中觀論疏 10.33

10.33

論有二分：前二十五品破大乘人法，明大乘觀行；今第二兩品破小乘人法，明小乘觀行。佛在世時眾生根利，稟於兩教同悟一道；末世鈍根，聞於兩教並皆起迷。是以四依出世，雙破二迷、俱申兩教。佛則雙說，論主雙申，則知四依猶如佛也。問：他亦云大小乘觀行，與今何異？答：他道理實有大乘，但小是方便耳；今明正道未曾大小，為眾生故說於大小。一往大小相望，則小為方便、大是真實；若望道非大非小，則大小俱是方便。故與舊不同。問：一往開大小者，有異大之小、異小之大不？答：昔虛指大因以為小異，故名於一佛乘方便說三，實無異大之小。今還空點小果為大因，名會三歸一，亦無異小之大。前論於大、後論於小，具如初品所明。今略明一意，雖無道二徹，但悟各有由，故明兩教。而著相者未能要期會歸，遂取信所見聞，大乘法空不肯信受，故復就彼所見以明其空也。兩品即為二意：第一申正、第二破邪。申正則顯生死過患，破邪明斷惑入道，小乘之要唯此二門。問：何故大乘觀行二十五章，小乘但有二品？答：示大乘探奧，是以文多；小乘淺狹，唯有二品。又示正論大乘，故有多品；傍申小乘，故有兩章。三者上大乘中以破一切邪，以明一切觀；小乘之觀、小乘之邪廣在其中，今但略明則於義便足，是故唯有二品。四者佛說小乘，唯有二意：一示生死過患、二令斷惑得道，稟教之徒不尋其根，遂枝流蔓莚成五百部；今欲令捨末歸宗，故但明二品。所言觀十二因緣品者，問：諸小乘論已明十二因緣觀，論主何故復說？答：佛為破無因邪因，故說十二緣生，此是借妄止妄。當時即用此了悟，末世還又執著求其定相，非但用之通於小乘，亦用此解通方等教，是以論主須重論之。問：諸部云何執此十二？答毘婆闍婆提定執十二是無為法，餘部皆言是有為法。於有為內復有三部：一犢子部雖明十二因緣，而計有我法；二薩婆多雖知十二無我，而未知十二因緣亦空；三者《成實論》等明十二相生無我無法。此之三部是小乘中利鈍三品，初未得二空名為下品、次我空法有名為中根、次無我無法名為上根。問：論主今明小乘觀行，因何部？答：前之三部各執一邊，互興諍論。論主知佛方便適化不同，悉可隨時而用。如《大集》云「雖有五部，不妨法界。」《文殊問經》十八及本二皆從大乘出，《涅槃經》三十諍論，論主申佛方便並須用之，皆是執著應須破。但末世眾生多滯有病，今宜說空，故下〈破邪見品〉具破人法也。問：以何文證具明人法二空？答：《智度論》釋小乘生法二空，引《大因緣經》云「是中何等是老死？誰為老死？」誰為老死即生空，何等是老死謂法空也。問：論主為末世多執有故說二空，佛經說小乘云何？答：亦說二空。如《法華．信解品》「聲聞法空，無生無滅、無大無小。」《大品》云「須菩提不見檀、不見行檀者。」問：何故經論並明二空？答：一切凡夫無始來常執有故也。問：若具明人法二空，與大何異？答：小乘雖明二空，而多說生空，少識法空，不明諸法本性空寂。上已具論，是故為異。今重述之，大乘知無明本自不生，爾時見二種空，一者有所無空，謂無明不可得；二者即見佛性畢竟清淨無有煩惱，亦名為空。此亦即是見空不空二義，見二種空名見空，即見佛性妙有名見不空。小乘並不見此三事，但折無明有，是故言空耳。問：小乘云何不見無明空？答：斷四住中無明，未斷無明住地，故無明不空。問：智者見不空，與小乘何異？小乘亦見四住空，與大乘何異？答：如上釋，但折四住言空，智者知四住本空也。今正觀因緣入於二空，十二緣滅得於涅槃，故以目品。

The treatise consists of two parts: the preceding twenty-five chapters refute Mahāyāna persons and dharmas, explaining Mahāyāna contemplation and practice; now the following two chapters refute Hīnayāna persons and dharmas, explaining Hīnayāna contemplation and practice. When the Buddha was in the world, sentient beings had sharp faculties; receiving both teachings, they realized the one Path alike. In the latter age, those with dull faculties, hearing both teachings, all give rise to delusion. For this reason, when the four reliances appear in the world, they dual-refute both delusions and concurrently elucidate both teachings. Since the Buddha dual-expounded them and the treatise master concurrently elucidated them, one knows that the four reliances are just like the Buddha. Question: Others also speak of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna contemplation and practice; how does this differ from the present [view]? Answer: In their principle, Mahāyāna actually exists, while Hīnayāna is merely an expedient; now it is explained that the correct Path has never been great or small, but for the sake of sentient beings, great and small are spoken of. Looking at them from one standpoint relative to each other, Hīnayāna is the expedient and Mahāyāna is the real; yet looking at them from the Path, it is neither great nor small, so both great and small are expedients. Hence, it is not the same as the old [interpretation]. Question: When great and small are tentatively distinguished, is there a Hīnayāna distinct from Mahāyāna, or a Mahāyāna distinct from Hīnayāna? Answer: Formerly, the great cause was empty-handedly pointed to as a small difference; hence it was said that 'within the one Buddha vehicle, three are expounded as expedients'—there is in reality no Hīnayāna distinct from Mahāyāna. Now, the small fruit is again pointed out as empty, becoming the great cause; this is called 'converging the three and returning to the one'—nor is there any Mahāyāna distinct from Hīnayāna. The previous discussion concerned the Mahāyāna, while the subsequent discussion concerns the Hīnayāna, as fully explained in the first chapter. Now I shall briefly clarify one meaning: although the Path is undivided, since awakenings have their respective origins, the two teachings are therefore explained. Yet those who cling to marks are unable to resolve upon converging and returning; they subsequently seize upon