中觀論疏 10.56

10.56

「若天即是人」下，第二周指事破二世八見。即為二別：初破過去世四見。又開二周：第一就即事破於四見、第二就道理破除四見，事理一雙。又初周就末破四見、次破無始義就根本破四見，謂本末一雙。又初破外道四見、次破小乘迷教墮於四見，即內外一雙。又初就人破四見、次就法破四見，謂人法一雙。故知斷常等有二：一者人斷常、二者法斷常，即是小乘中生法二空也。初四偈破四見，即為四別：初偈上半牒。明墮常過者。上四偈言奪破，明過去我不作今。此偈縱開，若過去天作人，天則為常。下半出常過者，外人明過去天作人即是常義，不以常義為過，故下半顯常有過。明天既是常，常則遍於五道、通在三世，云何有過去之天生人中耶？第二偈上半牒，明有無常過者，明過去天與現在人異。過去天不作今人，若爾則墮無常。下半出無常過者，外人既執人天異體，即是立無常義，不以無常為咎，故下半傳顯無常之過。問：無常有幾過耶？答：有上破過去世四偈中過，復有無相續過，如此文說。則昔天自住於昔，不轉天為人；今人自生於今，非人續天，故無相續也。第三偈上半牒，明墮二邊。其人見上有過，故今明天人相異故不即，非餘眾生故不異，而不知因果相續不即不異，便謂天分猶在、人分更增。猶在故即是半天，故常；更增即是半人，故無常。天分由在，則此分為天；人分更增，則彼分是人。人天兩分合成一身，何得爾耶？故下半直非也。長行云「半天是常半人無常」者，此據天為言耳。若約人，返上可解。外人避上二過，欲令立義，明天雖有我，不妨作人。論主：若爾，天有我故是常，作人故無常，故半天半人則墮常無常二過也。數人及光宅義明補續義，天滅於前、後人補處，此同第二句義。開善明轉變續者，則有二力，前舉體滅不作人，此是無常；復有不滅轉變作後人義，此則是常，同第三句義。第四偈用前第三句破第四句，以外人見前第三句過，便欲會之為一，以更增故非常、猶在故非無常。是故今偈上半還牒前二句不成，下半明第四句亦不成也。「復次今生死無始」下，生第二周，就根本破於四見。佛為聲聞人令厭離生死，故說生死長遠無始。而稟教不了者，聞過去世無始，便謂是常。故今破之。光宅云：眾生無頭、般若無底，何處有始耶？開善云：始於無明初念，而言無始者，無復始於此者，名無始耳。《地論》云「生死無始，違真起妄。此妄與真同年，真既無始，妄亦復然。」今偈正破無始，就文為二：初破無始，辨無有常義；第二偈以無常故例破後之三句。初偈意云：求諸法往來義成，可有無始；既無往來則無無始。此文分明辨小乘教中有法空義，又是破執小乘教起迷也，又亦得破外道計無始者也。第二偈舉初句例破後三句。前偈明合三句無，故後句無也。既破無始墮於常見，亦破有始墮於斷見，如是亦始亦無始、非始無始墮後二見也。長行云「有邊無邊」下，生第二破未來世四見。前破過去世四見，始終合有三周：初十一偈一周就理，破過去世四見；次一周四偈就事，破過去世四見；後一周兩偈就無始，破過去世四見。所以三周破者，凡有三義：一者初十一偈名為廣破，次四偈明處中破，後兩偈是略破。破見之術不出此三，此三既無，眾見都滅。又初為上根，一聞則悟；次為中根，再聽方了；後為下根，三聞始達。又雖有三周，合之為二：前兩周破外見、後一周除內迷，此二既除則眾見並息。今九偈破未來世四見，亦開三門：初五偈破邊無邊二句、次三偈破亦邊亦無邊一句、後一偈破非邊非無邊。初是廣破，次處中破，後是略破。又廣略互顯也。又初二句為本中之本，故須廣破；次第三句為末中之本，故須處中破；後為末中之末，是故略破。問：前周明無未來，與今何異？答：上明世異，以見同故，以當類過，非是正破未來；今此一周是正破未來，故前破過去既有三周，今破未來四見亦作三周破也。問：破過去世四見，與破未來四見何異？答：前破過去四見束為三類，六偈廣破初句、次四偈處中破第二句、後一偈略破後二句。今則分句與上不同，如前釋也。復有異義，文自顯之。就初五偈為四：初標破邪見章門、第二標正見章門、次兩偈釋邪見章門、次一偈釋正見章門，此是攝山大師作分也。又一意為三：初偈標非邊無邊、次三偈釋非邊無邊、次引《四百觀論》證非邊無邊。於三偈為二：初偈標章門、二偈釋章門。初偈意明有邊無邊俱無後世，有邊則與陰同盡故無後世，無邊便即是此身故無復後世。今實有後世，故非邊無邊。第二偈明陰陰相因故非今非後。所以然者，陰陰相因是故不斷，所以非邊；念念滅故，非是無邊。即小乘正見也。次兩偈釋邪見章門又二：初偈明若前陰壞不更生後，可是有邊；前陰雖滅而生後陰，故非是有邊。次偈明前陰不滅，不因前陰而生後陰，此則為常，可名無邊；而實不爾，故非無邊。長行云「世間有二種」，今說眾生世間者，小乘雖具明二空而多說生空。又國土可三災洞盡，物多不計之為常。眾生轉如尋環，物多計之常，故偏破眾生。「復次如《四百觀論》中說」下，此生第四釋正見章門。《付法藏經》云「提婆菩薩造四百論」，今注人引之將來破二邊也。亦可是龍樹自引，例如龍樹《智度論》第十八卷歎般若偈，此是羅睺法師所作，但龍樹、羅睺、提婆既是同時人，所以《智度論》引羅睺所說。此處引提婆之言，亦可別有此論，今所未詳。偈意明得真法說者及以聽者，則生死便盡，故非定無邊；不得三事，則非定有邊。問：云何得耶：答：其說法者無說無示，其聽法者無聞無得，如此之悟則無邊邊，與此相違邊而無邊。長行云「今當更破」下，生第二破第三句。三偈為二：初偈牒而總非，即是章門；次兩偈正破，釋章門也。釋中為二：初偈就人破、次偈就法破。就人破者，明人不應一分破、一分不破，不破是常、破是無常，一人不得亦常無常。次偈就法，易知也。

From "If a god were the same as a human" onward is the second cycle, refuting the eight views regarding the two times by pointing to actual things. This has two parts: first, refuting the four views regarding the past. This also opens into two cycles: the first refutes the four views in terms of immediate phenomena, and the second eliminates the four views in terms of principle—phenomena and principle forming a pair. Furthermore, the first cycle refutes the four views in terms of the branch, while the subsequent refutation of the concept of beginninglessness refutes the four views in terms of the root—forming a root-and-branch pair. Again, the first refutes the four views of heterodox paths, while the next refutes the Hīnayāna falling into the four views due to delusion about the teaching—forming an internal-and-external pair. Also, the first refutes the four views in terms of persons, and the next refutes the four views in terms of dharmas—forming a person-and-dharma pair. Hence we know that annihilation and permanence have two [aspects]: first, annihilation and permanence regarding persons; second, annihilation and permanence regarding dharmas, which correspond to the two emptinesses of living beings and dharmas within Hīnayāna. The first four verses refute the four views, having four divisions: The first half of the first verse cites the premise, showing the fault of falling into permanence. The preceding four verses were an exclusive refutation, showing that the past self did not make the present one. This verse provisionally concedes it: if a past god became a human, the god would be permanent. The second half brings out the fault of permanence: the outsider explains that a past god becoming a human is precisely the meaning of permanence and does not consider permanence a fault; therefore, the second half reveals that permanence has faults. It shows that since a god is permanent, permanence would pervade the five destinies and span the three times—how then could a past god be born among humans? The first half of the second verse