俱舍論疏 1.16

1.16

The shared doctrines of the fundamental Sarvāstivāda: There are also those among the devas who cultivate the brahma-conduct. The Buddha's loving-kindness, compassion, and so forth do not take sentient beings as their object, and one who grasps at the existence of a sentient being does not attain liberation. Definitely no subtle phenomenon can transmigrate from a past lifetime to a future lifetime. The rest are as commonly taught. The shared doctrines of the fundamental Mahīśāsaka: The past and future do not exist; the present and the unconditioned exist. The four noble truths are realized simultaneously; when one sees the truth of suffering, one then sees all the truths. Ordinary beings do not enact desire or ill-will in the desire realm. Nor are there any among the devas who abide in the brahma-conduct. There are nine unconditioned phenomena: space, analytical cessation, non-analytical cessation, the unshakeable state, suchness of wholesome phenomena, suchness of unwholesome phenomena, suchness of neutral phenomena, suchness of the eight limbs of the path, and suchness of the nine links of dependent origination. The Buddha and the two vehicles share the same single path and the same single liberation. The shared doctrines of the fundamental Kāśyapīya: If phenomena are already abandoned and completely known, they do not exist; if they are not yet abandoned and not completely known, they exist. For wholesome and unwholesome karma, if the fruit has already matured, it does not exist; if the fruit has not yet matured, it exists. Those in training possess the fruits of maturation. The shared doctrines of the fundamental Sautrāntika: They teach that the skandhas transmigrate from a past lifetime to a future lifetime. Within the stage of an ordinary being, noble phenomena also exist. They maintain the existence of a paramārtha-pudgala. The rest of their doctrines are also identical to the Sarvāstivāda. Now, in investigating the shared doctrines of the fundamental traditions of these various schools, the Samayabhedoparacanacakra expounds their differences in full; regarding the differing doctrines of the derivative traditions, for the most part it does not expound them, merely stating that they are immeasurable. Among the shared doctrines of the fundamental traditions, the Sarvāstivāda maintains that one who grasps at the existence of a sentient being cannot attain liberation; most of the other schools are indicated to be the same as the Sarvāstivāda. Among the shared doctrines of these various schools, none teach that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature. The Buddhadhātu-śāstra states: 'The Buddha taught to those of the Hīnayāna that there are sentient beings who do not abide in the [noble] nature and will never enter parinirvāṇa. Concerning this, doubts arose and they gave rise to lack of faith.' That treatise itself explains: 'The Vibhajyavāda states that all ordinary beings and noble ones emerge from emptiness, taking emptiness to be the Buddha-nature. If according to the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivāda and other schools, all sentient beings lack a nature that naturally possesses Buddha-nature, having only a Buddha-nature acquired through cultivation. Sentient beings are categorized into three kinds: first, those definitely lacking Buddha-nature, who will never attain nirvāṇa; second, those indeterminate as to whether they have it or not, who attain it if they cultivate, and do not attain it if they do not cultivate; third, those definitely possessing Buddha-nature, namely the noble ones of the three vehicles.' Examining the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, among its fundamental schools there is no Vibhajyavāda, nor is there any school that maintains the existence of Buddha-nature. Investigating this purport: the Vibhajyavāda belongs to derivative differing theories, and the positing of Buddha-nature is a derivative differing doctrine, for within the Vibhajyavāda they did not recite the sūtras cited by the Sarvāstivāda. Not having complete faith, doubts arose in their minds. The Sarvāstivāda, relying on the mutually accepted Āgamas and other scriptures, established the absence of nature through the Tathāgata's power of disposition in knowing the diverse elements. The Vibhajyavāda further used four points to argue for the existence of Buddha-nature, and the Sarvāstivāda immediately refuted them with five points: 1. Because diverse elements are observed; 2. Because markless sentient beings cannot be observed; 3. Because an example of the same category cannot be found—taking sentient beings as the same category; 4. Because an example of a different category is not comparable—taking insentient things as the different category; 5. Because the present absence of the phenomenon of nirvāṇa would be illogical. Since the Vibhajyavāda relies on the Hīnayāna tenets, their intention of [affirming] Buddha-nature violates the sūtras, as it was not taught in the Hīnayāna. The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra states: 'Among the nine classes of scriptures, there are no Vaipulya sūtras; therefore it does not speak of Buddha-nature.' It also says: 'In the sūtras for the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, I did not teach that icchantikas and the like all possess Buddha-nature.' Therefore, Bodhisattva Maitreya in the 'Śrāvakabhūmi' expounded the views of the Sarvāstivāda and others to refute the Vibhajyavāda, because it contradicted the sūtras. Bodhisattva Vasubandhu, relying on the Vaipulya sūtras, composed the Buddhadhātu-śāstra; in the chapter refuting Hīnayāna attachments, he refuted the views of the Sarvāstivāda and others, because he accorded with the Mahāyāna. Later generations reading the Yogācārabhūmi, because the 'Śrāvakabhūmi' refutes the existence of the nature, claimed that the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra's teaching that all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature is of non-definitive meaning, and that the Buddhadhātu-śāstra is a forged, deeply misleading work. Yet they did not know that the Yogācārabhūmi, in the stage corresponding to the five consciousnesses following the 'Bodhisattvabhūmi', establishes that all sentient beings possess the cause of buddhahood, which is the seed of the objective condition of suchness, possessed equally by all sentient beings. Moreover, it is no different from the ultimate emptiness, the Buddha-nature, and the middle-way seed of the anuttarā samyaksambodhi of all Buddhas in the Nirvāṇa-sūtra. Furthermore, the ultimate emptiness and Buddha-nature in the Nirvāṇa-sūtra is also named 'neither empty nor non-empty', because it can serve as the seed for wholesome phenomena. What difference is there?