俱舍論頌疏論本 30.1

30.1

從此第三，置答益物分，先難後答。犢子部難：若補特伽羅即諸蘊者，世尊何不說命者即身？論主答云：「觀能問者阿世耶故（阿世耶此云意樂），謂由問者執一實我名為命者，依此問佛，命者與身為一為異。故佛答：以我無體，一異不成。如不可答龜毛硬軟，本無龜毛，答何硬軟？命者本無，答何一異？」觀問者意，故佛不答。

From here on is the third section: setting aside answers to benefit sentient beings, first presenting an objection and then replying. The Vātsīputrīyas object: If the person is identical to the aggregates, why did the World-Honoured One not state that the life-principle (jīva) is identical to the body? The author of the treatise answers: "Because he took into consideration the disposition (āśaya; here translated as 'inclination') of the questioner. That is to say, because the questioner grasped at a single, real self called a 'life-principle', based on this he asked the Buddha whether the life-principle and the body are identical or different. Therefore the Buddha replied: Since a self has no real entity, being identical or different cannot be established. Just as one cannot answer whether the hair of a turtle is hard or soft—since the hair of a turtle does not exist to begin with, what hardness or softness could one answer?—so the life-principle fundamentally does not exist, so what identity or difference could one answer?" Considering the intention of the questioner, the Buddha therefore did not answer.