俱舍論頌疏論本 15
English (machine translation) 15
- Language
- English
15.1
From here, this is the fifth major section, explaining the distinctions in acquiring the three disciplines. Within this: first, explaining the similarities and differences regarding the locus and time of acquisition; second, explaining the sentient beings, the factors, and the causes; third, explaining the acquisition of the unwholesome and the intermediate.
15.2
Below, the first part explains the similarities and differences regarding the locus and time of acquisition. The treatise says: "Do these three disciplines—prātimokṣa, dhyāna, and undefiled—when one is acquired from that [source], also entail the acquisition of the other two, or not? If not, how is it?" The verse says:
15.3
"From all, two, and the present,
one acquires the discipline of the desire realm;
from the fundamental and all time,
one acquires [the discipline of] dhyāna and the undefiled."
15.4
The explanation says: The first two lines explain the acquisition of the prātimokṣa precepts; the last two lines explain the acquisition of the precepts of absorption (dhyāna) and the path (mārga). "From all, two, and the present, one acquires the discipline of the desire realm": first, acquiring the discipline of the desire realm from all; second, acquiring the discipline of the desire realm from two; third, acquiring the discipline of the desire realm from the present. "From all" means the fundamental karmapathas, their preliminary preparations (prayoga), and their subsequent acts (pṛṣṭha); these loci that give rise to offences are called "all". Because prātimokṣa abstains from fundamental offences as well as preliminary and subsequent offences, one acquires the prātimokṣa precepts in relation to all loci that give rise to evil. Second, "acquiring from two" means two categories: first, the intrinsic offences and prohibited offences pertaining to sentient beings—intrinsic offences being killing living beings and the like, and prohibited offences being lodging together with a woman and the like; second, the intrinsic offences and prohibited offences pertaining to non-sentient things—intrinsic offences being stealing external property, and prohibited offences being digging the earth and the like. Now, when receiving the wholesome precepts, one is able to abstain from both intrinsic offences and prohibited offences; therefore, one acquires the prātimokṣa precepts from both categories of loci that give rise to offences. Third, "acquiring from the present": the treatise says, "It means acquiring [them] from the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas of the present lifetime, not from the past or the future; for this discipline operates in relation to loci of sentient beings, and the past and future are not loci of sentient beings." (The explanation states: "Loci of sentient beings" means: first, the sentient being; second, the locus of the sentient being. "Locus" is twofold: first, the locus of support; second, the locus of habitation. By abstaining from sexual misconduct, precepts are generated toward the protected sentient being. If one abstains from killing living beings, precepts are generated toward the sentient being's locus of support. If one does not dig the earth, precepts are generated toward the sentient being's locus of habitation.)
15.5
"From the fundamental and all time, one acquires [the discipline of] dhyāna and the undefiled": first, acquiring the precepts of dhyāna and the undefiled from the fundamental; second, acquiring the precepts of dhyāna and the undefiled from all time. "From the fundamental" means acquiring the disciplines of absorption and the path from the loci of the fundamental karmapathas. In these two disciplines, at the stage of absorption, there are only the fundamental ones; because these precepts do not exist before absorption or after absorption, there are no stages of preliminary preparation or subsequent action. Because the precepts of absorption and the path are only fundamental, when the precepts are acquired, one acquires the prātimokṣa precepts only at the loci where fundamental evil arises; but because preliminary preparations and subsequent acts are both possible [in prātimokṣa], the acquisition of the precepts arises in relation to all three loci. The treatise says: "If one acquires the disciplines of dhyāna and the undefiled, it should be known that it is only from the fundamental karmapathas, not even from their preliminary preparations or subsequent acts, let alone from prohibited offences." (The above is the text of the treatise.) Second, "acquiring from all time" (all time means the three times) means generating the precepts of absorption and the path from the three times. Because the precepts of absorption and the path operate co-arising with the mind—that is, the mind accompanied by the precepts can take the three times as its object—the precepts accompanying the mind likewise guard against the three times. Based on the above distinctions, a fourfold proposition (catuṣkoṭi) should be constructed. The treatise says: "The first proposition: from the preliminary preparations, subsequent acts, and prohibited offences of the present time (because it is the present time, one acquires the prātimokṣa precepts; because it is the preliminary preparations, etc., one does not acquire the precepts of absorption or the path). The second proposition: from the fundamental karmapathas of the past and future (because it is the fundamental, one acquires the precepts of absorption and the path; because it is the past and future, one does not acquire the prātimokṣa precepts). The third proposition: from the fundamental karmapathas of the present time (because it is the present time, one acquires the prātimokṣa precepts; because it is the fundamental, one acquires the precepts of absorption and the path). The fourth proposition: from the preliminary preparations and subsequent acts of the past and future (because it is the past and future, there are no prātimokṣa precepts; because it is the preliminary preparations, etc., there are no precepts of absorption or the path)." Furthermore, the treatise says: "At the very time when the wholesome discipline is acquired, it cannot be definitively established that there are present unwholesome karmapathas and the like. Therefore, one should say that it is acquired from the present locus; in truth and reason, one should say that it guards against the future, and one should certainly not say that it guards against the past and present." (The explanation states: This passage is the treatise master’s critique of the previous third and first propositions. That is, at the very time of acquiring the wholesome precepts, how could there be present unwholesome karmapathas and the like? "And the like" includes the preliminary preparations, subsequent acts, and prohibited offences of the first proposition. Having critiqued this, he states correctly: "Therefore, one should say that it is acquired from the present locus." The meaning is that if the word "locus" is added to the first and third propositions, there is no conceptual obstacle. That is, although the intrinsic nature of the karmapathas and the like does not exist in the present, there are loci that give rise to the karma and so forth; thus, generating precepts in relation to the loci of the karmapathas and the like presents no contradiction. If one speaks of generating precepts, this applies to the three times. But as to guarding against offences, it reason dictates it must be the future, because one prevents them from arising; the past has already ceased and the present has already arisen, so they cannot be guarded against.)