cites the premise, showing the fault of impermanence, showing that the past god is different from the present human. The past god does not make the present human; if so, one falls into impermanence. The second half brings out the fault of impermanence: since the outsider clings to god and human having different substances, this is to establish impermanence and does not take impermanence to be a fault; therefore, the second half progressively reveals the fault of impermanence. Question: How many faults does impermanence have? Answer: It has the faults mentioned above in the four verses refuting the past, and it also has the fault of having no continuity, as stated in this text: the past god abides by itself in the past without turning from a god into a human; the present human is born by itself in the present, not a human continuing from a god—hence there is no continuity. The first half of the third verse cites the premise, showing that it falls into the two extremes. That person, seeing the faults above, now explains that because god and human are distinct, they are not identical; and because [the human] is not another being, they are not different. Yet, not understanding that cause and effect are continuous, being neither identical nor different, he claims that the god-portion still remains while the human-portion is further added. Because it still remains, it is half-god and therefore permanent; because it is further added, it is half-human and therefore impermanent. Since the god-portion still remains, this portion is a god; since the human-portion is further added, that portion is a human. The two portions of human and god combine into a single body—how could that be? Therefore, the second half directly rejects it. When the prose states, "half-god is permanent, half-human is impermanent," it speaks with reference to the god. If taken with reference to the human, it can be understood inversely. The outsider, avoiding the two faults above, wishes to establish his thesis, explaining that although the god has a self, this does not prevent it from becoming a human. The author of the treatise [replies]: If so, because the god has a self it is permanent, and because it becomes a human it is impermanent; hence being half-god and half-human falls into both faults of permanence and impermanence. The Abhidharma masters and Guangzhai explain the meaning of substitution-continuity: the god ceases first, and the subsequent human substitutes for its place; this accords with the meaning of the second proposition. Kaishan explains transformation-continuity, saying there are two forces: first, the substance ceases completely and does not become a human—this is impermanence; second, there is the sense of transforming without ceasing into the subsequent human—this is permanence; this accords with the meaning of the third proposition. The fourth verse uses the previous third proposition to refute the fourth proposition: because the outsider sees the fault of the third proposition, he wishes to reconcile them into one, holding that because it is further added, it is not permanent, and because it still remains, it is not impermanent. Therefore, the first half of this verse again cites the failure of the preceding two propositions, and the second half shows that the fourth proposition also fails. From "Furthermore, birth-and-death is now without beginning" onward begins the second cycle, refuting the four views in terms of the root. The Buddha, wishing to lead śrāvakas to detest birth-and-death, taught that birth-and-death is long and without beginning. But those receiving the teaching without thorough comprehension, hearing that the past is without beginning, deem it to be permanent; thus it is now refuted. Guangzhai said: "Sentient beings have no head, and prajñā has no bottom—where could there be a beginning?" Kaishan said: "It begins from the initial thought-moment of ignorance; saying it is 'without beginning' simply means there is nothing prior to this that can be called a beginning." The *Daśabhūmika-śāstra* says: "Birth-and-death is without beginning; violating the true, the false arises. This false is of the same age as the true; since the true has no beginning, the false is likewise so." The present verse directly refutes beginninglessness, dividing the text into two: first, it