中觀論疏 1.19

The fifth [gate], the gate of similarities and differences. Question: What difference is there between the 'Chapter on Refuting Causes and Conditions' in the Madhyamaka-śāstra and the 'Gate of Contemplating Causes and Conditions' in the Dvādaśamukha-śāstra? Answer: In refuting false causes and conditions and elucidating correct causes and conditions, their meaning is broadly identical; they differ only in that the texts are extensive or brief, separated or combined. This single chapter on causes and conditions in this treatise subsumes those three gates, and also combines those three gates into the present single chapter: the 'Gate of Causes and Conditions' is precisely the single verse in this chapter, 'The intrinsic nature of phenomena does not reside in conditions'; the second, the 'Gate of Contemplating the Existent and Non-existent Fruit', is the initial verse in this chapter that separately refutes the four conditions; the third, the 'Gate of Contemplating Conditions', is the concluding verse in this chapter that refutes the four conditions. Question: Why is this single chapter separated into those three gates? Answer: That treatise intends to show the meaning of general and specific contemplation: the general refers to the gate of causes and conditions; the specific refers to the gate of causes and the gate of conditions. This treatise only clarifies the general contemplation and does not clarify the specific contemplation. As their texts are alternately extensive and brief, the meaning may be understood. Second, clarifying the division and combination of the treatise's sections. Looking at India and China, those who commit to writing and those who transmit orally in expounding sūtras and lecturing on treatises are of two kinds: first, direct commentary; second, dividing into topical sections. For instance, when Tanying composed his commentary, he explained that this treatise has four fascicles and twenty-seven chapters, taking as its overarching theme the refuting of sentient beings' errors of annihilation and permanence, and elucidating the middle way of the two truths, so that through this middle way right contemplation may arise. Second, the northern Sanlun masters explain that this treatise has four fascicles and broadly clarifies three sections: first, four verses mark the overarching theme of the treatise; second, from 'Refuting the Four Conditions' onward through the 'Chapter on Wrong Views', it refutes attachments and reveals the central doctrine; third, the very last verse attributes merit to the Buddha. Because the beginning subsumes the beginning, the four verses marking the overarching theme are in the first chapter; because the end subsumes the end, the final verse attributing merit to the Buddha is in the last chapter. The master said: 'Teaching and transforming [beings] is without fixed manner; training and guiding is not of one kind. Investigating the sagely intent, pacifying errors is primary; examining the purpose of the teachings, opening the way is the core. If awakening is attained through division, the sagely teaching is divided for them; if the way is attained through combination, the sagely teaching is combined for them. If both are understood, both serve as ambrosia; if one is confused about both, both become poison. How could one rigidly cling to a single approach and block the many gates?' This meaning is fully provided, just as in the Fahua xuanyi. But because dull-rooted people of the latter age look through its continuous prose without seeing its beginnings and ends, those who lecture on sūtras and treatises have jointly divided it. Question: Sūtras have prologue, main exposition, and dissemination; why does the treatise have none? Answer: The great sage has the three clarities completely luminous and perceives the capacities of beings across the two times [of past and future]; therefore he establishes both general and specific prologues. The disciples' wisdom has not yet reached this; therefore they do not establish them. Furthermore, sentient beings are boundless and great compassion is infinite; not only intending to benefit the present age, he desires to transmit it afar to distant eras, hence there is dissemination. The disciples compose treatises only for understanding and benefit at that time, not daring to transmit it to future ages; therefore they do not establish dissemination. Second, treatises are originally composed to elucidate the sūtras; therefore they do not separately establish dissemination. Question: Other treatises have a main exposition and an epilogue; why does this treatise have none? Answer: Because the Akutobhayā is the extensive text, it has them; the present text is the abridged treatise, hence it has none. Second, relying on matters to express principle, precisely because it is abridged at the beginning and the end, it is called the Madhyamaka-śāstra. Transmitted down through the lineage from Sheling, the twenty-seven chapters are divided into three sections: the first twenty-five chapters refute the confusions and errors of the Mahāyāna and clarify the Mahāyāna contemplative practice; next are two chapters that refute the confused attachments of the Hīnayāna and distinguish the Hīnayāna contemplative practice; the third again clarifies the Mahāyāna contemplative practice and attributes merit to the Buddha. The reason there are these three sections is that the correct Way has never been small or great; responding to the capacities and conditions of the great and small, the two teachings, great and small, were spoken. But while the Buddha was in the world, sentient beings of merit and sharp faculties, upon receiving these two teachings, all became confused and lost. The treatise master refutes both those confusions and elucidates both teachings; therefore there is a text of three sections. Furthermore, a bodhisattva wishes to train comprehensively in all paths; having first known the great path, next he must recognise the small, and then expedient and real being thoroughly clear, he can bring about the dual transformation of the great and small. Question: For what persons did Nāgārjuna doubly refute both the great and the small, and doubly elucidate both teachings? Answer: Briefly, for four conditions: First, for those who study the great and lose the great, he refutes the great and elucidates the great. How is this known? The Dvādaśamukha-śāstra states: 'Sentient beings of the latter age have meager merit and dull faculties; although they search the sūtra texts, they cannot penetrate and understand them. Pitying them, I desire to bring them to awakening.' In this treatise it says: 'Hearing that the Mahāyāna teachings explain ultimate emptiness, not knowing by what cause and condition it is empty, they subsequently lose the two truths.' Hence we know that for the condition of those who study the great