and believe in what they have seen and heard, and being unwilling to believe in and accept the emptiness of dharmas of the Mahāyāna, [the treatise] again approaches what they see to clarify its emptiness. The two chapters thus have two intents: first, elucidating the correct; second, refuting the heterodox. Elucidating the correct reveals the faults and afflictions of saṃsāra; refuting the heterodox clarifies cutting off defilements and entering the Path. The essentials of the Hīnayāna consist solely of these two gateways. Question: Why are there twenty-five chapters for Mahāyāna contemplation and practice, but only two chapters for the Hīnayāna? Answer: To show the profundity of the Mahāyāna, its text is therefore extensive; the Hīnayāna is shallow and narrow, so there are only two chapters. Furthermore, to show that the main treatise concerns the Mahāyāna, there are many chapters; as the Hīnayāna is elucidated as an adjunct, there are two chapters. Third, in the preceding Mahāyāna section, all heterodoxies were already refuted and all contemplations were already clarified; the contemplations of the Hīnayāna and the heterodoxies of the Hīnayāna were already broadly included therein, so now a brief explanation suffices for the meaning; therefore there are only two chapters. Fourth, the Buddha expounded the Hīnayāna with only two intents: first, to show the faults and afflictions of saṃsāra; second, to cause [beings] to sever defilements and attain the Path. But the followers who received the teachings did not seek their root, spreading into branches and vines until five hundred sects were formed. Now, wishing to cause them to abandon the branches and return to the root, only two chapters are explained. Regarding the title 'Examination of the Twelve Links of Dependent Origination': Question: Various Hīnayāna treatises have already clarified the contemplation of the twelve links of dependent origination; why does the treatise master explain it again? Answer: Because the Buddha wished to refute the absence of causes and heterodox causes, he expounded the twelvefold dependent origination; this was using the false to stop the false. At that time, beings used this to attain awakening; in the latter age, they turned around and clung to it, seeking its fixed marks. Not only did they apply this understanding to traverse the Hīnayāna, they also used it to interpret the Vaipulya teachings; hence the treatise master needed to discuss it again. Question: How do the various schools cling to these twelve? Answer: The Vibhajyavādins fixatedly cling to the twelve as unconditioned dharmas, whereas the other schools all say they are conditioned dharmas. Within the conditioned, there are again three schools: first, the Vātsīputrīyas, though explaining the twelve links of dependent origination, posit the existence of a self and dharmas; second, the Sarvāstivādins, though knowing that the twelve are devoid of a self, do not yet know that the twelve links of dependent origination are also empty; third, the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* and others explain that the mutually arising twelve links are devoid of both self and dharmas. These three schools represent the three grades of sharp and dull faculties within the Hīnayāna: the first, not yet attaining either of the two emptinesses, is called the lower grade; the next, having the emptiness of self while dharmas exist, is of medium faculties; the next, having neither self nor dharmas, is of superior faculties. Question: Upon which school does the treatise master now rely in explaining Hīnayāna contemplation and practice? Answer: The preceding three schools each clung to one side, mutually giving rise to disputes. The treatise master knew that the Buddha's expedients adapt to beings differently and can all be applied according to