refutes beginninglessness, showing there is no meaning of permanence; the second verse, by analogy with impermanence, refutes the subsequent three propositions. The intent of the first verse is: if the coming and going of all dharmas could be established, there could be beginninglessness; since there is no coming and going, there is no beginninglessness. This passage clearly explains that the Hīnayāna teaching contains the meaning of the emptiness of dharmas, and it also refutes delusion arising from clinging to the Hīnayāna teaching; it can also refute heterodox paths that posit beginninglessness. The second verse adduces the first proposition to refute the subsequent three propositions by analogy. The previous verse showed that all three propositions are absent, so the final proposition is also absent. Having refuted beginninglessness, which falls into the view of permanence, it also refutes having a beginning, which falls into the view of annihilation; likewise, having both a beginning and no beginning, or having neither a beginning nor no beginning, fall into the latter two views. The prose stating "finite and infinite" onward introduces the second part, refuting the four views regarding the future. The preceding refutation of the four views regarding the past had altogether three cycles from beginning to end: first, one cycle of eleven verses in terms of principle refuted the four views regarding the past; next, one cycle of four verses in terms of phenomena refuted the four views regarding the past; finally, one cycle of two verses in terms of beginninglessness refuted the four views regarding the past. The reason it was refuted in three cycles has three senses: first, the first eleven verses are called the extensive refutation; the next four verses present the middling refutation; the last two verses are the brief refutation. Methods of refuting views do not go beyond these three; once these three are eliminated, all views are extinguished. Second, the first is for those of sharp faculties, who awaken upon hearing it once; the second is for those of medium faculties, who understand only upon hearing it twice; the last is for those of low faculties, who penetrate it only upon hearing it thrice. Third, although there are three cycles, combined they are two: the first two cycles refute external views, and the last cycle removes internal delusions; once these two are removed, all views are pacified. Now, the nine verses refuting the four views regarding the future also open into three gates: the first five verses refute the two propositions of finite and infinite; the next three verses refute the one proposition of both finite and infinite; the last one verse refutes neither finite nor infinite. The first is the extensive refutation, the next is the middling refutation, and the last is the brief refutation; furthermore, the extensive and the brief elucidate each other. Moreover, the first two propositions are the root of roots, so they require an extensive refutation; the next, the third proposition, is the root of branches, so it requires a middling refutation; the last is the branch of branches, so it is refuted briefly. Question: How does the previous cycle explaining the absence of the future differ from the present one? Answer: Above, the times were distinguished, but because the views were identical, the future was analogized to the past and was not a direct refutation of the future; this present cycle is a direct refutation of the future. Therefore, just as the past was refuted in three cycles, the refutation of the four views regarding the future also proceeds in three cycles. Question: How does refuting the four views regarding the past differ from refuting the four views regarding the future? Answer: Previously, the refutation of the four views regarding the past was condensed into three categories: six verses extensively refuted the first proposition, the next four verses moderately refuted the second proposition, and the last one verse briefly refuted the latter two propositions. Now the division of propositions differs from the above, as explained before. There are other interpretations as well, which the text itself clarifies. The first five verses are divided into four: first, indicating the section-heading for refuting wrong views; second, indicating