15.6
From here, this is the second part, explaining the sentient beings, the factors, and the causes. The treatise says: "For those who acquire discipline or non-discipline, are there differences regarding all sentient beings, the factors, and the causes? There are certainly differences. What are the characteristics of these differences?" The verse says:
15.7
"Discipline is from all sentient beings;
the factors and causes are said to be non-fixed.
Non-discipline is from all
sentient beings and factors, but not the causes."
15.8
The explanation says: "Discipline is from all sentient beings" means that the discipline is generated in relation to all sentient beings, because the discipline is generated only when one abides in a wholesome resolution (āśaya) toward all sentient beings; otherwise it is not generated, because the unwholesome resolution has not completely ceased.
15.9
"The factors and causes are said to be non-fixed": the "factors" refers to the seven factors [of physical and vocal actions], and the "causes" refers to the mind that receives the precepts. That the factors are non-fixed means: some are acquired from all factors, namely the bhikṣu precepts; some are acquired from four factors, namely the precepts of the novice (śrāmaṇera) and the like. That the causes are non-fixed means: the lower, middling, and superior minds do not arise simultaneously. Or some abide in the precepts not through all causes, meaning that with a lower mind, or middling, or superior, one receives the upavāsa, upāsaka, or śrāmaṇera precepts. Or some abide in the precepts by means of all causes, meaning that with a lower mind one receives the upāsaka precepts, then gives rise to a middling mind to receive the śrāmaṇera precepts, and subsequently gives rise to a superior mind to receive the bhikṣu precepts; possessing these three minds is called "all causes". The treatise says: "Only if a person does not make five kinds of definite restrictions can they receive and acquire the prātimokṣa precepts." These are definite restrictions regarding sentient beings, factors, places, times, and conditions. A restriction regarding sentient beings means thinking, "I will abstain from killing and the like only with respect to certain kinds of sentient beings." A restriction regarding factors means thinking, "I can uphold and not violate only certain factors of the discipline." A restriction regarding places means thinking, "I will abstain from killing and the like only in certain regions." A restriction regarding times means thinking, "I can abstain from killing and the like only during certain months, days, and the like." A restriction regarding conditions means thinking, "Except under conditions such as battle, I can abstain from killing and the like." If one receives them while making these five kinds of definite restrictions, one does not acquire the discipline, but merely acquires wholesome conduct resembling the discipline.
15.10
"Non-discipline is from all sentient beings and factors, but not the causes": this means that non-discipline is acquired from all sentient beings, because the mind intends to kill all sentient beings universally. Being acquired from all factors means that non-discipline possesses all factors, because one commits evil with all three bodily and four vocal [actions]. "Not the causes" means not from all causes, because the lower grade and other minds do not arise simultaneously. Question: "For a person of non-discipline, such as a sheep butcher, who throughout their life does not take what is not given, who maintains contentment with their own wife or concubines, and who is mute and cannot speak, thus having none of the four vocal faults—how could they possess all factors?" Answer: "Because they universally impair wholesome āśaya (āśaya is translated here as resolution); even though they are mute and cannot speak, they direct with their fingers, and by bodily intimations (vijñapti) express what they wish to say; hence they are able to possess all factors." If one does not resolve for the duration of life, does not possess all factors, and does not encompass all sentient beings universally, one only acquires intermediate unwholesome [conduct], and it is not called non-discipline. According to the Sautrāntika school, according to whatever time limit is set, whether the factors are complete or incomplete, and whether it is universal or not universal toward sentient beings, one always acquires non-discipline. The upāsaka precepts are likewise: according to how many one receives, one always acquires the precepts. The only exception is the eight precepts [of upavāsa]: because the duration is short, one must possess all factors and encompass all sentient beings universally before the precepts are generated. Those of non-discipline refer to sheep butchers, chicken butchers, pig butchers, fowlers, fishermen, hunters, robbers, executioners, jailers, dragon binders, dog cookers, trappers, wicked kings, execution officials, penalizers, investigators, and magistrates. "Dragon binders" refers to those who bind dragons and snakes with mantras, playing with them for amusement to seek wealth, thereby sustaining themselves. "Dog cookers": in the Western regions, wicked caṇḍālas are called "dog cookers", or it may refer to those who cook dogs to supply their own food. "Investigators" refers to censors and the like. "Magistrates" refers to high court judges and the like.