and lose the great, he elucidates the great teaching. Furthermore, the Buddhas of the three times and ten directions respond to great conditions and speak the great teaching; the bodhisattvas of the four reliances of the three times and ten directions respond to great conditions and reiterate the great teaching. Second, for small conditions, he elucidates the great teaching. Because rigidly clinging to the Hīnayāna obstructs the great path, he must refute the small and clarify the great. There is textual proof for this as well: thus the first chapter refutes the four conditions of the Abhidharma, up to the 'Chapter on Fire and Fuel' refuting the Sarvāstivādin attachment to dharmas and the Vātsīputrīya conception of the person; this is that very matter. Furthermore, the Buddhas of the three times and ten directions speak the Mahāyāna for two kinds of conditions: first, for direct-progressing bodhisattvas; second, for those who turn from the small to enter the great. The bodhisattvas of the four reliances of the three times and ten directions who compose treatises also do so for two kinds of persons: earlier, for those who study the Mahāyāna and lose the great, they refute the great and elucidate the great, who are the direct-progressing persons; next, to refute studying the small and obstructing the great, they cause them to turn from the small to enter the great. Third, because the ninety-six kinds of non-Buddhists cling to falsehood and obstruct the correctness of the Mahāyāna, he refutes falsehood and elucidates correctness. There is text everywhere in the treatise. Furthermore, the Buddhas of the three times refute the non-Buddhists within the Mahāyāna, causing the non-Buddhists to awaken and enter the Mahāyāna, such as the six teachers and ten ṛṣis in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]. The [bodhisattvas of the] four reliances of the three times are also like this: refuting the ninety-six falsehoods, they cause them to turn from falsehood and enter the correctness of the Mahāyāna. Fourth, the four reliances act for conditions who have never studied the Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, internal or external, such as the two newly renounced assemblies and the two lay assemblies; for these sentient beings, they directly discuss the great Dharma to lead them to awakening. For although these conditions have never studied the great, the small, the internal, or the external, from beginningless time they have naturally remained in delusion and lost the Way, conceiving of an internal self and external objects; now, by directly causing them to practice contemplation and seek but find nothing, they then attain awakening to the Way. Next, elucidating the Hīnayāna is also for four conditions: first, for those who study the Hīnayāna and lose the small, he refutes the small and elucidates the small, which is the chapter on Hīnayāna causes and conditions; second, to refute non-Buddhists obstructing the lesser vehicle and cause them to turn from falsehood and enter correctness (previously he caused turning from loss to gain; now he causes turning from falsehood to correctness), which is the 'Chapter on Wrong Views'; third, he elucidates the small teaching for Mahāyāna bodhisattvas.

There are bodhisattvas who understand the Mahāyāna but have not mastered the Hīnayāna, as in the "Medicinal Herbs Parable" chapter of the Lotus Sūtra where such bodhisattvas exist. Now, by causing bodhisattvas to understand both the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna, they are brought to awaken to the two wisdoms: the expedient and the real. The twenty-five chapters refute Mahāyāna [errors] and elucidate the Mahāyāna to bring bodhisattvas to awaken to the real wisdom; the following two chapters cause bodhisattvas to awaken to the expedient wisdom, so that they straightaway enter the Buddha's knowledge and vision and attain the dharma-body. Since the grand intention behind the appearance of the Buddhas in the ten directions and the three periods of time is thus, so too is the grand intention behind the appearance of the four-reliance bodhisattvas. The grand intention behind the appearance of the four-reliance bodhisattvas is likewise thus; therefore the four reliances are like the Buddha, and indeed are the Buddha. Fourth, for those who have never studied either the Mahāyāna or the Hīnayāna, whether internal or external, [the Buddha] directly teaches the Hīnayāna teaching for them, leading them to awaken to the path and fruit of the Hīnayāna. Moreover, in general terms there are four kinds of hindrances that obstruct the Mahāyāna: first, non-Buddhists, who are the weightiest and most distant among hindrances; second, the Hīnayāna, which is the next hindrance; third, the Mahāyāna of grasping, which hinders non-grasping; fourth, ignorance, which recognizes neither the Mahāyāna nor the Hīnayāna. Yet because they originally possessed the Mahāyāna root-capacity from former times, the bodhisattva preaches the Great [Vehicle] for them to destroy these four delusions, and also to cause these four classes of people to awaken and enter into the Great [Vehicle]. The Small [Vehicle] likewise has four kinds of hindrances: first, non-Buddhists; second, the Hīnayāna of grasping; third, grasping exclusively to the Great so as to repudiate the Small by means of the Great, as in the Lotus Sūtra's discussion of bodhisattvas who grasp exclusively to the Ekayāna; fourth, ignorance, which recognizes neither the Mahāyāna nor the Hīnayāna. Now he likewise causes these four classes of people to awaken and enter into the Small [Vehicle]. Question: What is the difference in refutation and elucidation between the Dvādaśamukha-śāstra and the Madhyamaka-śāstra? Answer: The Madhyamaka-śāstra refutes the four delusions and elucidates both teachings of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna; the Dvādaśamukha-śāstra also refutes the four delusions, but elucidates solely the Mahāyāna teaching. Third, regarding the re-elucidation of the Mahāyāna contemplation-practice to attribute the merit back to the Buddha, there are ten points of significance: First, wishing to show that the Hīnayāna does not exhaustively refute wrong views, whereas the Mahāyāna is shown to refute wrong views completely, he re-elucidates the Mahāyāna's refutation of wrong views. Second, because he previously explained generating the Small from the Great and subsequently explains gathering the Small back into the Great, he re-elucidates the Great. As the Lotus Sūtra summarizes the entire conversion by the Buddhas of the ten directions and Śākyamuni, there are altogether three turnings [of the wheel]: First, the fundamental wheel of the Dharma, meaning the Ekayāna teaching. Second, the teaching of the branch-and-leaf wheel of the Dharma: sentient beings could not bear to hear the One, so within the One