the section-heading for right views; the next two verses explain the section-heading for wrong views; the next one verse explains the section-heading for right views. This is the division made by the Great Master of Sheshan. Another interpretation makes it threefold: the first verse indicates the rejection of finite and infinite; the next three verses explain the rejection of finite and infinite; next, the *Catuḥśataka* is cited to verify the rejection of finite and infinite. Among the three verses, there are two parts: the first verse indicates the section-heading, and two verses explain the section-heading. The intent of the first verse shows that both finite and infinite entail having no future world: if finite, it perishes together with the aggregates, so there is no future world; if infinite, it is simply this present body, so again there is no future world. Since there is in reality a future world, it is neither finite nor infinite. The second verse shows that because aggregates depend on aggregates, it is neither present nor future. Why so? Because aggregates depend on aggregates, it is uninterrupted—hence it is not finite; and because they perish moment by moment, it is not infinite. This is the right view of the Hīnayāna. The next two verses explain the section-heading for wrong views, also in two parts: the first verse shows that if the preceding aggregates were destroyed and did not give rise to subsequent ones again, it could be finite; but although the preceding aggregates perish, they give rise to subsequent aggregates—hence it is not finite. The next verse shows that if the preceding aggregates did not perish, and subsequent aggregates arose without depending on the preceding aggregates, this would be permanence and could be called infinite; but in reality this is not so, hence it is not infinite. The prose states: "There are two kinds of world"; here, in speaking of the world of sentient beings, although the Hīnayāna fully explains both emptinesses, it mostly teaches the emptiness of living beings. Furthermore, while the receptacle world can be utterly destroyed by the three disasters and people mostly do not consider it permanent, sentient beings revolve like an endless ring and people mostly consider them permanent; hence it specifically refutes sentient beings. From "Furthermore, as stated in the *Catuḥśataka*" onward introduces the fourth part, explaining the section-heading for right view. The *Fu fazang jing* states: "Bodhisattva Deva composed the *Catuḥśataka*"; the commentator now cites it to refute the two extremes. It could also be Nāgārjuna citing it himself, just as in the eighteenth fascicle of Nāgārjuna's *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, the verse praising prajñā was composed by Master Rāhula; since Nāgārjuna, Rāhula, and Deva were contemporaries, the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* cites what Rāhula said. Here, citing Deva's words might also be from another treatise, which is not yet clear at present. The intent of the verse explains: if there is one who attains the true Dharma, one who teaches it, and one who hears it, birth-and-death is then exhausted, so it is not definitively infinite; if these three things are not attained, then it is not definitively finite. Question: How are they attained? Answer: The one who teaches the Dharma does so without teaching and without demonstrating; the one who hears the Dharma does so without hearing and without obtaining. With such awakening, the infinite becomes finite; contrary to this, the finite becomes infinite. The prose stating "We shall now further refute" onward introduces the second part, refuting the third proposition. The three verses have two parts: the first verse cites and generally rejects, serving as the section-heading; the next two verses directly refute, explaining the section-heading. Within the explanation are two parts: the first verse refutes in terms of the person; the next verse refutes in terms of dharmas. Refuting in terms of the person shows that one should not say one portion of a person is destroyed while another portion is not destroyed—the undestroyed being permanent and the destroyed being impermanent—for a single person cannot be both permanent and impermanent. The next verse in terms of dharmas is easy to understand.