俱舍論疏 1.103

1.103

Fourth, resolving external objections: The objection says: If the abandonment of defiled phenomena upon discarding possession is called abandonment in terms of intrinsic nature and not abandonment in terms of the object, why do the various treatises all say that the unconditioned corresponds in measure to the entities bound? Furthermore, the thirty-first fascicle of the Vibhāṣā states: 'From beginningless time, all defiled-and-conditioned phenomena have been bound by defilements and unable to attain liberation. If defilements are abandoned, through disjunction from them they attain liberation. Just as when a person is bound and attains liberation, the person is said to be liberated, not the ropes, etc.' Since what is bound realizes liberation, liberation is therefore also attained among external things. Furthermore, the Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya and so forth say: 'One should know that through [abandoning] the object, defilements can be abandoned.' According to the above texts, we know that defilements are abandoned through the object, yet are not identical to undefiled form and so forth; thus we know that analytical cessation is realized when the same grade is abandoned. Resolution: The texts cited here are none of them definitive proofs, because they are not clear. Who could believe these obscure texts and thereby contradict the two abandonments established by the great Abhidharma masters in accordance with what is taught in the sūtras? Carefully examined, these three texts all have different intentions. Take, for instance, the citation 'the unconditioned corresponds in measure to the entities bound': this clarifies the quantity of analytical cessation, not the realization of abandonment. Because differing masters in the Vibhāṣā posited that unconditioned analytical cessation matches the quantity of the binding agents, the Abhidharmika stated that it corresponds to the quantity of the bound entities; furthermore, this was stated in response to the Sammatīya school positing only a single unconditioned. It does not clarify that defiled phenomena are abandoned through the object. As for 'From beginningless time, all defiled-and-conditioned phenomena... up to: just as when a person is bound and attains liberation, the person is said to be liberated, not the ropes, etc.': this was stated because differing masters held that in abandoning phenomena liberation is attained on the binding agent, not on the bound external phenomenon; it was not stated to reject abandonment in terms of intrinsic nature. As for 'One should know that through [abandoning] the object, defilements can be abandoned': this was spoken in contrast to associated [bondage], not with the intention of precluding abandonment in terms of intrinsic nature.