俱舍論疏 7.9

7.9

論「由此色等至不等生故」，廢立緣體。謂心、心所前後體一名之為等，中無間隔名為無間，等而無間名等無間。色、不相應即不如是，雖無間生，體不一故；雜亂而生，非等無間。《正理》引《婆沙》說云「心及心所，所依、所緣、行相有礙，由斯故立等無間緣。色、不相應無如是事，故不立彼為此緣體。」下自釋云「謂一所依、所緣、行相，定無有二識等竝生，故必由前與處方起。若前為礙，後不得生，由此證知唯心、心所，前能為後等無間緣。」又云「然約開避及據牽生立此緣體。故極微等雖前避後，而非此緣。心等相生有定、不定，故知亦據有力牽生。現見一心前後相續，雖前避後其理皆同，而生、不生有定不定。且生定者，謂世第一法心之無間生苦法智忍。乃至廣說。問曰：若前後體一中無間隔，前與後處後方得生，及後定生，此證有力能牽引者，命根相生亦前後體一，中無間隔，前與後處後方得生，亦是定生，此命即是有力牽生，何故不立等無間緣？」《正理》釋云「此例不然。命與生體俱先行力所引生故。謂此命根非無間滅命力所引，要是先位所作行業力所引生。既爾，命根應一念頃一切頓起，一切同依一念行業力所引故。先業所引心、心所法起，應不藉等無間緣。且諸命根無頓起失，即由業力生次定故，因果法爾一剎那業引多剎那異熟令起。又無用故命不頓生，謂為任持眾同分故引命根起，一命相續足能任持，多便無用。心、心所法雖先業引，而非不待等無間緣，託諸根、境而得生故。既託根、境和合故生，設多竝生亦非無用，然無第二等無間緣，故同類中無二俱起。又心、心所非唯先業力所引生，異熟及餘雜亂起故。若不更託等無間緣，應一剎那有多俱起。謂命根體唯是異熟，唯由先業力所引生，可言同類定次而起。心、心所法無如是事，異熟滅已有等流生，等流無間有剎那起，或起異熟非定同類。故心、心所雖有異熟生，而亦不可言與命根等，是故唯等常無間生名等無間。以此與此為緣故說。」准上論文，等無間緣總有多義以簡諸法，一有開避與處後方得生；不開避後後即不生；二有牽引後力；三體等；四有生無間隔與後作緣，簡命根等。由此唯心、心所立等無間緣也。《正理論》云「譬喻論師說諸色法如心、心所法有等無間緣，見乳、醅種、花、生酪、酢、芽、果，如心、心所前滅後生，故知諸色有此緣義。又無經說唯心、心所能為此緣故立此緣，定非色者是虛妄執。」《正理論》中廣破此執。今此論明色非等無間緣，亦是破譬喻師執。