15.11
From here, this is the third part, explaining the acquisition of the unwholesome and the intermediate. The treatise says: "Having explained the acquisition of non-discipline from those [sources], by what expedient means does one acquire non-discipline and the other avijñapti? This has not yet been explained, and will now be explained (other avijñapti refers to the intermediate)." The verse says:
15.12
"All acquisition of non-discipline
is through action and undertaking by vow;
the acquisition of the remaining avijñapti
is through the field, undertaking, and intense action."
15.13
The explanation says: The first two lines concern the expedient means of acquiring unwholesome precepts; the last two lines concern the expedient means of acquiring the intermediate. The acquisition of non-discipline is due to two causes: first, through action; second, through undertaking by vow. "Through action" means that when one is born into a family of non-discipline, at the time of first performing killing and the like and initiating preliminary preparation, the unwholesome precepts are generated. That is, being born into a butcher family, having witnessed slaughter from childhood, the thought of making a vow is weak and does not generate unwholesome precepts; one must perform killing and the like to acquire non-discipline. Second, "through undertaking by vow" means that when born into another family, for the sake of livelihood, harbouring thoughts of killing, one makes a vow, saying: "From this day until the end of life, I shall perform such actions to support myself." At the time of making this vow, the unwholesome precepts are generated. That is, being born into another family, never having witnessed slaughter since childhood, the resolution of the vow is necessarily firm; therefore, the unwholesome precepts are generated.
15.14
"The acquisition of the remaining avijñapti": "the remaining" refers to the remaining intermediate avijñapti.
15.15
"Through the field, undertaking, and intense action": these are the causes for acquiring the intermediate. First, "through the field": when giving parks, groves, and the like to such fields of merit, the avijñapti of that giving arises as soon as the gift is first made. Second, "through undertaking": making a vow oneself, saying, "If I have not paid homage to the Buddha, I will not eat first," and the like; or on fast days vowing to always give food—merely by raising this vow in mind, avijñapti is generated. Third, "through intense action": giving rise to such earnest attention and performing good or performing evil, avijñapti is generated. Due to these three causes, one acquires the remaining avijñapti.
15.16
Below, this is the fourth major section, explaining the distinctions in relinquishment. Within this: first, relinquishing prātimokṣa; second, relinquishing the precepts of absorption and the path; third, relinquishing non-discipline; fourth, relinquishing the intermediate; fifth, relinquishing non-material dharmas.
15.17
Below, the first [section] explains relinquishing the prātimokṣa. The treatise states: "Thus having explained the acquisition of the vows and so forth, relinquishing the vows and so forth has not yet been explained and shall now be explained. First of all, how does one relinquish the prātimokṣa vows?" A verse states:
15.18
"Relinquishing the discipline of prātimokṣa
Is through intentional relinquishment, the end of life,
Both sexes arising together,
The severing of roots of good, and the end of the night.
Some say through committing a major offense; others say through the disappearance of the Dharma.
The Kaśmīrans say:
Committing [an offense entails] both, like being in debt."
15.19
Explanation: The first four lines are the Sarvāstivāda view; the fifth line is the Sautrāntika view; the sixth line is the Dharmaguptaka school's view; the last two lines are the Sarvāstivāda's resolution of objections. 'Discipline' (vinaya) is intended to indicate the vows, because through this one is able to discipline the faculties. Except for the upavāsa vows, the remaining vows are relinquished through four conditions. 1. 'Through intentional relinquishment': this requires possessing three conditions: first, through the mental intention of a mind disgusted with the vows; second, facing an understanding person who mutually comprehends; third, emitting an informative action (vijñapti), which means stating words of relinquishment contrary to the informative action of receiving. If any of the three conditions is lacking, relinquishing the vows is not accomplished. It is not accomplished merely by giving rise to a thought, because relinquishing in a dream is not accomplished; it is not accomplished merely by giving rise to an informative action, because in a mind of delusion, madness, and so forth, relinquishing is not accomplished; it is not accomplished merely by these two, because facing an animal or the like, relinquishing is not accomplished. Therefore, possessing these three, intentional relinquishment is first accomplished. 2. 'Through the end of life': the vows are obtained based on the physical body; when that which is relied upon is relinquished, the vows are relinquished accordingly. 3. 'Through both sexes arising together': that is, both male and female faculties arise; because that which is relied upon transforms, the mind transforms accordingly; furthermore, a hermaphrodite (ubhayavyañjanaka) is not a support for vows. 4. 'Through the severing of roots of good': the vows arise depending on the mind; when the wholesome mind is severed, the vows are also relinquished accordingly. 5. 'Through the end of the night': because the time limit of the vows has passed. Relinquishing the upavāsa vows occurs through the above five conditions; the remaining vows are relinquished only through four conditions, namely excluding the end of the night. In general, prātimokṣa is relinquished through five conditions.
15.20
Regarding 'some say through committing a major offense': the Sautrāntika masters say: 'If one commits any one of the four major prohibitions, one also relinquishes the vows of a novice (śrāmaṇera) and a monk (bhikṣu).'
15.21
Regarding 'others say through the disappearance of the Dharma': the Dharmaguptaka school holds that when the True Dharma disappears, one relinquishes the prātimokṣa vows, because when the Dharma disappears, all training rules, monastic boundaries (sīmā), and formal acts (karman) cease entirely.
