中觀論疏 1.33

1.33

「深著諸法」下，第三正明迷教，即釋上鈍根義也。就文為二：初明迷小、次明迷大。佛在世時雙說大小，眾生根利，聞並得悟；佛滅度後，以根鈍故，雙迷大小。是故龍樹霍破二迷、俱申兩教。所言深著者，以其埋著諸見根深，故言深著也。「求五陰十二入十八界」者，問小乘有幾失耶？答：總判諸部，有三種失。一者同失，如同計有五陰謂決定有。佛說五陰意在破我，不在於法；而諸部不領無我而取著於法，與佛意乖也。二者異失，諸部執五陰不同，互相是非起於諍論，是故為失。或言色有十一、或言色有十四，或有無作色、或言無無作色，或言四心一時、或言四心前後，或言別有心數、或言無別心數，遂成諍論。以諍論故便是煩惱因緣，以煩惱因緣即便起業，以業因緣即有生死憂悲苦惱。三者佛教所無，穿鑿橫造，是故為失。若體佛意，我妄不存法，心無所依便得解脫。陰門既爾，界入亦然。「十二因緣」者，佛欲借妄止妄，故說十二因緣生。外道計無因邪因生，是妄中之妄；今借輕妄止其重妄，明諸法從十二因緣生，重妄既息輕妄亦去，意令悟諸法本自無生。而諸部不體斯意，謂決定言有十二緣生。又既決定謂有於中，更復種種推斥，如薩婆多之流執於因緣定是有為，毘婆闍婆提等定執無為，遂成諍論。《涅槃》云「以是諍論名為執著，如是執著名為能斷善根。」又破外道自性故，明諸法無有自性、假諸因緣。然性病若去，因緣亦捨。然性病雖去實無所去，雖捨因緣亦無所捨，心無依寄即便得道。而觀諸部有性之可捨、有因緣之可立，即是取捨成斷常見，不體佛意也。問：小乘人俱迷人法，何故但說執於法耶？答：今就此文始末大判三計階級不同：外道執我、小乘計法、大乘著空也。又就小乘中自有三執：一計人法俱有，即犢子是也。二迷法不計人，薩婆多等是也。三俱不執人法，即《成論》是也。但小乘中少計人、多執法，是故此中偏敘計法耳。如《智度論》云「佛滅度後五百歲，五百部皆執諸法有決定相，聞畢竟空如刀傷心。」以此推之，故知多執於法盛行天下，故偏敘之。問：小乘中三部，何者得失？答：望《文殊問經》，明十八部及本二皆從大乘出。及《大集經》云「雖有五部，不妨法界大般涅槃。」三部之言皆是如來方便，能開道利人無淺深也。若封執定相，俱是顛倒，不知佛意也。但今望大乘實相言亡慮絕，則計人法俱有為下品、無人有法為中品、人法俱空為上品。如《玄義》中敘之也。

