俱舍論疏 8.156

8.156

論「若人信佛至此不成釋」，論主破也。佛既有持願通能久留身，何須胎生？《正理論》云「今謂此釋其理必成。通所留身非佛功德，力、無畏等所依熏故，不能廣大饒益世間。所以然者？是可留法通願能留，一切化生如剎那法必無留義。謂諸有為剎那定滅，諸佛神力亦不能留，設欲久留即須別化。此所別化，非佛功德力無畏等之所依熏，故於世間無大饒益。若不爾者，佛應化為如本身形受諸供養，令無量眾生天解脫。故我所稟毘婆沙師咸作是言：後身菩薩為利他故不受化生。此義極成不可傾動。化生何故死無遺形？由彼頓生故應頓滅，如戲水者出沒亦然。」毘婆沙師說化生者造色多故死無遺形，大種多者死非頓滅，即由此義可以證知，一四大種生多造色。《婆沙》一百二十七云「問：一四大種為但造一造色極微？為能造多？若但造一，如何不成因四果一？因多果少理不應然。若能造多，即一四大種所造造色有多極微，云何展轉非俱有因？對法者說有對造色展轉相望無俱有因，許則便違對法宗義。答：應作是說。一四大種但能造一所造色極微。問：如何不成因四果一？因多果少理不應然。答：果少因多，理亦無失。世現見有如是類，故因四果一於理無違。有說造多。問：若爾，一四大種所造造色有多極微，云何展轉非俱有因？答：非一果故非俱有因，以俱有因法必同一果故。此不成因，同猶豫故。評云：如前說者好。」今詳《正理》不以《婆沙》評家為正。若作俱舍師破，汝准此釋，違《婆沙》正義也。

On the passage in the śāstra from "If a person has faith in the Buddha" to "this does not constitute an explanation": The author of the śāstra refutes [this]. Since the Buddha possessed the supernormal power of retaining his vows and was able to sustain his body for a long time, why was womb-birth necessary? The Nyāyānusāra says: "We now maintain that the principle of this explanation is necessarily established. A body sustained by supernormal power is not permeated by or the basis for the Buddha's qualities, powers, fearlessnesses, and so forth, and thus cannot broadly benefit the world. Why is this? Things that can be sustained can be sustained by supernormal powers through vows; all apparitional births, like momentary phenomena, definitely have no possibility of being sustained. That is, all conditioned phenomena necessarily perish in an instant, and even the divine powers of all Buddhas cannot sustain them; if one wished to sustain them for a long time, one would have to make another manifestation. These other manifestations are not permeated by or the basis for the Buddha's qualities, powers, fearlessnesses, and the like, and therefore they bring no great benefit to the world. If it were not so, the Buddha ought to have magically manifested a form like his original body to receive offerings and cause immeasurable sentient beings to be reborn in heaven or attain liberation. Therefore, the Vibhāṣā masters whom I follow all say: 'The bodhisattva in his final lifetime, for the sake of benefiting others, does not take apparitional birth.' This thesis is firmly established and cannot be shaken. Why is it that when an apparitional being dies, no corpse is left behind? Because they are born instantaneously, they should also perish instantaneously, just as those who play in water appear and disappear in the same way." The Vibhāṣā masters say that because apparitional beings have an abundance of derived form (upādāya-rūpa), no corpse remains when they die; whereas those with an abundance of great elements (mahābhūta) do not perish instantaneously upon death. By this principle it can be proven that a single set of four great elements produces many derived forms. Fascicle 127 of the Vibhāṣā says: "Question: Does a single set of four great elements generate only one atom of derived form, or can it generate many? If it generates only one, how is it not four causes producing one effect? It is unreasonable for causes to be many while the effect is few. If it can generate many, then there are many atoms among the derived forms generated by a single set of four great elements; how then are they not mutually coexistent causes (sahabhū-hetu)? The Abhidharmikas state that mutually resistant derived forms (sapratigha-upādāya-rūpa) have no coexistent cause in relation to one another; if that were conceded, it would contradict the fundamental doctrine of the Abhidharma. Answer: One should state this: A single set of four great elements can generate only one atom of derived form. Question: How then is it not four causes producing one effect? It is unreasonable for causes to be many while the effect is few. Answer: That the effect is few while the causes are many is also logically unproblematic. Such types are directly observed in the world; therefore, four causes producing one effect does not contradict reason. Some say it generates many. Question: If so, there are many atoms among the derived forms generated by a single set of four great elements; how then are they not mutually coexistent causes? Answer: Because they do not have a single result, they are not coexistent causes, for dharmas that are coexistent causes must share the same result. This does not constitute a valid reason, because it is equally open to doubt. The critical evaluation says: 'The former explanation is better.'" Now, examining the Nyāyānusāra, it does not take the Vibhāṣā's critical arbiter as correct. If one refutes it as a follower of the Kośa: your reliance on this explanation contradicts the correct doctrine of the Vibhāṣā.