15.22
Regarding 'committing [an offense entails] both, like being in debt': this is the Sarvāstivāda school's explanation that committing a major offense does not relinquish the vows. Why is this so? It is not that by committing one aspect, all vows should be entirely relinquished, just as in committing a saṃghāvaśeṣa or the like, one also does not relinquish the vows. However, there are two designations: keeping the vows and violating the vows. Just as a wealthy person, when incurring debts to others, is called both a wealthy person and a debtor; violating vows is also like this: if one confesses and expiates the offense committed, one is called endowed with śīla, not called a violator of vows, just as one who repays debts is called simply a wealthy person.
15.23
Now briefly outlining the two schools: the reason the Sautrāntika school says committing a major offense relinquishes the vows is that the World-Honoured One said: 'If one commits a major offense, one is not a son of the Śākya, one destroys the state of a recluse (śramaṇatva), breaks the essence of a monk, is ruined and falls, and is termed defeated (pārājika: here translated as "defeat by another"; bad dharmas are called "other"; the other comes and defeats oneself).' Since the World-Honoured One said 'not a son of the Śākya' and so forth, it is clearly known that one relinquishes the vows. The Sarvāstivāda resolves this: 'In this sūtra, saying "not a monk" means not an ultimate-truth monk; ultimate-truth monks are the noble ones; because of committing a major offense, one does not accomplish the noble fruit, hence it is said "not a monk".' Furthermore, the Sautrāntika cites the Vinaya explaining four [types of] monks: first, a nominal monk (that is, a layperson conventionally called a monk); second, a self-proclaimed monk (that is, one who committed a major offense and proclaims oneself a monk); third, a mendicant monk (that is, a renunciant who sustains oneself by begging); fourth, a monk who has broken defilements (that is, a noble one). Since the Vinaya text says that one who commits a major offense is not a [real] monk and is called a self-proclaimed monk, it is known that one relinquishes the vows. Furthermore, the Sarvāstivāda cites a sūtra to prove that one does not relinquish the vows, as the World-Honoured One said: 'Cunda, you should know that there are four kinds of recluses and no fifth. The four are: 1. the recluse who has conquered the path (meaning the Buddha and pratyekabuddhas, because they are self-awakened); 2. the recluse who points out the path (meaning Śāriputra, because he teaches the Dharma and reveals the path); 3. the recluse who lives the path (Ānanda, because he takes śīla, samādhi, and prajñā as life); 4. the recluse who corrupts the path (a monk who has committed a major offense; the Vinaya calls them mahalla, meaning an old monk who likes to steal others' goods).' Since this sūtra states that one who commits a major offense is called corrupting the path yet still designated a recluse, it is clearly known that one possesses the vows. The Sautrāntika resolves this: a nominal recluse is called a recluse, not that possessing the essence of vows is called a recluse. Examining the intention of the author of the treatise, the Sautrāntika is correct. Therefore, the author of the treatise mocks the Sarvāstivāda, saying: 'If such a person still possessed the nature of a monk, one ought to take refuge in, revere, and pay homage to such a monk.' Against the earlier Dharmaguptaka school, the author of the treatise refutes: 'When the True Dharma disappears, although there are no boundaries, formal acts, and Vinaya at all, so that for those who have not yet obtained vows there is no reason for newly obtaining them, nonetheless for those who have previously obtained them, there is also no sense of relinquishment.'
15.24
From here, the second [section] explains relinquishing the absorption vows and path vows. The treatise states: "How are the two vows of dhyāna and taintlessness relinquished?" A verse states:
15.25
"Relinquishing the wholesome dharmas born of absorption
Is through changing levels, falling away, and so forth.
Relinquishing the noble [dharmas] is through obtaining the fruit,
Refining the faculties, and falling away."
15.26
Explanation: 'Relinquishing the wholesome dharmas born of absorption' sets forth the topic.
15.27
'Through changing levels, falling away, and so forth' explains relinquishment through two conditions. 1. Relinquishing through changing levels: when born into a higher level from a lower level, one relinquishes the dharmas of the lower level; or when dying in a higher level and born into a lower level, one relinquishes the dharmas of the higher level. 2. Through falling away: when having obtained superior absorption, one falls back and loses it. The word 'and so forth' in the verse includes relinquishing the nikāyasabhāga, and also relinquishing a small portion of superior roots of good. 'A small portion of superior roots of good' refers only to the four [aids to penetration], Heat and so forth, which are called superior wholesome [dharmas]. If an ordinary worldling relinquishes them, they are relinquished at the time of death; whether born in that same level or born in a higher level, one relinquishes Heat and so forth. Since they are relinquished in that same level, it is not changing levels, because relinquishing by changing levels is only between higher and lower. This explains relinquishing the absorption vows through the above three conditions. Just as absorption of the form realm is relinquished through changing levels and falling away, relinquishing formless absorptions is also like this; the only difference from the form realm is that there are no vows.
15.28
'Relinquishing the noble [dharmas] is through obtaining the fruit, refining the faculties, and falling away' explains relinquishing the noble [dharmas] through three conditions. 1. Through obtaining the fruit: if one obtains a subsequent fruit, one relinquishes the path of the prior fruit and the path of progress toward it. 2. Through refining the faculties: that is, when transforming the faculties, one relinquishes the path of dull faculties. 3. Through falling away: falling away from the path of the fruit and the path of the superior fruit; the path of progress is called the path of the superior fruit because it tends toward the superior fruit. This passage generally explains relinquishing untainted dharmas; because vows follow the dharmas, relinquishing untainted vows is also identical with the above three conditions.