Buddha-Vehicle he differentiated and taught three; since the three arise from the one, they are called the branches and leaves. Third, gathering the branches back to the root, unifying those three vehicles to return together to the single ultimate. These three gateways exclude no teaching and leave no principle ungathered, just as space encompasses the myriad forms and the ocean takes in the hundred rivers. Now the three sections of this treatise in turn elucidate the Buddha's three sūtra teachings: the first twenty-five chapters elucidate the fundamental teaching of the Ekayāna; the next two chapters elucidate the Buddha's branch-and-leaf teaching; and the final re-elucidation of the Mahāyāna elucidates gathering the branches back to the root. Therefore the text consists of three sections. Refuting these three delusions and elucidating these three teachings are entirely the work of the Buddha; thus at the very end he attributes the merit back to the Buddha. Since the sūtras of the three turnings omit no teaching, the treatise elucidating the three turnings also excludes no teaching; for this reason, this treatise explores the profoundest depths and reaches the broadest extent. Third, by first elucidating the Mahāyāna and next elucidating the Hīnayāna, it might appear to become a treatise on both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, and not uniquely termed a Mahāyāna treatise; however, although the Small is also explained in the middle, because both the beginning and the end are the Great, it is called a Mahāyāna treatise. Fourth, it shows that the Small cannot encompass the Great, whereas the Great is able to contain the Small. Only by fully clarifying all the teachings, Great and Small, throughout the beginning and end of a single teaching era is it then called a Mahāyāna treatise; therefore, in the third [section] he treats the Mahāyāna again, although in the ultimate discourse there is never Great or Small. Fifth, elucidating the Great has two approaches: first, elucidating the Great in terms of the Great; second, revealing the Great by adducing the Small. The twenty-five chapters are precisely elucidating the Great in terms of the Great, while the final two chapters reveal the Great by adducing the Small. Sixth, previously he elucidated the great Dharma solely for those with Mahāyāna capacities, while later, solely because those with Hīnayāna capacities could not bear to receive the Great, they requested the teaching of the Small, which is why he explains the Small. Seventh, this treatise directly clarifies the middle way; wishing to explain those who contemplate the middle way, there are altogether four classes of people: through lower-wisdom contemplation they attain the bodhi of the śrāvaka, up to the highest-wisdom contemplation through which they attain the bodhi of the Buddhas. The previous twenty-five chapters have already explained the attainment of bodhi through higher and highest wisdom contemplation, and the subsequent two chapters next explain the meaning of attaining bodhi through medium and lower wisdom. Thus the treatise text states: "Above, one has already heard the Mahāyāna Dharma and entered the ultimate truth; now one wishes to hear the śrāvaka Dharma and enter the ultimate truth." The ultimate truth is the middle way; hence we know that the middle way is non-dual, while those who enter rely upon different dharmas, which is precisely the proof. Eighth, having first explained the Great and next distinguished the Small, the confused would then give rise to the two views of Great and Small; therefore at the very end he abolishes both views, clarifying that the correct Path has never been Great or Small. Ninth, elucidating the Mahāyāna has two approaches: first, brief before and extensive after; second, extensive before and brief after. The first seven chapters briefly explain the Mahāyāna contemplation-practice, and from the "Agent Chapter" onward he extensively explains the Mahāyāna contemplation-practice; this is for the sake of understanding the meaning. Second, the twenty-five chapters extensively explain the Mahāyāna contemplation-practice, while the final single verse briefly explains the Mahāyāna contemplation-practice, for the sake of easy retention. Tenth, the twenty-seven chapters both refute the two wrongs of Great and Small and elucidate the two rights; the confused would then give rise to the two notions of wrong and right, and therefore at the very end he abolishes both views: the gate of the Path has never been wrong or right. Thus the later prose commentary states: "Since there is neither person nor dharma, one should not generate wrong views or right views." The same is true of essence and function, expedient and real. First the Great, then the Small—this is giving rise to function from essence, giving rise to the expedient from the real; next, gathering function back to essence, absorbing the expedient into the real. Once entered into the real, there is no longer any expedient, nor has there ever been the real—such are the five clauses. Thus it is said: "The Buddha cannot walk it, cannot reach it; this dharma cannot be indicated, and the characteristics of verbal expression are tranquil and extinguished." One does not know what to call it; regarding this treatise, it is called the middle, while in the sūtras it is called the wonderful Dharma, the dharma-body, Buddha-nature, and prajñā. Question: In accordance with the sūtras, which explain that the Buddha first preached the śrāvaka Dharma and later preached the bodhisattva Dharma, the treatise author should have first elucidated the Hīnayāna teaching and later discussed the Mahāyāna; why does he place the Great first and the Small later? Answer: Although the sūtras indeed place the Small first and the Great later, this treatise primarily elucidates the Mahāyāna and collaterally elucidates the Hīnayāna teaching; therefore it first elucidates the Great and later elucidates the Small. Furthermore, although the Buddha preached the Small, his intention lay in the Great. Thus the Lotus Sūtra says: "The Buddhas, the Tathāgatas, only teach bodhisattvas." Now, wishing to elucidate the Buddha's original intention, he first explains the Great. Moreover, the Buddha's sūtras also first taught the Great and later explained the Small, as when he first taught the Avataṃsaka teaching at the foot of the Bodhi tree, and later proceeded to the Deer Park to turn the Hīnayāna wheel of the Dharma. Now he likewise relies on this intention of the Buddha; hence the Great comes first and the Small later. Concerning the twenty-five chapters, the ancients divided them into two: the first twenty-one chapters refute worldly persons and dharmas, explaining the Mahāyāna contemplation-practice; the latter four chapters refute world-transcending persons and dharmas, explaining the Mahāyāna contemplation-practice.