On the Śāstra's statement: "Due to this, matter and so forth … because they do not arise equally": this determines and establishes the substance of the condition. That is, the preceding and succeeding natures of mind and mental factors are uniform, which is termed "equal" (sama); there being no intervening gap between them is termed "immediate" (anantara); being equal and without an intervening gap is termed "equal-and-immediate" (samanantara). Matter (rūpa) and non-concomitant [formations] (viprayukta-saṃskāra) are not like this: although they arise without an intervening gap, their substances are not uniform; arising confusedly, they are not equal-and-immediate. The Nyāyānusāra cites the Vibhāṣā as stating: "Mind and mental factors are obstructed with respect to their basis (āśraya), objective support (ālambana), and cognitive aspect (ākāra); on this basis, an equal-and-immediate condition is established. Matter and non-concomitant [formations] have no such characteristic; hence they are not established as the substance of this condition." Below, it explains of itself: "That is, with respect to a single basis, objective support, and cognitive aspect, two consciousnesses or [mental factors] definitely cannot arise together side by side; thus, [the subsequent] must necessarily arise only by the preceding one giving way. If the preceding one acts as an obstruction, the subsequent cannot arise; from this it is proven that only mind and mental factors can have the preceding act as the equal-and-immediate condition for the subsequent." It also says: "However, the substance of this condition is established in terms of clearing the way (giving place) and on the basis of having the power to induce arising. Therefore, although subtle atoms and so forth clear the way for what succeeds them, they are not this condition. The mutual arising of minds and so forth has definite and indefinite aspects; hence we know that it is also based on having the power to induce arising. It is directly observed that a single mind continues from before to after; although their clearing the way from before to after is the same in principle, their arising or non-arising is definite or indefinite. As for being definite in arising: immediately after the mind of the supreme mundane dharma (laukikāgradharma), the patient acceptance of the dharma of suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñāna-kṣānti) arises, and so forth in broad detail." Question: If the preceding and succeeding substances are uniform without any intervening gap, and the subsequent can only arise when the preceding gives place to the subsequent, and the subsequent definitely arises—proving that it has the power to induce—then the mutual succession of the life-faculty (jīvitendriya) is also uniform in preceding and succeeding substance without any intervening gap, where the subsequent can only arise when the preceding gives place to the subsequent, and it definitely arises. This life[-faculty] would thus possess the power to induce arising; why is it not established as an equal-and-immediate condition? The Nyāyānusāra explains: "This analogy is not correct. Both the life[-faculty] and the substance of birth are induced by the force of prior actions (karman). That is, this life-faculty is not induced by the power of the immediately perished life[-faculty]; it must be induced by the force of action performed in a previous state. If that were so, the life-faculty ought to arise completely all at once in a single moment, because they would all equally rely on being induced by the force of the action of a single moment. Furthermore, when mind and mental factors induced by prior action arise, they would not need to depend on an equal-and-immediate condition. Now, the various [moments of the] life-faculty do not incur the fault of arising all at once, precisely because the order of arising is fixed by the force of karma; it is the principle of cause and effect that an action of one kṣaṇa induces the arising of fruition (vipāka) of many kṣaṇas. Furthermore, because it would be purposeless, the life[-faculty] does not arise all at once: the life-faculty is induced to arise in order to sustain the generic similarity of living beings (nikāya-sabhāga); the succession of a single life[-faculty] is fully able to sustain it, and multiple ones would be purposeless. Although mind and mental factors are induced by prior karma, it is not that they do not depend on an equal-and-immediate condition, because they can only arise by relying on the sense faculties and sense objects. Since they arise through relying on the conjunction of faculties and objects, even if many were to arise together side by side it would not be purposeless; yet, because there is no second equal-and-immediate condition, within the same category two never arise simultaneously. Furthermore, mind and mental factors are not induced solely by the force of prior karma, because fruitions and other [types of mind] arise mixed together. If they did not further depend on an equal-and-immediate condition, then many would arise together in a single kṣaṇa. That is to say, the substance of the life-faculty is purely fruition, induced solely by the force of prior karma, so it can be said to arise in a fixed sequence within the same category. Mind and mental factors have no such characteristic: after a fruition has ceased, an outflow (niṣyanda) arises; immediately after an outflow, an instantaneous [dharmic realization] arises, or a fruition arises, not being of a fixed identical category. Therefore, although mind and mental factors have fruition-born [states], it cannot be said that they are equal to the life-faculty. For this reason, only that which is equal and continuously arises without an interval is called 'equal-and-immediate'. It is spoken of because this acts as a condition for that." Based on the treatise's text above, the equal-and-immediate condition generally has multiple meanings that screen out other dharmas: first, there is clearing the way and giving place, after which the subsequent can arise—if it does not clear the way for the subsequent, the subsequent does not arise; second, having the power to induce what follows; third, being equal in substance; fourth, having arising without interval and acting as a condition for what follows, which excludes the life-faculty and so forth. For these reasons, only mind and mental factors are established as equal-and-immediate conditions. The Nyāyānusāra says: "The Dārṣṭāntikas say that all material dharmas, like mind and mental factors, have an equal-and-immediate condition: seeing that milk, yeast/seeds, and flowers produce curds, vinegar, sprouts, and fruits, just as preceding minds and mental factors cease and succeeding ones arise, we therefore know that matter has the meaning of this condition. Furthermore, no sūtra says that only mind and mental factors can act as this condition; therefore, establishing that this condition definitely cannot be matter is a false clinging." The Nyāyānusāra refutes this clinging extensively. Now, when this treatise clarifies that matter is not an equal-and-immediate condition, it also refutes the clinging of the Dārṣṭāntikas.