15.29
From here, the third [section explains] relinquishing the non-vows. The treatise states: "Thus has been explained relinquishing the vows; how are non-vows relinquished?" A verse states:
15.30
"Relinquishing bad vows is through death,
Obtaining the vows, and the arising of both sexes."
15.31
Explanation: Relinquishing non-vows occurs through three kinds of conditions: 1. through death, because that which is relied upon is relinquished; 2. through obtaining the vows: that is, obtaining the prātimokṣa vows or obtaining the dhyāna vows, the bad vows are thereupon relinquished; 3. through the arising of both sexes, because that which is relied upon transforms. The treatise states: 'Even though one abiding in bad vows may at times give rise to the intention not to act, and lay down swords and weapons, if one does not receive and obtain the wholesome vows, there is no way to abandon the non-vows. For example, even if one avoids the causes and conditions that induce illness, if one does not take good medicine, the illness in the end will be hard to cure.'
15.32
From here, the fourth [section explains] relinquishing intermediate non-informative matter. The treatise states: "Again, how is intermediate non-informative matter relinquished?" A verse states:
15.33
"Relinquishing the intermediate is through [relinquishing] the commitment, force,
Activity, material objects, and the cutting off of life and roots."
15.34
Explanation: Relinquishing intermediate non-informative matter occurs through six conditions; the word 'through' in the upper line and the word 'cutting off' in the lower line apply to all six. 1. Through cutting off the commitment: that is, relinquishing what was undertaken, forming the thought: 'From now on, I abandon what I previously undertook.' 2. Through cutting off the force: that is, non-informative matter induced by the force of pure faith or defilements; when the force of those two limits is cut off and broken, the non-informative matter is thereupon relinquished. 3. Through cutting off activity: that is, not acting any further according to what was undertaken, as previously bowing to the Buddha and now no longer doing so. 4. Relinquishing through the destruction of material objects: that is, when the donated monasteries, dwellings, bedding, caityas, parks, or the donated hunting nets and traps and other things are destroyed, the non-informative matter is thereupon relinquished. 5. Through the cutting off of life: when life is severed and ended, the non-informative matter is thereupon relinquished. 6. Through the cutting off of roots: 'roots' means the roots of good; originally depending on the roots of good, intermediate non-informative matter was emitted; now when giving rise to the preparatory effort that severs the roots of good, one thereupon relinquishes the non-informative matter induced by the roots of good. The word 'roots' in the verse reasonably ought to extend to unwholesome roots; that is, giving rise to the preparatory effort that severs unwholesome roots, one thereupon relinquishes the intermediate non-informative matter induced by unwholesome roots. The treatise text only mentions severing roots of good because it implicitly includes unwholesome roots. (Saying 'preparatory effort' is because the intermediate is weak, so it is relinquished merely at the time of preparatory effort).
15.35
From here, the fifth [section explains] relinquishing non-material wholesome and defiled [dharmas]. The treatise states: "Again, how are desire-realm non-material wholesome [dharmas] and all other non-material defiled dharmas relinquished?" A verse states:
15.36
"Relinquishing desire-realm non-material wholesome [dharmas] is through severing the roots and higher rebirth;
Through the arising of the path of antidote,
All non-material defiled [dharmas] are relinquished."
15.37
Explanation: 'Relinquishing desire-realm non-material wholesome [dharmas]' has two conditions; wholesome [dharmas] such as the mind are called non-material wholesome [dharmas]. 1. Through severing the roots: that is, severing the roots of good; 2. through higher rebirth: that is, being born into higher realms.
15.38
'All non-material defiled [dharmas] are relinquished': 'all' refers to the three realms; non-material defiled [dharmas] of the three realms are dharmas such as the mind. They are relinquished through one condition, namely through the arising of the path of antidote; when the path of antidote of this category arises, all defilements in this [category] and their accompaniments ought to be relinquished (accompaniments are the associated, co-existent, and possessive [dharmas]).
15.39
From here, the fifth major section determines the wholesome and unwholesome according to location. The treatise states: "Which sentient beings possess wholesome and unwholesome vows?" A verse states:
15.40
"Bad vows belong to humans, excluding the North,
The two eunuchs, and the two-sexed.
Vows also exist among the devas;
Humans alone possess all three kinds.
Born in the desire-heavens and the form realm,
One possesses dhyāna vows.
Untainted [vows exist there] as well as in the formless realm,
Excluding the intermediate dhyāna and the non-conceptual [heaven]."
15.41
Explanation: 'Bad vows belong to humans, excluding the North, the two eunuchs, and the two-sexed' clarifies the locus of bad vows. Among the human destiny, they exist only in the three continents, excluding Uttarakuru; because those [beings] lack extreme shamelessness and lack of conscience, they have no bad vows. Among the three continents, excluding eunuchs and so forth, they also have no bad vows. Ṣaṇḍhas and paṇḍakas are called the two eunuchs.