The reason both the mundane and the supramundane are refuted is that followers who receive the teaching consider the mundane and supramundane to be two, and thus form dualistic views. Therefore the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says, 'For all those who hold to duality, there is neither path nor fruit.' The Nirvāṇa-sūtra says, 'Regarding vidyā (clarity) and avidyā (ignorance), the foolish consider them to be two.' The Avataṃsaka-sūtra says, 'Deluded regarding the path of the worthy and the noble, they consider saṃsāra and nirvāṇa to be two.' The Lotus Sūtra says, 'The Tathāgata truly sees and knows the characteristics of the triple world,' which Vasubandhu explains: 'The realm of sentient beings is not separate from the realm of nirvāṇa, because sentient beings possess the tathāgatagarbha.' The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says, 'Because one awakens to non-duality, one attains the anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti.' Now, wishing to refute such dualistic views and elucidate the non-dual path, [the śāstra] first refutes the mundane and afterward refutes the supramundane. Now it clarifies that when one seeks the mundane and the supramundane, they are ultimately unfindable; that is, being neither mundane nor supramundane is what is called the middle way. The reason for first refuting the mundane and afterward refuting the supramundane is simply following the sequence from easy to difficult. With regard to the twenty-one chapters, they are again divided into three: First, from the beginning up to the 'Examination of Karma', there are seventeen chapters that refute the perverse delusions of those who receive the teaching and reveal the true mark of the middle way. Second, the single chapter 'Examination of Dharmas' next clarifies the attainment of benefit. Third, the three chapters 'Time', 'Causes and Effects', and 'Arising and Passing Away' re-refute perverse delusions and re-clarify the true mark of the middle way. As for why these three are established: according to the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa's commentary on the 'Chapter on Practicing in Accordance', it first directly explains the bodhisattva's practicing in accordance with prajñā; second, it clarifies the attainment of benefit, namely the eradication of grave sins and protection by all the devas; third, it re-clarifies practicing in accordance. Since the sūtras preached by all Buddhas have these three, the principle of the treatises composed by bodhisattvas is also like this. Because false teachings obscure the correct sūtras, their meaning is not clearly illuminated; hence, one refutes bias and perversity to reveal the true mark of the middle way. Once the true mark of the middle way is revealed, the worthy and noble ones of the three vehicles are realized through it; hence, [the treatise] next clarifies the attainment of benefit. Master Sengrui's preface says: 'When its reality has been proclaimed and its words have been clarified, one is brightly and completely enlightened regarding the practice of the bodhisattva and the illumination of the bodhimaṇḍa.' However, because a brief exposition was not exhaustive, and moreover dull-rooted individuals find it difficult to awaken, [the treatise] re-refutes perverse delusions and re-states the true mark. Regarding the first seventeen chapters, they are again divided into two: First, there are seven chapters that briefly refute persons and dharmas and clarify the contemplative practice of the Mahāyāna; next, there are ten chapters that broadly refute persons and dharmas and analyze the contemplative practice of the Mahāyāna. First brief and afterward broad is for the sake of understanding the meaning. Furthermore, sharp-rooted individuals awaken easily and understand through a brief explanation; dull-rooted individuals understand with difficulty and awaken only when it is broadly unfolded. As for the seven chapters, they constitute seven sections. Within the 'Examination of Causes and Conditions', it naturally divides into two: first, citing the eight negations to state the intention for composing the treatise; second, re-citing the eight negations and explaining them. With regard to the first, there are again two parts: first, citing the eight negations; second, introducing the intention for composing the treatise. With regard to citing the eight negations, it is divided into three distinct parts: first, directly citing the eight negations to clarify the essence of the teaching that is elucidated; second, half a verse praising the function of the eight negations; third, half a verse revering the person and praising the Dharma. The first clarifies the essence of the teaching, which is the two truths; next, it clarifies the function of the teaching, which is the two knowledges. As for why it first clarifies the two truths and next clarifies the two knowledges: truth and knowledge have never been one or two; they are two without being two; therefore, truth and knowledge are expediently distinguished according to conditions. Without truth, there is no way to awaken knowledge; without knowledge, there is no way to illuminate truth. As the Tathāgata's inner knowledge is completely clear and outwardly illuminates