中觀論疏 10.12

10.12

長行云「汝上所說」下，此生第二段還有所得定性人過也。又開二別：第一牒外人義、第二推過還外人，即對前兩章也。「如是則無有」下，推過還外人。就文為二：第一對上還其無四諦三寶過、第二對上還無因果罪福過。然勿將此性有但安薩婆多上，今有所得大小乘人執有一豪人法體，則破世出世一切法也。初又二：第一對上還無四諦過、第二還無三寶過。就初又三：一總明無四諦、二別明無四諦、三總結無四諦也。以無生故則無苦集，以無滅故即無滅道，執自性有便無四諦。問：論主說空，空可無有生滅，故無四諦。外人執有有生滅，便有四諦，云何無生滅四諦？答：無所得無定性故，未生可得生、不滅可得滅；有所得既是定性，則未生定未生，不可令生，故無生也。既其不可令生，豈得有滅耶？譬如定無，無不可令有；既定有，亦不可令無，故無生滅也。「苦不從緣生」下，第二四偈，別明無四諦，則釋前章門。數人正以無常刀切有漏五陰，故是苦。無常刀亦切無漏五陰，但無漏被切順向涅槃，是故不苦。故能切則通漏無漏，所切則有苦不苦。今破云：有漏五陰既有定性，無常不能切之，是故不苦。成論師明三苦各有通別，覺惱為別苦苦，領緣不覺為通苦苦；樂受壞為別壞苦，無常遷滅為通壞苦；後心追患前心為別行苦，無常所役為通行苦。今以二義破之：一者作通別六苦義不成。如前〈苦品〉引《俱舍論》釋之，以苦受具二時苦，故名苦苦。樂受壞但一時苦，名為壞苦。捨受為無常所役，名為行苦。行苦則通、餘二則別，云何言三苦皆有通別？問：行苦若通，何故但約捨受？答：捨受無前二時苦，但有行苦，故就別說通耳。二者縱汝有通別六苦，無常是行壞二苦具，前有無常未有苦，無常何所役耶？若即無常是苦，云何復云無常是苦具耶？「苦若有定性」下，破無滅諦。成論師云：有餘滅二心，無餘滅空心，故滅三心名滅諦。問：為壞有得滅、為本有滅？若本有滅，則與數同；若壞有得滅，滅則始生。又問：滅既本有者，為有因、為無因？無因則自然同外道，有因則無常。問：毘曇滅是本有。苦集既有定性則不可滅，云何滅苦集得本有滅耶？「若無有苦諦」下，第三總結無四諦。觀此文是重破道諦。

From the prose statement, 'What you stated above,' onward, this initiates the second section: turning the errors back onto the person who clings to fixed nature with apprehension. This is further divided into two parts: first, restating the opponent's position; second, returning the errors to the opponent, which directly correspond to the two earlier sections. From 'If so, then there would be no...' onward, the errors are returned to the opponent. Within the text, there are two parts: first, corresponding to the above, returning to them the error of negating the Four Noble Truths and the Three Jewels; second, corresponding to the above, returning the error of negating causes and effects, bad karma and merit. However, one must not ascribe this intrinsic existence solely to the Sarvāstivādins; nowadays, any practitioner of the Great or Lesser Vehicles with apprehension who grasps at a single hair's-breadth of an entity of persons or phenomena thereby destroys all worldly and world-transcending phenomena. The first part also has two subdivisions: first, corresponding to the above, returning the error of negating the Four Truths; second, returning the error of negating the Three Jewels. Within the first, there are again three parts: 1. generally explaining the non-existence of the Four Truths; 2. specifically explaining the non-existence of the Four Truths; 3. concluding the non-existence of the Four Truths. Because there is no arising, there is no suffering or origin; because there is no cessation, there is no cessation or path. Clinging to intrinsic existence results in the absence of the Four Truths. Question: The Master of the Treatise expounds emptiness, and since emptiness admits of neither arising nor cessation, it is he who has no Four Truths. The opponent posits existence, which includes arising and cessation, and thus has the Four Truths; how could he lack arising, cessation, and the Four Truths? Answer: Because [our position of] non-apprehension lacks fixed nature, what has not yet arisen can arise, and what has not ceased can cease. Since [the opponent's position of] apprehension asserts a fixed nature, what has not arisen is definitively unarisen and cannot be brought to arise; hence there is no arising. Since it cannot be brought to arise, how could it undergo cessation? For instance, just as a fixed non-existence cannot be brought into existence, so too what is fixedly existent cannot be brought into non-existence; hence there is neither arising nor cessation. From 'Suffering does not arise from conditions' onward, the next four verses specifically explain the non-existence of the Four Truths, which explains the preceding headings. The Sarvāstivādins maintain that the knife of impermanence precisely cuts through the tainted five aggregates, and therefore it is suffering. The knife of impermanence also cuts through the untainted five aggregates, but because the untainted, when cut, accords with and inclines toward nirvāṇa, it is not suffering. Thus that which is capable of cutting applies equally to tainted and untainted, while that which is cut admits of being suffering and not being suffering. We now refute this by saying: since the tainted five aggregates possess a fixed nature, impermanence cannot cut them; therefore they are not suffering. The masters of the Tattvasiddhi explain that each of the three sufferings has both general and specific aspects: perception of distress is the specific suffering of suffering, while experiencing conditions without perceiving them is the general suffering of suffering; the destruction of pleasant feeling is the specific suffering of change, while the flux and extinction of impermanence is the general suffering of change; the subsequent thought regretting the preceding thought is the specific suffering of conditioning, while being driven by impermanence is the general suffering of conditioning. We now refute this on two grounds: First, the formulation of the six sufferings through general and specific aspects is untenable. As explained above in the 'Chapter on Suffering' by citing the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra: because painful feeling possesses suffering in two stages, it is named the suffering of suffering; because the destruction of pleasant feeling is suffering only at one stage, it is named the suffering of change; because neutral feeling is driven by impermanence, it is named the suffering of conditioning. The suffering of conditioning is general, whereas the other two are specific; how then can one say that all three sufferings possess both general and specific aspects? Question: If the suffering of conditioning is general, why is it restricted only to neutral feeling? Answer: Because neutral feeling lacks the suffering of the two preceding stages and possesses only the suffering of conditioning, it is explained as general with reference to the specific. Second, even granting you the six sufferings of general and specific aspects, impermanence is the instrument of both the suffering of conditioning and of change; if impermanence precedes suffering and suffering does not yet exist, what does impermanence drive? If impermanence itself were suffering, why say again that impermanence is the instrument of suffering? From 'If suffering had a fixed nature' onward, the text refutes [their claim] by showing the absence of the truth of cessation. The masters of the Tattvasiddhi state: the cessation with remainder extinguishes two minds, and the cessation without remainder extinguishes the mind of emptiness; hence the cessation of the three minds is called the truth of cessation. Question: Is cessation obtained by destroying existence, or is cessation originally existent? If it is originally existent, it agrees with the Sarvāstivādins; if cessation is obtained by destroying existence, then cessation begins to arise [anew]. Another question: If cessation is originally existent, does it have a cause or is it causeless? If it were causeless, it would be spontaneous, identical to the non-Buddhists; if it has a cause, it is impermanent. Question: In the Abhidharma, cessation is originally existent. Since suffering and origin possess a fixed nature, they cannot be extinguished; how could one extinguish suffering and origin to obtain an originally existent cessation? From 'If there were no truth of suffering' onward, the third part concludes the non-existence of the Four Truths. Examining this text, it is a further refutation of the truth of the path.