15.42
'Vows also exist among the devas': the two destinies of humans and devas can possess vows. Among the human destiny, excluding Uttarakuru—those [beings] do not receive vows, so they have no prātimokṣa vows; because they do not enter absorption, they have no absorption vows or path vows. Hermaphrodites and the like also have no wholesome vows, because in a single body both male and female desires arise and are both predominant; furthermore, they lack moral determination and have no capacity for correct discernment, and they have no extreme sense of shame and conscience. The bodies of ṣaṇḍhas and the like are like saline, alkaline fields that grow neither fine crops nor bad weeds; therefore they have neither wholesome vows nor bad vows.
15.43
'Humans alone possess all three kinds': meaning they possess all three kinds of vows: prātimokṣa, dhyāna, and taintless. The prātimokṣa vows do not exist in the deva destiny.
15.44
'Born in the desire-heavens and the form realm, one possesses dhyāna vows': within these two realms, both can enter absorption and possess dhyāna vows. In the non-conceptual heaven they are merely possessed (samanvāgama); in the formless realm they do not exist, because it is formless.
15.45
[As for the phrase] "Uncontaminated and the Formless [Realm]": this means that uncontaminated discipline exists in the Desire and Form Realms, as well as in the Formless Realm. Although it does not actively manifest in the Formless Realm, it is nonetheless achieved. When a noble person is born in the Formless Realm, they achieve the past and future uncontaminated discipline of the Form Realm, because the phenomena obtained earlier and later are acquired without being lost.
15.46
[As for the phrase] "Excluding the intermediate dhyāna and the non-conception [heaven]": this means that within the Form Realm, the Mahābrahmā of the intermediate dhyāna and the heaven of non-conception consist solely of ordinary worldlings and lack uncontaminated discipline; hence they must be excluded. Because noble persons exist in the remaining sixteen heavens, they all may achieve uncontaminated discipline.
15.47
From here, the second main section explains the various karmas taught in the sūtras. Within this there are eleven parts: first, explaining karma of the three natures; second, explaining the three karmas of merit and so forth; third, explaining karma of the three feelings; fourth, explaining karma of the three times; fifth, explaining bodily and mental feeling; sixth, explaining the crooked, the corrupt, and the turbid; seventh, explaining black-black and so forth; eighth, explaining the three munis and so forth; ninth, explaining the three evil conducts and so forth; tenth, explaining the ten karmapathas; eleventh, explaining the three wrong conducts.
15.48
From here, the first [part] explains karma of the three natures. The treatise says: "Now the sūtras say that karma is of three kinds: wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral. What are their characteristics?" The verse states:
15.49
"Secure, insecure, and non-[such] karma / Are termed wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral."
15.50
The commentary explains: Secure karma is called wholesome, because it obtains pleasant fruits and relieves manifold sufferings. Insecure karma is called unwholesome, because it incurs unpleasant fruits and harms sentient beings. The words "non-[such] karma" refer to that which is neither of the preceding two karmas; it is assigned the name "neutral" (avyākṛta) because it cannot be predicted as either wholesome or unwholesome.
15.51
From here, the second [part] explains the three karmas of merit and so forth. The treatise says: "Again, the sūtras say that karma is of three kinds: meritorious, non-meritorious, and so forth. What are their characteristics?" The verse states:
15.52
"Meritorious, non-meritorious, and immovable: / Wholesome karma of the Desire [Realm] is called meritorious; / Unwholesome is non-meritorious; / Wholesome of the higher realms is immovable, / Because, with respect to their own stages and places, / The karma and fruit are without movement."
15.53
The commentary explains: The first line states the headings, and below follows the explanation. "Meritorious, non-meritorious, and immovable" is the heading.
15.54
"Wholesome karma of the Desire [Realm] is called meritorious" because it incurs pleasant fruits and benefits sentient beings.
15.55
"Unwholesome is non-meritorious" because it incurs unpleasant fruits and harms sentient beings.
15.56
"Wholesome of the higher realms is immovable": wholesome [karma] of the upper two realms is called immovable karma. Question: "Did the World-Honoured One not state that the lower three dhyānas are all called 'having movement'?" Answer: "The first dhyāna has the movement of vitarka and vicāra; the second dhyāna has the movement of the feeling of joy; the third dhyāna has the movement of the feeling of pleasure. Therefore the name 'movement' is established. In the *Anejjasutta*, based on being able to bring about an immovable maturation (vipāka), it is called 'immovable'." Question: "How can a dhyāna that has movement incur an immovable maturation?" In order to answer this question, the verse states: "Because, with respect to their own stages and places, / The karma and fruit are without movement." Although the lower three dhyānas have the movement of calamities, when spoken of with respect to place, the karma and fruit are immovable. Just as karma of the first dhyāna incurs the fruit of the first dhyāna, the place of the first dhyāna is fixed and cannot be shifted to be experienced in the place of the second stage; because karma and fruit are fixed in place, the name 'immovable' is established. In the Desire Realm, however, karma for [rebirth as] a deva or the like may, by the force of distinct conditions, be shifted to be experienced among humans or the like; hence it is not immovable.
15.57
From here, the third [part] explains karma of the three feelings. The treatise says: "Again, the sūtras say that karma is of three kinds: conducive to pleasant feeling and so forth. What are their characteristics?" The verse states:
15.58
"Conducive to pleasant, painful, and neither: / Wholesome up to the third [dhyāna] is conducive to pleasant; / All unwholesome is conducive to painful; / Higher wholesome is conducive to neither. / Others say it exists below as well, / Because the intermediate incurs maturation; / Furthermore, these three karmas are admitted / Because they do not mature earlier or later. / 'Conducive to feeling' has five in all: / Namely, by nature, association, / Object, and maturation, / As well as by the distinction of present manifestation."