capacities and conditions, he preaches the verbal teachings of the two truths. Inwardly having the two knowledges and outwardly preaching them is called truth; that is, knowledge is the agent and truth is the object. Truth does not preach truth; truth also preaches knowledge; that is, truth is the agent and knowledge is the object. Wishing to clarify the causes and conditions of the practice and preaching of truth and knowledge, now directly addressing conditions to preach the teaching, [the treatise] first clarifies truth and next analyzes knowledge. Furthermore, the reason for first clarifying the two truths and afterward clarifying the two knowledges is that the former directly clarifies the preaching of the teaching, and the latter clarifies the intent of the teaching. The reason for preaching the two truths of the eight negations is to cause sentient beings to generate the two knowledges. Looking from the Buddha, it is from the root to the branch; looking from conditions, it is generating knowledge by means of the teaching. Furthermore, this treatise directly elucidates the two truths and secondarily clarifies the meaning of the two knowledges; hence it first preaches truth and afterward knowledge. The Śata-śāstra directly clarifies the two knowledges and secondarily clarifies the two truths; hence it first presents knowledge and afterward truth. Question: Why are the eight negations set forth at the beginning of the treatise? Answer: Ten meanings are briefly clarified. First, to distinguish the principle of the sūtras supporting and being elucidated by the treatise. The eight negations are the essential Vaipulya sūtras of all the Buddhas of the three periods. The author of the treatise received the sūtras and generated the two knowledges, and afterward composed the treatise for sentient beings; this is the sūtras supporting the treatise. Afterward, explaining the eight negations refutes the errors and delusions of the non-Buddhists; this is the treatise elucidating the sūtras. As for why it is necessary to cite the sūtras: fearing that followers of the Hīnayāna would not produce faith and acceptance, [the author] set forth the eight negations of the sūtra right at the beginning, which clarifies the intent of encouraging faith. Second, the title announces the 'Madhyamaka-śāstra', which is now explained: setting forth the eight negations at the beginning is the middle way, and afterward explaining the eight negations is clarifying the treatise; therefore, the title refers to the 'Madhyamaka-śāstra'. Third, introducing sentient beings' loss of the root, the eight negations are therefore cited at the beginning of the treatise. Question: How many kinds of people are there who lose the eight negations? Answer: Briefly, there are four kinds of people: First, those who are deluded about and lose the eight negations, and thus undergo the chaotic turmoil of the six destinies. As the Nirvāṇa-sūtra says, 'It is a medicine of a single flavor; following the places it flows, it has six flavors.' This is losing the Buddha-nature of the middle way to become the flavors of the six destinies. The eight negations are precisely the Buddha-nature of the middle way. Second, the various non-Buddhists and others seek this single path and are unable to attain it, and thus become ninety-six kinds [of heterodox views]. As the Nirvāṇa-sūtra says, 'Although ordinary persons exert painstaking effort, they do not obtain this medicine.' Third, people of the two vehicles adhere strictly to the view that all dharmas definitely arise; hearing of non-arising, their minds do not believe or accept it. As the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says, 'After the Buddha's passing, there were five hundred sects who, hearing of ultimate emptiness, felt as if their hearts were wounded by a knife.' Fourth, people who study the Mahāyāna hear of ultimate emptiness and thereupon form views of annihilation, abandoning transgression and merit, and denying the two truths. These four kinds of people all lose the eight negations. Now, wishing to state their loss of the root in order to clearly manifest and instruct them so that they realize what has been lost, [the eight negations] are placed at the beginning of the treatise. Fourth, to show that the assembly of noble ones has attained the source, they are set forth at the beginning of the treatise. Those who attain these eight negations are also four kinds of people. As the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra] says, 'Those who contemplate the middle way are of four kinds: through contemplating with inferior knowledge, one attains the bodhi of a śrāvaka; through contemplating with intermediate knowledge, one attains the bodhi of a pratyekabuddha; through contemplating with superior knowledge, one attains the bodhi of a bodhisattva; through contemplating with supreme knowledge, one attains the bodhi of all Buddhas.' Wishing to clarify that the assembly of noble ones has attained the root, it is placed at the head [of the treatise]. Fifth, this treatise takes the two truths as its primary tenet, and the eight negations directly clarify the two truths; hence they are set forth at the beginning. Sixth, it is to demonstrate what is signified to those who study the teaching.