From “Deeply attached to phenomena” downward is third, directly clarifying delusion regarding the teaching, which explains the meaning of “dull faculties” above. In the text there are two parts: first, clarifying delusion regarding the Hīnayāna; next, clarifying delusion regarding the Mahāyāna. When the Buddha was in the world, he taught both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna; because the faculties of sentient beings were sharp, hearing them they all attained awakening. After the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, because their faculties were dull, they were deluded regarding both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. Therefore Nāgārjuna swept away both delusions and elucidated both teachings. As for the words “deeply attached,” because their burying and attachment in views was deeply rooted, he says “deeply attached.” Regarding “seeking the five aggregates, twelve sense bases, and eighteen elements,” the question is asked: how many errors do the Hīnayāna have? Answer: broadly classifying the various schools, there are three kinds of errors. The first is common error, as in collectively positing the existence of the five aggregates and claiming they determinately exist. The Buddha's intent in speaking of the five aggregates lay in destroying the self, not in [affirming] phenomena; yet the various schools, failing to grasp selflessness, clung to phenomena, thus contradicting the Buddha's intent. The second is divergent errors: the various schools clung to the five aggregates differently, mutually disputing what was right and wrong and giving rise to polemics; this is therefore an error. Some said there are eleven forms of matter, some said fourteen; some affirmed unmanifest matter, some denied unmanifest matter; some said four moments of mind occur simultaneously, some said sequentially; some said there are separate mental factors, some said there are no separate mental factors—and so polemics developed. Due to polemics, there are conditions for defilements; due to conditions for defilements, karma is initiated; due to conditions of karma, there are birth-and-death, sorrow, grief, and suffering. The third is [fabricating] what is absent from the Buddha's teaching, distorting and arbitrarily contriving it; this is therefore an error. If one realizes the Buddha's intent, the delusion of self does not preserve phenomena, and the mind with nowhere to rely immediately attains liberation. As it is with the category of aggregates, so it is with elements and sense bases. Regarding the “twelve links of dependent origination”: wishing to borrow delusion to stop delusion, the Buddha taught origination through the twelve links of dependent origination. The non-Buddhists posited origination without cause or through wrong causes, which is delusion within delusion; now borrowing light delusion to stop their heavy delusion, he explained that phenomena arise from the twelve links of dependent origination, so that once heavy delusion ceases, light delusion also departs, his intent being to lead them to awaken to the fact that phenomena are originally unarisen. Yet the various schools did not realize this intent, asserting that the origination through the twelve links determinately exists. Moreover, having determinately claimed existence within them, they further pursued various inferences and refutations: those like the Sarvāstivādins clung to dependent origination as determinately conditioned, while the Vibhajyavādins and others determinately clung to it as unconditioned, thereby generating disputes. The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: “On account of these disputes, it is called clinging; such clinging is capable of severing the roots of good.” Furthermore, to refute the intrinsic nature posited by non-Buddhists, he clarified that phenomena lack intrinsic nature and are provisionally based on causes and conditions. But when the disease of intrinsic nature departs, causes and conditions are also discarded. Yet although the disease of intrinsic nature departs, in reality nothing departs; although causes and conditions are discarded, in reality nothing is discarded; when the mind has nowhere to rely, one directly attains the Path. But observing that the various schools hold that there is intrinsic nature to be discarded and causes and conditions to be established, this grasping and discarding constitutes views of annihilation and permanence, failing to comprehend the Buddha's intent. Question: Hīnayāna practitioners are deluded regarding both persons and phenomena; why does it speak only of clinging to phenomena? Answer: Taking the text as a whole, three grades of tenets are broadly distinguished: non-Buddhists cling to the self, Hīnayāna adherents posit phenomena, and Mahāyāna adherents cling to emptiness. Moreover, within Hīnayāna there are three clingings: first, positing that both person and phenomena exist, which is the Vātsīputrīya. Second, being deluded about phenomena without positing a person, which is the Sarvāstivādins and others. Third, clinging to neither person nor phenomena, which is the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra. But within Hīnayāna, few posit a person and many cling to phenomena; therefore here he predominantly relates the positing of phenomena. As the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: “Five hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, the five hundred schools all clung to phenomena as having determinate characteristics; hearing of ultimate emptiness, it was like a knife wounding their hearts.” Inferring from this, we know that clinging to phenomena was prevalent throughout the world, and thus he predominantly relates it. Question: Among the three Hīnayāna factions, which has gain and which has loss? Answer: In view of the Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā-sūtra, it explains that the eighteen schools and the original two all stem from the Mahāyāna. And the Mahāsaṃnipāta-sūtra says: “Though there are five schools, they do not hinder the great parinirvāṇa of the dharma-realm.” The words of the three schools are all skillful means of the Tathāgata, able to open the way and benefit people without [absolute distinction of] shallow or deep. If one is fixated on determinate characteristics, all are perversions, ignorant of the Buddha's intent. But now, in view of the true nature of Mahāyāna where words cease and thoughts are extinguished: positing that both person and phenomena exist is the lower grade; having no person but having phenomena is the middle grade; both person and phenomena being empty is the superior grade. As related in the Profound Meaning.