; one must analyze the intention of the treatise master here. The Nyāyānusāra recounts the explanations of two masters and refutes both as having faults. It itself explains: "I see such an intention here: If a phenomenon definitely arises simultaneously with the mind, is ubiquitous to all minds, and moves in dependence on the mind, that phenomenon and the mind depended upon are stated to be coexistence causes mutually in relation to each other. The mental factors do not definitely arise simultaneously, because they are presently observed to be either few or many. The mental factors relative to one another are variable in quantity; thus the treatise does not speak of them. Bodily action and verbal action are not ubiquitous to all minds, because they are entirely nonexistent in conjunction with non-concentrated mind. In non-concentrated mind and the formless absorptions, there are entirely no bodily or verbal actions. The characteristics such as arising all move in dependence on the mind, not mutually depending on one another; because arising and the like all have the phenomenon as their head and mutually assist it, for this reason it does not state that they are causes for one another. Furthermore, here, in order to show only that different categories are coexistence causes, that the same category are causes for one another is established without being stated. Thus the Prakaraṇaśāsana states: 'All mental factors, the two kinds of vows—dhyāna and anāsrava—and the characteristics such as arising of those phenomena and of the mind: all of these are called phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind. For what reason are the secondary characteristics of the mind not phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind? Because the secondary characteristics of the mind are not coexistence causes for the mind. For what reason are the secondary characteristics of the mind not coexistence causes for the mind? Because the mind is not caused to arise by their power, and they have efficacy only regarding a single phenomenon. Furthermore, because they do not have a single effect with the primary mind, and the majority in the collection are not their effect. If so, how can the mind be a coexistence cause for them? Because they are able to move through following the states such as arising of the primary mind. Should it not be like the arising and other characteristics of the primary elements, where the mind also uses them as a coexistence cause? Just as derived matter is not the effect of arising and the other characteristics, yet arising and the other characteristics are not unentitled to be coexistence causes for the primary elements, this too should be so.'" (Following the treatise's intention above: the arising and other characteristics of the primary elements do not share a single effect with the primary elements, yet they are able to be coexistence causes. Although the mind and secondary characteristics do not share a single effect, why not grant that they are coexistence causes?) Comparing them like this is unequal in principle. Reciprocal effects are either a single effect or many effects; because they are not its effect, they are not the derived matters. Within the reciprocal effects of the primary elements, they are subsumed under a single effect; how could derived matter not be the effect of the arising and other characteristics of the primary elements? Therefore, drawing this parallel is an error. Furthermore, it is as stated previously. What was stated previously? Because the mind is not caused to arise by their power. But the primary elements and the characteristics such as arising are produced by mutual power, and thus lack this fault. It also states: "Furthermore, in this collection of simultaneous concordances, there is that which is capable of causing movement but does not conform to the movement, namely, the primary mind; there is that which only conforms to the movement, namely, matter and formations non-concurrent with mind; there is that which is capable of causing movement and also conforms to the movement, namely, mental factors, because they conform to the movement of the mind and are capable of causing the movement of matter and formations non-concurrent with mind; there is that which is neither, namely, excluding the previous characteristics." Following the text of the treatise above, the phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind explained here differ in meaning from what is stated elsewhere regarding "following the conduct" and "conforming to the movement." As in the Abhidharma, where wisdom is stated to be the essential entity and the five skandhas follow its conduct, here the primary mind is subsumed under conforming to the movement. Here, the mind is stated only to be that which causes the movement and is not what conforms to the movement; that is, the primary mind does not conform to the movement. However, what is stated here is based on the principle of king and ministers: the mind is only that which causes movement. What is stated in the Abhidharma is based on the Abhidharma principle: wisdom is that which causes movement. Though the statements differ, their meanings are not in conflict.