When the Tathāgata spoke of phenomena such as saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, cause, and effect, it was to manifest the right path of neither saṃsāra nor nirvāṇa, and neither cause nor effect. Seventh, to show that the words of the eight negations are concise yet their meaning is comprehensive, completely encompassing all the teachings, they are set forth at the outset. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: 'The four siddhāntas encompass the twelve divisions of scriptures and the eighty thousand treasuries of the Dharma. Three of the siddhāntas can be refuted, but the siddhānta of the highest truth cannot be refuted. Although three siddhāntas are taught, it is to manifest the siddhānta of the highest truth.' The siddhānta of the highest truth is the eight negations; wishing now to show that the eight negations encompass the four siddhāntas as well as the twelve divisions of scriptures and the eighty thousand treasuries of the Dharma, they are therefore set forth at the outset. Question: How is it known that the eight negations are precisely the siddhānta of the highest truth? Answer: The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa cites the eight negations of the Madhyamaka-śāstra to explain the siddhānta of the highest truth; hence it is known that the eight negations are the siddhānta of the highest truth. Eighth, to show that this treatise is an exposition of impartial judgment, lacking an introductory section before and omitting remaining elaborations behind, it directly sets forth the middle way at the very outset. Ninth, setting forth the title 'Treatise on the Middle Contemplation' at the beginning is presenting the topic, and subsequently titling it 'Chapter on Contemplating Causes and Conditions' is explaining the topic; explaining the eight negations is explaining causes and conditions. Therefore the verse says: 'He who can teach these causes and conditions, skillfully extinguishes all prapañca.' Question: The eight negations are precisely causes and conditions; if the treatise refutes causes and conditions, it should refute the eight negations. Answer: If one understands that causes and conditions are precisely the eight negations, then they are elucidated and not refuted; if one is deluded about causes and conditions so that they are not the eight [negations], then they are refuted and not elucidated. Therefore, setting forth the causes and conditions of the eight negations extinguishes the prapañca of what is not the eight. This explains the purpose of the 'Chapter on Causes and Conditions' being at the beginning of the treatise. The eight negations are precisely causes and conditions; since the eight negations are at the beginning of the treatise, 'Causes and Conditions' therefore stands at the head of all the chapters. Tenth, wishing to distinguish the difference between the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna treatises, the eight negations are set forth at the outset. A Hīnayāna treatise is a treatise on arising and cessation, and therefore possesses a contemplation of arising and cessation; a Mahāyāna treatise is a treatise on non-arising and non-cessation, and therefore initially explains the contemplation of non-arising and non-cessation. Question: How is this known to be so? Answer: The Lotus Sūtra says: 'Formerly in Vārāṇasī, I turned the wheel of the Dharma of the four truths, discriminatively explaining the arising and cessation of phenomena and the five aggregates.' The Hīnayāna four truths and twelvefold dependent origination are all arising and cessation: suffering and origination are mutual arising, and are therefore termed 'arising'; cessation and the path are meant to clarify returning cessation, and are therefore the meaning of 'cessation'. The three truths are all conditioned, and thus upon entering [the nirvāṇa] without remainder they are entirely abandoned, which is therefore annihilation; the truth of cessation is unconditioned, and is called permanence. The three truths have distinctions, which is termed difference; the truth of cessation has no distinction, and is therefore termed identity. Suffering and origination are phenomena of saṃsāra, and are therefore termed coming; cessation and the path seek to return to the source, and are termed going forth; hence the truth of cessation is called cessation, pacification, excellence, and departure. The four truths being so, the twelvefold dependent origination is also like this: the mutual arising of the twelve is arising; the returning cessation of the twelve is cessation; terminating the twelve is annihilation; attaining the unconditioned is called permanence. The cause and effect across the three times of the twelve are not identical, which is termed difference; terminating the twelve leaves no cause and effect across the three times, which is termed identity; the seven effects coming from the five causes is designated as coming; terminating the twelve goes forth from saṃsāra, and is therefore termed going forth. Thus we know that for the two vehicles it explains the phenomena of arising and cessation, and is therefore a contemplation of arising and cessation. Although the Tattvasiddhi explains doctrines through the five aggregates, the four truths are its main theme; the Abhidharma lineage is likewise so. Now, wishing to distinguish it from the Hīnayāna treatise on arising and cessation and to explain the Mahāyāna treatise on non-arising and non-cessation: all phenomena are fundamentally unarisen, and therefore are neither suffering nor origination; now they are also without cessation, and therefore are not the path. Fundamentally lacking arising, how could there be suffering and origination to be severed? Now also lacking cessation, how could there be the permanence of the unconditioned? The rest can be understood by analogy. Question: How is it known that non-arising and non-cessation clarify the absence of the four truths? Answer: Below, in the 'Chapter on the Four Truths', the opponent challenges the treatise master: 'If all phenomena are empty, lacking arising and also lacking cessation, then there would be no phenomena of the four noble truths.' This is clear proof. Question: Since the treatise on arising and cessation is called the four truths, what truth is the treatise on non-arising and non-cessation? Answer: It is precisely the one real truth. As the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra explains that the one real truth is the nature of ultimate perfection, this manifests that this treatise is a fully complete treatise of the ultimate and perfect word. This, then, is one correct meaning explaining the eight negations. Question: The 'Chapter on Faith and Understanding' of the Lotus Sūtra says: 'The four great śrāvakas said that all phenomena are without arising and without cessation, without greatness and without smallness.' Hīnayāna also has the eight negations; how does it differ from