15.59
The commentary explains: The first stanza properly explains the three feelings, the second stanza cites proof, and the third stanza explains 'conducive to feeling'. "Conducive to pleasant, painful, and neither" is the heading. First, karma conducive to pleasant feeling; second, karma conducive to painful feeling; third, karma conducive to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, which is 'neither'.
15.60
"Wholesome up to the third [dhyāna] is conducive to pleasant" explains conducive to pleasant feeling: all wholesome karma beginning from the Desire Realm up to the third dhyāna is called conducive to pleasant feeling.
15.61
"All unwholesome is conducive to painful" explains conducive to painful feeling: unwholesome karma of the Desire Realm is called karma conducive to painful feeling.
15.62
"Higher wholesome is conducive to neither" explains neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling: above the third dhyāna, from the fourth dhyāna up to the Peak of Existence (bhavāgra), all wholesome karma is called higher wholesome, and is called karma conducive to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. The treatise says: "It is not that these karmas only bring about the fruit of feeling; it should be known that they also bring about the requisites for that feeling. Both feeling and its requisites are here called 'feeling'. (The commentary explains: What is associated with and co-existent with it is called requisites)."
15.63
"Others say it exists below as well, / Because the intermediate incurs maturation": other masters say that below the third dhyāna there is also the third karma, conducive to neither; "intermediate" refers to the intermediate dhyāna. Because the karma of the intermediate dhyāna incurs the maturation of the intermediate, it is clearly known that the lower stages have karma of neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, for birth in the intermediate has only the feeling of equanimity; hence that karma incurs a fruit conducive to neither.
15.64
"Furthermore, these three karmas are admitted / Because they do not mature earlier or later" cites proof. The intention is to clarify that the lower stages have the maturation of equanimity; this is taught in the *Jñānaprasthāna*. That text says: "Can there be three karmas that experience maturation neither earlier nor later? (The commentary explains: Experiencing it at the same time is meant by 'neither earlier nor later'.)" That treatise answers: "There are: namely, matter (rūpa) of karma conducive to pleasant feeling, mind and mental factors of karma conducive to painful feeling, and formations non-associated with mind of karma conducive to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, and so forth in detail. (The commentary explains: The matter of conducive to pleasant refers to the five sense faculties such as the eye, as well as visible form, fragrance, taste, and tangibles among humans and devas. Mind and mental factors of conducive to painful refers to incurring painful feeling and its associated dharmas among humans and devas. Formations non-associated with mind of karma conducive to neither-painful-nor-pleasant refers to the life-faculty, commonality of sentient beings (nikāya-sabhāgatā), and the four characteristics of acquisition among humans and devas.)" (This is the first passage. In the detailed exposition there is yet another passage; the *Abhidharmakośa* cites it in abridged form, merely stating 'and so forth in detail'. In the second passage: formations non-associated with mind of karma conducive to pleasant feeling can incur the four [dharmas] such as the life-faculty among humans and devas; matter of karma conducive to painful feeling refers to incurring visible form, fragrance, taste, and tangibles among humans and devas; mind and mental factors of karma conducive to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling can incur neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling and its associated maturation.) Now, citing that text's intention, the second passage is taken as proof: since it says that karma conducive to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling incurs the maturation of neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, it is clearly known that the Desire Realm has the maturation of equanimity, because the root treatise says that the three karmas experience the fruit of maturation simultaneously. From this it is proven and known that the lower stages also have karma conducive to neither, for these three karmas cannot mature simultaneously outside of the Desire Realm; since the higher realms lack suffering, the words 'three karmas' speak solely of the Desire Realm. Question: "Is it not that karma is wholesome or unwholesome, while the fruit of feeling is neutral? Since this karma and pleasant [feeling] are completely distinct in nature, how can it be called conducive to pleasant feeling and so forth?" Answer: "Karma can act as a cause to benefit pleasant feeling; therefore, with respect to benefit, it is called conducive to feeling. Or alternatively, this karma is experienced by pleasure: that is, pleasure is the fruit of maturation of the karma; the fruit apprehends the cause, which is the experienced being conducive to the experiencer. Or alternatively, that pleasure is experienced by karma: because by this [karma] one is able to experience the maturation of pleasure, the cause experiences the fruit, which is the experiencer being conducive to the experienced."
15.65
"Conducive to feeling has five in all" is the heading. In general, conducive to feeling has briefly five kinds.
15.66
"Namely, by nature, association": below follows the itemised explanation. First, conducive to feeling by intrinsic nature: having the three feelings as its essence; because its intrinsic nature is feeling, its intrinsic nature does not conflict [with feeling], hence it is called conducive to feeling. Second, conducive to feeling by association: having contact (sparśa) as its essence; contact being associated with feeling is called conducive to feeling by association, as the sūtra says: "contact conducive to pleasant feeling," and so forth in detail.