circumstance. As the *Mahāsaṃnipāta* states: 'Although there are five sects, they do not obstruct the dharma realm.' In the *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā-sūtra*, the eighteen and the original two all emerge from the Mahāyāna; in the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*, there are thirty disputing schools. The treatise master elucidates the Buddha's expedients, which should all be used; yet all that is clung to must be refuted. However, sentient beings of the latter age mostly suffer from the sickness of being stuck in existence; now it is fitting to expound emptiness, so the following 'Chapter on the Refutation of Heterodox Views' fully refutes both persons and dharmas. Question: What textual passage proves the full explanation of the two emptinesses of persons and dharmas? Answer: When the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* explains the two emptinesses of beings and dharmas in the Hīnayāna, it cites the *Mahānidāna-sūtra*, which says: 'In this, what is aging and death? Who has aging and death?' 'Who has aging and death' refers to the emptiness of beings; 'what is aging and death' refers to the emptiness of dharmas. Question: The treatise master expounds the two emptinesses because the latter age mostly clings to existence; what does the Buddha's sūtra say about the Hīnayāna? Answer: It also expounds the two emptinesses. As the 'Faith and Understanding' chapter of the *Lotus Sūtra* says: 'The Śrāvaka dharmas are empty, without arising and without ceasing, neither great nor small.' The *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* states: 'Subhūti does not see dāna, nor does he see one who practices dāna.' Question: Why do both sūtras and treatises explain the two emptinesses? Answer: Because all ordinary beings have always clung to existence from beginningless time. Question: If it fully explains both the emptiness of persons and of dharmas, how does it differ from the Mahāyāna? Answer: Although the Hīnayāna explains the two emptinesses, it mostly speaks of the emptiness of beings and rarely understands the emptiness of dharmas, failing to explain that all dharmas are originally empty and quiescent in their nature. This was fully discussed above, and that is why it is different. Now to restate it: the Mahāyāna knows that fundamental ignorance is originally unarisen; at that time it sees two kinds of emptiness: first, the emptiness of the absence of what was possessed, meaning that fundamental ignorance cannot be apprehended; second, directly seeing that Buddha-nature is ultimately pure and devoid of defilements, which is also termed emptiness. This also means seeing the two senses of emptiness and non-emptiness: seeing the two kinds of emptiness is called 'seeing emptiness'; directly seeing the wondrous existence of Buddha-nature is called 'seeing non-emptiness.' The Hīnayāna does not see any of these three things; it merely breaks down the existence of fundamental ignorance, and therefore speaks of emptiness. Question: How does the Hīnayāna fail to see the emptiness of fundamental ignorance? Answer: It severs the fundamental ignorance among the four entrenchments, but has not severed the ground of fundamental ignorance; hence fundamental ignorance is not empty. Question: In the wise one's seeing non-emptiness, how does this differ from the Hīnayāna? The Hīnayāna also sees the emptiness of the four entrenchments; how does this differ from the Mahāyāna? Answer: As explained above, [the Hīnayāna] merely breaks down the four entrenchments to speak of emptiness, whereas the wise one knows that the four entrenchments are fundamentally empty. Now, directly contemplating dependent origination enters into the two emptinesses, and with the cessation of the twelve links, nirvāṇa is attained; hence the chapter is titled after this.