Mahāyāna? Answer: They differ in five meanings. First, persons of the Hīnayāna only attain the emptiness of sentient beings, and thus attain the non-arising and non-cessation of sentient beings, but have not yet attained the emptiness of phenomena, nor have they attained the non-arising and non-cessation of phenomena; the Mahāyāna, on the other hand, holds that both persons and phenomena are without arising and cessation. Second, even if, as in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra and the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, it is explained that persons of the Hīnayāna fully attain both emptinesses and are without arising and cessation in both, this is merely analyzing phenomena to explain non-arising, without having attained the non-arising of intrinsic nature; Mahāyāna, on the other hand, explains the non-arising of intrinsic nature. Third, persons of the Hīnayāna attain non-arising and non-cessation only by ceasing arising and cessation, which is still arising and cessation: having arising and cessation, it is arising; ceasing arising and cessation, it is cessation; thus the Hīnayāna non-arising and non-cessation is still arising and cessation. Therefore the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Persons of the two vehicles are termed those with grasping.' Fourth, persons of the Hīnayāna only attain the non-arising of persons and phenomena within the three realms, whereas persons of the Mahāyāna fully attain the non-arising of all internal and external phenomena. Fifth, persons of the Hīnayāna only perceive the non-arising of the delusive, without perceiving the non-arising of the Buddha-nature of the middle way; hence they only perceive emptiness and do not perceive non-emptiness, nor do they practice the middle way. Mahāyāna is different: it perceives the non-arising of the delusive, and also perceives the non-arising of the Buddha-nature of the middle way. However, the text of the eight negations is concise while its meaning is rich; its intent is deep and its principle profound. Ever since [Falang of] Sheling and Xinghuang Temple explained these eight negations in accordance with the sūtras and alongside the treatises to refute errors and manifest the path, the variations in phrasing and regional idioms have been numerous. Now, briefly organizing the beginning and end, they are explained in two points: first, by taking up the eight negations initially to explain them concisely; and second, by taking up the eight negations again to examine and differentiate them extensively. Regarding initially taking up the eight negations, we recount the master's three types of expressions. The first states: The reason the eight negations are taken up at the beginning is to cleanse all minds of grasping. Why so? Because among followers of grasping, there is nothing in their practice and study that does not fall into these eight fabrications. For instance, persons of the Hīnayāna claim that there is understanding to be arisen, delusion to be ceased, that the impermanence of saṃsāra is annihilation, that the Buddha-fruit in its unmoving stillness is permanent, that the ultimate truth is identical because it has no distinction, that the conventional truth is different because it possesses distinctions and divergence, that sentient beings come because they wander from the stage of ignorance, and that they go forth because they return back to the source. Now, the twenty-seven chapters horizontally refute the eight delusions and vertically exhaust the five propositions, seeking that arising and cessation of theirs and finding them impossible to obtain; hence it says 'neither arising nor ceasing'.

Once arising and ceasing are eliminated, the five propositions—neither arising nor ceasing, both arising-and-ceasing and neither arising nor ceasing, and non-arising-and-ceasing nor non-non-arising-and-ceasing—collapse of their own accord. For this reason, the verse at the end of the treatise states: 'Because all dharmas are empty, regarding views such as eternity in the world: where, at what time, and by whom could such views arise?' The subsequent verse attributes the achievement to the Buddha, saying: 'Gautama, the great holy lord, who out of compassion proclaimed this Dharma to completely sever all views: I now bow down my head in reverence to you.' Thus, this entire treatise horizontally refutes the eight deluded views and vertically exhausts the five propositions, washing away the affliction of inversion so that ultimately nothing remains; this is the middle and real, which is why it speaks of neither arising nor ceasing, up to neither permanent nor annihilated. However, non-arising and non-non-arising being the middle way, and arising yet not arising being the provisional designation, this provisional arising and provisional non-arising constitute the two truths; therefore, regarding non-arising-and-ceasing as arising-and-ceasing constitutes conventional truth, while regarding arising-and-ceasing as non-arising-and-ceasing constitutes ultimate truth. Yet provisional arising cannot be said to be arising, nor can it be said to be non-arising; this is the middle way of conventional truth. Provisional non-arising cannot be said to be non-arising, nor can it be said to be non-non-arising; this is called the middle way of ultimate truth. This is the discussion of the middle way separately for each of the two truths. Furthermore, conventional arising and ceasing is non-arising-and-ceasing arising-and-ceasing; ultimate non-arising-and-ceasing is arising-and-ceasing non-arising-and-ceasing. But how could non-arising-and-ceasing arising-and-ceasing be arising and ceasing? How could arising-and-ceasing non-arising-and-ceasing be non-arising and ceasing? Hence, neither arising and ceasing nor non-arising and ceasing is called the middle way that unifies both truths. The Master also gave an oral teaching at one time, stating: The reason three kinds of middle way are explained in terms of the eight negations comprises three points: First, to demonstrate that from the night of achieving the Way until the night of nirvāṇa, the Tathāgata constantly proclaimed the middle way; although the middle way is boundless, briefly explaining the three kinds encompasses everything, and thus identifying the three middles with this verse comprehensively elucidates all the Buddha's teachings. Second, since this treatise is entitled the Madhyamaka-śāstra, it explains the middle way with respect to the eight negations; though the middle way has many aspects, they do not exceed these three kinds, so the three middles are distinguished with respect to this verse. Third, because practitioners who study the Buddha's teachings fail to establish the three middles and thereby fall into one-sided afflictions, in response to their failure to establish the meaning of the middle, and wishing to establish the meaning of the middle, three kinds of middle are distinguished. Question: How is