15.67
"And object, maturation": third, conducive to feeling by object: having the six sense objects such as visible form as its essence; the cognitive object being conducive to the feeling that cognises it is called conducive to feeling by object. Fourth, conducive to feeling by maturation: karma that incurs maturation is conducive to the fruit of maturation; hence it is called conducive to feeling by maturation, as the sūtra says: "karma conducive to experience in the present," and so forth in detail.
15.68
"As well as by the distinction of present manifestation": fifth, conducive to feeling by present manifestation: "present" means the present time; feeling actively manifesting right now is the essence of feeling itself, and being presently manifested without conflict is called conducive to feeling by present manifestation. The word "distinction" refers to the distinctions among the five feelings discussed above. The previously mentioned conducive to pleasant feeling and so forth are, among these five, the fourth, conducive to feeling by maturation. Because karma is able to bring about the maturation of feeling, although karma and feeling differ in intrinsic nature, they still receive the names "conducive to pleasant feeling" and so forth.
15.69
From here, the fourth [part] explains karma of the three times. Within this: first, explaining the four karmas; second, explaining distinctions; third, explaining karma of the intermediate existence; fourth, explaining determinate karma; fifth, explaining karma with fruits in the present life; sixth, explaining karma as the experience of the fruit itself.
15.70
Below, the first [section] explains the four kinds of karma. The treatise says: "These three karmas are determinate and indeterminate. What are their characteristics?" The verse states:
15.71
"These are determinate and indeterminate; / Determinate is threefold: conducive to the present, and so forth. / Or it is said that karma is of five kinds; / Other masters state four alternatives."
15.72
The commentary explains: "These are determinate and indeterminate" is the heading. The preceding three karmas have determinate and indeterminate.
15.73
"Determinate is threefold: conducive to the present, and so forth" is the itemised explanation. Determinate karma is threefold: first, conducive to experience in the present life (dṛṣṭadharmavedanīya), meaning created in this life and experienced in this very life; second, conducive to experience upon rebirth (upapadyavedanīya), meaning created in this life and experienced in the second life; third, conducive to experience in subsequent lives (aparaparyāyavedanīya), meaning created in this life and experienced after the third life. According to the Sautrāntikas, karma conducive to experience in the present life is strongest in power and must be experienced in the present, rebirth, and subsequent [lives]. Karma conducive to experience upon rebirth is somewhat weaker in power and must be experienced in rebirth and subsequent [lives], not in the present. Karma conducive to experience in subsequent lives is weakest in power, not experienced in the present or upon rebirth, but only in subsequent [lives]. According to the stage of initial maturation, they are called conducive to the present and so forth, and together with indeterminate karma they form four kinds. As for the term "indeterminate": because it is not determinately experienced—that is, it does not determinately experience maturation; or because its timing across the three times is indeterminate—the name "indeterminate" is established.
15.74
Regarding "Or it is said that karma is of five kinds": Some wish that karma of indefinite fruition should further be of two kinds. That is, with respect to maturation, there are definite and indefinite, which are opened into two kinds: (1) Maturation is definite but time is indefinite; that is, the fruit is definitely experienced, but the time within the three times is indefinite. (2) Both maturation and time are indefinite; that is, both the fruit and the time are experienced indefinitely. There is only karma where the fruit is definite and the time is indefinite, and none where the time is definite and the fruit is indefinite; for if it is definite in time, it is necessarily definite in fruit, since time has no separate nature apart from maturation. The four karmas and the five karmas differ only by division and combination; in principle there is no difference. Regarding "Other masters state a tetralemma": Other Dārṣṭāntika masters state that karma is divided into eight kinds, and thus formulate a tetralemma. They accept that time may be definite while the fruit is indefinite. Within the indefinite, time is further divided into three, which, combined with the previous five karmas, makes eight kinds. In the first lemma, the time division is definite and the maturation is indefinite; that is, for the three karmas to be experienced in the present, etc., the time in the three times is definite, but the fruit is indefinite. If its fruit is experienced in the present life, it is experienced only in the present; if not experienced, it will never be experienced again. It is necessarily definite in time and indefinite in fruit; as this is true for [karma] to be experienced in the present, so it is also for [karma to be experienced in] the next and subsequent lives. This is divided into three kinds: (1) definite as to the present, indefinite as to fruit; (2) definite as to the next life, indefinite as to fruit; (3) definite as to subsequent lives, indefinite as to fruit. In the second lemma, there is karma definite as to maturation and indefinite as to time; that is, indefinite karma definitely obtains maturation. This is only one: the fruit is definite and the time is indefinite. In the third lemma, there is karma definite in both; that is, [karma] to be experienced in the present, etc., definitely obtains maturation. This has three kinds: (1) both time and fruit are definite as to the present; (2) both time and fruit are definite as to the next life; (3) both time and fruit are definite as to subsequent lives. In the fourth lemma, there is karma indefinite in both; that is, karma indefinite in time does not definitely obtain maturation. This is only one: the fruit is indefinite and the time is indefinite. The śāstra says: "They state that all karmas amount in total to eight kinds: namely, to be experienced in the present has definite and indefinite, up to indefinite also having two kinds." (An explanation says: The three definite ones of the present, etc., are the third lemma. The three indefinite ones of the present, etc., are the first lemma. The definite within the fourth, indefinite karma is the second lemma. The indefinite within the indefinite karma is the fourth lemma.)
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