中觀論疏 1.26

1.26

「有如是等謬」下，第二總結過患。所以須總結者，凡有二義：一者略，上雖列八計，未辨邪正；今欲明此八計是邪非正，故須總結之。二者為欲攝法，上略明八計則是總攝眾邪，故須結也。有如是等謬者，有二：一不識實相無生而計有生，是故為謬。二者不識諸法從因緣而生，謂從八種而生，故名為謬。然有此身心已是顛倒，於中更復起邪，既是倒中之倒，所以秤謬。「墮於無因邪因」者，凡就此文有三義：一者若就正義，無如此因，故名無因；於彼邪心謂有，名為邪因。此迷悟合名也。二者即邪因之計，具邪因無因。萬物從自在天生，是邪因；而自在天不從他生，是無因義。三者前六後一名為邪因，自然一計謂無因也。問：何故八計之中不以邪因為一類、無因為一類，而前列六計邪因、次列第七無因、後列第八邪因也。答：示外道所計虛妄。初立有因，推因義不成；次執無因，推無因不成，還執有因。是故前後相間列也。「斷常」者，有因是有，故名為常；無因是無，故所以名斷。又從因生果，即是本無今有。必已有還無，故名為斷；無因有果，此則為常。初義就因明斷常，後義就果明斷常。三者邪因是常而果無常，故是斷常。無因是無故斷，有果是有故常，亦具斷常。「邪見」者，邪見有二種：一別邪見，謂撥無因果，非此中所明。二通邪見，以其所見不正，故名為邪，即今文是也。問：無因邪因，五見中何見所攝？答：身見者計有於我，邊見者執我斷常，見取是正諸見，戒取謂非道為道，邪見撥無因果。此無因邪因非四見所攝，四見所不攝者屬通邪見。又有數論師云：邪因屬戒取攝，即苦諦下戒取。然戒取雖明非道為道，但此是略舉其一。非因計因通屬戒取，無因是集諦下邪見所攝，以撥無集諦因故也。有人言：非因計因，如計微塵為因，此是執果為因，即是迷果。如計杌為人，正是迷杌，故屬苦諦下通邪見攝。實有集因而撥言無因，是集諦下別邪見所攝。「種種說我我所」者，外道有二迷：一者迷法無生、二者迷人無生。上來明不知諸法無生，橫計有生，故是迷法無生；今是迷人無生也。迷法無生，墮無因邪因；迷人無生，墮即陰離陰。又有外道，非但迷我無我，亦迷無我我，以迷二無我，謂迷第一義諦；迷於二我，謂迷世諦也。「不知正法」者，自上以來敘其能迷，此之一句明其所迷。所以計人及法者，以不知正法故也。

From 'there are such errors' downward is the second part, summarizing the faults and perils. The reason why a summary is necessary has two meanings: First, brevity: although the eight views were listed above, heterodoxy and orthodoxy were not yet distinguished; now, wanting to clarify that these eight views are heterodox and not orthodox, a summary must be made. Second, to subsume the teachings: the eight views briefly explained above encompass all heterodoxies, so they must be summarized. That there are 'such errors' has two aspects: First, not recognizing the unarisen real mark and positing that there is origination—therefore it is an error. Second, not recognizing that phenomena are born from causes and conditions, and asserting that they are born from the eight kinds—hence it is called an error. However, possessing this body and mind is already an inversion, and within it to further give rise to heterodoxy is an inversion within an inversion, which is why it is called an error. Regarding 'falling into causelessness and perverse causes', there are three meanings in this text: First, in terms of the correct doctrine, there is no such cause, so it is called causelessness; in their perverse minds they hold it to exist, so it is called a perverse cause. This is a combined name for delusion and awakening. Second, the very assertion of a perverse cause contains both perverse cause and causelessness: that all things are born from Īśvara is a perverse cause; and that Īśvara is not born from another is the meaning of causelessness. Third, the first six and the last one are called perverse causes, while the single view of spontaneity is called causelessness. Question: Why among the eight views are perverse causes not grouped into one class and causelessness into another class, instead of listing the first six views as perverse causes, next listing the seventh as causelessness, and lastly listing the eighth as a perverse cause? Answer: To show that what the non-Buddhists posit is false and vain. At first they posited having a cause, but when investigated the meaning of cause could not be established; next they clung to causelessness, but when investigated causelessness could not be established, so they returned to clinging to having a cause. Therefore, they are listed alternating between earlier and later. Regarding 'annihilation and permanence': having a cause is existence, hence it is called permanence; causelessness is non-existence, hence it is called annihilation. Furthermore, an effect being born from a cause is something originally non-existent now existing; since what has existed must return to non-existence, it is called annihilation; having an effect without a cause is permanence. The first meaning explains annihilation and permanence in terms of the cause; the second meaning explains annihilation and permanence in terms of the effect. Third, the perverse cause is permanent while the effect is impermanent, hence it is annihilation and permanence; causelessness is non-existent, hence annihilation, and having an effect is existent, hence permanence—this too contains both annihilation and permanence. Regarding 'perverse view' (mithyā-dṛṣṭi), there are two kinds of perverse views: First, specific perverse view, which refers to denying cause and effect; this is not what is explained here. Second, general perverse view: because their view is not correct, it is called perverse; this is precisely what is in the present text. Question: Into which of the five views are causelessness and perverse cause subsumed? Answer: View of personal identity (satkāya-dṛṣṭi) posits the existence of a self; extreme view (antagrāha-dṛṣṭi) clings to the self's annihilation or permanence; view-attachment (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa) takes various views as correct; attachment to rules and rituals (śīlavrataparāmarśa) holds what is not the path to be the path; perverse view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi) denies cause and effect. These [views of] causelessness and perverse cause are not subsumed under the [first] four views; that which is not subsumed under the four views belongs to general perverse view. Furthermore, a Sarvāstivāda master said: A perverse cause is subsumed under attachment to rules and rituals, namely attachment to rules and rituals under the truth of suffering. Although attachment to rules and rituals explains holding what is not the path to be the path, this is merely citing one aspect concisely. Clinging to what is not a cause as a cause generally belongs to attachment to rules and rituals; causelessness is subsumed under perverse view under the truth of origin, because it denies the causes of the truth of origin. Someone said: Clinging to what is not a cause as a cause—such as clinging to subtle atoms as the cause—is clinging to an effect as a cause, which is being deluded about the effect. Just as mistaking a stump for a person is precisely being deluded about the stump, it belongs to general perverse view under the truth of suffering. Denying that there is a cause when the cause of origin truly exists is subsumed under specific perverse view under the truth of origin. Regarding 'variously speaking of self and what belongs to self', the non-Buddhists have two delusions: First, delusion regarding the non-arising of phenomena; second, delusion regarding the non-arising of persons. Previously it was explained that not knowing the non-arising of all phenomena, they arbitrarily posited that there is origination; this was delusion regarding the non-arising of phenomena. Now it is delusion regarding the non-arising of persons. Delusion regarding the non-arising of phenomena falls into causelessness and perverse causes; delusion regarding the non-arising of persons falls into [the views of the self as] identical to the aggregates or distinct from the aggregates. Furthermore, non-Buddhists are not only deluded about self and non-self, but are also deluded about non-self and self: being deluded about the two non-selves refers to being deluded about the ultimate truth; being deluded about the two selves refers to being deluded about conventional truth. Regarding 'not knowing the true Dharma', everything above describes that which can delude; this single phrase explains that which is the object of delusion. The reason why they posit persons and phenomena is that they do not know the true Dharma.