it that those who study the Buddha's teachings fail to establish the three middles? Answer: Others say that because real dharmas cease there is no permanence, and because provisional designations continue in series there is no annihilation; non-permanence and non-annihilation are called the middle way of conventional truth. We now say: non-permanence is still annihilation, and non-annihilation is still permanence; seeing only annihilation and permanence, what middle could there be? Furthermore, they say: because the effect-entity does not yet exist in the cause, it is called non-existence; because there is the principle of obtaining the effect, it is called non-nonexistence; neither existence nor non-existence is the middle way of conventional truth. Examining it carefully, non-existence is still non-existence, and non-nonexistence is still existence; there is no middle here either. Moreover, they say: ultimate truth transcending the four extremes is called the middle. Now I ask them: does this principle of transcending the four extremes exist, or does this principle not exist? If the principle of transcending the four extremes exists, then it is called existence and cannot be called the middle; if the principle of transcending the four extremes does not exist, then there is no ultimate truth, which is also not the middle. Furthermore, if ultimate truth is definitively transcendent and cannot not be transcendent, this is biased; how could it be called the middle way? Again, the middle is unimpeded, yet ultimate truth being definitively transcendent turns out to be unavoidably transcendent; since it possesses obstruction, how can it be called the middle? Furthermore, if ultimate truth transcending the four extremes eliminates the four propositions, it is the non-existence of the four propositions, and hence is called annihilation; having this principle of transcending the four extremes is called existence, and hence is the view of permanence. Therefore, the 'Examination of Becoming and Decay' says: 'If there is any dharma that is apprehended, one falls into annihilation or permanence; you should know that any dharma apprehended is either permanent or impermanent.' As for their middle way that unifies both truths, they claim that neither ultimate nor conventional is called the middle way. This too is incorrect. Non-ultimate is still conventional, and non-conventional is still ultimate; it remains the two truths, without any separate middle. Deducing from this, their three middles fail to be established. To respond to this failure to establish the three kinds of middle, we now elucidate the three kinds of middle way. Question: How are the three kinds of middle distinguished? Answer: Others hold that where there is an existent that can exist, there is an arising that can arise; and where there is an arising that can arise, there is a ceasing that can cease. If there is an arising that can arise, arising does not depend on ceasing; if there is a ceasing that can cease, ceasing does not depend on arising. If arising does not depend on ceasing, arising is not arising from ceasing; if ceasing does not depend on arising, ceasing is not ceasing from arising. Arising not being arising from ceasing, arising is self-arising; ceasing not being ceasing from arising, ceasing is self-ceasing. Self-arising is real arising, and self-ceasing is real ceasing; real arising and real ceasing are the two extremes, and therefore not the middle way. We now explain that there is no existent that can exist; because of emptiness there is existence, so there is no arising that can arise, nor is there ceasing that can cease. There being no arising that can arise, arising depends on ceasing; there being no ceasing that can cease, ceasing depends on arising. Depending on ceasing for arising, arising is arising from ceasing; depending on arising for ceasing, ceasing is ceasing from arising. Arising being arising from ceasing, arising does not arise of itself; ceasing being ceasing from arising, ceasing does not cease of itself. Arising not being self-arising, it is only for the sake of conventional truth that arising is provisionally spoken of; ceasing not being self-ceasing, it is only for the sake of conventional truth that ceasing is provisionally spoken of. Provisional arising does not arise, and provisional ceasing does not cease; neither arising nor ceasing is called the middle way of conventional truth. In contrast to conventional arising and ceasing, ultimate non-arising and ceasing is explained: regarding emptiness as existence constitutes conventional truth, where conventional truth provisionally arises and provisionally ceases; regarding existence as emptiness constitutes ultimate truth, where ultimate truth neither arises nor ceases. This neither arising nor ceasing does not autonomously neither arise nor cease: dependent on conventional provisional arising, ultimate provisional non-arising is explained; dependent on conventional provisional ceasing, ultimate provisional non-ceasing is explained; neither non-arising nor non-ceasing is the middle way of ultimate truth. As for the middle way that unifies both truths: non-arising-and-ceasing arising-and-ceasing is conventional truth, and arising-and-ceasing non-arising-and-ceasing is ultimate truth. How could non-arising-and-ceasing arising-and-ceasing be arising and ceasing? How could arising-and-ceasing non-arising-and-ceasing be non-arising and ceasing? Therefore, neither arising and ceasing nor non-arising and ceasing is called the middle way that unifies both truths. Question: How does this later explanation of the three middles differ from the earlier one? Answer: The earlier explanation of the middle way of the two truths was dependent-origination provisional designation, refuting intrinsic-nature two truths, and hence was called the middle. The third simultaneously eliminates both provisionalities, and is called the middle of the essence. Therefore, the earlier discourse had four successive stages: First, seeking intrinsic existence and non-existence they cannot be found, and therefore it says that neither existence nor non-existence is called the middle way. When outsiders hear 'neither existence nor non-existence', they immediately think that the two truths of ultimate and conventional no longer exist, and thus give rise to the view of annihilation. For this reason, it next speaks of both existing and non-existing as the two truths, in order to rescue their mind of annihilation. Next, wishing to reveal both existing and non-existing, it explains that these are the existence and non-existence of the middle way, different from the meaning of intrinsic existence and non-existence; hence it next explains the two truths, using the middle to refute both intrinsic natures at once. Next, wishing to transform the duality of provisional existence and non-existence to reveal the non-duality of the middle way, it explains the middle of the essence.