俱舍論疏 6.314

6.314

論「能為彼種至故名與果」，答也。取時為因義，成名為種子。與時正引果起，名之為與。兩用俱在其因，不在其果。舊釋為因義，成名為取果，義不失也。果起酬因名為與果，謬也，是果力故。

On the Śāstra's: "Being able to serve as its seed […] up to: is therefore called giving a fruit": this is the answer. At the time of grasping, because the function of being a cause is established, it is called a seed. At the time of giving, precisely inducing the arising of the fruit is called giving. Both functions reside in the cause, not in the fruit. The old commentary's explanation that "the establishment of the meaning of being a cause is called grasping a fruit" does not miss the meaning; but its statement that "the arising of the fruit in requital of the cause is called giving a fruit" is mistaken, for that is the power of the fruit.